

Reorienting the GWOT to Win the Moral Level of War

A Monograph
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Abstract

REORIENTING THE GWOT TO WIN THE MORAL LEVEL OF WAR by MAJ David M. Reardon, U.S. Army, 68 pages.

This paper seeks to examine the changing nature of war and the environment in which it is fought. The fact that America is not applauding its successes at the physical level of war in waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and does not perceive the threat to be significantly diminished implies that there are other factors that are keeping America from the victory it seeks. This paper will identify two of these factors as the mental and moral levels of war and show how the changing nature of war and the environment in which is fought has also changed the function of these levels when it comes to achieving victory. The decline of the role of the state and subsequent rise of non-state actors employing asymmetric tactics against states has made the moral level of war dominant over all others, and this paper will seek to propose one strategy for America to achieve dominance over its enemies at this level of war. The objective will be to expand the “box” in which military thinkers rely on for solutions based on their experience, knowledge, and study of environmental factors to better understand changes in the nature of war and the environment in which it is fought. In doing so, it is hoped that they will come to see that the GWOT lacks moral legitimacy and America is losing the GWOT at the moral level of war. The goal is to convince military leaders of the moral shortcoming of the current GWOT, convince them of the need to reorient their approach to this war, and provide them the tools to reorient to the constantly changing environment America faces in future conflict.

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INTRODUCTION

After the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, America embarked on its infamous Global War on Terror (GWOT). Experts frequently compared the subsequent invasions of first Afghanistan, and then Iraq to the “quagmire” of Vietnam, believing once again that America was seeking only military solutions towards an ambiguous objective. On a higher plane however, the comparison that few have made with the GWOT is with the seventy-year struggle known as the Cold War. Vietnam was only a small, yet significant, part of the Cold War, just as Afghanistan and Iraq are only a significant part of the GWOT. What is similar between the GWOT and the Cold War is that both sides have a unifying message (Islamic Fundamentalism versus Democracy); both sides divide the world into two halves (Believers and Non-Believers versus Democratic States and Tyranny); and both sides understand and utilize the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) approach to attack their enemy in the hope of either weakening him or collapsing him from within. Like the Cold War, ultimate victory for either side will be determined by the strength of their message and their ability to collapse their opponent from within. Most importantly, like the Cold War, the GWOT will not be won on the battlefield, but in the ability of one side to fragment and collapse the system of the other.

There have been significant changes in how war is waged in the last fifty years. Military thinking has transformed from counting missiles and bombers in hopes of deterring nuclear annihilation to state and non-state actors who have learned to defeat states by bypassing their military prowess. Although the traditional images of two armies facing each other on the field of battle are absent in the latter, this type of conflict is rarely “bloodless.” The terror and horrific suffering of these wars can often surpass that of what is considered to be conventional conflict. Today, non-state actors possess many of the same capabilities as states and they are using these capabilities to wage war on the legitimacy of the state. They have sophisticated intelligence capabilities relying primarily on human intelligence embedded in the societies of their enemies,

the internet, and commercially available assets. They have secure communication networks that leverage the existing infrastructure of the states they are attacking, and they have precision munitions in the form of car bombs and suicide bombers that rival the accuracy of the precision guided munitions of most states.¹

There have also been significant changes in the environment in which wars are fought. Globalization and the dawn of the Information Age have changed the ways wealth is moved and accumulated and rapidly increased the gap between rich and poor. They have brought societies closer together and enabled cultures to imbed themselves within other cultures. State boundaries have become transparent as trade unions and countries come together and information, goods and people pass freely between states. Most importantly, non-state actors have risen to fill the gap between what people and cultures need and what states are able to provide. As more and more of these non-state actors rise up to perform what has traditionally been functions of the state, rivalry has ensued and recently this rivalry has taken the form of war.

This paper seeks to address these issues and expand the “box” of the military reader by applying these observations to our current environment. To understand how this environment affects us today requires that we expand our traditional mental paradigm of the ends, ways, and means in war. In addition to thinking of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, we must understand that there also exists a physical, mental and moral level of war that can be equally important. This paper will explain why the moral level of war is paramount to winning the GWOT and suggest an approach America can take in winning the moral level of war.

One thing is common in the nature of conflict, regardless of how it is waged. Conflict and war are about problem solving. Throughout the ages men have sought solutions to the problems they have encountered in war and passed those solutions on to other generations. This paper will argue that warfare evolves, and today states are threatened by enemies who have the ability to

¹ Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), 201.

defeat or weaken states using tactics that can make the state's military irrelevant; if states hope to maintain the monopoly on war that they have held since the Peace of Westphalia, then they must "observe" and "orient" to this evolution in warfare. America has not oriented to this changed environment, and as a result the GWOT lacks the moral legitimacy needed to achieve victory. Because America has not "observed" the real threat it faces to its 200 year legacy of democracy, it has not "oriented" itself to this threat and its "decisions" and subsequent "actions" are not guiding it to victory.

James Webb, in "A New Doctrine for New Wars," draws an interesting parallel between the challenge facing America today and that which Britain faced in the decades leading up to World War I. With an army consisting of only six divisions, the British maintained an empire that spanned the globe. Webb tells us that they were able to do this because of their maritime superiority and their strategy of "cooperative forces." This strategy relied on the armies of allies and friends, trained and supported by the British, to maintain order throughout their empire. He then tells us how the Soviets employed a similar strategy in the Cold War, evidenced by the numerous "proxy" wars that never required the fielding of large Soviet conventional armies. He concludes by pointing out that the British Empire met its demise in the fields of Europe during World War I when the nation was "bled dry" by the loss of over a million men.² The Soviets suffered a similar fate following Afghanistan. The goal of this paper is to help America avoid a similar demise.

CHAPTER ONE: THE EVOLUTION OF WAR

The purpose of this chapter is to help us "orient" to the current operating environment. The importance of this orientation becomes clearer in Chapter Two of this paper. Specifically, I seek to address for the reader what the current operating environment is regarding war by or

² James Webb, "A New Doctrine for New Wars" (http://www.d-n-i.net/webb/doctrine_for_new_wars.htm, November 30, 2001), 2.

against the state and provide some insight as to how warfare has evolved to meet the challenges presented by opponents. Showing that war is evolutionary and that like humans, generations of warfare will often overlap, I then seek to find a common definition of the recent phenomenon of what is termed Fourth Generation Warfare. This chapter concludes by showing how the declining power of the state has created new vulnerabilities that are exploited by opponents using the tactics of Fourth Generation Warfare. The lens created by this chapter will be used to focus in on the problems America faces in its Global War on Terror in Chapter Two.

The Changing Face of Conflict, Evolution or Revolution?

In its simplest form, whether between people, cultures or states, conflict is about problem solving. When this conflict involves a state, then we define the conflict as war. Since the earliest days of war to today's current operating environment, states have been plagued by the question of how to emerge victorious in war. Concurrently, as states and man found newer and more innovative ways to overcome problems on the battlefield, the nature of war itself has changed. The question that we will seek to answer in this section is how does this change come about?

Some, like the Toffler's in their book *War and Anti-War*, argue that changes in society have been the catalyst of changes in war. Advances in agricultural production freed men to fight. The rise of civilization created a professional class of warriors and then the Industrial Age served to combine the increased wealth of nations with the ability to mass-produce the instruments of conflict. The result of these successive advances has been a vast increase in the size, depth and lethality of the modern battlefield compared with old.

Today, however, the predominant theory is that proposed by Knox and Murray in their book *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*. In their book, the authors argue that war has been transformed by a series of five successive military revolutions that have "recast society and the state as well as military organizations... (thus) they alter the capacity of states to create

and project military power.”³ These five revolutions in order are the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which gave the state a monopoly on war; the French Revolution with its levee en masse which served to nationalize the scale of war; the Industrial Revolution which made it possible to equip these larger armies; World War I which combined the previous two revolutions to define modern war; and finally, the development of nuclear weapons which greatly increased the costs of going to war and forced states to find alternative methods of achieving victory over their opponents. Occurring within each of these military revolutions are what the authors term Revolutions in Military Affairs, “a complex mix of tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare.”⁴ The centerpiece of these Revolutions in Military Affairs is technology, which serve as the focal point around which these changes develop.

For today’s military, the concept of Revolutions in Military Affairs fits in nicely with our Military Industrial Complex and platform centric nature that drives the funding of our services. As our Army transforms for the 21st Century, Colonel Thomas Hammes (USMC) points out that we have formalized these Revolutions in Military Affairs in *Joint Vision 2010*, *Joint Vision 2020*, the Department of Defense’s “Transformation Planning Guidance,” and “Network-Centric Warfare.” He states that our military continues to see technology as the “driver” of change in warfare, “(in) particular, these concepts see increased technical capabilities of command and control as the key factor shaping the future of war.”⁵ Colonel Hammes denies Knox and Murray’s argument that Revolutions in Military Affairs result in military revolutions that recast society, instead arguing the reverse: That change in society, politics and economics were the catalysts that ultimately resulted in changes in how we fight today versus how we fought yesterday.

³ Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 6.

Similar to the Tofflers, Colonel Hammes sees the nature of modern war in terms of generations. These generations are not independent of one another, but overlap because of overlapping external factors such as politics, economics, military, social, and the media. Because of this overlap, there does not exist a single moment, event, or technology that suddenly changes the nature of warfare, but rather it evolves as states overcome and solve problems to achieve their ends and ultimately victory over their opponents. While technology may help in improving the form of warfare, it does not radically alter the manner in we conduct it. As a case in point, while there are numerous reasons for the defeat of the French at the beginning of World War II, the development of the tank by the Germans was not one of them. At the beginning of World War II, the French had more and better tanks than the Germans. The foundation of strategy for employment of the tank had been set at the end of World War I and was widely known to both sides. However, the outcome for the French was far from what they expected because they did not correctly identify the nature of the problem that they faced. Thus, we see how maneuver warfare evolved from its underpinnings in World War I. All of the factors that were needed to form the concept of Blitzkrieg were present at the end of World War I, but by the time of World War II had evolved during the Interwar years. America's recent success in both Gulf Wars has only reinforced this notion of technology as the instrument of change. The question that proponents of technology cannot answer is how would the situation in Iraq be any different today if the Army had its Future Combat System, or if the Air Force had the FA-22 Fighter? The answer is that it would not be any different.

Of course warfare is not limited to problem solving between states, it also takes place with non-state actors against states. These types of conflict are not new, but as Chet Richards points out: "Beginning with Mao Tse-Tung, and continuing to the present day, guerilla warfare and other forms of non-state armed conflict have become more potent and much more dangerous

in at least two ways.”⁶ First, he draws attention to the evolution of organizations and technologies that enable non-state actors to conduct operations over a greater area, and second, to the improving finances of these non-state actors combined with proliferation of weapons, to include nuclear, chemical and biological, that dramatically increase their lethality in waging war.

Non-state actors, confined to a lesser degree than states by doctrine, politics, and budgetary rivalries are the “free-thinkers” on today’s battlefields. The solutions they seek to overcome problems in warfare are perhaps the most innovative and challenging states face. In classical insurgency, non-state actors seek to weaken the power of the state before mounting a conventional attack to overcome it. As Colonel Hammes points out, non-state actors are not awed by the military might of a state, but rather, seek what we term as unconventional solutions to the problem it presents. Of course not all of their answers are successful, but non-state actors have shown themselves throughout recent history to be able to quickly learn from their mistakes.

In warfare, no two problems are exactly the same. In the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky mobilized the proletariat against the bourgeoisie to overthrow Czar Nicholas II, but Mao Tse-Tung observed a slightly different problem and adapted the Russian model to better suit the peasant masses that dominated China. After a series of missteps, Mao retreated to Yen-an where he wrote his famous work *Yui Chi Chan* (Guerilla War). In this work, Mao evolved guerilla warfare “from a subordinate effort to support a conventional army to a war winning approach,” expounding on Clausewitz’s statement of war as a political undertaking by recognizing that for the problem he faced “political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war.”⁷ The problem facing Mao was how to defeat a large conventional army with only a poorly equipped and trained peasant army. Mao’s solution involved a three-phase process that sought to build political strength in its first phase, conduct an active insurgency to build bases of support in

⁶ Chet Richards, “Dear Mr. & Mrs. 1RP: Welcome to the 21st Century” (http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/conflict_years_ahead.htm, July 12, 2005), 6.

⁷ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 51

its second, and finally, in its third phase a conventional push in a final offensive against the state. To preserve his base of support while simultaneously avoiding direct confrontation in phases one and two, Mao's solution is found in the folk rhyme:

“(When the) enemy advances, we withdraw,
(When the) enemy rests, we harass,
(When the) enemy tires, we attack,
(When the) enemy withdraws, we pursue.”⁸

The next step in the evolution of guerilla warfare was conducted by Ho Chi Minh. Recognizing that the outside support of the United States was critical to the continuation of the South Vietnamese regime, Ho introduced international politics to the equation to set the conditions for Mao's phase three. As Colonel Hammes points out: “This is Ho's unique contribution to the evolution of war. He shifted the emphasis from the defeat of the enemy's military forces to the defeat of his political will.”⁹ Armed with this strategic focus, Ho then successfully conducted an operational campaign that achieved this political objective.

The Sandinista National Liberation Front applied the solutions presented by Mao and Ho to their own struggle against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, once again adapting them to their specific problem. However, lacking the broad based support and conventional ability of their predecessors, they evolved the nature of warfare further by doing away with Mao's phase three and making phase two, as modified by Ho, the decisive engagement. Recognizing the urban environment in which this conflict would occur and threats from other non-state actors, Colonel Hammes identifies the two-tiered approach the Sandinistas took. The first tier was similar to Ho's and sought to undermine the support of Somoza's key ally, once again the United States, by

⁸ Ibid., 46.

⁹ LTC Thomas X. Hammes, “The Evolution of War. The Fourth Generation,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 1994), 6.

“carefully cultivating contacts with mainline U.S. churches, academies, and peace groups.”¹⁰ The second tier sought to gain mass appeal through the inclusion of rival organizations and promotion of democratic principles to avoid an East Bloc taint.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked another evolution in the nature of warfare. The end of Cold War and resulting multi-polar world has dramatically increased the number of conflicts between state and non-state actors. A number of outside influences are now once again changing the nature of war, “among these forces are the pressures of overpopulation, rapid urbanization, accelerating environmental degradation, stark poverty and the widening gap between rich and poor, growing scarcities (including water), the effects of near instantaneous global communications, and a growing conflict between Western materialism and eastern spiritual values.”¹¹ As the number of conflicts between state and non-state actors increase, destruction of the opponent’s political will has become more important than the destruction of his fighting force. Unfortunately for the state, non-state actors appear to be more adept at this than states.

Nowhere are these influences more clearly seen than with the Palestinian Intifada that began in December 1987. Like the Sandinistas, the Palestinians sought a political solution to their problem vice a military one. They created broad appeal among their masses built upon local organizations and “popular committees.” Once again, they tackled their specific problem with an innovative solution that limited the methods of the movement to deny their opponent international support and preserve their power base. By purposely threatening Israelis only in the Occupied Territories and leaving Israel proper intact, they conveyed the message that they were not a threat to Israel’s existence, only its expansion. Economically, their targeted labor strikes crippled the Israeli economy. Repeated images of Israeli soldiers firing on Palestinian youths throwing rocks

¹⁰ Ibid., 8.

¹¹ Franklin Spinney, John Sayen and Donald E. Vandergriff, “Spirit, Blood, and Treasure.” (http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/vendergriff/sbt_intro.htm, 2001), 2.

broadcast on global media outlets changed “the image of Israel from a besieged nation in the midst of powerful enemies to that of oppressive occupier.”¹² Fortunately for the state, even non-state actors can become set in their ways and impediments to innovation. For while Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization were virtually absent from the grass-roots campaign of the Intifada, they failed to apply the lessons learned in their subsequent al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Here, Arafat resorted to his old ways and the images of gun toting Palestinians randomly shooting at Israeli soldiers destroyed any ground gained in the international community.

Al Qaeda, like its other non-state predecessors applies the strategies of past non-state actors fighting states and evolves them with its own innovations. Like Ho, it seeks to attack the political will of those who support its opponents in the international arena. Similar to the Sandinistas it seeks a solution that avoids a conventional phase three, and like the Palestinians, it relies on local organizations and leadership for support. As Bruce Hoffman points out in his testimony to Congress, “Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Meet the Threat?” “Effectively and successfully countering terrorism as well as insurgency is not exclusively a military endeavor but also involves fundamental parallel political, social, economic, and ideological activities.”¹³

Of course there have also been changes with regards to the state that have also influenced the nature of warfare. While discounting the primary role of technology in changing the nature of warfare, it nonetheless has an influence. Prior to World War II, the wealth of states was measured in terms of its industrial output, however, the development of the computer coupled with an international communications system that relays information instantaneously has not only changed how we measure wealth, but also how it is moved. Once again, this is not a revolutionary change, but merely an overlap, meaning that industrial capability still matters and that global economics are evolving. As Colonel Hammes points out, this further complicates problems as “a

¹² Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” 8-9.

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, “Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” (https://digitaltraining.leavenworth.army.mil/upload/section_files/m_875/f_7857/v_1/Enemy_3_RAND, September 29, 2005), 10.

fair percentage of wealth today is generated by using knowledge developed in one nation to build factories that exploit resources (people, raw materials, markets) in another.”¹⁴

In the evolving world of the Information Age where technology and information take precedence over industrial capability, William Lind reminds us that for those who lack technology and information, problem-solving remains relegated to the world of ideas. He goes on to tell us that with new technologies comes new vulnerabilities for these ideas to attack. Colonel Hammes picks up on this idea, pointing out that in the Information Age: “Knowledge that is the key to wealth is not a physical entity that must be protected at a fixed location.”¹⁵ He goes on to state that warfare is evolving to “parallel” this model of the Information Age: “The knowledge of how to conduct an attack is developed in one country, then the knowledge is combined with the raw materials, personnel, and training available in other countries.”¹⁶ The attacks of 9-11 are an example of “ideas” that leveraged vulnerabilities in a society to solve a problem, and illustrate the latest evolution in the nature of warfare between state and non-state actors.

Welcome the 4th Generation of War!

In October of 1989, two Army, two Marine Corps officers and a civilian got together to write an article for *The Marine Corps Gazette* that introduced the military community to the idea that war evolved in generational shifts. Although conflict between men is as old as man, it was not until the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that the conduct of war became the sole purview of the state. Thus, it is here that the authors began their search for defining changes in the nature of war that signaled the birth of new generations. An important point to note here, and one that again breaks with the idea of Revolutions in Military Affairs, is that movement from one generation to another does not mean the end of the previous generation(s). Instead, generations will often overlap, thus even in modern warfare today we can find evidence of previous

¹⁴ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

generations. In addition, the building blocks for successive generations will often be found in its predecessor. In the sixteen years since this article first appeared numerous authors have picked up on the concept of generational warfare to better understand the nature of war and attempt to predict what is next.

Authors agree that to date we have witnessed four generations of change in the nature of warfare. Prior to the Peace of Westphalia and the beginning of what is termed the First Generation of War, there existed medieval war. Writing fifteen years after the concept was first introduced in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Colonel Hammes tells us that First Generation Warfare was the tactics of line and column where weapon inaccuracy and short range required fires to be massed in order to kill one's opponent. Several factors were critical to transforming the nature of war from the medieval to the First Generation. Technology played a role through the development of gunpowder, smoothbore muskets and artillery that could be transported on the battlefield, but it was the wealth of the state that enabled the large scale production of these weapons as well as the manning and sustainment of armies trained to use them and large enough to effectively employ them. States also created transportation networks to maintain their economies that could subsequently be used to move these armies. Finally, states provided the sense of nationalism necessary to man these armies, and "it was this enthusiasm that could provide a continuous supply of manpower to support the famous column attacks."¹⁷ Because these large armies consisted primarily of poorly trained conscripts, hierarchical control combined with strict discipline was necessary to maintain the desired order on the battlefield.

The Second Generation of War is most commonly associated with attrition warfare. The increasing lethality of the battlefield presented those who wage war with new problems that they had to overcome. Relying on the resources, wealth and industrial capacity of their respective states, these leaders found their solution. Waging Second Generation Warfare required that one

¹⁷ Ibid., 18.

side simply wear down the other side until it was no longer able to fight. As Colonel Hammes points out, Second Generation Warfare required evolutions in politics, economics and technology before states could graduate to this level. Once again, it was only the massed resources of the state that could wage Second Generation Warfare. As the Industrial Age combined with advances in agriculture and medicine to vastly increase European populations and personal wealth, the state's wealth increased proportionally as systems of taxation evolved. This increased wealth enabled states to field better weapons and larger armies and to sustain war over a longer period of time. Politically, the Second Generation of War required an "international political structure that focused on the balance of power, formed alliances, and stuck to them."¹⁸ Technology advances also contributed in the form of rapid loading weapons, the railroad and telegraph. It is with the Second Generation that operational art becomes possible. Second Generation Warfare also has several characteristics that carry over from First Generation Warfare. Among these are the desire for linearity and order on the battlefield and the patriotic fervor created by nationalism that enables large armies to be fielded and for society to be willing to accept the horrendous losses associated with the nature of this type of warfare. Among the various authors who have written on generational warfare, there is varying consensus as to when the Second Generation of Warfare first evolved. William Lind, one of the original authors of the 1989 article that appeared in *The Marine Corps Gazette* argues that it was developed by the French during World War I, but Hammes discounts this, pointing out that many of the lessons of World War I were visible in the American Civil War fought fifty years earlier.

Through the Second Generation of War defense was dominant on the battlefield. During the course of World War I, leaders on both sides sought solutions to the problem of how to overcome the massed firepower and lethality of the battlefield. It was the Germans who developed the solution that would become one of the building blocks of the next generation of

¹⁸ Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," 2.

war in the form of their infiltration tactics developed in the closing years of the war. Third Generation Warfare is more commonly referred to as maneuver warfare. For the first time, the idea of obtaining victory without necessarily destroying the enemy's fighting force came to light. Third Generation Warfare breaks the mold of the linear battlefield and relies on decentralization of command for success. William Lind points out that "the basis of operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time."¹⁹ Once again, a combination of political, economic and technical factors contributed to the birth of the Third Generation of War. Politically, while most Europeans had grown tired of war and distrustful of government following the horrific losses of World War I, the German people maintained strong support for their army. The Treaty of Versailles limited the German Army to only 100,000 soldiers, thus, forcing them to develop new and innovative solutions to the complex problems of the battlefield in order to defeat the larger armed forces of their opponents. Economically, the Great Depression combined with loss of popular support forced states to field smaller armies and concentrate more on research and development than procurement. Technically, improvements in airplanes, tanks and communications enabled the emergence of the combined arms tactics that overthrew the dominance of the defense in favor of the offense. As William Lind notes, speed had replaced firepower and initiative overshadowed obedience. The objective of this form of warfare was to collapse the enemy through battles of encirclement. While the initial success of the Germans in World War II was impressive, they learned a significant fact about generational warfare that once again distinguishes it from Revolutions in Military Affairs: Successive Revolutions in Military Affairs trump their predecessors; the same is not always true in generational warfare. As World War II showed, Second Generation Warfare was still able to beat an opponent using Third Generation Warfare.

¹⁹ William S. Lind, "The Free Congress Commentary." (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_archive.htm, February 4, 2003), 2.

As we look back on the first three generations of war, Colonel Hammes points out several trends between them. First, he points out that each evolved over a span of decades. Second, that they required developments outside the realm of the military, and third, that each reaches deeper into the enemy's rear than its predecessor. Comparing today's society with that at the close of World War II, and analyzing the changes that have occurred in politics, economics, and technology we see that we are due for the birth of another generation. Following the trends of the first three, the next will reach even deeper into the enemy's rear, it will "focus on the direct destruction of the enemy's political will to fight."²⁰

While there is general consensus among numerous authors on the first three generations of war as we have characterized them here, this consensus ceases when it comes to characterizing the Fourth Generation of War (4GW). What is common to most is that 4GW is built around a unifying idea that unites groups against an opponent; it seeks to influence the mind of its opponent by convincing them that the cost of opposition to their demands does not justify the ends; it seeks to defeat an opponent from within; and it uses all available networks (political/economic/social/and military). The problem facing those who consummated the notion of 4GW was the same as those facing leaders in previous generations, namely, how to defeat a greater economic and military power. Hints to the solution, like with other generations, are found in proceeding generations such as Italian General Giulio Douhet's theories on aerial bombardment published in 1921, designed to turn an opposing populations against its state as a means to a quick and economical victory. Numerous solutions have been found and many can be characterized as 4GW, but before we do so, we need to reach a consensus on what exactly are the characteristics of the generation we are fighting against now.

Colonel Hammes argues that 4GW is an evolved form of insurgency that can trace its origins all the way back to Mao Tse-Tung and the evolution of his People's War. He states that

²⁰ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 31.

like all wars, 4GW seeks to change an enemy's political position using whatever weapons are available to it, and like all wars previous, its nature is a reflection of the society from which it emerged and which feeds it. Colonel Hammes argues that the increase in the number of states and the number of non-state actors since World War II have reduced the dominance of the state not only in international affairs, but also in the conduct of war. Globalization and the coming Information Age have not only widened the gap between rich and poor, but simultaneously intertwined societies and cultures on a global scale lessening the influence of the state on its people. A 4GW opponent will essentially come to mirror Information Age societies with a flat organization moving information rapidly through numerous nodes and networks. Colonel Hammes concludes by noting that 4GW wars will be lengthy and that it represents the only generation of war to defeat a superpower (Vietnam & Afghanistan).

Like its predecessors, 4GW has characteristics in common with the preceding Third Generation of War. William Lind identifies four of these as greater dispersion on the battlefield; dispersed logistics and an ability to "live off of the land;" increased emphasis on maneuver; and the goal of defeating the enemy from within, thereby, avoiding the necessity of destroying his fighting force.²¹ In 4GW, greater battlefield dispersion extends not just into the enemy's rear, but according to Lind, his population as well. This extension then blurs the distinction between what we traditionally call combatants and non-combatants. In 4GW, terrorism is a method, but not the only method. Terrorism takes advantage of the increased disorder of the battlefield to strike directly at its target, non-combatants. The problem we face as an Army in confronting terrorists is that "(our) military is simply irrelevant to the terrorists."²²

If Carl von Clausewitz is the primary theorist of Second Generation Warfare, then LTC Wilcox argues that Sun Tzu is the primary theorist of 4GW. The reference here to Clausewitz as the primary theorist of Second Generation Warfare is significant, because this is the generation of

²¹ Lind, "The Free Congress Commentary," 2.

²² Ibid., 5.

war that America is currently using to fight its 4GW opponent. The problem we face is that in fighting a 4GW opponent, Second Generation Warfare is not effective until the emergence of Mao's phase three.

The two most important questions remaining about 4GW are who fights it and what do they fight it for? 4GW represents a direct threat to the monopoly on war that the state has held since the Peace of Westphalia. Several authors see 4GW only as an evolved form of insurgency, thus limiting it to non-state actors. However, globalization and the political, economic and social changes brought on by the dawn of the Information Age have opened new doors of vulnerability to the state that can be leveraged by both state and non-state actors, thus, blurring the distinction between war and peace. Of course, this begs the second question of what do they fight for? Specifically, does 4GW seek the total collapse of its opponent, or can it have limited objectives? I will explore this topic in more detail in the subsequent two chapters when I discuss the morality of 4GW and how America can take a moral highroad to defeat a 4GW opponent using Second Generation Warfare. What is important to remember at this point, however, is that 4GW seeks to influence an opponent's leadership. Against Western democracies, the easiest way to do this is by attacking their political will. There are numerous ways to do this that can be utilized by both state and non-state actors seeking either the defeat of their state opponent or other limited objectives.

While 4GW can be waged by either states or non-states, it is most effective against states. States have the political, economic, and information infrastructure vulnerabilities that provide targets for 4GW opponents. The insurgencies mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and America's Global War on Terrorism are all examples of 4GW. The final point that should be noted from all of these examples is that they are struggles that have, or will, last for decades.

Deregulating the State's Monopoly on War

In the 18th Century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau presented his theory of the Social Contract to explain the origin and justification of the state. The premise of Social Contract theory is that the collective needs of groups cannot be achieved individually, thus, they require the formation of the state with its laws and governance to provide for the general welfare of the people as a whole.²³ Whereas the Reformation diminished the Catholic Church's ability to provide for the general welfare of feudal society resulting in the Peace of Westphalia, globalization and the Information Age are equally diminishing the ability of the modern state to provide for the general welfare of its citizens. Martin van Creveld points out that the principle function of states "has always been to fight other states, whether defensively in an attempt to defend its interests or offensively to extend them."²⁴ First, Second, and Third Generation Warfare are all the result of states fighting one another to either protect or extend their interests. However, 4GW, mirroring its environment just as its predecessors did, expands the protection of interests upon actors other than the state. The reason for this was that over time, the state was no longer able to provide for the general welfare of its citizens in all areas and other actors rose up to fill the gap between what the citizens needed and what the state could provide. When the interests of these groups conflict with those of the state, especially outside states, many see their actions as illegitimate, "because in our eyes they operate outside our traditions 'of the state.'"²⁵ Van Creveld warns us that the people's trust in the state to provide for their general welfare is beginning to be challenged and the state's authority over people is waning as a result of the creation of new states, globalization and the dawn of the

²³ Cahn, *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 532-566.

²⁴ Martin van Creveld, "The Fate of the State." (http://www.d-n-i.net/crevald/the_%20fate_of_the_state.htm, 1996), 2.

²⁵ Michael Vlahos, "Two Enemies: Non-state actors and change in the Muslim World." (https://digitaltraining.leavenworth.army.mil/upload/section_files/m_875/f_7857/v_1/Enemy-2.pdf, January 2005), 12.

Information Age. The result is that war is no longer fought only by states and that war is no longer the Clausewitzian concept of “policy by other means.”

Politically, since World War II, there have been a number of changes in the world that have weakened the power of the state. First, the number of players on the world stage has increased. The United Nations has added over 130 nations to its charter since the end of World War II bringing the tally to 192 existing today. In “Of the Social Contract,” Rousseau parallels the diminishing power of states with the proof that “Government is weakened as the number of magistrates is multiplied,” and the effects on today’s world are obvious.²⁶ Actions by states are increasingly constrained by the interests of other states and forming majority consensus requires taking the interests of more states into consideration. In addition, these actions are no longer merely constrained by the interests of other states, but other non-state actors as well. Second, the introduction and subsequent proliferation of nuclear weapons has diminished the state’s ability to resolve problems through the use of war. The cost of doing so is too high. First, Second and Third Generation Warfare have become unthinkable between two nuclear-armed powers, but 4GW seeks to provide a solution. Third, the state’s ability to provide for the security of its citizens has declined as more communities, organizations and even state’s rely on private security contractors and mercenaries to provide that which is the state’s principle function. Even in the United States, private security employs 1.6 million people at a cost of \$52 billion a year.²⁷ Competing interests within states have also forced reductions in the size of militaries as compared to those that fought World War II, and the void is filled by mercenaries as witnessed by the numerous contractors currently employed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There have also been significant social changes within states that have diminished their ability to wage war. The first stems from the state’s ability to protect its citizens, or to do so at a

²⁶ Cahn, *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*, 548.

²⁷ Van Crevald, “The Fate of the State,” 8. Primary source for van Crevald are figures from B. Jenkins, “Thoroughly Modern Sabotage,” *Worldlink* (March-April 1995), 16.

cost acceptable to them. William Lind tells us that “the death of the Modern Age actually comes with World War I; in 1914, the West, which created modernity, put a gun to its head and blew its brains out.”²⁸ The cost of modern conflict ended the veil of ignorance of the masses that had existed since the creation of the levee en masse. Societies became more reluctant to commit to open war and more open to questioning the reasoning of states to do so. The result was that states found themselves more constrained in finding solutions to problems as citizens increasingly came to conclude that maybe the general welfare was not worth dying for. The second was also a result of the Great Wars, and that is the rise of the welfare state. Since the Allies relied on Second Generation Warfare to defeat their enemies, management of scarce resources became a critical function of the state and one that it did not alleviate itself from at the end of the World War II. The result of the emergence of the welfare state upon warfare has been that “the welfare state, which attempt to buy popular loyalty with promises of financial security, has diverted so many resources from the military that the gigantic land armies the European states employed prior to 1945 have become largely extinct.”²⁹ Finally, the third is a result of improved transportation and global connectivity, and that is the loss of nationalism within states. Technologies such as the internet and satellite communications have combined with mass media to create a wealth of information that brings people together over vast expanses. Communities that form over like interests or shared needs are no longer limited to a specific geographic area, but instead can theoretically span the globe. Improved transportation and immigration have likewise brought communities closer together and in many cases intertwined various cultures within communities. If these communities within communities are not brought into the whole, then over time as the divide over competing interests expands, society fragments and the state is further weakened.

The Information Age and globalization also affect the state’s control over its economy. The measure of wealth is expanding to include not just manufacturing, but also knowledge and

²⁸ Lind, “The Free Congress Commentary,” 45.

²⁹ Franklin Spinney, John Sayen, and Donald E. Vandergriff, “Spirit, Blood, and Treasure,” 5.

information. Companies are increasingly becoming transnational, diminishing the role of the state in controlling loyalties and property rights. Deregulation of currencies and the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement have given corporations, banking conglomerates, stock markets, and others increasing control over state economies at the expense of the state. They have also made states more vulnerable to outside influence, influence that 4GW actors can leverage.

The future of the state lies in the growing struggle between order and disorder. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the world remains bi-polar. On the one side are the traditional modern states and on the other failing and failed states. Neither side has a unifying idea or principle as both sides have divisions within them. In this bi-polar world, William Lind reminds us that when two states of order fight each other, “the likely winners will be non-state elements.”³⁰ For the forces of disorder, 4GW provides solutions in their struggle against the forces of order. Some such as terrorist organizations will seek to destroy the forces of order, while other such as drug cartels, pirates, and gangs may seek only to weaken the state enough to allow them to freely operate within its infrastructure. The forces of disorder are on the march; already they control much of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia. As people realign themselves against the state along cultural, religious, ethnic, and other common interests the legitimacy of the state is continually challenged. William Lind again tells us that “to survive the crisis of legitimacy of the state that lies at the heart of fourth generation war, the state needs two qualities: an open political system and a unitary culture.”³¹

This is one way to describe the world facing states as they embark into the 21st Century. It is an environment that challenges our traditional ways of thinking, our alliances, and who and how we fight. Our opponents recognize our strengths and weaknesses and have learned from their mistakes. The solutions they present are innovative and passed on to others to improve upon. The

³⁰ Lind, “The Free Congress Commentary,” 38.

³¹ William S. Lind, “Strategic Defense Initiative: Distance from disorder is the key to winning the terror war.” (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_strategic_defense.htm, November 22, 2004), 6.

4GW is now approaching the ripe age of 80 years old, yet it is only within the last 15 years that we have identified it. As with other generations of war, it is likely that the building blocks of the fifth generation already exist in our current operating environment, we just have not been able to open our eyes wide enough to see them. Fred Fuller characterizes the current operating environment as one of increasing urbanization, with 90% of the world's population living along littorals; armed forces and strategic arsenals that provide little to no deterrent against 4GW threats; resource scarcity; decline of the state; and the increasing influence of mass media.”³² This is the environment we are fighting in now. The question we ask ourselves is whether we have evolved our solutions to take this changed environment into consideration, or are we simply relying on what has worked in the past?

CHAPTER TWO: MORAL DILLEMA OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Looking at America's GWOT through the lens provided by Chapter One, this chapter will begin by introducing the moral level of war and how it relates to 4GW. Understanding the importance of the moral level of war in fighting non-state 4GW actors, this chapter will then look at the moral history of the justice of war (*jus ad bellum*) to trace its origins and seek parallels to today's operating environment in order to evaluate the current GWOT. The same analysis of *jus ad bellum* will then be applied to look at the history of justice in war (*jus in bello*). Once again, the GWOT will be evaluated in accordance with parallel and modern thinking of what is morally right in the conduct of war. Identifying the moral shortcomings of the GWOT in fighting a 4GW opponent, Chapter Three will then look at possible solutions to these problems to guide American strategy and tactics to win the GWOT at the moral level of war.

³² Fred Fuller, “New Order Threat Analysis: A Literature Survey,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1997), 3.

The Moral Level of War

Each generation of war has its theorist. 4GW theory traces its origins to Sun Tzu. As America transforms its Army to an expeditionary mindset and takes small steps to move from a history of Second Generation Warfare based on the principle of attrition to maneuver warfare based on outmaneuvering an opponent to gain a position of advantage, it is in need of a new theorist to guide it in its conflict against 4GW opponents. One possible candidate is Colonel John Boyd, USAF, (1927-1997). Colonel Boyd was an avid reader of philosophy, mathematics and science and sought solutions to the problems facing the American military at the end of the Vietnam War. Colonel Boyd saw three levels to war, the physical, mental and moral. Most are familiar with his mental model, commonly expressed as the OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). Colonel Boyd argued that the side that can go through these repetitions the fastest gains an advantage over his opponent that provides him the opportunity to out maneuver him on the battlefield.

Many believe that the side that is able to “Act” first maintains the initiative in battle, however, Colonel Boyd would argue otherwise. Initiative is maintained by the side that is first able to “orient” to changes in the battlefield environment then implements solutions to the problems these changes present. A number of factors influence the ability of each side to orient to its evolving environment. LTC Wilcox reminds us “the orientation of the actor relies on perspectives from his environment, upbringing, and education in addition to the things that are of immediate attention such as the observation of a threat.”³³ Years of educating our leaders in the principles of Second Generation Warfare and conventional war have hampered our ability to “orient” to the emerging threat of 4GW. Example include our inability to understand the nature of the war in Vietnam, the threat posed by Osama bin Laden despite the 1993 World Trade Center

³³ LTC Greg Wilcox, “Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative.” (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/4gw_and%20the_moral_imperative.pdf, October 2, 2003), 7.

attack, and our inability to adjust to the growing insurgency in Iraq as conventional operations came to an end. The actor who is able to “orient” first can then find vulnerabilities in his opponent that allow him to “decide” on courses of action and then “act” on them. The result is to sow terror in the mind of the enemy, destroying him from within. Examples of where actors were able to successfully do this go as far back as Genghis Khan and as recently as America’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Getting inside an opponent’s OODA Loop causes paralysis and uncertainty, which enable maneuver warfare to achieve its objectives.

While America may not be dominant at the mental level of war, it certainly is when it comes to the physical level of war. Our technology combined with our industrial capability enable us to destroy the physical infrastructure and forces of our enemy with relative immunity and efficiency. Our military is fixated on the physical destruction of the enemy to the almost complete exclusion of the mental and moral levels of war. Unfortunately, as we are constantly reminded of in Iraq, “in Fourth Generation War what wins at the physical level tends to lead to defeat at the moral level of war.”³⁴ The principal strength of 4GW actors lies in their moral message, not in their organization. While physically removing their leaders and systematically dismantling their organization may weaken many 4GW actors, the threat is not defeated until we develop a moral message that is superior to that of our opponent. The modern 4GW actor does not rely on a military organization to bring it final victory; it relies on the strength of its message. If its message is stronger than its opponent’s, it will either convince his opponent that there is no sense in resisting, or break his opponent up from within opening the door for his defeat.

4GW lacks a tangible center of gravity that can be influenced by the physical and mental level of war. If there is a center of gravity for a 4GW actor, then LTC Wilcox tells us that it lies within the moral level of war. Leaders as far back as Sun Tzu recognized a moral level of war. In

³⁴ COL G. I. Wilson, USMC, LTC Greg Wilcox, USMC (Ret.), and COL Chet Richards, USAF (Ret.), “4GW and OODA Loop Implications of the Iraqi Insurgency.” (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/ppt/16th_strategy_conference.ppt, April, 2005), 5.

his book *On the Art of War*, Sun Tzu refers to it as The Moral Law. He states that The Moral Law “causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.”³⁵ From Sun Tzu, the moral level of war evolved to not only create a unifying message, but also to paralyze an opponent’s mental process by sowing fear and doubt into his observation and orientation of the battlefield. Colonel Chet Richards provides us an early example when he talks of how Genghis Khan operated inside his opponent’s OODA Loop by creating “impressions of terrifying strength – by seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.”³⁶ 4GW actors such as Mao, Ho, and bin Laden seek to create similar impression, all founded in the strength of their moral message. Understanding the moral level of war, each has used terror along with a unifying moral message to paralyze, alienate, and fragment their opponent. The anti-war movement in Vietnam, political division, international division between states, and cultural divisions are all used by 4GW actors to weaken their opponent and eventually collapse their ability to resist from within.

Actors who recognize the moral level of war and can intelligently manipulate it to their advantage gain a significant advantage over their opponent. The degree of that advantage depends on the nature of the conflict. In First and Second Generation War, the physical level of war is dominant as each side seeks to destroy the ability of its opponent to fight. In Third Generation Warfare the mental level of war is dominant as opposing sides seek to get inside their opponent’s OODA Loop, and in 4GW the moral level is dominant as it seeks to gain a position of advantage that weakens or destroys an opponent from within, turning his own system against him. There are numerous examples in the world today where 4GW actors who understood the dominant nature of the moral level of war were able to use this to their advantage, as well as numerous examples of where they got it wrong. Mao, Ho and the Sandinistas were all able to successfully weaken their

³⁵ BG T. R. Phillips, ed., *Roots of Strategy*, vol. 2, *On the Art of War*, by Sun Tzu (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1985), 21.

³⁶ Chet Richards, “Conflict in the Years Ahead.” (http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/conflict_years_ahead.htm, May 2005), 28.

opponents through the strength of their moral message and their understanding of 4GW tactics. However, the others have not been able to apply their lessons to their own problems with equal success. The differences between the Intifada and the al-Aqsa Intifada are an example of where the leaders of the second did not learn from the success of the first. By arming the protestors and expanding the conflict to threaten the very existence of Israel, Arafat lost the moral strength and image of his message. Similarly, bin Laden's attack on the World Trade Center, while meant to alienate America from the Middle East instead drew parallels to Pearl Harbor because of its surprise and destructiveness, thus, framing the war as a matter of survival in the minds of many Americans. Of course, like other 4GW actors, bin Laden learns from his mistakes, thus, we see how the insurgency in Iraq and the Madrid Train Bombings, while less dramatic, were better tailored to alienate the United States and incite division and fragmentation within America.

The GWOT frames moral level of war as the classic struggle between "good" and "evil." Of course, one's opinion of what is "good" versus what is "evil" varies depending on many factors. Regardless, most are inclined to cheer the side that most closely fits their conception of "good." While we may not have drawn attention to it, all conflict has a moral level. In World War II, it was the message of Fascism versus that of Democracy. The Cold War was between the competing messages of democracy and communism. Martin van Creveld points out that states facing non-state actors employing 4GW face several dilemmas concerning the moral level of war. On the one hand, 4GW actors are not deterred by a state's military prowess and when states seek military solutions to 4GW problems, the perceived asymmetry in the force applied and its results often diminish the state's moral message. On the other, if the states use 4GW tactics against their opponent, regardless of the outcome, they often lose the perception of "good" in the classic paradigm of "good" versus "evil."

The physical, mental and moral levels of war must all work in harmony to be successful. In 4GW, it is not good enough to be adept at one and ignore the remaining two levels of war. These levels of war are also found within the classical framework of what military thinkers

commonly refer to as the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. They do not exist separate from it. Within the strategic, operational and tactical levels there are corresponding physical, mental, and moral levels that are intertwined with those above and below. For example, mental processes (OODA Loop) at the operational level both influence and are influenced by similar processes at the strategic and tactical levels. Within the operational level of war, the physical, mental and moral levels of war must all work in harmony toward a common operational objective. Physically dismantling the Iraqi Baath Party after capturing Baghdad but failing to realize that these same Baathist would have nowhere to turn but insurgency and then failing to reorient to that insurgency demonstrate what happens when the physical, moral, and mental levels do not work in harmony.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that there exist two paradigms within the moral level of war. The first is psychological morality which consists of convincing others of the “righteousness” of one’s cause. This is the paradigm that Sun Tzu refers to with The Moral Law as it seeks to expand the following of the Communist Chinese movement by convincing others of the “righteousness” of their cause. It is also the paradigm that other 4GW actors target with the message they expound, and it is the paradigm that America targets when it speaks of the virtues of democracy over tyranny. The second is ethical morality, which consists of the actions that actors take in pursuing their objectives. The next two sections of this chapter address ethical morality in addressing the problems of the GWOT as it applies to jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Ethical morality reinforces psychological morality. In other word, one’s actions reinforce the message that they are trying to express. Regardless of how “good” one’s intentions, actions that violate ethical morality will do little to convince others of the “righteousness” of their cause. This is why states that use 4GW tactics against their opponents often lose the perception of being “good” in the classic struggle of “good” versus “evil.”

The Fog of Jus ad Bellum

Colonel Boyd defined grand strategy as “the art of connecting to as many other independent power centers as possible, while isolating the enemy from as many independent power centers as possible.”³⁷ In the state’s ongoing struggle for legitimacy in the current operating environment, failed and failing states are the greatest obstacles towards maintaining that legitimacy. William Lind claims that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were lost even before the first bombs were dropped because in the struggle for order among legitimate states, whenever one state fights another, disorder wins. For states to emerge victorious in the GWOT, states must first recognize the threat they face and then find a way to effectively deal with it without tearing the state apart, or alienating it from other sources of order. This is the challenge we face today following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Dismantling the Baath Party at the end of major combat operation in Iraq shows that to date, America has failed to understand this challenge. We have also failed to understand the environment and the nature of 4GW as it relates to grand strategy. Because our opponents will use 4GW across the spectrum of the DIME around the world, America, as the key player in the GWOT will “have to give much greater consideration to regional and worldwide audiences in addition to (our) own national constituenc(y).”³⁸ As Colonel Hammes points out, for states that do not have vital interests at stake in the GWOT it will be difficult to bear the high costs for the extended amount of time required when fighting 4GW. In addition, states must prove their cause to be just in the eyes of not only their constituents, but also the world in order to build and maintain support in the Information Age as each side seeks to deny others potential sources of power. This is where the media will play an increasingly important role in formulating opinion and why it is necessary for America to be morally right, or just, in the eyes of the world. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, is one example of where a

³⁷ Lind, “Strategic Defense Initiative: Distance from disorder is the key to winning the terror war,” 2.

³⁸ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 218.

state's cause was not viewed as just by either the world or its own constituency, and the result was a long, slow spiral to defeat that eventually forced their withdrawal. As states have become more intertwined, the ability of states to act independently of others has been reduced. William Galston points to the Nuremberg trials following World War II as the turning point for the absolute sovereignty of the state, as it showed that: "No state can take complete refuge in Private Judgment (of its leaders). Ultimately, states must face the bar of collective judgment and justify their violent conduct in terms acceptable to the common moral sense of mankind."³⁹

"Just" means to be fair, honorable in one's dealings, and valid within the confines of law. According to Paul Christopher, Aristotle was the first philosopher to coin the phrase of a "Just War." Since then, many have written about what constitutes just causes that set the environment for deciding to go to war, and just war theory that establishes the justification for the decision to go to war. The first state to formally adopt notions of just cause and just war was the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire lasted from 31 B.C. to 476 A.D., and its dominance through much of this period allowed it to operate behind a "veil of ignorance" that took an objective approach to warfare, expecting no more of opponents than it did of itself.⁴⁰ After the fall of Rome, it would take another 400 years before a state once again formalized rules of war in the form of Abraham Lincoln's General Order 100, published in 1862.

The early writers of just war theory had many influences. Among the earliest was Christianity, which transformed Roman legal notions of just war into the classic struggle of good versus evil. War became a trial of the state with God the judge of the worthiness of each side's cause. Throughout most of the feudal era, the Catholic Church became the unifying authority between princes and kings that judged their actions in terms of a higher authority and helped to maintain a relative degree of peace between kingdoms and to regulate hostilities between them.

³⁹ Verna V. Gehring, ed., *War after september 11* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 4.

⁴⁰ Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004), 13.

Two of the earliest philosophers of Christian ideals and just war theory were Bishop Ambrose and Saint Augustine. Ambrose established principles that would lead Christians to salvation and would serve as the foundation of later writings on *jus in bello* that will be discussed in the next section. More importantly, he argued that God would protect the just in time of war, which set the path for Saint Augustine to write the first theories of *jus ad bello*. In developing his theory, Saint Augustine emphasizes state's intentions over actions. As Paul Christopher tells us, he defines just wars as those that avenge injuries, or are directed by God's command. More properly, in maintaining consistency between just cause and just war, just causes are when one has been attacked or when God tells us to attack. For the war to be just in Saint Augustine's eyes, the *jus ad bello* must have a just cause (i.e. An opponent has attacked or God has directed the attack); must be declared in a carryover of the Roman tradition in order to give an opponent the opportunity to redress the wrong committed; and the final objective of the war must be peace.⁴¹

While both Ambrose and Saint Augustine wrote just following the pinnacle of the Roman Empire, the empire was beginning its long 1,000-year spiral into oblivion. In 312 A.D. the Roman Empire formally adopted Christianity, and both were seeking to overcome Christian principles of non-violence to ensure encourage Christians to defend the empire against its growing list of enemies. The next philosopher to evolve the theory of *jus ad bellum* was Saint Thomas Aquinas, writing in the 13th Century, in the middle of the feudal era. Saint Aquinas adopted Saint Augustine's notions of just war, but sought additional limits to control the violence of war. He termed the phrase "double effect" which will be discussed in the next section as it relates to *jus in bello*. However, the most significant philosopher of just war theory concerning today's environment is Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645).

The environment that influenced Grotius' thinking is significant because of the parallels to today's environment. Grotius was writing at a time when the feudal system was being replaced

⁴¹ Ibid., 42.

by the system of nation states; discovery of the New World led to increases in trade between nations and colonialism; and fragmentation of the Catholic Church which had for years controlled when and how wars were fought, caused by the Reformation.⁴² Five hundred years later, as we embark into the 21st Century, the global community sees many of these same influences on its notions of just war theory. Nation states are fragmenting under increased cultural pressures and failures of the state to address the needs of these varying cultures. The rapid growth in the number of states in the last fifty years, coupled with the development of non-state actors that have taken over the functions of the state in many areas diminish the power of the traditional states to regulate conflict. Globalism and the Information Age are rapidly bringing states and cultures once separated by vast distances closer together, and the corresponding “gap” between rich and poor continues to grow, as a few rich nations are perceived to expand at the expense of poorer states and cultures. Finally, immigration and the loss of state identity by many in favor of cultural identity, religious identity, or other non-state actors threaten state’s sovereignty and pose a direct threat to their legitimacy. The end of the Church’s power on war was marked by the Thirty Years War, a “‘righteous’ religious war wherein the only acceptable outcome to the opponents was either the conversion or the annihilation of the opposing side.”⁴³ Today’s GWOT is a similar conflict, in that it seeks the annihilation of terrorism as a means of political violence, and/or the conversion of Islamic extremists to more moderate forms of Islam. The question is will the consequences of the GWOT be the same for the state as the Thirty Years War was for the Catholic church?

Hugo Grotius begins from the assumption that relations between states parallel those between individuals. Thus, by looking at how individuals should act within society one can draw similar conclusions to the conduct of states. Grotius represents a return to Roman ideals of objective standards that can be applied to law versus the subjective ideals of sovereigns, and thus,

⁴² Ibid., 66.

⁴³ Ibid., 67.

as Paul Christopher points out, omits Saint Augustine's principal of intention from jus ad bellum. Grotius adds to Saint Augustine's principles of just war, identifying six criteria that should be met before making the decision to go to war. First among these is the criterion of just cause. By disregarding intention in his objection approach to jus ad bellum, Grotius makes it clear that just cause only exists after one has been attacked, or offended and seeking punishment. Regardless, similar to Saint Augustine, actions taken in response to a just cause must have a good aim (peace). Second is proportionality. If the first criteria has been met, the actor considering war must then ensure that the aim of the bad effects of the war they are about to embark on are equal to, or outweighed, by the good. Third, that the war will have a reasonable chance of success. Fourth, in the Roman tradition, that the war be declared to afford one's opponent the ability to seek a solution short of hostilities, and as Paul Christopher notes, to unify support behind the war. Fifth, that only those authorized declare the war. Sixth, and finally, that the war is a last resort. This last criteria applies only to actors contemplating starting a war, it does not apply to actors responding to the hostilities of another.⁴⁴

Although Grotius wrote at the time of the birth of the nation state, today we can still use his objective principles based upon natural law to analyze the moral justifications of both state and non-state actors resorting to violence to resolve perceived wrongs. Traditionally, the state has been the arbitrator of disagreements between people, but globalization and the growth of transnational non-state actors have exceeded the authority of the state to resolve these disputes. Grotius recognized the absence of a higher authority to regulate sovereigns with the loss of the church's authority during the Reformation, and thus, appealed again to natural law to show how nations and states could interact with each other to enforce the ideals of just war theory. According to Grotius, order in the Law of Nations is maintained by the consent of all. Those who chose, rightly or wrongly, to go against the consent of others are then open to sanction.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 82 – 87.

Broadening his definition of nation to include actors other than political bodies that unite and combine their forces to improve the security and welfare of the group, we can then apply his principles to many of the non-state actors challenging the legitimacy of states today to see if their actions are morally justified.

Of course, few wars are fought by any actor who does not feel that they are morally justified by their actions. So what happens when both sides reason themselves to be morally right? If one refers back to Grotius' foundation of his principles in natural law the side that gets the consent of the majority will eventually emerge the victor. In natural law, numbers count, and strength lies in the largest herd. Thus, returning to our principle of grand strategy, we see that in the GWOT, it is possible that both sides believe themselves to have just cause, and both see themselves engaged in a just war. With no higher authority recognized by both sides to arbitrate their differences, the only option left to either of them is war. However, applying Grotius' criteria of *jus ad bellum*, is either side really just?

Looking first at Islamic extremists prior to 9-11, they felt that our continued troop presence in Saudi Arabia along with our support of the Saudi regime and Israel, and the corrupting influence of Western ideals were all destroying the future of Islam. In the eyes of the Islamic extremist, the West needed to be punished for the wrongs it had inflicted on Islam. The injury had already occurred, and thus, the conditions allowing for the 9-11 attacks had been set. Their aim was to convince America that a continued presence in Saudi Arabia and support for the Saudi regime was not worth the risk of additional attacks on the American homeland. Thus, they had just cause. Concerning proportionality, Al Qaeda does not consider the death of non-believers as wrong, regardless of whether they are combatants or non-combatants. All are guilty of not following in the path of Mohammed. The political end was stated as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and support from Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Israel, and the end of U.S. aggression against Iraq. However, Al Qaeda failed to consider how their actions might affect others in the World Community, certainly those outside the Muslim world. Given the backlash that followed

from the 9-11 attacks and their subsequent war with the West, Al Qaeda failed to meet the criteria of proportionality as defined by Grotius. Had Al Qaeda been a better practitioner of 4GW, there are certainly a number of other means that they could have used to achieve their objectives. By underestimating America's response to the horrific nature of the 9-11 attacks, their attack had only a very limited chance of success. Of course, had they limited the scale of their attack they might have had a more reasonable chance of success. It only took 18 deaths for the U.S. to withdraw from Somalia, and only 190 deaths for Spain to withdraw its support for the American war in Iraq. Thus, here we see the cumulative nature of Grotius' criteria. Getting the second criteria wrong, makes it nearly impossible to get the third right. Osama bin Laden can be said to have publicly declared war against the U.S. in the form of his 1998 fatwa, but of course, Al Qaeda's first attack against the U.S. occurred with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Then there is the question of whether Osama bin Laden represents a legitimate authority to declare war? What is his authority, short of organizing a movement that claims to represent all Muslims, but in reality represent only a small extremist element? Concerning offensive jihad, Islamic law says that only religious leaders believed to be directly descended from the Prophet Mohammed may declare such a war. The conclusion that follows from this analysis is that Al Qaeda is waging an unjust war against America based on just cause.

The problem in looking at how America has fought the GWOT to this point is that America has combined two separate conflicts into one. Individually, both the war in Iraq and the GWOT are just wars per the criteria developed by Grotius, but taken together, the combination of the two is not just. Although the secondary consequences of the war in Iraq may certainly help the GWOT in the end, it is an unjust extension of the political ends found in the criterion of proportionality. The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, published in February 2003, mentions Iraq only once, listing it as one of seven state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq was not invaded because it was involved in the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Iraq was not invaded because it had weapons of mass destruction. Many other countries have similar weapons,

yet there have been no calls to invade them. Iraq was invaded because it failed to live up to the treaty obligations it incurred at the end of the First Gulf War. The “aims” set in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* in 2003, are to “defeat terrorist organizations of global reach;” “deny further sponsorship;” “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk;” and “defend the United States...(by) extending our defenses.”⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the Administration chose to channel the flexibility that the global community had extended it following the 9-11 attacks to rid itself of a thorn in its side, and that thorn was Iraq. In doing so, America lost the moral high ground it held up to that point in the GWOT. Because it was the lone superpower, its actions were viewed by other states as aggressive and threatening to their own long-term sovereignty, hence the limited support America has received in its endeavor.

Applying Grotius’ criteria first to the GWOT, America saw itself reacting in self-defense to punish Al Qaeda and end terrorism as a way for non-state actors to redress grievances. The political aim was to stop terrorism. The perceived good that would come from this was the protection of innocents. America’s subsequent invasion of Afghanistan was proportional given the way that the conflict was fought (use of Special Forces versus conventional thrust); the close relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda; and the tyrannical nature of the Taliban towards its own people. In addition, we had the support of the global community who recognized the threat the Taliban posed to its own people, neighboring states, and Europe in the form of terrorist ties and the export of heroin. The American invasion of Afghanistan had a reasonable chance of successfully defeating Al Qaeda as it was organized and understood at that time, and the war was legitimately declared.

Applying Grotius’ criteria separately to Iraq, there was just cause in punishing Hussein for his failure to abide by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, agreeing to inspection and

⁴⁵ President, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (<http://www.usembassy.bg/documents/strategy.pdf>, February 2003), 11-12.

removal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs; his numerous documented human rights violations against his own people; his attempted assassination of the former President Bush; and his support of state sponsored terrorism, primarily against Israel. The Administration's invasion was deemed proportional, and though there may be some debate here, U.N. Resolution 1441 gave the global community's consent for America to take action. The invasion was understood to have a reasonable chance of success, and Congress authorized the President to take action. Regardless of whether there was a formal Declaration of War by Congress, Hussein was given adequate time to address the grievances levied against him. Finally, because this was an offensive action, it must be asked whether war was a last resort? Certainly, the U.S. could have waited, but the previously stated criteria had failed to yield a satisfactory conclusion, thus the U.S. was justified in resorting to war as a last resort.

Finally, there is the problem of what exactly is the Global War on Terror? There has been much debate on what title to give this conflict, and certainly a Global War on Terror provides a post 9-11 America a unifying message to rally towards, but who are we really fighting and what are we really fighting for? This discussion has limited application of the criteria to the GWOT to Al Qaeda, and the result was that the war is indeed just. But since America has decided to title this conflict a war against terror, if that is really what we are fighting against, then the war is unjust because proportionally we are doomed to inflict more bad in achieving our good than if we did not fight at all; and our chance for success is nonexistent as long as terrorism as a way works to achieve the ends desired by the means. The premise is that if Al Qaeda was destroyed as a non-state actor and the perpetrators of 9-11 were all either killed, or captured, then America could declare victory. However, if this really is a war on terror, and victory cannot be declared until terrorism as a way is no longer conducted, then the damage and suffering that America will inflict upon the world to achieve this goal will far exceed that which the terrorists will be able to inflict. It will require giving these non-state actors other ways to arbitrate their grievances, and since many reside under tyrannical regimes that provide them no other way, these regimes will have to

be replaced. Of the 192 states recognized today, fewer than 50 are true democracies in the sense that they have some form of representation by opposition groups within their government. What will be the cost in both dollars and lives of having to fight a dozen more Iraqs, and is this cost proportional to the good that will arise? The answer is no. Therefore, the GWOT must be viewed as an ideal, Saint Augustine's City of God, a goal we work to come as close as possible to achieving, knowing that we will never reach it. If America sticks to its objectives outlined in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, then simply destroying the ability of transnational non-state actors employing terrorism as a way to communicate and operate across state borders and reducing them to a level where the authorities of the state could keep them contained would be victory in the GWOT.

The Fog of Jus in Bello

Once engaged in war, how it is fought can be just as important as how it came to be. This is especially true in 4GW, which tends to be characterized by low-intensity conflict and fought by those outside the conventional realm of state militaries. What wins on the battlefield against 4GW opponents can easily lead to defeat off the battlefield. Our traditional notions of international law govern states fighting other states employing 4GW tactics, but when non-state actors oppose states using 4GW tactics, the traditional definitions between war and peace, combatant and non-combatant become less clear as international law has not evolved at a pace equal to that of the evolution of war. The opponents that states face in this evolution of war most likely will not have a code of conduct to govern their actions. Indeed, as Colonel Chet Richards points out, the only thing that may govern their actions and those of the state are the perceptions of others, primarily those transferred via the media, and it is those perceptions that have the greatest impact on the moral level of war in the Information Age. This is not to imply that 4GW actors cannot have a code of conduct, for those proficient in 4GW understand the moral level of war. Mao issued his "Six Main Points of Attention" to govern the conduct of his soldiers operating in the Chinese

countryside. Among these was guidance to soldiers to “return whatever they borrowed;” “pay for anything they damaged;” “to be courteous;” and “to treat prisoners humanely.”⁴⁶ Similarly, Ho understood the moral level of war, as do Hezbollah and Hamas.

Shannon French points out that: “When weaker forces take on stronger ones, any restrictions on the conduct of war that the former expect can only limit their arsenal of potential means to overcome their opening handicap.”⁴⁷ In response to this, many states throughout history have “taken the gloves off” in order to deal with this unconventional threat. America’s primarily kinetic approach to defeating 4GW actors at the physical level of war seems to reinforce this approach, and some are calling for America to take its gloves off. Of course, the French took their gloves off in Algeria in 1956 with great success against the FLN, but in so doing, lost their moral compass, their government, and Algeria. In Lebanon, following the 1982 invasion, Israeli soldiers experienced battle fatigue and other psychological problems at a rate five times that of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.⁴⁸ Until national survival is actually at risk, any state that tries to take the gloves off risks its own moral survival. Fighting for a worthy cause and fighting it with honor are essential to states hoping to win the moral level of war. Non-state actors employing 4GW tactics are not going to sign-on to the Geneva Conventions, but this does not alleviate states of the right to treat them within the bounds of international law. Paul Christopher reminds us that the 1949 Geneva Convention not only echoed the previous 1907 protocols, but added “that the denunciation of, or withdrawal, from the convention does not relieve parties of obligations.”⁴⁹ The Geneva Conventions recognize only three classes of people on the battlefield: combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians. Other terminology used by states to define non-state actors

⁴⁶ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 47.

⁴⁷ Shanon French, *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present* (New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 232.

⁴⁸ Major Christopher Whitting, RAAOC, “When David Became Goliath” (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 82.

⁴⁹ Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*, 3rd ed., 105.

engaged in war against the state that attempt to separate them from these three categories risks the loss of consent by other states and of the state's own populace.

The apparent asymmetry that exists between conventional military forces and non-state 4GW actors on the battlefield can be deceiving. Indeed, the asymmetry itself is considered by many to be immoral. Some philosophers of *jus in bello*, to include Juergen Habermas, argue that there must be an equal level of risk between both sides in battle. America's use of precision guided munitions fired beyond the weapons ranges of our opponents, and images of tanks against street fighters all shape world opinion and give the perception of waging war in an immoral fashion.⁵⁰ However, asymmetry has always been the objective of warfare, whether it is to gain advantageous terrain, holding a position in the defensive versus charging the enemy, or seeking ways to maneuver around the enemy's combat power into his vulnerable rear. America's desire for quick wars with relatively few casualties has stretched this asymmetry beyond anything known since the pinnacle of the Roman Empire. However, in 4GW, America's perceived dominance of the battlefield is misleading, for as LTC Wilcox reminds us, in 4GW this perceived asymmetry works to our opponent's advantage at the moral level of war. In addition, given the long time lines associated with 4GW and America's growing penchant for short conflicts won with overwhelming force and few casualties means that the asymmetry in these conflicts most likely favors our opponents. They have the advantage of time.

Jus in bello traces its beginnings to the writings of Bishop Ambrose who argued that all soldiers have a duty to protect the innocent and that there is moral equality among soldiers, thus, they are free from guilt for the decision to go to war. To this, Saint Augustine adds that soldiers who are following the orders of their superiors are not guilty of crimes. Of course, Saint Aquinas recognized innocent people die in every war, and any absolute rule protecting innocents would make morality in how the war was fought impossible. Thus, he developed the theory of "double

⁵⁰ Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy In A Time of Terror: Dialogues with Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 2003), 28.

effect,” stating that acts that have both good and bad consequences are permissible provided the “bad” effect is unintended, it is proportional to the “good” effect, and there is no alternate means to achieve the “good” effect.⁵¹ However, the question of who is “innocent” remained. Since Saint Augustine characterized the nature of war as good versus evil, there was no possibility of any member of an opponent’s society being termed innocent. Francisco de Vitoria, writing in the early part of the 16th Century, parted with the Augustine tradition by identifying those not directly taking part in the fighting as “innocent,” and arguing that the intentional killing of innocents is unlawful. However, he continues Saint Aquinas’ theory of double effect by permitting this rule to be overridden by “military necessity.”⁵²

In the *Law of War*, Grotius draws from the Roman philosopher Cicero to limit who can morally be killed in war. Grotius states that once a just war is begun, he who has done wrong may be killed if the punishment is proportional to the wrong inflicted, or is necessary to protect one’s life and property. However, this does not extend to the entirety of an opponent’s army. Grotius places further limitations by saying that only those with hostile intent may be killed, but those forced into service, deceived by their leaders, or acting out of ignorance and not displaying hostile intent and malice should be spared. Grotius even goes so far as to single out farmers, merchants, religious persons, old men, children, and women unless the latter are acting out of malice and warrant death.⁵³ All of these exceptions are born out of his perception of natural law and frequently reinforced by biblical quotations that show examples of God’s mercy on even the most evil of civilizations. Grotius’ ideas of who can and cannot be killed in the conduct of war are captured in the Third Geneva Convention, adopted in 1950, in its discussion of prisoners of war. Per Articles 4 and 5 of this convention, combatants are described as members of any armed force, militia, or volunteer corps. Insurgents are included in militias and volunteer corps provided

⁵¹ Ibid., 52.

⁵² Ibid., 55-56.

⁵³ *The Law of War: A Documentary History*, ed. Leon Friedman, vol. 1, *Law of War* (New York: Random House, 1972), 78-89.

they have a chain of command to establish responsibility; wear a fixed insignia to distinguish them from civilians; carry their arms openly; and abide by the laws and customs of war.⁵⁴

4GW actors fighting in today's environment rely on their ability to blend in with society in order to take advantage of it and attack the state. Wearing uniforms, or other easily identifiable insignia would quickly bring the wrath of the state's security apparatus down on them and render them ineffective. The definition of combatant found in international law readily apply to conventional warfare between state armies and even to insurgency when it reaches the level of Mao's phase three. It has not adapted, nor do states wish to acknowledge, the ability of 4GW actors to infiltrate the societies they seek to disrupt. This places the state in the difficult dilemma of who to attack and how to attack them. Obviously civil authorities are best suited to distinguish between combatants and civilians in this environment, but often the 4GW actor grows beyond the ability of civil authorities to deal with them. In addition, terrorism has been a part of most modern wars. In early warfare and again now, more civilians have died in war than soldiers. Unfortunately, the disparity is growing wider as states attempt to wage war against non-state actors using 4GW tactics. The results at the moral level of war can be devastating to the state, as witnessed by the estimated 30,000+ Iraqi civilians killed in the latest Gulf War, and the world's reaction to the death of 18 "innocents" in the recent Predator attack on a suspected Al Qaeda leader in Pakistan. States engaged in struggles against 4GW actors, particularly non-state actors who abandon the restrictions of international law as restraints against their already weakened start point, face a difficult task when it comes to winning the moral level of war. In simple terms, states have two options for overcoming this challenge. The first is to "take the gloves off" and hope for a quick resolution of the conflict in their favor. Of course, getting this wrong only strengthens the state's opponent and the odds of getting it right are not in the state's favor. The

⁵⁴ Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, *Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, (<http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>, October 21, 1950).

second is to seek the moral high ground with a morally superior message and conduct that reinforces that message. This requires a strong commitment and the willingness to pay a high price, in lives and resources.

In many ways, America's GWOT is similar to its War on Drugs. Both seek to reduce transnational non-state actors who are neither combatants, nor civilians, that threaten to weaken the sovereignty of the state. Waging the war against both requires careful consideration of the sovereignty of other states from which these groups operate and careful application of Aquinas' theory of double effect. Paul Christopher summarizes Michael Walzer to point out how the U.S. military has modified the theory of double effect to make military operations permissible when: "(1) The bad effect is unintended; (2) The bad effect is proportional to the desired military objective; (3) The bad effect is not a direct means to the good effect (e.g. bomb cities to encourage peace talks); and (4) Actions are taken to minimize the foreseeable bad effects."⁵⁵ The problem America faces in waging the long-term struggle of the GWOT, is that it seeks to economize by reducing risk to its fighting force. While this section has already argued that asymmetry does not violate the principle of forfeiture, operations aimed at safeguarding the lives of American soldiers at the expense of civilians do violate the moral principles of *jus in bello* and further weaken our ability to win at the moral level. The question our military commanders must ask before deciding to undertake these operations is whether they would take the same action if the "innocents" on the battlefield were American citizens? Media images of troops approaching enemy safe houses and then withdrawing to call in air strikes and images of UAVs and helicopters patrolling the airspace over cities waiting to strike, all work against America at the moral level of war at this stage of the conflict. It is no accident that in our NATO ally, Turkey, both the top book and movie of 2006 deal with Muslims defeating the Americans in Iraq, and if that isn't a wake-up call to America that we are losing the moral level of war, the fact that in the

⁵⁵ Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues*, 3rd ed., 92.

book it is the Russians and the European Union who come to the aid of the insurgents should.

William Lind makes the comment that “other than during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, I do not know of any case where German occupation forces used bombers or artillery on cities they occupied, something U.S. forces now do routinely in Iraq.”⁵⁶

Then there is the issue of what to do with our enemy, or those we think are our enemy, when they are captured. Under the Geneva Convention, because many of today’s 4GW actors do not wear uniforms and do not abide by the laws of war in their use of terrorism as a way, they are not entitled to the protections normally afforded prisoners of war. The obvious alternative is to enter them into the criminal court system where higher standards of proof and little physical evidence against them, means that many who are guilty may go free. While this may be okay with philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, it was not to America’s leadership. Their approach has been the development of a hybrid that combines the right to hold prisoners of war as threats to the state until hostilities are over, and military tribunals to expediently judge “guilt” or “innocence” based upon significantly lower standards of evidence and rights for the defendant, with the ability to question and interrogate those deemed to have unlawfully murdered others on the battlefield. The problem facing states engaged in conflict with non-state 4GW actors is that frequently, because of their flat organizational structures, there is no one to negotiate the release of prisoners or the end of hostilities with. Even the GWOT, given that it attacks a way versus a means, further complicates the identification of who the enemy is. The problem with treating these 4GW actors as criminals is that they are not deterred by the rule of law or censure by the members of the state that they are opposed to, and this makes law ineffective in protecting the members of its society, and hence, the ability of the state to perform its most basic function is questioned and the state weakened. David Luban points out that the central criticism of the hybrid model developed by America to deal with this situation is: “To declare that Americans can fight enemies with the

⁵⁶ Lind, “The Free Congress Commentary,” 45.

latitude of warriors, but if the enemies fight back they are not warriors but criminals, amounts to a kind of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose international morality in which whatever it takes to reduce American risk, no matter what the cost to others, turns out to be justified.”⁵⁷

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz warns that in war there is no logical limit to the application of force, thus, each side (usually the beginning with the losing side) takes more extreme action to guarantee its survival. This in turn, causes its opponent to reciprocate in what theoretically becomes an unending cycle. John Rawls picks up on this point, to argue how the bombing of German cities in World War II was justified from the British perspective. In the GWOT, America has responded to the enemy’s extreme (i.e. terrorism), by means of its own as illustrated above. However, application of what Rawls terms the “supreme emergency exemption” is only justified when a state’s survival is at stake, allowing the state to set aside “the strict status of civilians that normally prevents their being directly attacked in war.”⁵⁸ When the state’s survival is no longer in question, as was the case for Britain after 1943 and the U.S. throughout World War II, then the exemption no longer applies and attacks that directly attack civilians with the goal of annihilation (i.e. Dresden) or terrorizing them to sue for peace (i.e. Hiroshima and Nagasaki) are no longer morally justified. America’s hybrid approach to terrorists represents only the latest supreme emergency exemption in its GWOT, and further weakens both the strength of its message to the world and its ability to win the moral level of war.

CHAPTER THREE: A PATH TO MORAL VICTORY

Whereas the first two chapters of this paper sought to “observe” and “orient” us to the current environment that America finds itself in waging the GWOT, this chapter seeks to provide solutions for military leaders at all level to consider when developing and “deciding” on courses of action to “act” upon. The chapter begins by taking us full-circle in military theory and

⁵⁷ *War after september 11*, ed. Verna V. Gehring, “The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights” (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 57.

⁵⁸ Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 100.

returning to Clausewitz's argument that the defensive is the stronger form of war to see how it applies and can "evolve" strategy for the GWOT at both the physical, mental and moral levels of war; as well as at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Having already identified the need to win the moral level of war when fighting non-state 4GW actors, this chapter begins by showing how the defensive is better suited than the offensive to match military objectives with political aims. Identifying the need to reorient our strategy, this chapter then explores how we also need to reorient our thinking in the GWOT and the tactics we are using to win it.

Defense, the Stronger Form of War

The offensive manner in which America has waged the GWOT is viewed by many Muslims to validate Osama bin Laden's message. America's invasion of Iraq gave credibility to bin Laden's warning that America seeks to takeover and control Muslim land and rape its people and resources.⁵⁹ The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with media coverage of the first battle of Fallujah, AC-130 attacks on villages in Afghanistan, aerial bombardment and artillery strikes in urban areas, and incidents at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have driven an increasing number of Muslims toward Islamic extremism. Al Qaeda has certainly been damaged by America's offensive, but it has not been weakened. What began in Afghanistan, organized under the auspices of the state government (Taliban) and was easily defeated in a conventional campaign waged by the U.S. and the Northern Alliance, has morphed into a flat organization of various groups spread across numerous cultural and state boundaries, all united by a common ideal. Globalization and the rapid movement of people and ideas in near instantaneous time make it impossible to distinguish and separate Western culture and interests from Muslim culture and interests. Michael Vlahos warns that: "Americans must come to terms with the situation as a relationship rather than as a war, because satisfactory or realistic goals cannot be framed through

⁵⁹ Juan Cole, "Bin Laden's Vision Becoming Reality," (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/cole_bin_laden.htm, September 13, 2004), 2-3.

the language of war... by demanding a war narrative, America has literally set about creating enemies to fight.”⁶⁰ Since winning World War II, America has viewed the offensive as the only way to achieve a decisive victory in war. In so doing, it has also come to the mistaken belief that it is the stronger form of war. However, 4GW has changed the environment in which wars are fought, bringing the evolution of war full circle to a time more reminiscent of the nature of war in the time before the rise of the nation state. Likewise, America’s thinking about how to fight this war needs to evolve in recognition of the changed environment, to a time when defense was understood to be the stronger form of war, “the one that makes the enemy’s defeat more certain.”⁶¹

At the moral level of war, America’s dominance on the modern battlefield works against it. Just as images of Israeli tanks facing down Palestinian youth throwing rocks in the first Intifada changed the world’s perception of Israel from a country struggling to survive into an aggressor beating down on a weak opponent, America’s overly successful ground invasion of Iraq and the subsequent struggle against an emerging insurgency have provided the world the image of a Goliath beating down David. William Lind points out history’s lesson that: “Whenever one nation attempts to attain world dominance, it pushes everyone else into a coalition against it.”⁶² The Germans learned this lesson twice in the 20th Century, and if America does not heed the warning signs, it will become the next victim of this lesson. America’s failure to sign the Kyoto Treaty, its dismissal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its opposition to the International Criminal Court, the invasion of Iraq, and the handling of the prisoners at Guantanamo may all appear justified from an American perspective, but they push America further away from the global community and other sources of order. America appears ignorant of the fact that not

⁶⁰ Vlahos, “Two Enemies: Non-state actors and change in the Muslim World,” 18.

⁶¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 54.

⁶² William S. Lind, “4th Generation Warfare and the Dangers of Being the Only Superpower: A Warning from Clausewitz” (http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_3_8_03.htm, March 8, 2003), 2.

everyone in the world shares its values, or its orientation towards democracy, laissez faire economics and globalization as a desired end state.⁶³

Concessions are required anytime two individuals, organizations, or states come together to form a union. Each must be willing to give up something in order that both may attain some higher good. In accordance with the principles of grand strategy, America must also be willing to sacrifice some of its own personal interests in order to bring it closer to other centers of order in the global community. Failure to do so in today's environment will lead to an isolation that will limit America's ability to control the flow of people, money and resources in the Information Age. The time has come for America to evolve its message from offense to defense, sending the message to the world that "if you leave us alone, we will leave you alone."⁶⁴ The prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have culminated America's ability to wage war decisively at the physical, mental and moral levels of war. Physically, America's armed forces are stretched to the limit. If America had to fight another conflict, it would be hard pressed to do so, and certainly the idea of occupying and rebuilding another country comparable in size to Iraq is out of the question until we are first able to withdraw our forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Mentally, the distractions of the GWOT are keeping America from dealing decisively with other equally, if not more, threatening problems such as those posed by Iran and North Korea. Morally, whatever latitude the global community gave America after 9-11 is now gone, as the world reacts to the 30,000+ civilians killed in Iraq, the untold number killed in Afghanistan, and the idea of humans held indefinitely in detention centers. To reverse this situation, America must bring itself closer to centers of order in the world, while simultaneously distancing itself from centers of disorder. The aim of this strategy should be to turn centers of disorder in on themselves, while ensuring that America's vitality and independence are not dependent on them.

⁶³ Richards, "Conflict in the Years Ahead."

⁶⁴ Lind, "The Free Congress Commentary," 55.

Clausewitz tells us that the true aim of war is to render our enemy powerless. America's offensive strategy is not achieving this aim at the strategic level. While America has certainly killed, or captured, many members of Al Qaeda, the movement has more professed followers and support today than it did before 9-11. The offensive nature of America's struggle and the unintended message it sends are increasing the flow of recruits into the ranks of Al Qaeda and similar groups. By switching to a defensive posture, America will deny them a foe to rally against and the home court advantage that they currently enjoy.⁶⁵ Without a perceived threat to unite the various interests of these non-state 4GW actors, they will undoubtedly turn on themselves as each seeks control over the Muslim masses and as each seeks to ensure the dominance of its particular brand of Islam. Sun Tzu states that "the most important virtue of a military commander... was not to win in battle, but rather to 'subdue the enemy without fighting.'"⁶⁶ Sunnis and Shiites, extremists and moderates, secular and non-secular elements of the Muslim world have clashed for generations. Lacking a Muslim version of the Thirty Years War to reinforce notions of toleration within the various sects of Islam, if the U.S. were absent from the equation, these groups would continue their struggles against each other. The result would be to weaken all of them to the point that the environment would be right for a new center of power to emerge.

This call for a defensive strategy does not mean an untimely withdrawal for either Iraq or Afghanistan. Instead it is a call for change in how we deal with future confrontation. As both countries stand now, victory remains possible and the U.S. should do everything in its power to ensure that it is achieved. Some may argue that proclamation of a defensive strategy in the GWOT would be an admission of strategic failure and give additional support to the cause of America's opponents. This is nonsense, because in most wars that America has fought we either started on the offensive or defensive, but at some point we switched. A switch to a defensive

⁶⁵ Fabius Maximus, "Militia: The dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?" (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_maximus_militia-1.pdf, March 23, 2005), 4.

⁶⁶ Wilcox, "Fourth Generation Warfare and the Moral Imperative," 12.

strategy does not have to signal defeat or a loss of initiative, only “observation” of changes in the strategic environment and a “reorientation” of our efforts. The message would be that America has achieved its initial objectives in the GWOT and that it would be immoral to continue to burden the Muslim people with more hardship. The reality is that we would be leaving our enemies to rot in the stew that they have helped to create. America’s enemies would be forced to attack, for as Mao states: “In order to maximize their political power, insurgents must project beyond their borders.”⁶⁷ They must attack to keep their ideas alive, and if they don’t, they will inherit the systems of disorder that gave them their initial strength and then fall by the very sword that brought them to power. This is the sad and unfortunate fate that awaits the Palestinians after their recent election of the Hamas party. The requirement for 4GW non-state actors to stay on the offensive reinforces the utility of a defensive strategy, for as Clausewitz states: “We must ask whether the advantage of postponing the decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other. Whenever it is not, it cannot balance the advantage of defense and in this way influence the progress of the war.”⁶⁸ A defensive strategy allows America to use our opponent’s asymmetrical advantage of time against him.

What price is America willing to pay for victory in the GWOT? Are we willing to pay \$10 a gallon for gas; loss of our allies in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan; and five American soldiers a day killed in occupied lands? In the GWOT, America’s center of gravity is its political will. In dealing with a 4GW opponent, Colonel Hammes reminds us that Mao understood that political strength is the primary requirement in 4GW: “This is a fundamental shift from the Third Generation concept that victory is won primarily through military superiority to the Fourth Generation concept of defeating the enemy primarily through political action.”⁶⁹ America’s continued involvement in the Middle East and calls for democracy threaten the legitimacy of the

⁶⁷ Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” 5.

⁶⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 94.

⁶⁹ Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” 5.

Saudi Royal Family, the military dictatorship of Pakistan, and the limited democracy in Egypt. Recent elections in Egypt resulted in the winning of 29 seats in government by the Muslim Brotherhood, and voting in extremist strongholds had to be repressed to ensure President Mubarak's continued rule. America's offensive strategy is seeking to minimize the effects of the war at home, while destroying its enemies abroad. Clausewitz warns that: "The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive."⁷⁰ Reorienting America's strategy in the GWOT to the defensive will enable us to moderate our political aims to align more accurately with the level of effort we are willing to exert. Separating America from the centers of disorder in the Middle East and Africa will mean that we either become more self-sufficient, or find alternate sources for the resources we need, but it will give America increased flexibility in the GWOT and again diminish the enemy's advantage in time as we find a level of conflict that we can readily sustain for an extended period of time. Clausewitz tells us that the object of the defense is preservation. Throughout history, it has always been easier to hold ground than to take it. What makes preservation easier than acquisition according to Clausewitz is that time that passes unused by the attacker works to the benefit of the defender.⁷¹

In discussing means, Clausewitz recognized the existence of the moral level of war, arguing that it interacts and is inseparable from the physical level. While defense is the stronger form of war, because it lacks the initiative granted to the offensive, it is viewed to have what he terms to be a negative object. Therefore, the defense should be used by the weaker actor until it is the stronger, and then that actor may seize the initiative and reorient themselves to an offensive that will achieve the political aim. In the current 4GW environment, America is the weaker actor at the moral level of war which is primary (by a ratio of 3:1 according to Colonel Hammes) in fighting 4GW. America's invasion of Iraq has destabilized the equilibrium that existed in the

⁷⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 91.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 428.

global community prior. Clausewitz argues that the greatest resource available to the defender is his allies, and that the nature of relations between states is to maintain equilibrium, particularly if that equilibrium was one of “calm.”⁷² America disrupted that equilibrium with its invasion of Iraq, and in so doing, lost the support of many of its allies. Only a reorientation to a defensive strategy can bring them back into the fold and only if our reorientation can maintain calm between states. The defense will enable us to strengthen America’s relations with the global community, all adding to our strength, while our enemy is weakened by rivalry and the forces of order within the states that they operate.

Clausewitz tells us that the “defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well directed blows.”⁷³ He argues that the defense consists of constant change between periods of waiting and periods of action. The periods of action, or retaliation are fundamental to the defense, but it is the periods of waiting to be struck by the enemy that are the hardest for America to come to terms with. 9-11 was a horrific act that served as a powerful inspiration for the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent GWOT. Military objectives and the political object of the war were closely tied to the destruction of Al Qaeda. However, after Afghanistan, Al Qaeda morphed into an actor that could no longer be singled out for military action and the subsequent war with Iraq has quelled the emotions of the American masses. The latter was not a “well directed blow,” and instead has served to separate our military objectives from our political will. The unfortunate reality is that it may take another 9-11 attack on American soil before the population is once again stimulated for military action. Regardless, until the population is stirred, the political object of the war is not congruent with the military objectives as they stand now. A reorientation to the defensive is necessary to match military objectives with the changed political will. If America is attacked again on its soil, two types of reaction are available to us. First, to destroy the attacker with our own counterattack, or to allow

⁷² Ibid., 447-448.

⁷³ Ibid., 427.

him to perish by his own efforts. Think of the first in terms of what Syrian President Hafez al-Assad did to the city of Hama following an uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, and the second in terms of the long Russian retreats in the Napoleonic Wars and World War II that simply caused the invaders to continually attack until they had nothing left to attack with.

William Lind calls the first the “Hama” model and the latter the “de-escalation” model, and states that “you can use either model with some hope of success, but if you fall between the two, you will certainly fail.”⁷⁴ The “Hama” model was what we attempted with the initial invasion of Iraq, but if you use this model, it must be over fast because the longer the bloodshed continues, the farther you distance yourself from moral victory. While America may still win in Iraq, and it must, it will be a long time before history will look back at this conflict as a moral victory.

Because our victory will never be deemed a moral victory and the war considered in violation of jus ad bellum, America will be viewed as a threat to others for several generations of Muslims to come.

A reorientation to the defensive will also need to recognize a change in how we approach other states. Historical alliances will need to change in recognition that the threat posed by non-state actors is greater to our values than that posed by other state actors. Globalization makes states more reliant on each other and brings their communities closer, breeding reliance. Looking at economic markets, we can see how the actions of one state quickly affect actions in others. As the world’s leading economy, America’s successes benefit the global community, and our failures are likewise detrimental. Traditional rivalries such as ours with China need to be replaced with a rivalry with centers of disorder to maintain and expand centers of order. William Lind points out that America and China “are united by the most powerful of all strategic interests, an interest in the preservation of order.”⁷⁵ China’s history is one of internal division and the loss of Taiwan

⁷⁴ Lind, “The Free Congress Commentary,” 42.

⁷⁵ Lind, “The Strategic Defense Initiative: Distance from disorder is the key to winning the terror war,” 7.

would only strengthen the forces of disorder in China. The last thing that America could afford in the GWOT is for a country like China to become a center of disorder. Similarly, America should reach out to Russia as another source of order in Asia. The President's recent trip to India, the world's largest Democracy, is a positive step towards bringing the U.S. closer to centers of order in Asia and marks the beginning of signs that the American government recognizes the need to reorient its thinking when it comes to international relations. Distancing America from sources of disorder is harder. It means ending our reliance on countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan. It doesn't mean ending relations, but simply an understanding that any one of these countries could collapse tomorrow and become a source of disorder and that America needs to minimize the damage that his possibility could cause.

Winning Versus Killing

Second Generation attrition warfare means having more men than your opponent's machine gun has bullets. It's a war of resources where bean counters rely on the metrics of tanks produced, enemy killed and captured, and dollars spent. It is easy to get caught up in these metrics when fighting Second Generation Warfare and forget that the aim in war is to win. In the media, the American government attempts to convince the populace that we are winning by telling us how many insurgents are killed and captured in each of our raids, sweeps, and air attacks. If the military announced that it conducted a raid in Sadr City today and killed 1,000 insurgents should we be confident that we are winning? The answer is no. The reality is that in 4GW, the more killing we do, the more we lose. William Lind points out: "Nobody wants to be 'liberated' by being killed."⁷⁶ In the Arab culture, where family honor, tribal loyalty and martyrdom are highly regarded by many, killing 1,000 only creates 5,000 more enemies. The key to winning in the modern evolution of 4GW is found not in fighting at the physical level of war,

⁷⁶ Lind, "The Free Congress Commentary," 32.

but in avoiding the fight at the physical level of war. When a battalion of the 101st Airborne found themselves surrounded by an angry mob in Iraq early in the war, the Battalion Commander ordered his men to take off their sunglasses, kneel and smile. His response worked, quickly deescalating what was a potentially violent situation into a peaceful encounter. At the tactical level of war, leaders who ride into the countryside looking for a fight will certainly find what they are looking for. What is needed in today's evolution of 4GW are leaders who ride into the countryside prepared for a fight but looking to avoid one. Along with this, American policy needs to reflect a similar attitude. A reorientation to the defense and a reevaluation of our alliances to connect to centers of order and disconnect from centers of disorder would go a long way towards deescalating the GWOT. When and how America does this is a difficult decision that must be made in a manner that "saves the face" of the GWOT and denies our opponents political ammunition. To this end, two critical factors are important. The first is the killing or capture of Osama bin Laden, and the second is the trial of Saddam Hussein. Completion of both of these objectives could mark an opportunity for America to adopt this reorientation while denying our opponents political ammunition.

Deescalation at the strategic level of war involves the reorientation to the defensive and a rethinking of our alliances as discussed previously. It also requires us to rework our "what is acceptable" paradigm when it comes to other state and non-state actors. Bryce Lance reminds us that: "There are other relationships than 'love' or 'fear,' sometimes just 'helpful' is good enough."⁷⁷ John Rawls, in *The Law of Peoples*, defines toleration as the acceptance of others as equals in the global community, or what he terms the "Society of Peoples." What both have in common is an acceptance of lesser evils in the belief that by connecting with them, we can gradually liberate society as a whole. It is this acceptance of lesser evil that the GWOT has been reluctant to make public. America's inability to accept lesser evil within its current GWOT

⁷⁷ Bryce Lance, "4GW, High Noon, And How Even I Get It Now" (http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/lane_4gw_high_noon.htm), 2.

paradigm is evidenced by the withdrawal of funding for the Palestinians as a result of the recent election of Hamas to power. By not “tolerating” Hamas as the democratically elected head of the Palestinian people America is throwing fuel on a fire that already threatens to burn down the Middle East. The Palestinian problem is identified by the GWOT as the central underlying tenet of tension in the Middle East. Instead of withdrawing our support of the Palestinian government, we should be actively engaging Hamas to bring them into the global community. Hamas must also come to an understanding of its changed environment and conduct its own reorientation. If it does not, then the arguments of many philosophers and historians who have argued that democracies do not fight other democracies will have to change. If Hamas is unable to reorient out of recognition of its change from a non-state to a state actor in the global community, then Israel will be left few options short of a repeat of its 1982 invasion, as the threat of states using 4GW tactics against other states is far more dangerous to the legitimacy of the state than that posed by non-state actors.

The issue of prisoners captured and detained is also a strategic level decision that requires resolution. Reorientation of America’s strategy in the GWOT to the defensive, and the corresponding de-escalation must be coupled with a morally acceptable solution to America’s hybrid approach to reinforce the unifying message that America is sending to the global community. There are two morally acceptable answers. Either we prosecute them within our criminal court system, or treat them in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Treating these prisoners as captured combatants returns us to our paradigm of “good” and “evil” and thus, requires adjustments to our traditional thinking with regards to combatants and non-combatants. Treating them as combatants even though they do not wear uniforms and do not adhere to the world’s commonly held notions of jus in bello is the equivalent of accepting a lesser evil in order to achieve the global community’s consensus that our actions are morally right. These prisoners should be afforded the same rights as combatants captured on the battlefield. While the GWOT will not end with a negotiated peace, as their parent states join the family of states comprising

centers of order they could be turned over to their parent state for adjudication of their guilt. In losing the ability to question and possibly torture these prisoners, America would be taking a step closer to regaining the moral high ground in the GWOT. Of course there is the risk that we would be denying ourselves the ability to discover an impending attack plot, or more easily dismantle a terrorist cell, but war is not without risk. This would be the strategic equivalence to the tactical notion of *jus in bello* that for conflict to be moral the possibility of death must be equal for both sides.

At the operational level of war, America must realize that its real enemy is not Al Qaeda, Hamas, or the former Baathists. The enemy is Islamic extremism. While many at the highest levels of government may understand this, it has not been communicated effectively to the populace that they rely on to form political will. In this 4GW conflict, America must seek to fold Islamic extremist in on themselves. This must be accomplished at the physical, mental, and operational levels of war. Colonel Chet Richards, in “Conflict in the Years Ahead,” states that physically, we must isolate these non-state 4GW actors from the outside world, or more specifically, centers of order. The first step in doing this will be for America and then its allies to separate themselves from centers of disorder. Mentally, we must get inside their OODA loop cycle and keep them guessing as to our next move. Reorienting will be the first step in this process. By changing our thought paradigm and expanding our toleration of what is acceptable, America will open up a new door of decisions and actions that will ultimately prove the strength of its message over that of our opponents. Morally, Colonel Richards tells us that we must avoid mismatches “between what we say we are, and what we are, in the world we have to deal with, as well as by abiding by those other cultural codes or standards that we are expected to uphold.”⁷⁸

One of the many common threads that unite the physical, mental and moral levels of war at the operational level is information operations. America must get its message out effectively in

⁷⁸ Richards, “Conflict in the Years Ahead.”

order to seize the moral high ground. It is a thread that our opponents know and use well. Many non-state 4GW actors have media operations groups imbedded in their organizational structures. By providing video tapes to local networks to televise, staging events to portray either the strength of their cause, or the moral injustice of their opponents, these actors have sought to manipulate the political will of their opponents. Their efforts have been largely successful. Notice that there are not any anti-war movements within the actors of 4GW, whereas in America, the repeated images of car bombs, IEDs and suicide bombers broadcast on our airwaves have caused many to question the worthiness of our cause. What is America doing to broadcast images in the areas where our enemies operate and at home that show the worthiness of our cause? The answer is not enough. If the primary means of communication in the Arab world is rumor, who are our agents spreading America's message? At the physical and mental levels of war, a strong information operations campaign could be used to isolate and fragment our enemies by cutting off their support and playing upon their own divisions based on a history of tribal, ethnic and religious infighting. We could show how their leaders selfishly improve themselves at the expense of their followers, or "to the detriment of others (i.e. their allies, the uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior patterns that they profess to uphold or others expect them to uphold."⁷⁹ America needs to take the oil out of our enemy's gears, by directing an information campaign that aims at collapsing, or weakening, our enemy's system by increasing the friction between nodes.

America must also continue to make improvements in its interagency coordination and synchronization as a result of this new orientation. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was a good start. At the Department of Defense it has been complemented by the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* and the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. What are the complementing strategies for the other Departments? Unfortunately, there

⁷⁹ Ibid.

are no comprehensive strategies that direct the activities of America's other agencies involved in the GWOT, nor synchronize them with the Department of Defense. As Colonel Hammes notes: "With no unifying strategy, each agency performs its functions within its stovepipe, as it sees fit, often at cross purposes with the others."⁸⁰ Victory at the moral level of war against our 4GW opponents in the GWOT will not be won by the Department of Defense. The Department of State should be the supported command in this struggle as the environment is observed now. Thus, part of America's reorientation needs to be recognition of the roles and relationships between the various agencies involved. For the Department of Defense, it will mean recognition of itself as a supporting command in a time of war, and for the Department of State it will mean stepping up to the plate to take the lead in the GWOT.

At the tactical level of war, American military commanders must begin by reorienting how they think about their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. We must recognize the sovereignty of both governments "officially" and "unofficially." We are no longer there to liberate the people, or standup democracies in both countries, we should now orient to think of ourselves as being there at the request of their "sovereign" governments to assist them as asked. At the physical level of war, the aerial bombardments and large sweeps and raids must stop. In Iraq we should get our forces out of the palaces and turn them back over to the Iraqis. Our troops should either move outside of the cities as they are turned over to the Iraqi security forces, or share bases with the Iraqi military. America's penchant for force protection is isolating it from the very hearts and minds we seek to win over. Only by integrating ourselves within Iraq and Afghanistan will we be able to get our moral message out at the lowest level. If we are successful, and the indigenous populations of both countries accept us, then the human intelligence they provide will be able to propel us inside our opponent's OODA loop and enable us to complete the isolation of our opponents. The military's emphasis on force protection and use of stand-off weapons sends the

⁸⁰ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 227.

message that American lives are worth more than Iraqi lives, and as long as we are sending this message we will be unable to win the moral level of war.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter One, the reader was introduced to the idea that war is evolutionary versus revolutionary. This is fundamental to understanding the relationship between the various generations of war that the reader was introduced to next. In the GWOT, America is fighting a non-state actor utilizing 4GW tactics. The evolution of this form of war makes the military power of the state irrelevant in deterring the attacks of our enemy. America's traditional methods of attrition warfare are ineffective in combating an enemy who camouflages himself among the numerous non-combatants who congest today's modern battlefields. Vulnerabilities created by Globalization and the Information Age result in targets that are easily attacked by these enemies and weaken the legitimacy of the state. Threatened by the emerging threat these non-state 4GW actors pose, the legitimacy of states is being challenged by displaying their inability to perform their most basic function: guaranteeing the security of their populace.

Chapter Two expanded the "box" of the reader by introducing the physical, mental, and moral levels of war and how they relate to the traditional mental paradigm of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Armed with this understanding, we then explored the origins of Just War Theory as expressed by the terms *jus ad bello* and *jus in bello*. By applying *jus ad bello* and *jus in bello* to the GWOT, we showed how America is losing the GWOT at the moral level of war.

The final chapter of this paper looked to provide military thinkers a solution to enable the GWOT to achieve the moral high ground. By orienting to changes in the nature of war and the environment in which it is fought, a defensive strategy was proposed to match military objectives with political goals and reinforce a strong moral message to the global community that seeks to reconnect America with centers of order, while distancing ourselves from centers of disorder. In

addition, America must reorient itself at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to reinforce this message, isolate its enemies, and eventually destroy them from within by winning the moral level of war.

The purpose of this paper has been to expand the “box” of military thinkers to better understand changes to the nature of war and in the environment in which it is fought. In doing so, it is hoped that they will come to see that the GWOT lacks moral legitimacy and America is losing the GWOT at the moral level of war. The goal is to convince military leaders of the moral shortcoming of the current GWOT, convince them of the need to reorient the GWOT, and provide them the tools to reorient to the constantly changing environment we face in the GWOT.

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