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**EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN**

by

Brigadier Javed Iqbal  
Pakistan Army

Professor Edward J. Filiberti  
Project Adviser

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States shook the world. Within Pakistan, the consequences were profound. Whereas most Pakistani leadership perceived that support for the US in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was in their national interests and a continuation of the policies begun under President Pervez Musharraf, others within Pakistan believed that the support signaled a dramatic change in Pakistani policies designed to pander to the US for short term political and economic gains. Some of the Jihadi organizations also labeled it as betrayal by the Pakistan Government. Resultantly, the active role of Pakistan in the US-led GWOT has exposed Pakistan to multifarious external and internal security challenges. This paper examines the Pakistani security posture and internal extremist-related policies before 9/11, particularly during and immediately after Afghan war against the Soviet Union, and focuses on the concept of Jihad, the role of Madaris, and the situation within the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. It will then analyze the development and maturation of Pakistan's internal policies together with a projection of Pakistan's future security challenges. Finally, the paper examines the prospects for President Musharraf's concept of 'Enlightened Moderation' for the future stability and prosperity of Pakistan.



## EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have forever changed the strategic landscape of South Asia. Within Pakistan, the consequences have been particularly significant influencing both its internal stance against extremism and its external relationship with its regional neighbors and the US. Although, many of the policies pursued by Pakistan and President Musharraf had been initiated well before the 9/11 tragedy, the post 9/11 responses have clearly accelerated and brought to the fore Pakistan's fight against terrorism and religious extremism. However, many continue to criticize Pakistan's deliberate approach to combating terrorism as being much too slow and conservative, thus allowing terrorist sanctuaries and even allowing for the continued recruitment and training of terrorists in remote regions of the country. Notwithstanding, Pakistan continues to pursue a patient and measured strategy against terrorists and terrorism: systematically increasing the central government's presence and control in remote regions previously subject to only tribal rule; improving economic prosperity and public literacy; while marshalling the national will supporting the development of progressive and moderate social and political institutions. Key to the success of this strategy is recognizing and overcoming the traditional and cultural impediments to moderating the social and religious-based political orders. Moreover, success will be dependent upon rolling back the radical temperament of many of the same social and religious institutions that were, in fact, fomented and exploited by the US and Pakistani governments to better support the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The future of this struggle is by no means secure and will depend, in large part, upon a comprehensive and unified strategy towards achieving "Enlightened Moderation." It also requires the US to take a "long view" of the "long war," recognize that progress in many areas will be difficult and slow, and will also be dependent upon the gradual acceptance of the Pakistani populace of progressive reform efforts.

This paper examines the Pakistani security posture and internal extremist-related policies before 9/11, particularly during and immediately after the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, and focuses on the concept of Jihad, the role of Madaris (religious seminary), and the situation within the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. It will then trace and analyze the development and maturation of Pakistan's internal policies together with a projection of Pakistan's future security challenges particularly in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Finally, the paper examines the prospects for President Musharraf's concept of 'Enlightened Moderation' for transforming Pakistan and integrating the FATA into a moderate and progressive Islamic state.

## Background

### Afghan War against Soviet Union (1979-89)

Defeating the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan was not an easy task. It needed fighting skills, sacrifices and more so, an ideological foundation that could be used to motivate the people for fighting the war against the Russians. The concept of Jihad, which is the last and ultimate toil in self defense, was invoked and spread throughout the region.<sup>1</sup> Financial support for the effort was provided through a number of channels and from several sources that included the United States, Saudi Arabia and a number of other Muslim countries and Islamic charity organizations. The institution of Madaris, a place with the sole objective of imparting religious education to the young Muslims, was instead subverted into indoctrination centers infusing potential mujahideen with the spirit of Jihad to fight in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> The immediate effect of this policy was a sharp rise in the number of these institutions in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and elsewhere. For instance, in 1947 there were 147 registered Madaris in the entire country. In 25 years that number had grown to a moderate 900. However, by the end of the Soviet occupation in 1988 (just 16 years later), that number had jumped to about 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered Madaris.<sup>3</sup> The students in these jihad-oriented Madaris were recruited primarily from the FATA of Pakistan and from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries of Asia, Middle East and Africa. The students were also given military training in the camps established in the border belts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The indirect effect of this strategy in Pakistan included the spread of radicalism and militancy, an increase in ethnicity and sectarianism, empowerment of religious clerics, and the deterioration of Pakistani domestic institutions.<sup>4</sup>

Overall, the joint policies of the US and Pakistan governments, with active support from some Arab countries, resulted in the militarization of Muslim youth with far reaching negative consequences for the growth of terrorism within the region.<sup>5</sup> US interests in South Asia began to diminish almost simultaneous with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988. Afghanistan at that time was in deep turmoil following the decade of Soviet occupation and civil war and the Soviet's precipitous withdrawal. Nevertheless, the US chose to leave Afghanistan without any follow-on strategy for reconstruction and stabilization.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, the success of jihad in Afghanistan did not restore peace and tranquility, but rather set the conditions for other regional players to pursue their own interests within the chaos, disorder and lawlessness that followed the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan made a concerted effort to help establish a broad based government in Afghanistan through the sponsorship of a number of peace accords.

However, internal political turmoil, in some cases caused by the interference of regional and extra-regional countries, fueled instability and thwarted these peace efforts. The resultant chaos paved the way for a successful Taliban takeover as perhaps the only solution to Afghanistan's growing lawlessness and anarchy.<sup>7</sup>

#### Major Effects of the Afghan War on Pakistan

Ten years of Pakistan's active involvement in the Afghan war as the "front line state" affected the social fabric of Pakistan. It negatively impacted and polarized certain politico-religious segments of the Pakistani society. During this period, Pakistan also suffered extreme internal instability due to covert acts of subversions by Soviet and Indian intelligence agencies. There were thousands of bomb blasts in trains, buses, railway stations, shopping centers and other public places resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. There was also a rise in political polarization due to continued governance by the military regime and increased instability due to the introduction of a new phenomenon of ethnic and sectarian violence. The internal strife was also fuelled by an influx of cheap Soviet weapons including Kalashnikovs, rocket launchers, and many other small arms weapons.<sup>8</sup> The major social and political impacts included:

- 3.5 million Afghan migrants anointed in religious extremism adversely affected the religious and socio-economic environment, mostly in Baluchistan and NWFP, through increased religious and socio-political interaction.<sup>9</sup>
- The movement of armed freedom fighters, mostly in the garb of refugees, throughout Pakistan gradually established armed militants in certain other parts of the country previously devoid of these weapons and factions.
- Pakistan had no opium or heroin addicts in the 1970s, but as the Afghan crop began to grow and Pakistan was increasingly used as a transit country, the estimated number of Pakistani addicts grew to over 1 million.<sup>10</sup>
- Refugees and foreign elements caused demographic, ethnic, sectarian and political turmoil in certain parts of the country.
- Internal and external influences caused the advent of intolerant religious extremism and social disharmony.
- Adverse influences by large numbers of refugees in the tribal areas vitiated the tribal environment to an extent that the power was shifted from tribal chiefs to emerging influential and extremist clergy.

- Invasive Shiite ideology in the post Iranian Revolution era upset the previous existing religious equilibrium.

#### Environment from 1989 up to 9/11

Following the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan, Pakistan was essentially left alone to face of the chaotic regional environment including Islamic militancy. What remained after the Soviet withdrawal was a force of highly motivated, militarily trained Islamic militants, who later assumed political ambitions.<sup>11</sup> The United States not only turned its back on Afghanistan instability, it took additional measures to actually censure Pakistan for its previously ignored nuclear weapons development program. This spawned a decade of declining cooperation due to the Pakistan-specific sanctions mandated by Pressler Amendment. These sanctions, along with the quick withdrawal of United States resources from South Asia after the defeat of the Soviet forces, were taken by the majority of the Pakistanis as a US betrayal.<sup>12</sup> It is difficult to understate the widespread bitterness and anger that accompanied the social and economic consequences of the US withdrawal and US imposed sanctions following the Soviet withdrawal. Anti-US sentiment literally permeated the country and persists in large measure today.<sup>13</sup>

Notwithstanding the sanctions imposed by the enforcement of the Pressler Amendment, and energized by India's progress in this area, Pakistan continued development of its nuclear program and exploded six nuclear devices in May 1998.<sup>14</sup> The United States responded by further tightening the sanctions against Pakistan. As a consequence, Pakistan's economic condition worsened while simultaneously the seeds of ethnic and sectarian extremism planted during the Afghan War began to grow. Also during this period, the newly liberated Central Asian Republics offered many economic and trade opportunities for Pakistan. However, the instability in Afghanistan continued to act as a barrier between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics. Starved for energy resources and hoping to access the Central Asian markets via the shortest route, Pakistan started to cooperate with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Taliban regime was later recognized by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate as well.

#### Pre and Immediate Post 9/11 Internal Security Environment of Pakistan

Prior to 9/11, there were very few sectarian-related terrorists' acts inside Pakistan. Those that did surface were met by an aggressive Pakistani government response. This forced many sectarian militant organizations out of Pakistan and, unfortunately, many subsequently developed strong linkages with the Taliban, who also reflected their radical brand of Islam and regressive philosophy of life. Correspondingly, these same radical elements infiltrated and



subverted the Kashmir Freedom Struggle and convoluted fundamentalism and extremism within the Kashmiri struggle for self-governance. The Taliban's support to sectarian terrorists also enabled the terrorists to commit a number of terrorist acts in Pakistan and simultaneously established a breeding ground for these terrorists in Afghanistan. Immediately following 9/11, these relationships were strengthened and sectarian-based terrorism became firmly established within the region and it further eroded Pakistan's internal security environment.

Cognizant of attendant ramifications of such a nexus, the Government of Pakistan conceived a well orchestrated strategy to deal with the growing menace of religious extremism. Important steps to counter extremism and increased terrorism included:

- A ban on the display of weapons throughout the country
- The promulgation of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997
- The banning of Sectarian Organizations
- Integration of many key Madaris into the main national education system through a package of educational reforms and increased oversight<sup>15</sup>
- Revamping of law enforcing agencies, especially police, through a well planned reform strategy
- Establishment of a Crisis Management Cell to institutionalize a national-level capability to rapidly respond to terrorist acts and terrorism
- Development of and shared agency access to a database of known and suspected terrorists

The attack on Afghanistan by the US-led coalition after 9/11 led to the rapid defeat of the Taliban, reduced their strength and forced them to go underground in Afghanistan. However, some of the Taliban exploited their connection with their Pakistani counterparts and infiltrated into Pakistan.

For Pakistan, the fall of the Taliban caused a dramatic shift in the regional environment. Externally, Pakistan was faced with the consequences of US and coalition successes in Afghanistan, continued combat operations in a neighboring country, and the related migration of the Taliban and radical religious militants into the remote FATA. Internally, its own fight against religious extremists intensified.<sup>16</sup> Having previously considered the Taliban as a necessary evil for Afghani internal stability, Pakistan was now forced to engage in open combat with many of these same elements within its own borders. While perceived by many as a shift in policy made out of compulsion not conviction, it actually represented a logical extension of its opposition to extremism and terrorism now completely adopted and reflected in the doctrine and activities of

the deposed Taliban.<sup>17</sup> Through their support of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden-sponsored terrorism, the Afghani Taliban had morphed into another more dangerous and invasive threat. Conscious of this evolving menace, the government initiated the following additional steps.

- Extradition of foreign students from Madaris
- Proscription of sectarian militants and Jihadi organizations
- Initiation of a policy of direct confrontation, retribution and strict legal penalties to address radical sectarian and Jihadi organizations<sup>18</sup>

### The War on Terrorism

#### Measures by Pakistan at the International Level to Combat Terrorism

Pakistan continues as a willing and proactive participant in the war on terrorism, and has implemented all anti terrorism measures taken by the United Nations in pursuance of Security Council resolutions. Pakistan froze the assets and accounts of a number of terrorist-related entities and individuals and continues to prosecute the war against terrorist elements within its borders.<sup>19</sup> Pakistan is also a signatory to 10 out of 12 United Nations conventions on suppression of terrorist bombing and has signed the Organization of Islamic Countries' Convention on combating international terrorism. Additionally, Pakistan has also signed extradition treaties with twenty-seven countries. Correspondingly, approximately 500 terrorism suspects have been extradited under these treaties.<sup>20</sup> Apart from undertaking active military operations, and employing more than 80,000 troops against the terrorists hiding along the border with Afghanistan,<sup>21</sup> Pakistan is sharing intelligence, providing logistic support and coordinating the operations with coalition partners in Afghanistan. Through the effective and efficient intelligence provided by Pakistan, a number of acts of terrorism have been foiled, including uncovering and helping to prevent at least 25 terrorists from simultaneously blowing up 10 passenger airplanes in August 2006; all traveling from Europe to the US.<sup>22</sup>

#### Present Security Challenges for Pakistan

The present security challenges for Pakistan stem primarily out of two factors. First, certain elements of Pakistani society, though in a minority, are adversely influencing the society as a whole. The activities of these elements, though mostly underground, keep surfacing intermittently. Internationally, this has a profound effect on the perception about Pakistan in general and, in particular, raises doubts about the commitment of the Pakistan Government to the Global War against Terrorism. Secondly, the threat emanating from the FATA is not only affecting peace and stability in Afghanistan; it is also responsible for undermining the

effectiveness of the government's overall counter-terrorism campaign efforts, further inflames anti-government sentiment, and encourages pro-militant and extremist support. Several regional experts and scholars have posited five major causes for the social and political changes that have caused the FATA to become a major root of volatility and source of instability. These causes were addressed in a recent (7 Nov 2006) panel discussion conducted by the US Institute of Peace:

- The influx of mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Taliban and al Qaeda following 9/11 imported “political Islam, money, and illicit economic activity to the region and buttressed emergent Islamist leadership.”<sup>23</sup>
- The demographics of the tribes and their corresponding influences have shifted thus causing internal power struggles and changes in traditional leadership. New influential religious leaders emerged “as political entrepreneurs using political Islam as their instrument of mobilization. These Islamist leaders also gained considerable credibility and resources with the influx of foreign fighters from the Soviet-jihad period and the persistent flow of financial and Islamist resources during the period of Taliban consolidation in Afghanistan.”<sup>24</sup>
- The exodus of many tribal members from the FATA has influenced the tribal hierarchy within the FATA. “To escape the poverty and underdevelopment of the tribal areas, many tribals left for the settled areas of Pakistan or to the booming oil economies in the Gulf. These workers have provided substantial remittances to their families, many of whom come from traditionally lower tribal lineages with relatively low social and tribal prestige. These families now seek power and influence consonant with their new wealth. Migrants have also become aware of inequities in the tribal areas and have garnered greater appreciation for the rights that Pakistani citizens enjoy everywhere except in the FATA.”<sup>25</sup>
- The increased role and authority of mullahs and political Islam has intruded into the FATA and adjacent areas replacing tribal-based leadership and influence. The complex interaction between the recent franchise of adults and the follow-on banning of any campaigning by mainstream parties for elections in the FATA (attempting to select representatives on a non-partisan basis) resulted in a shift in power. Although also banned from campaigning, Islamist parties were de-facto allowed the opportunity to campaign through the mosques and Madaris. Thus, Islamist candidates (the mullahs) were almost uniformly elected to represent the FATA. This was a dramatic shift from the FATA's historical representation by secular tribal “maliks.” Consequently,

political representation and the corresponding power (and resources) shifted from the tribal-based maliks to the religious mullahs.<sup>26</sup>

- US and Pakistani operations within and adjacent to the FATA “have contributed to the ever-shifting social and power structures and the deepening turn toward Islamism and even Islamist militancy in the region. The Pakistan military's operations in South and North Waziristan—and concomitant peace deals—have empowered, enriched, emboldened, and legitimized the socio-political role of the mullah, the militants, and their Taliban allies. The military operations have led to widespread dissatisfaction and a sense of betrayal among the tribes, as the operations are viewed as excessive and indiscriminate uses of force.”<sup>27</sup>

Each of the above listed security challenge requires separate strategies that are best suited to their strategic context. Tribal areas bordering Afghanistan have a peculiar environment, needing a three-tier strategy based on the coordinated implementation of military, political and regional development measures. Similarly, when addressing the views of the society as a whole, the concept of ‘Enlightened Moderation’ envisioned by President Pervez Musharraf provides a viable strategic approach to effect the needed societal changes.<sup>28</sup>

### Implementing the Strategy of Enlightened Moderation: Meeting the Challenge of the FATA

#### Concept of Enlightened Moderation

President Musharraf proposes a two-prong strategy. One prong solicits the Muslim World to reject violence and “involves shunning militancy, extremism and adopting the path of socio-economic uplift.”<sup>29</sup> The other prong cajoles the West, particularly the US, to “aim at resolutely resolving all political disputes with justice and also assisting in the socio-economic uplift of the deprived Muslim World.”<sup>30</sup>

In his related article, carried not only in the Pakistani press but also the Washington Post and Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly,<sup>31</sup> President Musharraf further explains his strategy of enlightened moderation. He characterizes the current world strategic environment, identifies the various influences that have created this environment, and calls on the Muslims and the West to both stop and reverse what he perceives as a “downward slide” into a polarized confrontation between Muslims and the West.<sup>32</sup>

He examines some of the forces that have contributed to extremism and militancy within the Muslim community including identifying the root causes of “political injustice, denial, and deprivation.” He traces the genesis of the association of Muslims with terrorism to first the Palestinian dispute and subsequently to the Soviet-Afghan conflict in the 1980s and to later

conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and renewed Palestinian Intifada in the 90s, and ending with the 9/11 terrorist attack and the US reaction against the Taliban, al-Qaeda and eventually against Iraq. He asserts that this has “led to a total polarization of the Muslim masses against the United States” that has in-turn reinforced the misperceptions by non-Muslims “that Islam is a religion of intolerance, militancy and terrorism.” He calls for a stop to the carnage and for Muslims to “stem the downward slide” and also for the West to resolve the attendant political disputes.<sup>33</sup>

Musharraf outlines a path for Muslims that leads towards self introspection and enlightenment and asks the Muslim community to “concentrate on resource development through poverty alleviation, education, health and social justice” and to abandon what he calls a “confrontationist approach” and shun militancy. To implement these aspects a number of steps will be required to be undertaken at national, regional and domestic levels.

### Shunning Militancy

Although the strategy asks for Muslims to voluntarily shun militancy, an effective strategy requires both inducements and coercion and includes the following activities:

- Continue participation in the GWOT. This includes the isolation of the Taliban and active employment of security forces to combat the extremists sheltered in the FATA.
- Contribute to coalition efforts to rebuild and develop Afghanistan infrastructure and establish a viable electoral process. Key to Pakistani’s contribution is the construction of a railway link between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The development of Afghanistan will require a long-term commitment by all parties but promises to significantly reduce a major source of militancy within the region.
- Renounce terrorism in all its forms and deny terrorists any access or sanctuary within Pakistan. Intensify counter-terrorism operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and improve US-Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation including intelligence sharing and operational coordination.
- Reinvigorate conflict resolution efforts with India through peaceful means. Although considerable progress has already been achieved in this regard, a peaceful resolution remains elusive. However, the confidence building measures initiated in 2002 have successfully reduced the tension between the two countries and provided a foundation for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Issue.<sup>34</sup> Progress towards peace needs to be deliberate and progressive with negotiations facilitated by the United States.

Resolution of this issue will eliminate the rallying cause of militant jihadi organizations and undermine their ideological base of support within Pakistan.

- Effectively enforce the ban on jihadi groups and cut off all sources of their support and funding. Those that support terrorism must be treated as terrorists themselves. Donors and receiving organizations must be held accountable for how funding is actually expended. This particular measure requires international support and cooperation to identify, monitor and check the flow of funds to jihadi organizations.

### Shunning Extremism

Likewise, shunning extremism requires coordinated measures by all levels of the government and society. The main challenges are as follows:

Education- Certain numbers of the religious seminaries, commonly known as Madaris are viewed as one of the means for spreading extremism, sectarianism and militancy. A number of steps have been taken to gain control and reform these institutions. These measures include registration of Madaris, return of the foreign students to their respective countries of origin, reforming the curriculum of Madaris so that they can impart education as well as religious training that will enable their graduates to become other than religious instructors, and reducing foreign funding for the Madaris. While, the Madaris problem has been somewhat over stated and progress continues in these areas, much work remains to be accomplished. Additionally, far more attention is also being given to the content and quality of public and private education to ensure extremist dogma does not pervade these institutions and that the curriculum focuses on current and future economic needs.<sup>35</sup>

Religious Parties- Pakistan religious-based political parties are another source of extremism in the society. By and large, many elements of these parties foment discontent within the masses to solicit emotive support for their parties and local institutions. Success of some political parties' representatives in the previous elections was mainly attributed to the dislike of the on-going military operations in Afghanistan against the religiously affiliated Taliban and a negative reaction by citizens in areas neighboring Afghanistan of policies pursued by the Pakistani government that attempted to discourage the extremist messages propagated by these parties. However, as the government pursues a measured, focused and deliberate campaign against radical and extremist factions; solicits tribal support for moderate and responsible policies and practices; and provides improved infrastructure, services, and governance to the associated geographical areas, these religious-based parties are gradually

loosing their appeal. Despite the relatively modest success in the 2002 elections, the overall popularity of these religious parties appears to be on the decline.<sup>36</sup>

Information Campaign- As a religious motivational tool to solicit recruits for the Afghan War against the Soviets, tons of material was produced, published and distributed amongst the Muslims both internationally and within Afghanistan and Pakistan. This material was produced with the aim of engendering extremist views. Although the Afghan war against the Soviets is long since over, this material remains in circulation and reinforces and supports the narrow views and dogma of the radical religious clerics. To help counter this, the Pakistani government has undertaken a huge effort to collect and remove from circulation this hate material and eliminate this as a source of sectarianism, religious hatred and obscurantism. Moreover, the government itself has taken deliberate measures to explain and disseminate the tenets of enlightened moderation with the media and through related policies.

#### Socio-Economic Uplift

Social progress, political reform and economic development are dependent upon both internal and external factors. Close relations and open trade arrangements with developed countries and the creation of a business-friendly domestic environment immeasurably improve prosperity and societal stability. Within Pakistan, economic activity is brisk with a high economic growth rate. The challenge is to continue this progress and capitalize on its social and political influences to further fuel reforms and progress in other related areas.

At the international level, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) promises to assume an increasing role in implementing many measures associated with those of enlightened moderation. However, this organization needs to be empowered by the full support and backing of its members to truly deliver on the twin principles of its charter- unity within and solidarity without. The OIC needs to be restructured, reformed and energized to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and live up to aspirations of the Muslim world. The areas that can be improved are:<sup>37</sup>

- Restructuring of OIC internal organizational functions, including the general secretariat.
- Developing associated programs focused on organizational goals and objectives and fully funding its activities - all on an assured and continuous basis.
- Establish professionally staffed internal departments dedicated to promulgating Islamic thought and devoted to clarifying the values of Islam.

- Refocusing emphasis on furthering science and technology, healthcare and women's welfare and empowerment.

#### Federally Administered Tribal Area

As previously indicated, the most dramatic challenges to the implementation of enlightened moderation emanate from the FATA. Understanding the socio-political profile of the FATA is crucial to formulating a cohesive strategy for dealing with its threats. There are over 60 main tribes inhabiting FATA, and each consists of numerous sub-tribes. Collectively, the tribes' people are conservative Muslims and deeply resent the presence of non-Muslims within the FATA. Although challenged by some recent trends, the tribes are governed through a hierarchy of Maliks (elders). The rule of law is enforced through the Maliks and Jirgas (council of elders) who are quite rigid in their doctrine and traditions. These tribes are fiercely independent and have a tendency of rallying together and confronting any threat or intrusion into their homeland. However, they are very friendly and accommodating when approached with humility and mutual respect. They are united by language, religion, and a code of conduct that emphasizes honor, dignity, and loyalty to their tribe. When wronged or affronted, they relentlessly seek vengeance. Conversely, they can be very friendly, warm and hospitable.<sup>38</sup> Historically these tribes have been great warriors, boldly resisting any interference with their daily lives or intrusions into their society and traditions. They are well armed: collectively maintaining large quantities of arms and ammunition for use during periodic inter-tribe feuds. The Afghanistan-Pakistan international border has artificially divided families and tribes with many possessing property on both sides. Cross border trade, commerce, and inter marriages are common practices and tribals move across the border freely under the British offered concession of "Easement Rights."

Militant al Qaeda and radical Islamists have recognized and exploited the conditions existing within the FATA. Some of the foreign elements and Taliban found sanctuaries in these areas by taking advantage of the proximity of the border, rugged nature of the terrain, semi autonomous nature of the FATA, old established Afghan War ties and common religious beliefs. These elements assumed a fairly standard modus operandi:<sup>39</sup>

- Use the remote area to isolate themselves from pursuing US-Pakistani forces and establish support bases from where they can recover and operate.
- Consolidate their positions by select acts of violence by focusing on soft targets, conducting assassinations and abductions, and by using hit and run tactics.
- Use stand off weapons and IEDs attacks to interdict and attack any organized operations conducted by US or Pakistani forces.



- Blend with the populace and recuperate during harsh weather, rearm, solicit funds and collect supplies for future operations.
- Position obvious targets and, when required, engage the enemy so as to exploit collateral damage to fuel resentment, spread hatred and marshal public opposition against US and Pakistan military operations.
- Increase their strength by exploiting the unemployed and disaffected youth with money and by recruiting them to their cause.
- Support an illegal drug-based economy and illicit weapon smuggling network to sustain lawlessness and militancy while creating an environment conducive for terrorist activity.
- Continuously undermine the Maliks, official Political Agents (representatives of the government) and Frontier Corps (law enforcing agency troops) to erode their authority and conversely to increase the influence and security of the terrorists.
- Exploit the harsh and adverse economic and social environment of the FATA through monetary enticements, appeals to self-proclaimed justice, solicited enforcement of a related but stricter brand of Islam, and by establishing a preeminent position within the FATA's social structure.
- Gradually, expand their sphere of influence to adjacent settled areas of Pakistan to broaden their base of operations and further obviate and subvert legitimate Law Enforcement Agencies.

Success against the growing threat within the FATA requires a complex strategy with four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthen the political and administrative institutions in the FATA; (3) establish a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress; and (4) integrate the FATA into the national mainstream. The pursuit of these objectives requires a coordinated campaign spanning military, political, social, economic, and informational domains and should lead to a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the terrorist threat. The goal will be to eliminate a source of disaffection for the populace within the FATA, isolate the terrorists, deny their use of the FATA as a sanctuary, and eliminate any cross-border or internal terrorist threat.

#### Military Campaign

The military performs a key role in implementing the enlightened moderation strategy. Notwithstanding the strategy depends primarily upon the willing participation of the Muslim

community, the military is instrumental in creating the conditions for success. The military must establish a secure environment for the more benign but critical economic, social and political measures and it must aggressively seek out and eliminate extremism in all its manifestations. To accomplish this, military forces must: effectively seal the border and stop the cross border movement; dominate the internal environment of the FATA by stationing troops throughout the area; and strike targets when and where they are detected by employing quick reaction forces and special operation task forces.

However, just as important is the exercise of restraint when employing military forces. Support of the populace is critical to isolating and eliminating the extremist elements so military operations must be tempered by this impact and respect local customs, culture and traditions; avoid collateral damage; and be coordinated with diplomatic, economic and social efforts. Additionally, external coordination with the Coalition forces in Afghanistan is essential for denying militants and terrorists escape routes and safe refuge just across the border and also to prevent potential fratricide.

Although there is still much to be accomplished, military operations to date have been highly successful. Some of the high ranking leadership in Al Qaeda has either been killed or captured, many training camps have been eliminated and heretofore safe heavens have been destroyed. However, because operations must be measured and precise, and cooperation of the populace solicited and trust and confidence built, the military campaign will take considerable time and resources.

There are several initiatives that may expedite the campaign. First, the proposed fencing of selected portions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, presently under consideration by the Pakistan Government, could help in securing the border. Second, the repatriation of Afghan refugees would remove the ability of many militants to hide within these population groups now residing in Pakistan and also cut-off a large source of recruits for the terrorists as well as a source of enemy intelligence. However, effective measures have to be taken in monitoring the repatriation process so that the refugees, once sent back to Afghanistan, do not return to Pakistan.

#### Political Integration

The integration of the FATA into the mainstream Pakistan political landscape is essential for the long-term strategic success. It is essential to keep the people of the FATA engaged with government political reform efforts, avoid de-stabilization and provide an opportunity for the terrorists to surrender. Political strategy revolves around strengthening the three important

pillars of: (1) establishing a strong basis of political administration that includes Maliks (local leaders); (2) empowering the Political Agents (government representatives in the FATA) with both the authority and resources to impact their oversight areas; and (3) building an effective and responsible Frontier Constabulary (law enforcing agency at the disposal of the political agent). The sound, responsive and non-corrupt political administration is a key enabler of almost every development initiative and should: ensure writ of the government by making the local law enforcing agencies more effective; provision the basic amenities to the populace; enforce a fair and equitable rule-of-law; and add credibility and re-establish the authority of tribal institutions by empowering the Maliks and returning the clerics to moderated religious institutions.<sup>40</sup>

A broad range of activities could facilitate this political strategy to include: holding of frequent Jirgas and engaging the tribes in positive negotiations intended to wean them away from the terrorists; enhancing job opportunities in the armed forces and other governmental organizations for eligible youth and adults; restructuring and intense training of the local police; and oversight and control over misuses of "Easement Rights." These are only a few of the measures that would contribute to establishing a stable political environment within the FATA.

#### Social and Economic Development and Informational Operations

Military and political strategies work with and empower the social and economic development of the FATA. Military operations provide the necessary security environment needed to implement developmental projects while effective political measures ensure development is both efficient and equitable. All work together to provide multi-dimensional infrastructural developments and welfare measures aimed at the socio-economic uplift of the area. Such nation building projects are likely to serve as a stepping stone in integrating the FATA into the Pakistani mainstream. However, as with everything, local leaders and the populace should be willing participants in both project planning and implementation.<sup>41</sup> Likewise, developmental projects can be allocated to those cooperative tribes who are willing participants in the full range of military operations and political reform efforts. Additionally, many of these projects can provide employment to local tribal youth and stimulate other economic activities. An effective and efficient development program, that is expertly administered, can reinforce all strategic efforts, build positive attitudes within the populace and turn the population against miscreants and militants. The identification and selection of the development projects should be done by the appropriate level political administrator in collaboration with tribal chiefs. The physical control, execution, supervision, progress, quality control and implementation should be

done by the local administrators with assistance from the Army. Augmenting these efforts, and the strategies, should be an improved and aggressive information campaign designed to: publicize the military, political, and developmental successes; explain the rationale for specific measures and activities; and discredit any radical and extremist elements disrupting progress.

### Summary of Strategic Concept

The campaign for implementing enlightened moderation within the FATA requires a comprehensive strategy encompassing military, political, social, economic, and informational domains. The goal will be to eliminate the sources of disaffection for the populace within the FATA, isolate the terrorists, deny the terrorists' use of the FATA as a sanctuary, and eliminate any cross-border or internal terrorist threats. The following summarizes the major tenets relating to the above activities:

- Law enforcing agencies and the administration must work in unison.
- Intelligence gathering must be proactive and enable pre-emptive and preventative operations.
- Use of the military instrument alone will not produce the desired and sustainable results; it should create space for the political process.
- The population should never be alienated and their customs, culture and traditions respected .... but not at the cost of their support to terrorists.
- The campaign to win the hearts and minds of tribals is as an important factor in the conflict as is the destruction of the terrorists.
- Continuous engagement of tribal elders into dialogue will be critical to success.
- Collateral damage must be avoided at all costs.
- Tactics must be changed frequently to keep the terrorists off balance.
- Just and fair political representation and the development of open lines of communication will lead to good and accountable governance that will further separate the populace from the terrorists.
- Large scale military operations are difficult to conceal; swift and small scale operations launched unconventionally will be much more effective within an environment saturated with possible sympathizers.
- Concurrently, long term measures to absorb the FATA into the national mainstream should be pursued vigorously.

## Conclusion

The Afghan War of the 80's, supported and facilitated by the West as a proxy war against the Soviet Union, saw the emergence and nurturing of pan Islamic militancy. Islam was used to solicit world-wide support for freedom fighters within Afghanistan. The main recruitment for external fighters was done from Pakistan, who also served as the indoctrination and the training ground in the form of Madaris and training camps all along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. To make matters worse, the militancy established in Afghanistan, which needed to be defused after the end of the cold war, was allowed to fester. Pakistan was left alone to manage the deteriorating social and political environment for over a decade. Eventually, Pakistan was forced to accept the extremist Taliban's rule in Afghanistan as the only solution for its internal chaos and instability. Together, these events had a profound and long-term negative impact on the region and on the internal dynamics of Pakistan.

Although Pakistan had already begun a deliberate campaign against terrorism and extremism within its borders, the events of 9/11 provided a catalyst for a more aggressive strategy and as the impetus to support the US in the war on terrorism. The GWOT eventually led to the removal of the extremist regime in Afghanistan. Since then, Pakistan has taken a very deliberate and conscious decision to support GWOT and that support remains in its best national interests. These efforts have been collected and organized around a strategy of "enlightened moderation" aimed at rejecting extremism and eliminating the sources of instability and conflict. However, the forces that were placed in motion by both the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the subsequent emergence of the extremist Taliban influence within the region has provided a difficult challenge to both the strategy and GWOT operations. Nowhere is the challenge of growing militancy and extremism more severe than in the FATA.

To be successful, Pakistan must pursue a broad based strategy encompassing military, political, social, economic, and informational domains aimed at accomplishing four major objectives: (1) elimination of foreign terrorists and their facilitators; (2) strengthening of the political and administrative institutions in the FATA; (3) establishing a safe and secure environment conducive for sustained development and the realization of real socio-economic progress; and (4) integrating the FATA into the national mainstream.

In the long term, the strategy based on President Musharraf's concept of 'Enlightened Moderation' is the right solution, not only to the internal problems of Pakistan, but also for the Muslim world and the international community. This strategy warrants action by the international community for peaceful resolution of the political issues being faced by the majority of the Muslim countries. However, it lays the primary responsibility on the Muslim countries to shun

militancy, extremism and adopt the path towards the socio-economic uplift of their people. In line with the concept, the specific action plan outlined for Pakistan will help transform the society into a moderate and progressive Islamic state that is well connected to the international community, and can also serve as a role model for other Muslim countries to follow.

### Endnotes

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<sup>2</sup> Hussain Haqqani, "Madrassas: Knowledge or the 'Shade of Swords'," *The Daily Star*, 21 April 2004; available from <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/>

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<sup>3</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 89, as cited in Ajai Sahni, "Wars Within Borders," available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/NATIV2002.htm>; accessed 15 February 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Tariq Gilani, "US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward," *Parameters*, (Winter 2006-07): 87.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 88.

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<sup>7</sup> The Jihad did result in the withdrawal of Soviets but no political system/government could replace them due to the infighting amongst the leaders who had played a major part in the Jihad. Ultimately the Taliban replaced them, and when in control, the Taliban projected a faulty and narrow view of Islam that included values of intolerance and extremism.

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<sup>15</sup> Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, "Address to the Nation," 12 January 2002; available from <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/2002Jan12.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Schaffer, 173.

<sup>17</sup> Schaffer, 173.

<sup>18</sup> Musharraf, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Congressional Research Service Report, "Pakistan Country Analysis: CRS Report For Congress," 23 February 2006; available from <http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idCategory=33&idarticle=2645>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 3.

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<sup>29</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "Islam and West: Time for Enlightened Moderation," *The Khaleej Times*, 2 June 2004; available from <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4016>; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

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