

## AN ASYMMETRICAL SYMMETRY: HOW CONVENTION HAS BECOME INNOVATIVE MILITARY THOUGHT

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
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# **PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **AN ASYMMETRICAL SYMMETRY: HOW CONVENTION HAS BECOME INNOVATIVE MILITARY THOUGHT**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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In the last few years, notions like “asymmetric warfare”, and, more recently, “hybrid warfare” have become as common and pervasive as to appear like new orthodoxy in military thought. Contemporary doctrine, official documents, papers, briefings strive to pay tribute or reverence to these new ideas. If no reference is made to them, the author is accused of conservatism, myopia, ignorance, or bad faith. This new picture is conceptualized in sound and persuasive theory; plenty of references are made to the masters of strategic thinking, including Sun Tzu, von Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, as well as to wars, campaigns and battles of the past in order to demonstrate their relevance. This project will examine these theories through the lens of critical thinking and demonstrate that these “new” constructs are anything but original. In particular, two historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE) and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE), will be summarily analyzed to demonstrate that asymmetry and hybridism have been common characteristics of war through the ages since the very beginning of humanity. Thinking otherwise is to invite professional atrophy and insipidness.

## AN ASYMMETRICAL SYMMETRY: HOW CONVENTION HAS BECOME INNOVATIVE MILITARY THOUGHT

The international arena has dramatically changed in the last few years, and in the same way it has changed the approach of the western world toward war. The unfamiliar co-protagonists of nation-states are failed or failing states, ungoverned regions, crime and drug cartels, transnational terrorist groups, multinational corporations, mass media, international and multinational organizations, international regimes, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.<sup>1</sup> Few strategic leaders seem familiar dealing with non-state actors and are struggling to find “revolutionary” solutions to problems. Many are convinced that the present strategic environment is absolutely unique and argue that war has completely changed its nature. They assert that today’s wars are “asymmetric” or “hybrid” and require innovative approaches, creative ideas and, of course, more time and resources to be solved. In response, this strategic research project (SRP) first describes the concept of asymmetric war and its origins. It then traces the evolutions of the concept all the way through the introduction of the concept of hybrid war. Next, this paper summarily examines two historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE) and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE), to find analogies with the concepts. Finally, it analyses these theories through the lens of critical thinking and demonstrate that these “new” constructs are anything but original, and that asymmetry and hybridism have been common characteristic of war through the ages.

### Asymmetric Warfare Defined

The origins of the theory can be found in a 1974 study from Andrew Mack entitled “The Concept of Powers and Its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict.”<sup>2</sup> Professor Mack developed the concept in a January 1975 World Politics article entitled

“Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” The author’s initial point was that the success of Western imperialist expansion and the experience of the First and Second World Wars “served to reinforce and to rigidify the pervasive notion that superiority in military capability (conventionally defined) will mean victory in war.”<sup>3</sup> He highlighted that numerous conflicts in the years following the Second World War proved that “military and technological superiority may be a highly unreliable guide to the outcome of wars.”<sup>4</sup> The stated focus of the essay was on analyzing the reasons how and why the external powers were forced to withdraw from asymmetric conflicts.<sup>5</sup> Mack, in order to define “asymmetry,” noted that in many post World War II conflicts the “relationship among the belligerents was asymmetric,” meaning that: the insurgents posed no direct threat to the survival of the external power, lacking an invasion capability, while the external power had not only the power of invasion but also the power of occupation; for the insurgent the war was “total”, while for the external power it was “limited.” Nevertheless, the external power had the pervasive expectation of victory due to its conventional military capability. In other words, the asymmetric relationship envisaged was a “function of the asymmetry in ‘resource power’.”<sup>6</sup> Mack took the Vietnam War as an example of asymmetric war and highlighted three main lessons taken from the conflict. First, pre-eminence in military force does not guarantee victory and under certain circumstances could be counterproductive; second, under certain conditions, the theatre of war takes in the polity and social institutions of the external power; third, guerrilla strategists put great importance on “protracted warfare.”<sup>7</sup> The author concluded that for the insurgent to win, he had to not lose; this goal can be achieved by refusing to confront the external power on its own terms and by resorting to

“unconventional” forms of warfare, including guerrilla operations, urban terrorism and even nonviolent action. The insurgent can achieve his objectives if the opponent’s political capability to wage war is destroyed. The external power cannot be defeated militarily, but the insurgent can adopt a strategy of “political attrition” and increment the cost of the war, thereby eroding the will of the external power, and forcing a military withdrawal.<sup>8</sup> Regrettably, Mack’s analysis remained unnoticed due to the Cold War.

### Evolution of the Concept

Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II defined “Strategic Asymmetry” as the “use of some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an adversary,” stating very clearly that “[i]n war there are always differences between the opponents.”<sup>9</sup> The authors add that the concept is as old as warfare itself and that these differences are sometimes insignificant and other times important. The work of Metz and Johnson well summarized the evolution of the concept in U.S. strategic thinking. Accordingly, the first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in Joint Publication 1 (1995).<sup>10</sup> The authors state that the U.S. Department of Defense mostly focused its strategic thinking on negative asymmetry, intended as forms of threat, and not on positive asymmetry, intended as the use of differences to gain advantage.<sup>11</sup> Exceedingly interesting is the consideration of the two authors that sometimes asymmetry is “by default”, suggesting that “antagonists in a conflict or war simply use what they have and do what they know how to do.”<sup>12</sup> The authors also introduced six forms of asymmetry: asymmetry of method, intended as the use of “different operational concepts or tactical doctrines than the enemy;”<sup>13</sup> asymmetry of technology; asymmetry of will;<sup>14</sup> normative asymmetry that comes into play when antagonists have “different ethical or legal standards;”<sup>15</sup> asymmetry of organization,



meaning that organizational innovations can give advantage to a competitor; asymmetry of patience, linking it to the asymmetry of will, or to “cross-cultural conflicts”.<sup>16</sup>

Following on the work of Metz and Johnson, Adam Lowther published a study to examine “a number of the most widely respected military treatises in an effort to determine if, in fact, classic military theory holds the key to a better understanding of modern asymmetric conflict.”<sup>17</sup> Significantly, the conclusion was that “...many of the strategic and tactical concepts of modern asymmetry are restatements of concepts developed decades, centuries and millennia ago. What is often mistaken for innovation is the restatement of well-worn ideas rediscovered or modified by the application of technological innovation.”<sup>18</sup> The author considered the term “asymmetric warfare” a synonym for “partisan warfare” (i.e. irregular warfare) waged by non-state actors, and considers Mao Zedong, General Vo Nguyen Giap and Che Guevara examples of asymmetric warfare theorists.<sup>19</sup>

While the term “asymmetric” is absent from the National Security Strategy (2006), the National Defense Strategy (2008) stated that “U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.”<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the term “asymmetric” appeared 14 times in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; it addressed asymmetric operations, threats (four times), challenges (four times), military capabilities, tactics (two times), approaches, and warfare. Interestingly, the term “asymmetric warfare”, although parenthetically, is used synonymous with “irregular warfare.”<sup>21</sup> The document further stated that “[e]nemies are likely to pose asymmetric threats, including irregular, catastrophic and disruptive

challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will choose irregular warfare — including terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare — in an attempt to break our will through protracted conflict.”<sup>22</sup> In the 2004 National Military Strategy the term “asymmetric” appeared eight times, addressing asymmetric weapons, capabilities (four times), threats, attacks, and challenges.<sup>23</sup> Current Joint Publication 1 refers asymmetry to Irregular Warfare (IW), and states that IW is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of the military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.”<sup>24</sup>

#### Introduction of the Concept of Hybrid War

The first to use the term “hybrid” was credited to Robert G. Walker in his unpublished 1998 Master’s Thesis “Spec Fi: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations.” Walker states that “Hybrid warfare is that which lies in the interstices between special and conventional warfare. This type of warfare possesses characteristics of both the special and conventional realms, and requires an extreme amount of flexibility in order to transition operationally and tactically between the special and conventional arenas.”<sup>25</sup> The first public use of the term was by General James N. Mattis, USMC, on September 8, 2005, in Arlington, Virginia, at the fourth annual Sea Services Forum.<sup>26</sup> The concept was clearly articulated by General Mattis and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), the following November when they challenged the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) statement that “An array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests....”<sup>27</sup> Their reclama asserted that “... future conflicts will not present the sort of

neat distinctions represented by the Office of the Secretary of Defense view of emerging challengers.... We do not face a range of four separate challengers as much as the combination of novel approaches — a merger of different modes and means of war. This *unprecedented* [emphasis added] synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare.”<sup>28</sup>

Hoffman further developed the concept with a Marine Corps Gazette article in March 2007,<sup>29</sup> and then expanded it with the paper “Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.”<sup>30</sup> His main point was that: “Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimension of conflict.”<sup>31</sup> The author added that “[c]omplicating the problem, the battlespace in tomorrow’s Hybrid Wars will take place in complex terrain, most likely the burgeoning cities of the developing world.”<sup>32</sup> In his view, the main characteristics of hybrid wars are “multi-dimensionality,” “operational integration,” and “exploitation of the information domain.”<sup>33</sup> In a subsequent article, Hoffman added that “... the operational fusion of conventional and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts may be even more complicated. Compound wars offered synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion and simultaneity we anticipate at the operational and even tactical levels in wars where one or both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the battlespace.”<sup>34</sup> Finally, the author eliminated the

threat “disruptive technology” introduced by the 2005 NDS and incorporated instead the threat “disruptive social behavior” or criminality. Consequently, and significantly, Hoffman currently defines a hybrid threat as “[a]ny adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”<sup>35</sup>

The final concept now appears in several US official documents, although formal approval is still in progress. For example, the 2007 National Maritime Strategy states that “Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”<sup>36</sup> The 2008 Joint Operating Environment publication likewise asserts that “... there is a great amount of granularity across the spectrum of conflict, and a greater potential for “hybrid” types of war. This assessment acknowledges the blending of regular and irregular forms of warfare.”<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations declares that “... future conflicts will appear as hybrids comprising diverse, dynamic, and simultaneous combinations of organizations, technologies, and techniques that defy categorization.”<sup>38</sup> The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review states that “the term ‘hybrid’ has recently been used to capture the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of conflict.”<sup>39</sup>

Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., in his study “Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare,” labels asymmetric warfare as the “*term du jour* for future military operations” and, analyzing some case studies, states that for millennia the “weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their enemy’s technological or numerical superiority by fighting in

ways or on battlefields that nullify it.”<sup>40</sup> Likewise, this paper will summarily examines two historical case studies, the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE) and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE), to find analogies with the concepts, and demonstrate that they are not new.

#### First Case Study: the First Jewish-Roman War (66-73 CE)

In 66 CE, Judaea was a province of the Roman Empire. In June 66 CE, after a period of unrest and riots, the inhabitants of Jerusalem revolted against Roman authority. After seven days of slaughter, Roman and loyalist troops were forced to shut themselves in the fortress Antonia and the Royal Palace. In the meantime, a group of terrorists called *Sicarii* captured by treachery the stronghold of Masada and exterminated the Roman garrison. On September 3, Antonia was taken by the insurgents and the garrison put to the sword. The insurrectionaries, reinforced by the *Sicarii* from Masada, assaulted the Royal Palace, but were repelled by the defenders. The belligerents reached then an armistice and the garrison surrendered, but the Romans were executed.

Cestius Gallus, governor (*Legatus*) of Syria decided to intervene personally. He left Antioch at the head of a powerful army and, during the march, the loyal cities of the province provided numerous additional troops. Cestius advanced on Jerusalem. The revolutionaries immediately left the city and attacked the Romans who were initially overwhelmed by the ferocity of the assault. Only the intervention of cavalry stopped the attackers, who were forced to withdraw. At the end of October, Cestius entered Jerusalem. After five days of fighting, he personally directed the assault on the Temple. When victory seemed certain, the Legate suspended the attack and vacated the city. The insurgents immediately seized the opportunity and attacked the retreating enemy,

inflicting heavy losses. The following day, Cestius ordered a general withdrawal. During the march, the heavy Roman formations were severely pounded by the insurgents, lightly armed and highly mobile. Many bands of ruthless and skilled brigands joined the revolutionaries and attacked the retreating Romans. After a two day battle at the fortified camp of Gibeon, Cestius' force was defeated. The Legate abandoned the artillery and ammunition, leaving a sacrificial rearguard to deceive the rebels. At dawn, the insurgents butchered the rearguard and took Roman weaponry, but were unable to catch their fleeing enemies. The Romans took shelter in Antipatris, having lost 5,300 infantryman and 480 cavalrymen.<sup>41</sup>

After the victory, the insurgents assigned the different provinces to the most valued commanders and prepared themselves for further hostilities. In particular, Galilee was assigned to Josephus, son of Matthias, a young and cultured priest. He ordered the most defensible positions fortified, existing city fortifications repaired, and a large army of volunteers raised. Josephus, aware of the might of the Roman army, struggled to equip and train his men according to Roman regulations.<sup>42</sup>

Emperor Nero appointed the experienced general Vespasian as Legate, with the task of subduing the insurrection in Judaea. Vespasian's plan was to take control of Galilee, secure his rear, cut off Jerusalem from all sides, and then capture it.<sup>43</sup> Vespasian advanced into Galilee and Josephus fielded his army to confront him on a favorable battlefield. At the news that the Romans were approaching, the insurgents fled, leaving Josephus with a handful of fighters. He was thus forced to shut himself in his headquarters, the stronghold of Jotapata. On June 4, Vespasian surrounded Jotapata and attacked. The insurgents bravely refused to retreat inside the walls and

deployed a strong body of infantry to defy the Romans. For five days the Romans attacked the insurgents who answered with determined sorties. Josephus reports that “[e]very device of guerrilla war was brought into play, everything in their path was plundered and the rest of the besiegers’ works were set on fire,”<sup>44</sup> forcing Vespasian to recall his troops and ordering the town placed under siege to starve the insurgents into surrender. Josephus hid warriors in ravines and hideaways to carry out surprise raids on the Romans, synchronized with sorties of the garrison.<sup>45</sup> Finally, Roman rams succeeded in opening three breaches in the city defenses. Vespasian unconventionally ordered dismounted cavalymen, completely covered in heavy armor and employing their long spears, to lead the assault against the breaches in the walls. Formations of heavy infantry were to follow, while archers, slingers and artillerymen were ordered to pour a deluge of missiles on the insurgents. Josephus employed boiling oil and boiled fenugreek to repel the attack, inflicting severe casualties on the Romans.<sup>46</sup> Subsequently, informed by a deserter that the insurgents were exhausted and many sentries fell asleep during the night, Vespasian’s son, Titus, lead a small detachment of particularly well trained legionaries over the wall, dispatched the sentries, and opened the way for the attacking formations.<sup>47</sup> On July 20, Jotapata fell; Josephus was captured and became a counselor of Vespasian.

Insurgent survivors fled to Joppa, built a large fleet and raided at sea, seriously endangering Roman sea lines of communications, especially the supplies of grain from Alexandria. Vespasian sent one of his generals to take the city, destroy the fleet and ravage the countryside.<sup>48</sup> Simultaneously, Vespasian led the army to Tarichaeae, on the shore of the lake of Gennesaret. The town was taken, but many insurgents were able to

escape by boat and gathered in the centre of the adjacent lake; Vespasian ordered dozens of rafts built to attack the rebels. On every raft he put legionaries armed with spears and Arab bowmen. The flotilla encircled the insurgents and defeated them.<sup>49</sup>

Despite the fact that the normal campaigning season was over, Vespasian wanted to complete the re-conquest of Galilee. As such, the next objective was the fortified city of Gamala. The engines opened three breaches in the city walls, allowing Vespasian to launch a general assault. The insurgents were promptly driven back and the Romans entered the town. Suddenly, the insurgents counterattacked en masse, taking the Romans off-balance and killing many. The fight in urban terrain was bitter and merciless; pressed forward by their comrades who were entering the town, the first Roman echelon was unable to withdraw, suffering fearful casualties. Finally, the Romans were able to exit the town, closely pursued by the insurgents. Vespasian deployed his men in close formation and, with the cover offered by the bowmen, he repulsed the rebels. On November 9, 67 CE, Titus led a chosen body of men in a night attack on Gamala's battlements. They took the sentries by surprise and entered the town, opening the way for the main Roman body, personally led by Vespasian.<sup>50</sup> With Gamala captured, he finally ordered his men to take up winter quarters.

Planning subsequent operations, Vespasian devised a strategy to isolate the enemy center of gravity—Jerusalem—by seizing the remainder of Judaea. During the winter, he kept himself aware of the political and military situation in Jerusalem by interrogating deserters and refugees.<sup>51</sup> It also appears from Talmudic sources that the Legate had spies inside Jerusalem.<sup>52</sup> Vespasian adopted an indirect approach to exploit the internal divisions of the rebels. As a consequence, he delayed a Roman attack on



the city that posed the risk of reunifying the different enemy factions.<sup>53</sup> Less productive, Vespasian also persisted in a policy of systematic devastation of the countryside that generated thousands of fugitives and fueled the insurgency he was attempting to subdue.<sup>54</sup> His plan was to clear the country and force the people to flee to Jerusalem, denying the bands of insurgents the support they needed.<sup>55</sup> In the spring of 68 CE, he ordered his men to advance into the region of Perea. He restored Roman rule over Gadara and Antipatris, devastated the surrounding region and marched on Lydda and Jamna, garrisoning them with trusted deserters from Jerusalem. He then established a fortified camp at Emmaus in order to block the approaches to Jerusalem, and marched south ravaging the countryside. Vespasian pursued his strategy of isolation by establishing fortified camps at Jericho and Adida, and garrisoned them with infantry and auxiliary cavalry. Thus, he completely encircled Jerusalem and secured his lines of communications by eliminating enemy strongholds and field forces.<sup>56</sup>

Political crisis in Rome forced Vespasian to stop the campaign for the rest of the year. In the countryside, the revolutionaries organized themselves in companies and started to attack villages and towns, particularly those that were favorable to an agreement with the Romans. The most violent were the *Sicarii* of Masada, who ravaged the entire region, but “[i]n all districts of Judaea there was a similar upsurge of terrorism.”<sup>57</sup> In the Judean countryside the Jewish rural population conducted a protracted revolutionary war against the Romans, who employed combined formations of cavalry and infantry to subdue the insurgency.<sup>58</sup> In the spring of 69 CE, Vespasian launched a limited operation from Caesarea to subdue the remaining part of the country and take control of the northern approaches to Jerusalem. Simultaneously, his main

effort advanced towards Jerusalem to spread terror among the insurgents, while also dispatching one of his generals to lay waste to Upper Idumea and conquer Hebron, recently retaken by the rebels. Many insurgents surrendered or deserted, but resistance remained with small bands attacking the Romans behind the lines, or sabotaging wells and springs to deny them water. Continued insurgent activity forced Vespasian to concentrate prisoners in special guarded camps, wasting manpower.<sup>59</sup>

After Vespasian became emperor, Titus received command of the Judean campaign. In March 70 CE, he advanced on Jerusalem at the head of a powerful army. On May 1, he ordered three legions to encamp on Mount Scopus and one legion on the Mount of Olives. Suddenly, the insurgents made a sortie against this legion, and unexpectedly routed it. Josephus reports that “[m]en highly organized and trained to fight according to the book and in obedience to orders are most quickly demoralized by unorthodox and enterprising tactics.”<sup>60</sup> Finally, the rebels retreated inside the city, having suffered heavy losses. An angry Titus ordered his men to build three platforms to approach the walls. Bowmen and artillerymen covered the legionaries at work, who were relatively safe due to the fact that the insurgents did not know how to use the catapults previously captured. Unfortunately, some deserters from the Roman army taught the insurgents how to work the engines, wreaking havoc among the besiegers. On May 25, a section of the wall collapsed. The Romans stormed the breach and took the so called “New City.”<sup>61</sup> Four days later, the Romans captured the Second Wall and Titus entered the inner city without widening the breach, and accompanied only by a thousand legionaries and his personal bodyguard. When the insurgents counterattacked, the Romans remained entrapped. The breach was too narrow both for

the reinforcements to advance and the vanguard to retreat, and the rebels had the advantages of numbers and familiarity with the city. Titus saved the day and his life by placing the heavy infantry at the end of the street in close battle order with the bowmen behind them; the ensuing barrage of arrows and the wall of shields stopped the insurgents. The Romans were able to retire through the breach, reaching their comrades.<sup>62</sup> Undeterred by the setback, Titus persevered and retook the breach after four days of fierce fighting. He immediately ordered the wall demolished. Titus then commanded platforms be constructed to attack the Upper City and the Fortress Antonia. The insurgents, thanks to a contingent of skilled Jewish soldiers from Adiabene, mined the platforms in front of Antonia and destroyed them. Subsequently, the rebels sallied and destroyed the other platforms. Titus was forced to stop the attacks and ordered the construction of a wall around the city to starve the defenders.<sup>63</sup> The Romans built other platforms to attack Antonia and opened a breach in its wall but no one dared to assault the breach. Two days later, during the night, the guards of an advanced post took the initiative and cautiously slipped inside the fortress. The insurgents were taken by surprise and the Romans were fast in mounting a major attack. The lack of discipline and of a proper command structure handicapped the insurgents, enabling the Romans to take control of the fortress. Despite their superior training, weapons and discipline, the Romans were unable to push towards the Temple.

Titus formed a special task force with the most gallant men, with the aim to attack the Temple under the cover of darkness. The insurgents responded quickly and the Romans suffered heavy losses, especially because the soldiers were from different units and unaccustomed to fighting together. The besiegers thus began building a

platform to attack the Temple and for days the battle raged between small raiding parties. Perhaps inevitably, the Romans captured the Temple after the Sanctuary caught fire, forcing the insurgents to evacuate the holy site.<sup>64</sup> The following day, the Romans drove the revolutionaries from the Lower City in the wake of a bitter street fight. Titus ordered platforms built to attack the Upper City. On September 25, 70 CE, a section of the wall collapsed and the Romans attacked. The insurgents panicked and fled; Titus was master of the entire city.<sup>65</sup> In the aftermath, Masada was conquered in 73 CE or 74 CE, after an epic siege.<sup>66</sup> Some *Sicarii* fled to Alexandria and tried to foment an anti-Roman revolt, but were caught. Other *Sicarii* went to Cyrene and provoked anti-Roman protests. The Governor immediately sent a contingent to crush the demonstrators.<sup>67</sup> Although this upheaval roused minor Jewish rebellions for the following decades—and prominent Jews in Rome and Alexandria were accused of providing money and weapons to the rebels—the Jewish insurgency against Rome collapsed with the fall of Jerusalem.<sup>68</sup>

#### Second Case Study: the Philippine-American War (1899-1902 CE)

On May 1, 1898, at Manila Bay, during the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, commanded by Commodore George Dewey, destroyed the Spanish Pacific Squadron, commanded by Admiral Patricio Montoyo y Pasarón. On May 25, the first American expedition departed from San Francisco to occupy the Philippines.<sup>69</sup> The Americans arrived at Manila Bay on June 30. The Spanish forces were entrenched in the city, under siege by Filipino revolutionaries, led by General Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippines on June 12, and eleven days later came the formation of a Revolutionary Government. On June 20, he had promulgated the creation of the regular Army of Liberation of the Philippines and

the irregular Revolutionary Militia, with respective chains of command.<sup>70</sup> On August 13, the Americans stormed and seized Manila, confining the Filipino soldiers to the suburbs. Tension among Americans and Filipinos arose, with the Army of Liberation forces—estimated from 15,000 to 40,000—enveloping the American lines. Aguinaldo's men built extensive field fortifications, with artillery and blockhouses, and organized the city militia and the inhabitants themselves for an uprising against the U.S. garrison, numbering about 11,000 men.

Finally, on the night of February 4, 1899, hostilities erupted.<sup>71</sup> Timely intervention by the U.S. Provost Guard overcame the ill-conducted uprising in the city, thereby protecting the rear of the army. The following morning, the American offensive started. Covered by the fire of field batteries, naval artillery, and machine guns, U.S. soldiers gallantly assaulted the formidable Filipino fieldworks. After a brutal combat at close quarter, they dislodged Aguinaldo's soldiers, who fought heroically and died by the hundreds. By the end of the day, the Americans had broken through the Filipino lines and drove away the Army of Liberation.<sup>72</sup> During the night of February 22, the revolutionaries started an insurrection in the city. Inexplicably, the Army of Liberation did not support the rising and allowed the Americans to defeat the insurgents.<sup>73</sup>

On February 11, U.S. forces conducted an awkward landing on the island of Panay and seized Iloilo City.<sup>74</sup> The Americans established a defensive perimeter outside the city, encompassing the towns of Jaro and Molo. Nevertheless, the countryside was infested by insurgents and bandits. On March 16, the revolutionaries attacked Jaro, but were driven back by a strong column of infantry with artillery and machine guns sent from Iloilo City. As a consequence of the severe losses, the rebels abandoned

conventional tactics and relied solely on guerrilla warfare.<sup>75</sup> A subsequent landing on the island of Negros was peaceful, thanks to the local elite willing to cooperate with the Americans. In the countryside, a weak guerrilla threat developed, waged by bands of common brigands, insurgents, and religious fanatics. The latter were called *Babaylanes*, from their leader, the *Babaylan* (shaman) Dionisio Sigobela, known as Papa Isio (Pope Isio). They killed, raped, looted and kidnapped, but were more like rural gangs than guerrillas.<sup>76</sup> Despite the fact that bands of brigands reinforced the movement, it rapidly crumbled thanks to tactical adaptations of U.S. local commanders.<sup>77</sup> The landing on the island of Cebu was likewise peaceful (February 21, 1899), but soon the insurgents reorganized and were able attack U.S. forces and local officials. The mayor of Cebu City was assassinated on June 11, and guerrillas and bandits raided the countryside and towns with impunity.<sup>78</sup>

In response, Major General Elwell Stephen Otis, U.S. forces commander and military governor, planned to advance into central Luzon to confront insurgent resistance directly. He sought a classical battle of annihilation, with concurrent operations in central and southern Luzon to sever the Army of Liberation's north-south lines of communication and preempt its activities there.<sup>79</sup> Otis carefully planned the campaign, while the commander of the Army of Liberation, General Antonio Luna y Novicio, improved the defense around Malolos (the capital city of the Republic), recruited soldiers, and trained the army with the similar aim of fighting a conventional battle.<sup>80</sup> The offensive started on March 25, 1899; however, the advancing American columns were delayed by jungle, harsh terrain, rivers, and the fierce resistance of numerous Filipino detachments. On March 31, U.S. forces entered Malolos, but the

Army of Liberation had been able to retreat and escape the trap.<sup>81</sup> Otis resumed the offensive, with the city of Calumpit as his new objective. Luna deployed his best troops to defend the city, employed thousands of laborers to built impressive fieldworks, and secured his flanks with more troops and earthworks. The offensive began on April 23, and two days later, after bloody engagements with the insurgents, U.S. forces took Calumpit. The Filipinos retreated, launching large bodies of irregular fighters on the stretched American lines of communication.<sup>82</sup> On May 16, the Americans captured San Isidro, signaling an end to the offensive. Otis then ordered a march to southern Luzon to crush the guerrillas harassing American garrisons and convoys. After fierce skirmishes, the insurgents melted away, hiding among the populace and continuing to frustrate American plans.<sup>83</sup>

During the summer, the U.S. Navy tightened the blockade of the archipelago, pursuing insurgent boats, smugglers, and pirates, and conducting reconnaissance for the Army.<sup>84</sup> On June 5, General Luna was murdered, presumably by partisans of President Aguinaldo.<sup>85</sup> Otis planned a new northern campaign to encircle and destroy the Army of Liberation.<sup>86</sup> The advance started on October 9; however, harsh terrain, heavy rains, and stubborn resistance delayed the march of U.S. troops. Faced with this new American offensive, Aguinaldo ordered the Army of Liberation to disperse and adopt guerrilla tactics.<sup>87</sup> On November 7, U.S. forces landed in San Fabian, on the Lingayen Gulf, supported by naval gun fire. Four days later, the Americans took San Jacinto, after a pitched battle with superior Filipino forces, and marched further south. On November 12, the Americans entered Tarlac, the previous capital of the Republic.

Filipino forces had melted away; the northern campaign finished by the end of the month.<sup>88</sup>

In January 1900, the Americans marched into southern Luzon. U.S. soldiers drove through several entrenched Filipino lines of resistance and scattered Filipino forces. The main concern of the insurgent commander, Brigadier General Miguel Malvar y Carpio, was an amphibious operation in the south; consequently, he deployed his best troops to face such a threat. Thus, U.S. forces confronted only poorly armed and untrained militia who gave way. The Americans captured a large quantity of equipment and occupied the major towns, but Filipino forces dispersed and resumed guerrilla tactics.<sup>89</sup> On January 18, a joint Army-Navy expedition departed from Manila to the Bicol Peninsula. Two days later, Sorsogon City was taken. On January 23, U.S. forces attacked the heavily fortified and garrisoned city of Lagazpi. U.S. commanders spotted a weakness on the Filipino left flank and landed troops to attack it; as a result, the entire Filipino line collapsed and the insurgents retreated with heavy losses.<sup>90</sup> The expedition sailed to the island of Samar, taking Calbayog City on January 26 without a fight. Finally, the expedition captured Catbalogan City and seized the ports of Tacloban and Ormoc on the island of Leyte. At the end of February, another joint expedition took the province of Ambos Camarines in northern Bicol, routing Filipino insurgents.<sup>91</sup> Major General Arthur MacArthur, Jr., succeeded Otis on May 5 as commanding general and military governor.<sup>92</sup> The situation in the archipelago was worsening and the number of attacks on U.S. forces—and casualties—rose steadily.<sup>93</sup>

Rebel forces on the island of Mindanao were relatively scarce, but they were well led, brave, and made good use of the traditional wood-and-stone fortresses, called



*cottas*. U.S. forces were able to defeat their opponents employing mounted infantry, special sharpshooter units, and artillery to destroy the *cottas* and supply depots.<sup>94</sup> On the island of Leyte, the Filipino leadership mobilized the entire population and tried to defend strongholds and supply depots. As a consequence, U.S. forces were able to crush the insurgents in a series of field confrontations. Insurgents withdrew to the interior of the island, reverting to guerrilla tactics. The Americans developed intelligence gathering, employed long range patrols, and launched several expeditions to destroy enemy forces and camps. Filipino forces were obliged to disperse and many fighters deserted or surrendered. In the end, the entire revolutionary organization collapsed.<sup>95</sup>

U.S. commanders devoted a great deal of resources, especially in Luzon, to reorganize their forces, build roads, telegraphs lines, schools, establish local governments, and provide services to the population. Militarily, they introduced new tactics, established police and paramilitary Filipino forces, and adopted measures to subdue the resistance; namely, confiscation of crops and livestock, destruction of foodstuff, fields, boats, and buildings, imprisonment, and forced resettlement of populations.<sup>96</sup> Filipino leadership in northern Luzon was particularly effective in establishing shadow governments, organizing militias, and coordinating guerrilla regulars to attack U.S. forces and local supporters. In March 1901, the Americans arrested the guerrilla Crispulo Patajo, leader of the religious sect *Guardia de Honor*. U.S. officers convinced him to cooperate with them and he and his men became one of the most effective anti-guerrilla units, killing and capturing scores of insurgents and local supporters. With renovated popular support, the recruitment of local guides and auxiliary units, and the lessons from the aforementioned engagements, U.S. forces

made significant headway against the insurgents. They manned outposts along the roads, patrolled the countryside, searched houses, swept barrios, established mounted long-range reconnaissance detachments, and launched mobile columns to attack rebel camps. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1900, well trained and supplied guerrilla formations counterattacked U.S. troops, inflicting severe losses. During the winter, American forces swept the mountains to attack the camps of the insurgents, arrested numerous sympathizers, and established protected zones for the populations; these initiatives forced many rebels to surrender.<sup>97</sup> Extremely important for the success was the recruitment of local auxiliary units, as well as joint riverine and amphibious operations.

On February 23, 1901, Brigadier General Frederick N. Funston captured President Aguinaldo.<sup>98</sup> On the island of Marinduque, the U.S. commander ordered all the peasants to move to the towns, leaving the guerrillas without support, food and shelter. In the following April, the insurgents capitulated.<sup>99</sup> The head of the insurgency in southern Luzon was Major General Vito Belarmino y Loyola. He focused his effort in the Province of Bicol, leaving the Camarines to local chiefs. His main mistakes were trying to defend the beaches and ordering the population to desert the towns and go to the countryside. The Americans—with an effective maritime blockade and a policy of food deprivation—persuaded the populace to return to the towns, leaving the guerrillas without support. Belarmino was forced to disperse his troops. Meanwhile, young U.S. officers developed innovative tactics and raised local police forces, sending combined patrols to hunt the guerrillas and their supporters. Small night patrols composed of U.S. soldiers and natives searched the countryside, while strong mobile columns and

amphibious detachments assaulted guerrilla bases. In March 1901, resistance in the Camarines ended and Belarmino surrendered on July 4.<sup>100</sup>

In the provinces of Cavite, Batangas and Laguna the insurgents were supported by the upper class and were able to maintain semi-permanent military units. The leadership adopted a strategy of attrition, attacking small outposts, patrols, and supply trains, as well as the supporters of the Americans. U.S. commanders made a sound use of information operations and convinced local elite to support them. Additionally, they attacked the logistical infrastructure of the insurgents and employed patrols, mobile columns, amphibious landings, and gunboats to attack the guerrillas. Resistance in Cavite ended in March 1901, while the last insurgents surrendered in Batangas in May. Laguna province was pacified the following June.<sup>101</sup>

In July 1901 Major General Adna Romanza Chaffee became commanding general and military governor. The final campaign of the war was conducted on the island of Samar. The U.S. offensive started on June 13, 1901. The Army established camps in the main river valleys, aggressively patrolled the countryside, and sent mobile columns to the mountains. The Navy effectively blockaded the islands, patrolled adjacent waters, and landed Army detachments. Many civilian boats were confiscated to stop smuggling and the flow of supplies. The populations were concentrated in protected zones and crops destroyed. Nevertheless, September and October were characterized by numerous and effective guerrilla raids. On September 23, the infamous "Balangiga Massacre" occurred. The U.S. garrison was annihilated during a well planned and executed onslaught conducted by the guerrillas and the townspeople.<sup>102</sup> The Army, Navy and Marine Corps reinforcements sent after the

massacre were employed to put pressure on the guerrillas. Riverine and amphibious operations struck the logistical system of the guerrillas, severely limiting their combat effectiveness. Searches undermined the insurgent support, while foot and mounted patrols by loyal Filipino scouts limited the freedom of movement of the rebels. On April 27, 1902, the last malnourished insurgents surrendered.<sup>103</sup>

### Analysis of the Theories

As previously shown, the early concept of asymmetry simply referred to a disproportion in military power. As demonstrated with quotations from official U.S. documents, the term “asymmetric warfare” has become the mere synonym of “irregular warfare.” In time, scholars tried to find another concept suited to describe the purported uniqueness of today’s wars. The most successful has been the term “hybrid warfare”, and its most vocal supporter has been Frank G. Hoffman. His definition has been adopted in the 2009 Army Capstone Concept, thereby providing informal endorsement.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, the two case studies clearly show that asymmetry is as old as war and that hybridism is not a new phenomenon. Good commanders have always tried to exploit positive asymmetry and overcome negative asymmetry.

Many belligerents have employed a mix of regular and irregular forces, often resorting to terrorist tactics and sometimes allying with criminal organizations. Jewish insurgents even tried to obtain recognition and aid from a state actor. The Jewish kingdom of Adiabene in the Upper Tigris region affected the eastern policy of Rome, and bolstered the insurgents, who apparently sent emissaries and expected to receive military and financial supports. Actually, members of the royal family of Adiabene took an active part in the revolt and specialist troops from Adiabene fought against the Romans, but officially the sovereign of the country withheld open military involvement.<sup>105</sup>

Josephus and other field commanders tried to employ conventional forces and many times the insurgents fought the Romans in conventional pitched battles. As far as technology is concerned, captured catapults provided the insurgents with powerful state-of-the-art war machines, capable of wreaking havoc among the Romans. Conventional means, however, were certainly not the norm and the *Zealots* provide a perfect example of asymmetric guerrilla fighters. Some scholars view the *Zealots* as an anti-Roman, religiously motivated, organized national resistance movement.<sup>106</sup> A new perspective views the movement as the result of Roman re-conquest. Accordingly, as the armies of Vespasian advanced, the peasants were forced to flee villages and farms, and many of them formed bands of guerrillas to fight the invaders. Vespasian's men, by the end of 67 CE, had destroyed the bulk of these bands. The survivors took shelter in heavily defended strongholds, or fled to Jerusalem for the final stand. Here, they formed a coalition, called themselves "*Zealots*", and tried to implement their religious, political and social beliefs.<sup>107</sup> In any case, the group was a powerful and unwavering national resistance movement, religiously motivated, strongly committed to the cause, and willing to fight to the last man.

Not unlike their *zealot* guerrilla cousins, the Jewish Revolt provides an excellent example of a terrorist organization utilizing asymmetric means to achieve political ends. The *Sicarii* surfaced in Jerusalem in the 50s of the first century CE. Their name came from the weapon they used, very similar to the Roman *sica*, a curved short sword with a blade 40-45 cm long. They committed deliberate and organized assassinations in urban environments with political aims. Moreover, they adopted covert methods of operations and remained unidentified in normal public life. Terrorism was the perfect tactic for the

small group and the victims were Jews who collaborated or cooperated with the occupier, as well as high value targets with political or religious significance. The *Sicarii's* terrorist tactics then evolved, adding kidnapping or assassination of rich and influential people in conjunction with the devastation or looting of their properties. The attacks were intended to punish, warn, deter, dissuade, and possibly provoke the ruling elite or the Romans to retaliate against the Jews. Encouraged by the results of their campaign, the *Sicarii* extended their actions in the countryside against the nobility. Organized in company-size formations they assaulted the villas of the landed gentry, killed them and their relatives, ravaged their properties and burnt their villages. They encouraged the peasants to revolt, and threatened with death the Jews that cooperated with the occupiers. They also kidnapped rich Jews or public officials to obtain by threat the liberation of incarcerated partisans. The terrorist campaign of the *Sicarii* was one of the precipitants of the revolt, spreading terror among the ruling elite and forcing them to organize gangs of armed men to protect themselves. The *Sicarii* played an important role in the initial phase of the insurrection and later instigated revolts in Egypt and Libya. In short, the *Sicarii* were an organized terroristic group with a religiously motivated political strategy and sophisticated terror tactics; nevertheless, they remained unable to build a social-political base among the people.<sup>108</sup>

Criminality was also an important factor before and during the revolt. Bands of brigands, in some cases fairly large, were active in Judaea prior to the insurrection of 66 CE. Banditry was epidemic in the region and survived the great offensive ordered by Emperor Augustus. The perpetrators were common criminals that became brigands for merely economic reasons. They threatened farmers, villagers and travelers, rich and

poor.<sup>109</sup> Brigandage was, among other factors, one of the precipitants of the anti-Roman insurrection. The vast majority of brigand groups joined the insurgents immediately or subsequently, providing the best leaders and fighters to the insurgency movement. Some of them did so for money and a few even provided protection to towns loyal to the Romans.<sup>110</sup> Bandits were masters in guerrilla tactics, as pointed out by Josephus when he states that the Jewish insurgents adopted a “bandit-like warfare” to fight the Romans.<sup>111</sup> In any case, Vespasian and his generals found them reconcilable insurgents and employed them to protect and garrison the re-conquered towns.

A different phenomenon is represented by social banditry. The brigands considered themselves victims of injustice and were simply avenging themselves; moreover, they enjoyed the benefit of support from the common people, who shared the same beliefs, values and religion. In Judaea, social banditry was endemic and the targets were the land-owners, the rich gentry, and the Romans. The outlaws aided the impoverished farmers and villagers, thereby becoming popular heroes. The ruling class and the occupiers tried to suppress the brigandage by ravaging the countryside and punishing the supporters. These efforts to subdue the brigandage, however, exacerbated the situation and pushed many peasants into becoming bandits. Social banditry was a catalyst for the revolt of 66 CE, and provided battle hardened commanders and warriors willing to fight a merciless war for the liberation of their nation.<sup>112</sup> It was the most noteworthy form taken by “nascent Jewish rebellion against the Romans ...,”<sup>113</sup> and “... in effect became a peasant rebellion.”<sup>114</sup>

The second case study likewise provides clear evidence of the concept that asymmetry and hybridism are not new in warfare. At the end of the nineteenth century,

banditry was endemic in the Philippines. It was primarily caused by social and economic factors, mainly by the rich landlords forcing the peasants to the status of debt peonage. Many dispossessed joined bands of brigands or militant religious sects and fought the Spaniards and Filipino upper class. In 1892, in Manila, a group of nationalist Filipinos formed a secret revolutionary society with the purpose of gaining independence through an armed revolution. The name of the organization was “Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Children of the Country.” The plot was discovered by Spanish authorities in August 1896 and fighting erupted on August 25. Initially successful, the insurrection was doomed by May 1897, mainly due to the insistence of the insurgents to take and defend the towns. The rebels retreated to the hills and adopted guerrilla tactics.

On November 11, 1897, General Aguinaldo decreed the institution of a village militia, called *Sandahatan*, to wage protracted guerrilla warfare.<sup>115</sup> On June 20, 1898, he instituted the regular Filipino army, initially based on three infantry regiments, and the revolutionary militia, formed by the aforementioned *Sandahatan*, town companies, and units of varied size raised by local governments and prominent people. On July 30, he decreed that every province of the Tagalog ethnic group had to raise a provincial battalion for the regular army.<sup>116</sup> Confronting the Americans, Aguinaldo and his generals—relying mainly on veterans and weapons of the Spanish army—tried to organize a conventional army, with line and light infantry, cavalry, artillery, and staff organization.<sup>117</sup> On February 13, 1899, Aguinaldo ordered all males aged sixteen to fifty-nine to join the militia, armed with traditional *bolo* knives, and established local guerrilla units in towns and villages. The guerrilla organization was based on existing



municipalities, with local governments serving as committees of defense and local officials serving as military commanders.

The establishment of a conventional field army and a decentralized guerrilla force shows what McAllister Linn calls the “hybrid nature of Aguinaldo military thought.”<sup>118</sup> On November 12, 1899, Aguinaldo ordered the Army of Liberation to disband and the soldiers to return to their provinces and revert to guerrilla warfare. Geographical districts were assigned to general officers who divided their area of responsibilities into provincial and zone commands assigned to colonels or majors.<sup>119</sup> The tasks of the militia were: provide village security, build field fortifications and mantraps, cut telegraph wires, collect taxes, hide fighters and weapons, supply the full-time guerrillas, provide information, and intimidate collaborators. Regular units were highly mobile formations made up of riflemen and bolomen, with a net of strongpoints in remote areas of the mountains and jungle. Regulars and militia banded together to attack enemy patrols, garrisons, convoys, lines of communications, and collaborators.<sup>120</sup> In reality, the distinction between the two forces was vague; local militia provided recruits to the regular units, but in areas where American presence was limited the militiamen became full-time partisans. In contrast, when facing overwhelming U.S. offensive action, regular units dispersed, and the fighters hid among the population.<sup>121</sup> Militiamen spied, ensured villager loyalty, acted as a police force and as a reserve force for the regulars. Some of them served in small semi-regular units but the vast majority were called upon for specific actions.<sup>122</sup>

As far as technology is concerned, Filipino regulars possessed good smokeless powder Remington Rolling Block rifles captured or provided by the Americans; the

weapons were superior to the black powder, shorter range Springfield Model 1873 rifles employed by the U.S. state volunteers and the smokeless powder Model 1892/99 Krag-Jørgensen rifles employed by the U.S. Regulars.<sup>123</sup> The Army of Liberation also employed modern Maxim and Gatling machine guns, Krupp artillery pieces, and excellent Mauser Model 1893 rifles captured from the Spanish Army. In particular, the Mauser was far superior to its U.S. counterpart.<sup>124</sup>

Bands of brigands joined the revolutionary movement and spread the rebellion.<sup>125</sup> Brigandage was endemic in many areas of the archipelago, and bandits were expert irregular fighters.<sup>126</sup> Some bands had hundreds of bandits and controlled several villages. The insurgency was evidently multi-dimensional and was characterized by operational integration as demonstrated by the fact that in the fall of 1900 the revolutionary leadership launched a coordinated campaign to influence U.S. presidential elections. The objective was to inflict heavy losses on U.S. forces and influence Americans to vote for the anti-war candidate, William Jennings Bryan, instead of President William McKinley, who was running for a second term of office.<sup>127</sup> The Filipino leaders understood very clearly that the strategic center of gravity of the Americans was "... the national willpower as expressed by the Commander-in-Chief and supported by his superiors, the voting public," and the operational center of gravity was "... the forces fielded in the Philippines."<sup>128</sup>

The insurgents made good use of propaganda, populism, secret societies, and religious sects. Millenaristic religious rebels, such as the *Babaylanes*, *Pulahanes*, *Colorums*, *Dios-Dios*, and *Guardia de Honor*, fought both the revolutionaries and the Americans.<sup>129</sup> In many areas, especially in Mindanao, Muslim-pagan-Christian rivalries

spread “banditry, rustling, and violent crime.”<sup>130</sup> Many revolutionary leaders employed terrorism to maintain popular backing to the cause of independence. Torture, mutilation, kidnapping, robbery, arson, maiming, and murder were largely employed to get support, punish collaborators, convince the undecided, and scare the opponents.<sup>131</sup> The fate of collaborators was widely publicized in order to deter such behaviors.<sup>132</sup> Insurgents wanted to “create a climate of fear and anxiety, and to demonstrate that the Americans could not protect the inhabitants.”<sup>133</sup> The response of U.S. forces was equally brutal. Widespread burning, execution of prisoners, and torture outraged American public opinion.<sup>134</sup> The most employed form of torture was the so called “water cure.”<sup>135</sup> Insurgent terrorism was at first effective in separating the occupiers from the population, denying intelligence, blocking civic action, and dampening collaboration, but in the end such harsh means only alienated the population and pushed many people to cooperate with the Americans.<sup>136</sup> In southwestern Luzon, terrorism was also employed to demoralize U.S. soldiers through acts of violence on American prisoners of war.<sup>137</sup>

## Conclusion

Ignorance and arrogance are fierce enemies of true innovation. The reason for failure is lack of knowledge. The famous caveat of Spanish philosopher George Santayana reminds us that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it;”<sup>138</sup> this caution could be very useful for today’s strategic leaders. Many are convinced that nation-states have dominated the history of humanity, yet they know nothing of the millennia before the nineteenth century. Whether we believe or not, non-state actors were facets of ancient, medieval, and early modern warfare: powerful traders; private armies; contractors who defended border and coastal fortresses; private investors who provided logistical supplies and/or ships; mercenaries; privateers; pirates;

tribal chiefs; religious leaders; warlords; rebels, terrorists, insurgents and revolutionaries.<sup>139</sup> Strategic leaders of those times were perfectly able to deal with state and non-state actors; moreover, they were more flexible, competent, and were better innovators than contemporary strategic leaders. This paper has demonstrated that asymmetry has always existed. The reflections of Professor Hew Strachan serve us as a fitting epitaph for the concept: “Asymmetrical warfare is what armies do in their peacetime imaginations.... The popular belief that asymmetric war is new is therefore a reflection of the way in which we have allowed peacetime norms to shape our understanding of strategy.”<sup>140</sup>

As far as hybridism is concerned, this paper has demonstrated that it is not an “unprecedented” phenomenon. Moreover, belligerents have always employed technology to win and tried to exploit cities for their purposes. Many conflicts through the ages have seen the employment of a mix of regular and irregular fighters, the use of terrorist tactics, and even the participation of gangs of criminals in a multi-dimensional battle-space with good operational integration, thereby refuting Hoffman’s theory. The two case studies have demonstrated also that the exploitation of the information domain is not new. Jewish insurgents minted coins for propaganda purposes and appealed to the kingdom of Adiabene for moral and material support. Filipino leadership appealed to the emperor of Japan for help, tried to influence the American presidential election, showed good theatre integration, and instituted a conventional army, uniformed, trained, and organized along Western lines to “demonstrate the high level of civilization of the Filipinos and encourage recognition of their independence.”<sup>141</sup> To conclude, the risk is

that, as pointed out by General Sir David Richards, traditional military options become “an asymmetric attraction to a potential enemy.”<sup>142</sup>

## Endnotes

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 181-182.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 177-178.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 195.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 11.

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<sup>23</sup> *National Military Strategy 2004* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 1, 5, 14, 15, 18, 24.

<sup>24</sup> Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2, 2007, incorporating change 1 March 20, 2009), GL-8.

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<sup>28</sup> James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* 132, no. 11 (November 2005): 30-32.

<sup>29</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, "Preparing for Hybrid Wars: What Will Be the Future Marine Corps Capability," *Marine Corps Gazette* 91, no. 3 (March 2007): 57-61.

<sup>30</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), 1.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>34</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2009): 36.

<sup>35</sup> Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid vs. Compound War The Janus Choice: Defining today's Multifaceted Conflicts," *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2009): 15.

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<sup>40</sup> Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., "Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters* (Winter 2000-01): 21-30.

<sup>41</sup> Josephus, *The Jewish War* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books Ltd, 1981), 166-169.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 170-179.

<sup>43</sup> Brian W. Jones, *The Emperor Titus* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 36.

<sup>44</sup> Barbara Levick, *Vespasian* (London: Routledge, 1999), 194.

<sup>45</sup> Gaalya Cornfeld, *Josephes Flavius: The Jewish War* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing, 1982), 226.

<sup>46</sup> Josephus, *The Jewish War*, 198-202.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 205-206.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 216-222.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 223-229.

<sup>51</sup> Desmond Seward, *Jerusalem's Traitor* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 131.

<sup>52</sup> Gaalya Cornfeld, *Josephes Flavius: The Jewish War*, 296.

<sup>53</sup> Brian W. Jones, *The Emperor Titus*, 39.

<sup>54</sup> Andrea M. Berlin and J. Andrew Overnam, *The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 2002), 99.

<sup>55</sup> Brian W. Jones, *The Emperor Titus*, 55.

<sup>56</sup> Desmond Seward, *Jerusalem's Traitor*, 134.

<sup>57</sup> Josephus, *The Jewish War*, 255.

<sup>58</sup> Gaalya Cornfeld, *Josephes Flavius: The Jewish War*, 288.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 378.

<sup>60</sup> Josephus, *The Jewish War*, 282.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 296-300.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 303-304.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 316-319.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 343-347.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 357.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 374-391.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 392-394.

<sup>68</sup> Gaalya Cornfeld, *Josephes Flavius: The Jewish War*, 508-509.

<sup>69</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 13.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-22.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 48-52.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 59-61.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-68.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 70-71.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 77-78.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 79-81.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-87.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 96-99.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 110-111.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 117-120.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 130-132.



<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 144-148.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 149-159.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 164-168.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 176-177.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 178-179.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 208.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 209.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 228-230.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 234-240.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 255 and 258.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 262-263.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 275.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 279-280.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 280-286.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 287-305.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 306-311.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 312-321.

<sup>104</sup> *The Army Capstone Concept 2009* (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, Headquarters United States Army, TRADOC, December 21, 2009), 15 and 47.

<sup>105</sup> Gaalya Cornfeld, *Josephes Flavius: The Jewish War*, 431.

<sup>106</sup> M. Hengel, *Die Zeloten* (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 111.

<sup>107</sup> Richard A. Horsley, "The Zealots: Their Origin, Relationships and Importance in the Jewish Revolt," *Novum Testamentum XXVIII*, 2 (1986): 190-191.

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<sup>111</sup> Josephus, *The Jewish War*, 119.

<sup>112</sup> Richard A. Horsley, "Josephus and the Bandits," *Journal for the Study of Judaism X*, 1 (1979): 37-63.

<sup>113</sup> Richard A. Horsley, "Ancient Jewish Banditry and the Revolt against Rome, A.D. 66-70," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 43 (1981): 410.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 426.

<sup>115</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 4-6.

<sup>116</sup> Robert D. Ramsey III, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, n.d.), 11.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>119</sup> Robert D. Ramsey III, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902*, 23-24.

<sup>120</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 187-188.

<sup>121</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 17.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>124</sup> "The Krag-Jorgensen Gun, It Is Inferior in Many Respects to the Mauser Used by the Spaniards. Lessons of Cuban Campaign," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1898.

<sup>125</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 34.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>128</sup> Timothy K. Deady, "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902," *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 57.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 289.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 268.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 219.

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<sup>136</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 268.

<sup>137</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 133.

<sup>138</sup> George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (London: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1906), 123.

<sup>139</sup> Flavio Russo, *La Difesa Delegata* (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, 2008), 12.

<sup>140</sup> Hew Strachan, "The Politicians and the Generals," *Oxford Today* 19, no. 3 (Trinity Issue 2007): 16.

<sup>141</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 12.

<sup>142</sup> Quoted by Andrew Chuter, "Deep U.K. Budget Cuts Coming, Experts Say," *DefenseNews* 24, no. 27 (July 6, 2009): 8.