

US Strategy in a Post-Western World

Robert A. Manning

It received precious little attention. But the World Bank report earlier this year indicating that, for the first time, trade between developing countries – ‘South–South trade’ in the parlance – has surpassed their trade with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations is a milestone in the transformation of the global system.¹ Developing nations now account for roughly one-third of world trade. This is a telling sign of the new dynamics of globalisation, which are shifting away from a US-centric economy towards a more complex and disorderly world order. The Obama administration would do well to fully grasp the implications of these realities and adjust US foreign policy accordingly. This essay seeks to sketch the accommodations US strategists might be wise to consider.

Globalisation has wrought a diffusion of power among nation-states and increased the technology-driven empowerment of individuals, non-state actors and networks. This is redistributing and redefining power – a far cry from the early 1990s, when the term globalisation was synonymous with the United States. Solving problems such as poverty, disease, climate change and those stemming from the Middle East’s difficult metamorphosis may lie more in new collaboration between non-traditional partners – including, in some cases, non-state actors – than in current arrangements among states. It is a fragmented and messy, but not a classically multipolar, world.

Robert A. Manning is a Senior Fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as a Senior Strategist, DNI National Counterproliferation Center, 2010–12, and as Director for Long-range Energy and Regional/Global Affairs, US National Intelligence Council, Strategic Futures Group, 2008–10; and served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff, 2004–08. This essay is adapted from *Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World* (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, December 2012), now available as an e-book.

The redistribution of clout, combined with ongoing technological innovation, is changing the nature of power in the twenty-first century. Power is the ability to obtain desired outcomes. This will be much more difficult and more complicated than ever. As former US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft has argued, 'the very nature of power is being transformed. It is not based to the same extent on how many people are under arms or the strength of the national economy, but instead on more subtle attributes and levers of influence.'²

There is a burgeoning strata of pivotal states – dynamic, rising middle powers (most prominently: Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) – that are likely to play an increasingly important role in regional security and the shaping of global rules. Modernisation does not necessarily mean Westernisation; instead, it is occurring on the terms of various cultures as wealth and technology spreads to the east and the south. Some of these emerging states – democracies as well as authoritarian regimes – harbour resentments against past Western diktats that are likely to surface in unexpected ways. We saw a glimpse of this in 2010 when Brazil and Turkey tried to launch their own diplomatic effort to solve the Iranian nuclear issue.

It is important to understand that no major power seeks an alternative to the current interdependent global system. There appears to be a broad consensus on the desirability of a rules-based system. But as is displayed at annual BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summits, many emerging powers seek to bend the rules to serve favoured interests, values and aims, and do not necessarily accept the legitimacy of US rule-making. Key definitions of regulations, standards and norms are increasingly contested as emerging powers press for a larger role in global institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations Security Council. As evidenced by the failures of the Doha Round of global trade talks, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, effective global governance is increasingly difficult to achieve.

These emerging powers have a seat at the table in the G20, and the unwieldiness of that process offers a window into the future of global problem-solving. Yet the G20 is an important shift from the G8, reflecting the diffusion of global power. It represents some 80% of the world's population and 85%

of the global economy. Despite its somewhat disappointing performance to date, it is probably as good a mechanism as we will get for global decision-making and building consensus on global governance. The degree to which G20 nations evolve as stewards of the international system will determine whether a scenario of cooperation and sustainable global growth or a gloomy future of scarcity and conflict prevails. US strategy will require increased investment in intensive public and private diplomacy to foster a greater sense of both empowerment and responsibility on the part of G20 actors.

Region-centric globalisation

Within the G20, the dynamics of globalisation have shifted. Whatever the next phase of the European project, the EU is an emblem of, if not a trail-blazer in, an ongoing trend towards region-centric patterns of trade and investment that is reshaping the international system. The emerging nations of the G20 have become the engines of economic growth in a two-tier global economy. This is reflected in the growth of South–South trade, and in patterns of commerce and investment in the major economic clusters: the EU, East Asia, member states of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Latin America.




Figure 1. **Intraregional trade in 1999 and 2010 (\$billion)**

Nearly two-thirds of European trade is within the EU; more than 40% of US trade is with other NAFTA countries; 53% of East Asian is intra-regional; and, excluding Mexico, roughly 35% of Latin American trade is also intra-regional (and this last figure is growing rapidly).³ It should not be surprising that, however aspirational the initiative may be, South American countries are pursuing an EU-type regional body – the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) – or that Asian states are trying to build their own regional economic and political architecture.

One consequence of this economic pattern is more fragmented globalisation. Perhaps the most dramatic example of greater South–South economic activity is the growing ‘energy nexus’ in which two-thirds of Middle Eastern oil is exported to East Asia; China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan receive over 70% of their oil imports from Gulf states. This has generated growing commercial and cross-investment interdependence between the two regions, and may increasingly affect their geopolitical calculations. This trend will increasingly affect US influence in the Middle East over time. China and India will probably become more deeply involved in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Both countries will have the naval capacity to contribute to the security of sea lanes and the ability to collaborate in facilitating the transformation of




Figure 2. Oil export flows from the Middle East and major strategic maritime channels

the Middle East. The degree to which they act as stakeholders and assume some of this burden – and the United States’ ability to share power – will be an indicator of which of the positive and negative future scenarios outlined in the US National Intelligence Council report ‘Global Trends 2030’ lies ahead.⁴

Similarly, we see growing economic links between Asia and Latin America, and between China and Africa. In real terms, the diffusion of power means, for example, China and Brazil using the renminbi as a unit of exchange in bilateral trade. By 2030, the renminbi may compete with the dollar as a reserve currency. China has also become a major source of capital flows to non-OECD nations, loaning over \$110 billion to governments and companies in these countries since 2009, an amount rivalling that provided by the World Bank.⁵ Additionally, Beijing has provided grants of roughly \$15bn and around \$10bn in foreign aid to these countries.⁶

Other emerging G20 countries will also have a growing role in the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, unbeknown to most Americans, China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea also have growing foreign-aid programmes – and therefore competing interests with the West and with each other – in Africa, Central Asia and other areas. These patterns are altering the dynamics of globalisation.




Figure 3. **Gross official development assistance (\$billions)**

New power realities are further complicated by regional tensions and rivalries: between China and India, China and Japan, Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Greater Middle East, and Turkey and Iran. Beyond resentment of US dominance, it is unclear how much the BRICS agree on.

Global governance deficit

Such economic and political patterns will undoubtedly be a factor in the geopolitical calculus of major and middle-tier actors as they define and pursue their interests. This trend both reflects and is a driver of the diffusion of power, and will likely persist to 2030 and beyond. It has led some observers to conclude that we are living in a 'G-Zero' world, defined by Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini as 'one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage – or the will – to drive a truly international agenda'.⁷ Moisés Naim has gone further in his recent book *The End of Power*.⁸

This idea is rather exaggerated: we have seen demonstrable leadership and cooperation on issues such as terrorism; maritime piracy; myriad regional free-trade agreements; sanctions on nuclear proliferators, such as North Korea and Iran; and, in 2008, even initial G20 financial cooperation.

But for illustrative purposes, the G-Zero concept highlights a substantial underlying cause of what is widely considered to be a global governance deficit. It is worth recalling that the UN had 51 members at its founding in 1945; it now has 193 member states. Today, it would be considerably more difficult to write, much less achieve a consensus on, a UN Charter.

Nearly seven decades later, global institutions such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank and the IMF still largely reflect the power realities of the post-Second World War order. The International Energy Agency (IEA), created by OECD consumer nations in response to the 1973–74 oil crisis, even now does not count two of the world's largest energy consumers – China and India – among its members. Both are free riding on the strategic petroleum reserves of the 27 IEA members. Many countries call for the 'democratisation' of the international system, even though some, such as China, refuse to do so at home.

The lag between the diffusion of power and the distribution of power in multilateral institutions fosters resentment in emerging economies, thereby

complicating efforts at global problem-solving. It is therefore relatively easy for nations to block global agreements. But it also increases the difficulty of effectively cooperating to address global problems.

Nonetheless, the term ‘governance deficit’ is something of a misnomer. The world is not in a state of anarchy. There are dozens of mechanisms whose transnational activities we take for granted, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, whose rules coordinate world airline flights; the Internet; mail services; global use of credit cards; patent and copyright protection; and nuclear safety agreements. This ‘plumbing’ for the international system enables day-to-day globalisation.

The notion of a governance deficit most properly refers to global problem-solving. Avoiding the worst-case 2030 scenarios requires adjusting the global order in ways that more accurately reflect the actual influence of emerging G20 powers and regional groupings. It will be a test of US leadership to navigate the sharing of power in global institutions, and a test of ambition for emerging powers more comfortable with getting a free ride. It would be a world in which emerging states and non-state actors become responsible stakeholders and stewards of the global system. Not impossible to imagine, but extremely difficult to achieve.

Global Governance: The ‘Plumbing’ of Day-to-Day Globalisation

Arctic Council	Universal Postal Union
European Union	International Telecommunication Union
World Health Organization	Bank for International Settlements
World Intellectual Property Organization	International Committee of the
World Meteorological Organization	Red Cross
World Tourism Organization	International Mobile Satellite
World Trade Organization	Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency	Internet Corporation for Assigned
International Maritime Organization	Names and Numbers
Food and Agriculture Organization	European Bank for Reconstruction and
International Civil Aviation Organization	Development
World Customs Organization	International Court of Justice
Proliferation Security Initiative	International Criminal Police
International Telecommunications	Organization
Satellite Organization	International Labour Organization

One key problem in updating institutions is that there is a trade-off and a constant tension between political legitimacy and effectiveness. There have been efforts to reform the UN Security Council for several decades. However logical including India, Japan, Brazil or Germany may appear to be, would adding more veto-wielding members make the council more effective? And, of course, we have seen current permanent council members like China systematically veto proposals to admit regional rivals such as Japan and India.

Similarly, post-2008 efforts to reform the international financial system, many of them centred on the G20, have had limited success. Much of the accommodation of the 'rise of the rest' will come at the expense of Europe, which is over-represented in many post-war institutions. The United States will also face some difficult developments diluting its power over the next few decades. For example, an 85% supermajority is required for major decisions in the IMF, and it is hard to say what will happen when the US vote in the organisation – which is currently worth 16.75% – falls below the 15% required for a veto.

Situational power

Globalisation, the dispersal of economic strength beyond the West and, not least, the growing role of NGOs and empowered individuals, have changed the nature of power – the ability to obtain desired outcomes. Rather than a G-Zero world, US strategy will increasingly have to navigate a world of what might be called 'situational power', a more transactional diplomacy. While the United States will continue to have overwhelming military pre-eminence in state-on-state scenarios to 2030, recent history has shown that military preponderance is not necessarily determinant of many outcomes. Just because you have a hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.

That is to say, different issues and problems will require different tools and different constellations of actors to obtain results. The operative principle should be 'form follows function': who has a seat at the table depends on who is able and willing to act on a given issue. The test of leadership will be the ability to mobilise partners to solve problems. For example, in

addressing the conflict in Syria and removing President Bashar al-Assad from power, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar may be more important partners than Europe. The suspended Six-Party Talks on the denuclearisation of North Korea involve the major powers in Northeast Asia (the United States, China, Russia and Japan) and the two Koreas. Adding other players would only complicate already difficult negotiations. On issues such as combatting particular diseases or global healthcare more generally, private actors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation may be more important partners than many individual nations. This may also be true for efforts to foster development in the poorest countries.

While efforts to update the UN system remain an important challenge, and the UN umbrella is often an important source of legitimacy, its utility is limited. UN-specialised agencies monitoring nuclear weapons, fighting disease and helping refugees through the provision of food aid will remain important institutions that should be strengthened. But since the end of the Cold War, ad hoc multilateral cooperation has frequently been the most effective mechanism for global problem-solving. It was evident in the Timor-Leste crisis in the 1990s; the 2002 SARS pandemic; the 2004 tsunami relief effort, in which a coalition of naval powers cooperated; the 2007–08 H1N1 influenza virus pandemic; and recent anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The coordinated efforts of 60 nations combatting piracy off the coast of East Africa is facilitated by several UN Security Council resolutions. Many such exercises can be conducted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which authorises regional groups to take action, and can therefore offer UN sanction as an important source of legitimacy. This is the efficacy of situational power.

Applying the ad hoc multilateral principle more broadly, it made sense to form the Major Emitters Group: 16 of the world's largest emitters account for 85% of greenhouse-gas emissions. Given the unwieldy nature of the Kyoto Protocol, the negotiations for which involved 191 UN members, agreement among the key players would be a condition for success in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. On the other hand, success on some issues can better be ensured by expanding the participation of nations. The United States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003, a scheme

involving a network of countries cooperating to halt trafficking in nuclear-, chemical- and biological-weapons technologies. From an initial ten members, the network has expanded to 98 countries.

American primacy will remain, but on an increasing array of issues the operational meaning of US leadership will be a *primus inter pares* relationship with partners, state and non-state actors, and networks. Regardless of the degree to which some partners may be much less than equal, reaching a consensus for cooperative action will often require them to have a sense of enfranchisement.

Even in the best of circumstances, achieving US objectives will require a more agile exercise of leadership, with a keen sense of both possibilities and limits. The painful lessons and opportunity costs of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that in regard to wars of choice and exercises in nation building, distinguishing between the desirable and the necessary is critical. It will require balancing interests and values, and a difficult psychological adjustment to sharing power. It will also require clever, redefined leadership to revamp the international economic, political and security system. This means reinforcing – and, in some cases, rethinking – relationships with traditional and new allies and partners; identifying emerging actors, such as megacities and NGOs; and cultivating a *modus vivendi* with emerging major and middle-tier actors whose interests may not be congruent with those of the United States on many issues.

In regard to defining US leadership in such a political milieu, this will vary with circumstances. Rather than considering itself a hegemon, it would be wise for the United States to think more like a chairman of the board, convener-in-chief, a catalyser and – decreasingly – the world's first responder to global crises. Operationalising *primus inter pares* is an art, not a science. Discreet engagement, humility and knowing where your leverage starts and stops will be critical to a prudent, strategy-driven and priority-focused policy. There will be a tension between shedding the habitual role of 'global nanny' and sustaining domestic consensus for an internationalist foreign policy. And, not least, changing the institutions of global governance will be a difficult, incremental process most often energised in response to crises.

Partners: transatlantic pillar

In a world of diffused power, it may seem counter-intuitive, but the transatlantic partnership, and the United States' Pacific and Middle East alliances, remain key pillars of US strategy towards Eurasia and, more broadly, in shaping the international system. The transatlantic economy accounts for 54% of global GDP, Europe is the largest investor in the United States and Japan has the world's third-largest national economy.⁹ For example, successful conclusion of a robust Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement, and a similarly successful agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership; such arrangements would offset the absence of future global trade rounds and shape a more diffuse global order. The EU is an historic experiment in post-Westphalian meta-sovereignty and NATO, despite its manifold problems, remains the unique multilateral institution capable of rapid military action and a proven global-security actor.

Serious questions hang over the future of Europe, and over NATO partners' political will and capacities in a time of sustained defence austerity. Nonetheless, shared democratic values and the habits of military cooperation underscore the continued importance of the transatlantic partnership for US foreign policy. This is shown by European participation in Afghanistan, and the EU's strong advocacy of tough sanctions against Iran and pressure on the Assad regime. The EU's proposed 'Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities' is an important contribution to managing the global commons. And US–EU and NATO collaboration will be critical to defining new rules for stable and open cyberspace. The EU can play a role in East Asia: it has an ongoing dialogue with Beijing and is China's largest trading partner, with more than \$500bn in two-way trade in 2011. The EU's efforts to enhance its ties with Asia, including the annual high-level Asia–Europe Meeting, reflect the reality that the challenges to global security and prosperity in coming decades lie beyond geography and, more often than not, outside the realm of military force. This is true despite the fact that the EU and the United States differ on a range of global issues, such as climate change and genetically modified crops, and although NATO, as former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, has become a 'two-tier organisation'.¹⁰

But this partnership may weaken before 2030. Even before its debilitating debt crisis, Europe tended to punch below its weight in the international system. And now, EU soft power as an exemplar of prosperous multilateralism is diminishing: the future of the euro is increasingly questioned amid signs of renationalisation and a widening North–South European divide.

Europe is undergoing a generational crisis, as the cost of social welfare in ageing societies takes its toll. The current levels of sovereign debt and public deficits of several eurozone nations are unsustainable, as is unemployment in some countries (50% of people aged 18–26 are out of work in Greece and Spain).¹¹ The European banking crisis, with many banks financially stretched and disagreement over how the European Central Bank should respond, reflects a political crisis within the EU, as austerity measures and spending cuts foster unrest in the most affected countries.

Whether or not all 17 members stay in the eurozone, for much of the rest of this decade Europe will be enmeshed in this predicament, and focused inward. The optimistic scenario is that a strengthened Europe will emerge after a period of painful structural economic reforms in the weaker countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy), enabling a deepening of EU financial integration. That would reinforce the EU as a global political actor as well.

A less optimistic scenario would be a fragmenting EU, with what remains of the eurozone divided between its prosperous northern members – led by Germany – and its poorer south, with France perhaps sitting in the middle and the United Kingdom increasingly peripheral to European decision-making. The result would be a fragile global economy pushed into recession and a diminishing European role on the world stage. A failing Europe would also reshape the transatlantic relationship: in all probability, the United States' geostrategic tilt towards Asia and the Middle East would become more pronounced.¹²

Whatever happens, the EU will continue to be one of the world's largest economies, and a key trade and financial partner of the United States. A reinvigorated EU would offer new opportunities to create an integrated US–EU single market and for growing transatlantic competitiveness in the new global economy. A US–EU free-trade agreement, particularly with the Doha Round of global trade talks effectively dead, would have reverbera-

tions for the entire global trade and financial system. Such an arrangement could play a key role in setting global standards and regulations in emerging industries, for example.

In the security realm, such new dynamism appears to be far more problematic. For NATO, the question seems to be only one of the degree of austerity driven by the eurozone crisis. As an analysis by RAND researchers concludes:

Planned defense cuts to the armed forces of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Poland (who together comprise 80 percent of NATO Europe's defense spending) ... will have a serious impact on NATO Europe's ability to deploy and sustain power over long distances.¹³

The United Kingdom's capacity to project air and naval forces will be significantly constrained.

In his farewell address in Brussels, Robert Gates warned NATO allies of 'the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance', if Europe did not assume its share of the burden.¹⁴ Although European countries' defence spending, at some \$300bn, is collectively the second-largest in the world, as is noted above the total is far less than the sum of its parts. Gates and others have urged Europe to become more operationally effective through improved integration and allocation of existing resources. Growing UK-France defence cooperation may bridge some capability gaps, and as France is one of the few NATO Europe members able to project force outside the region, Paris's continued integration into NATO's command structure grows in importance. Despite its limitations, when viewed in contrast to US allies in Asia – where there is a dearth of multilateral coordination (for example, Japan-South Korea intelligence sharing blocked by bilateral disputes) – NATO's continued importance is evident. The organisation has demonstrated its utility as a global security institution, and even if scaled back will continue to be an important actor, particularly vis-à-vis the Greater Middle East in the coming decade and beyond.

Often overlooked is the role of Turkey, one transatlantic partner not hobbled by the euro crisis, and an increasingly dynamic middle power. The

country will be a key actor in the Greater Middle East and, to a lesser extent, in Central Asia. Ankara has created new opportunities for itself, although it is less likely to seek or attain EU membership. As Nicholas Burns has argued, 'if NATO hopes to maintain a central role in shaping its strategic neighbourhood, it will need Turkey to take on a position of leadership within the Alliance'.¹⁵ Whether within a NATO context, coordinating or acting in parallel with the United States, or as an autonomous actor, Turkey's importance to US strategy will continue to grow to 2030.

The Russia question

One big uncertainty is the future role and status of Russia. That may turn on the long-standing question of whether the country seeks to become more integrated into Europe and the global system, or whether it chooses a Eurasian future.

As highlighted by continuing protests and other forms of opposition facilitated by social media, 'Putin 2.0' faces a very different Russia than that which he presided over in his first 12 years in power. There is a new middle class that has more than doubled in size since 2000, and now by some estimates comprises some 25% of Russia's dwindling population. This is reflected in the doubling of per capita GDP since 2000 to roughly \$16,000, in large measure a result of booming oil and commodity prices.¹⁶ Since 2000, there has been a 300% increase in new auto registration, a 500% increase in Internet usage – nearly 50% of Russians are now online – and the number of Russian tourists travelling abroad has more than doubled.¹⁷

However, the economy has yet to truly diversify. One indicator of Russia's direction will be the effect of its ascension to the WTO, which occurred in August 2012. Prior to this, Russia was the only G20 nation not to have joined the organisation. The country's entry into the WTO coincides with ambitious economic goals and a range of political promises by Putin. Russia's president has promised to provide large salary increases for teachers, civil servants and engineers; create 25 million highly skilled jobs; increase investment from 20% to 27% of GDP by 2018; improve the country's ranking from 120th place to 20th place on the World Bank ease-of-doing-business index; and move away from dependence on oil and gas.¹⁸

Yet Putin's basic political posture in his third term seems to be one of 'back to the future', moving away from declared notions of reform. According to the World Bank, the share of oil and gas in Russia's exports has risen from less than one-half of total exports in 2000 to two-thirds in recent years. More than 60% of Russian GDP is based on oil, gas and other extractive industries.¹⁹ However, Russia's oil output is projected to reach a plateau from the middle of this decade onwards.²⁰ Moscow's budget is pegged to oil at \$115 per barrel to avoid deficits, but many analysts project a soft oil market, with very low US and EU growth, and slower growth in BRICS economies.

Whether Russia remains a declining petro-state or uses the WTO as a mechanism to catalyse reform and diversify its economy will shape its economic and political evolution. But with charges of rigged Duma elections, new laws to penalise protesters, the new requirement that NGOs receiving funds from abroad register as foreign agents and censorship of the Internet, Moscow's increasingly repressive behaviour and failure to implement key reforms has deepened scepticism about its ability to change.

Without a trajectory towards economic modernisation, an independent judiciary and reform of its business environment, it is difficult to envision Russia becoming more than an eclectic, issue-specific partner of the United States in a future that would have elements of cooperation and competition. One factor that may impact on Moscow's mindset and attitudes towards the West is the presence of an increasingly powerful China on its borders. The United States' strategy will need to focus on working with its transatlantic partners to create an environment conducive to Russia's modernisation, greater integration with the EU and NATO, and cooperation on global issues.

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How would a successful shift in the United States' global posture and *modus operandi* be measured? In a complicated operating environment characterised by the diffusion of power, achieving results will be inherently difficult; it will require patience and forbearance beyond the comfort level of US officials – and perhaps that of many other Americans. It is beyond the scope of

this essay to detail policy recommendations.²¹ But one core metric will be the character of US–China relations. The status quo of mixed cooperation and competition is unsustainable. Whether Sino-American relations evolve to be more cooperative or the inherent security dilemmas in the current strategic competition dominate will be a key indicator of not just the bilateral relationship, but of the world order that evolves to 2030.

In addition to China, post-Doha Round expansion of global trade and reform of the world financial system are among a host of major international challenges that will probably be addressed – or not – in accordance with the way in which the United States adapts to its *primus inter pares* status, as part of an order in which *primus* may matter less than *pares* on some issues. The transformation of the Greater Middle East over the coming decade is one such issue that will test Washington’s ability to adapt to situational power.

The nuclear future is also one that will require movement beyond the current US–Russia paradigm. Further reductions in US and perhaps Russian nuclear weapons need to be linked to the levels of such weapons held by other states, particularly China and India. For the United States, reductions such as those suggested by President Obama in his June 2013 speech in Berlin must be weighed against its extended-deterrence commitments to NATO and Asian treaty allies.

It is no less important to achieve stability, security and sustainability in the global commons, particularly in cyberspace. Establishing new rules and norms in regard to the use of outer space, and slowing down and adapting to climate change, will also be metrics by which to judge what sort of future is realised – and what role the United States plays in it.

Notes

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- ²¹ For a fuller discussion of policy challenges and recommendations, see the book from which this essay is adapted: Manning, *Envisioning 2030*.