

US Imperialism After Iraq

Jerry Harris

What is the future direction of US imperialism? The strategic choices being debated by ruling elites are framed by the disaster in Iraq. And while the exact outcome remains unclear, one thing is perfectly clear, the US has been defeated in its Middle East invasion.

To properly judge the US war we must remember its original goals. A compliant pro-US government, a totally privatized economy run mainly by US capital, 14 permanent US military bases, and a Middle East ready for regime change in Iran, Syria and wherever else the US deemed necessary. None of this has been achieved nor likely will be

Shelby Steele from Stanford's Hoover Institution lays out the original vision in unambiguous terms; "victory in foreign war has always meant hegemony: You win, you take over...A complete American victory in Iraq would put that nation...entirely under American power and sovereignty. We would in fact "own" the society as a colony." (Shelby Steele, "Our Unceasing Ambivalence." Wall Street Journal, 12/8/06, p. A16.)

In fact the opposite has occurred. Rather than a stronger and more threatening presence the world has witness the US military unable to control the battlefield and the US government unable to direct the political course of events. Iran emerges stronger, terrorist networks more organized and the region more unstable than before the war. A defeat on this scale, comparable to Viet-Nam, will have far reaching ramifications in US ruling circles on the role and capabilities of the US military in the decades to come. Even Charles Krauthammer, who first popularized US unilateralism, admits "The unipolar moment is now over." (Guy Dinmore, "A uniform trend? How democracy worldwide is on the back foot." FT 1/17/07, p. 9)

But if the unipolar moment is over has the globalist era fully asserted itself? For all the power of economic globalization there is a political and military disconnect. In Davos world elites bemoaned political violence and turmoil during a "golden period" of economic integration and success. (Martin Wolf, "A divided world of economic success an political turmoil." FT, 1.31/07, p. 11) Much of this unease is centered on the war in Iraq and growing protectionism. While capitalist globalization continues apace its political structure and corresponding military policy seems mired in nationalism.

This presents serious problems for a transnational capitalist class (TCC) whose existence is rooted in global production, trade and finance. Post-national capitalism has built powerful institutions such as the WTO and its economic character is clearly distinguished from national capital. (Sklair, Robinson, Harris)

But what would transnational political and military policy be and how would it differ from the nation-centric international system? A fully integrated TCC would have a political process based on transnational debates held in world based institutions with efforts to develop mutual consensus and common military policy. The most advanced translateral process takes place in the WTO on economic policy, (Robinson and Harris) and in terms of military policy this project is partial evident in the UN. But the existence of the US as the world's sole military superpower conflicts the emerging transnational system.

In the US we see several global projects: unilateral imperialism as defined by the neorealist and neoconservative doctrine of US domination; traditional realists whose views on a US lead international system is linked to cold war nation-centric competition; and the globalist approach that some term humanitarian interventionism.

Writing for a strategy research project at the Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Beck articulates three basic security approaches for the 21st century. The first labeled "Primacy" or "Domination" refers to hegemonist policy that seeks stability through an "imbalance of power...heavily dependant on military requirements (that) place immense burdens on the nation's gross product." "Selective Engagement" reflects the realist position that relies on economic and political power as well as military might, "striking a balance between doing too little or too much militarily." The globalist approach is titled "Cooperative Security" and looks to "multilateral cooperation and collective consensus through international organizations" with military interventions entailing mutual efforts by a concert of powers. (Lt. Colonel Charles Beck, US Air Force. "IS the Bush Doctrine the Right American National Security Strategy for the Beginning of the 21st Century?" US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 3/18/05) These three distinct and identifiable strategies demarcate the lines of debate inside the military/industrial complex.

Transnational military policy by nature would need to be a *translateral* affair. William Robinson argues that, “The beneficiaries of US military action around the world are not US but transnational capitalist groups.” (William Robinson, *A Theory of global Capitalism*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2004, p. 139) Yet transnational political elites around the world opposed the US invasion of Iraq as well as US threats against Iran. As French president Jacques Chirac said, “The Americans always want to impose their point of view...I told Bush 36 times that he was committing a monumental error.” (Chirac Tells of Daughter’s Anorexia in Candid account of his private life” FT, p. 4 2/21/07)

Globalist’s interest cannot be represented by singular national leadership linked by history to the cold war international system. Military policy promoting hegemonic domination commanded by the nationalist wing of US capitalism does not represent a transnational process. Although certain results may open previously closed markets to transnational penetration, if power and leadership is unilateral then the political and economic system is attached to nation-centrism rather than a new global order. A globalist political/military system would need be *translateral* and integrated in the same manner as the transnational economy. The most advance articulation of this are calls to recognize a polycentric world order with different regional centers coordinating common multilateral policy. Yet this arrangement is just one step beyond the US lead cold war international alliance, still reliant on nation-centric political actors, not a fully developed system of rule by an integrated and organic TCC.

If history moves two steps forward and one step back, then the Bush years have been a step back to geopolitical and imperial policies. A globalist military project was emerging during the Clinton administration although it never achieved a hegemonic position within the military/industrial complex. (Harris) After six years of unilateral leadership the globalist voice has been weaken and modified to accommodate realist doctrine. Certainly the transnational economic project continues to expand and deepen with cross border mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investments, capital flow and financial speculation. But it has faced serious problems on a number of fronts, not just US unilateralism. The Doha round of the WTO continues to be road blocked after years of negotiations and anti-neoliberal political movements have gained strength, particularly in Latin America. From a historical viewpoint such problems are not unexpected. During transitional

eras there is often a disconnect between rapid economic developments and slowly changing political structures.

A number of important studies have recognized this nationalist/globalist split in the US ruling class. In Ismael Hossein-zadeh's book, *The Political Economy of US Militarism* he addresses the "conflict between the two major competing factions within the ruling elite at home: multilateralist proponents of neoliberalism, representing primarily the interests of nonmilitary transnational capital, on the one hand, and unilateralist advocates of nationalism and militarism, who tend to represent the interests of military industries and of the internationally noncompetitive businesses." (Ismael Hossein-zahed *The Political Economy of US Militarism*, Palgrave MacMillian new York, 2006, p. 4) Rather than oil and resources the author argues the main drive for war is the tremendous profits and huge economic needs of the military/industry complex. This analysis points to the permanent nature of aggressive imperialist policies built into the economic and political structure of the government and Pentagon.

Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler contend that wars are driven by the accumulation needs of the "Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition." The authors also see two dominant capitalist factions tied to distinct regimes of accumulation. The first being the oil and armament corporations whose accumulation is "fuelled by stagflation and driven by conflict," the other being the "new economy coalition led by civilian high-tech companies." (Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, "The Economy of the Occupation." The Alternative Information Center, #10, Jerusalem, Sept. 2006. p. 18) This globalist faction is interested in "securing free trade and open capital flows, tries to establish political stability and international peace (and has) no need to physically conquer new territory." (Ibid, p. 10) Unlike Hossein-zadeh, Nitzen and Bichler argue oil is allied to the military/industrial complex and that energy resources have been a major element in all the wars that have raged in the Middle East. They do this in a detailed and careful study of price and profits in the oil and weapons industry before and after each war, linking the two industries as one faction of dominant capital. (Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler. *The Global Political Economy of Israel*. Pluto Press, London, 2002)

As insightful as the above authors are they present an overly economist view of the military/industrial complex and the drive to war. Hossein-zahed argues that the oil industry itself has never advocated war and generally

prefers stability, but ignores the fact that energy security is an essential question for the entire capitalist class, not just oil companies. Nitzan and Bichler limit their analysis to the competition between two models of accumulation and the capitalist factions that are linked through profits and power to either broad economic expansion or inflation and stagflation. Ignored is the power of ideology and culture embedded in nationalism that plays a subjective motivating force among both elites and the population. This goes beyond mere propaganda. Consciousness becomes an objective force in political organization. We can't reduce political economy to rates of accumulation and the drive for profits, as important as these may be. Furthermore, while all three authors correctly point to nationalist and globalist class factions they fail to recognize this split extends into the military/industrial complex itself. (Harris)

Investigating these splits and possible military and political directions in the post Bush years will be the main subject below. How will failure in Iraq affect hegemonists, realists and globalists as they struggle to redirect US imperialism onto the road of recovery?

Down But Not Out

Hegemonists have called for sole US domination of the entire twenty-first century. This unilateralist project was most clearly articulated by the neo-conservatives but reflects a broader base than this cadre of think-tank activists. Hard-line nationalist from the realist school of foreign policy participated in the formulation of this strategy. This included neo-conservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle but also neo-realists Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Together they developed the unilateralist strategy in the influential policy paper titled "Rebuilding America's Defenses, Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century" published by the Project for the New American Century. Their strategic vision prepared the field for the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war. But it would be a mistake to see this policy as simply the product of some neoconservative coup. Its real influence came about because it represented a clear statement for major elements within the military/industrial complex articulating a map for political power and profits in the post-Soviet world. (Harris, "The Dialectics of Globalization")

By following this path the White House/Pentagon leadership team created what many in the ruling class see as the most serious strategic blunder in US

history. As former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, “the war in Iraq is a historic, strategic and moral calamity.”(Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Four steps towards calming the chaos in Iraq” FT p.13 2/2/07.) The looming defeat in Iraq allowed other factions within US ruling circles to challenge the hegemonists. Concerned the fiasco could severely restrain US imperialism in the future The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the National Defense University (NDU) jointly sponsored a “Symposium on Iraq’s Impact on the Future of US Foreign and Defense Policy” in October 2006.

Panelist, Steven Miller from Harvard, laid out a grim picture of Iraq. *“The United States, with a half-trillion-dollar-a-year military, with 150,000 well-trained, well-armed forces in Iraq, possessing total superiority in the air, with a massive technological advantage is being stymied by 5,000 Ba’athist bitter-enders. What this told you was that there were ways for adversaries to confront American power that rendered irrelevant or neutralized many of our advantages militarily and gave them a chance to achieve their interests over ours. And I assume that anybody who’s out there on the world stage who thinks they’re on Uncle Sam’s target list has noticed this. And if we come after them they know what to do...The point is that there is now a demonstrated, asymmetric strategy that can bog down, hog tie and stymie the United States of America.”* (Steven Miller, “Coping with Rouge States, Failing States, and Proliferators.” 10/6/06)

The magnitude of the defeat is such that neorealists and neoconservatives will be kept on the outskirts of power in the post Bush years. But their bold rejection of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group and their escalation of the war shows they may be down but not out. Just as CFR was declaring “The idea of talking to Iran is now the consensus position,” (Guy Dinmore, “White House hunts for way into Iran talks” FT. p. 5 11/16/06) Bush was pushing more troop into Iraq and increasing threats against Iran. In fact, the escalation and the renewal of counter-insurgency doctrine indicates the strong attraction that military power and domination through victory maintains.

Widening the war brought renewed support from neo-realists such as Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman. Neo-realists like Cheney, Rumsfeld and McCain seek hegemonic power without the crusading democratic rhetoric of the neoconservatives, more willing to limit US engagements to vital interests. In Iraq they see victory as central to

promoting hegemonic power. Some neo-conservatives hope McCain can become the new hegemonist hero, as William Kristol writes; “The Republican Party will have to choose, in the very near future between Baker and McCain.” (John Broder, Robin Toner, “Report on Iraq Exposes a Divide Within the G.O.P.” NYT, 12/10/06) Another neoconservative argues “McCain could prosecute the war on terror vigorously with the kind of innovative thought that realists hate and the country needs.” (Joshua Muravchik, “Operation Comeback.” Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec 2006)

McCain defends the need for a broader and deeper commitment to war. A position long favored within the military/industrial complex and most clearly articulated in Collin Powell’s doctrine on overwhelming force. This was one of the first battles within the Pentagon and swirled around Rumsfeld’s implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that called for a smaller, flexible and technologically advanced army. (Harris, “Dreams of Global Hegemon and the Technology of War”) This doctrine worked well in Afghanistan and the taking of Baghdad. But some military leaders argued that a force of 250,000 or more was necessary to control Iraq. This continued to be a controversy during the entire occupation. Bush’s post-Rumsfeld surge strategy and the resulting support of neorealist and neoconservatives is a shift away from RMA, but maintains the object of world hegemony intact.

Although never adherents to overarching neoconservative theories McCain and Powell are still representatives of military/industrial influence and leadership. The Powell/Rumsfeld debates were always more about tactical differences than the fundamental role of US imperialism. The overwhelming force versus the RMA doctrine had important consequences over military contracts, force size and battlefield tactics that are often the lifeblood of bureaucratic conflicts inside Washington. The difference with Rumsfeld was not over a reliance on hard power, but over how best to construct a military force and political leadership that best guarantees US hegemony.

In Foreign Policy Joshua Muravchik makes an appeal on “how to save the Neocons.” He writes, “*One area of neoconservative thought that needs urgent reconsideration is the revolution in military strategy that our neocon hero, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, has championed. This love affair with technology has left our armed forces short on troops and resources...Let’s now take up the burden of campaigning for a military force that is large enough...to assure that we will never again get stretched so*

thin. Let the wonder weapons be the icing on the cake.” (Joshua Muravchik, “Operation Comeback.” Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec. 2006.)

The renewed hegemonist/neo- realist strategy emerged out of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in the paper titled “Choosing Victory, A Plan for Success in Iraq” by Frederick W. Kagan, a neoconservative and associate of the Project for the New American Century. Faced with the Baker-Hamilton group, vice-president Cheney asked Kagan to draw-up an alternative policy that advocated victory over what they saw as Baker’s plan for defeat. This lead to the surge strategy that called for more soldiers, money and time. (Kagan, Choosing Victory 1-5-07 www.aei.org/publications)

Some at the AEI even accused troops of avoiding combat. Kagan’s fellow neo-conservative Michael Ledeen wrote; “We’ve got lots of soldiers sitting on megabases all over Iraq. They should be out and about...I don’t know how many guys and gals are sitting in air-conditioned quarters and drinking designer coffee, but it’s a substantial number. Enough of that.” (Ledeen, “The Sure and its Critics”, 1/9/07, www.aie.org/about) This after over 3,000 dead and 25,000 wounded.

The surge strategy relies on the counter-insurgency doctrine advocated by General David Petraeus that argues the military must protect citizens from violence and win their hearts and minds through economic aid. But as history shows counter-insurgency campaigns target civilian populations because guerrillas are embedded among the people. For insight we can turn to two more associates of the AEI , Eliot Cohen and Bing West. They call upon the US military to increase the Iraqi prison population by 600 percent complaining that releasing prisoners has been “the single weakest link in the US strategy.” (Bing and Cohen, “Our Only Hope” 1/8/07 WSJ) One can easily imagine the house to house sweeps this would entail and the anger and fear it would create among Iraqis. A returning American interrogator from Abu Ghraib reported more than 80% of the current prisoners are innocent Iraqis picked-up in neighborhood raids. (Tori Marlan, “How I Learned to Hate the War.” August ’06, Chicago Reader)

A more concrete assessment of counter-insurgency difficulties is given by Antulio Echevarria II from the Army War College and Director of National Security Affairs. Echevarria writes, “*What terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and (to a lesser extent) Al Qaeda actually have done is integrated themselves into the social and political fabric of Muslim societies*

worldwide. Hamas and Hezbollah, especially, have established themselves as organizations capable of addressing the everyday problems of their constituencies: setting up day cares, kindergartens, schools, medical clinics, youth and women's centers, sports clubs, social welfare, programs for free meals, and health care. Each has also become a powerful political party within their respective governments...in short, they have become communal activists for their constituencies, which have, in turn, facilitated the construction and maintenance of substantial financial and logistical networks and safe houses." (Echevarria, "Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths." Nov. 2005, Strategic Studies Institute)

In light of this assessment counter-insurgency wars, in Iraq or elsewhere, clearly would have to attack the local population that creates the support network for the insurgency.

This review of changing tactics in Iraq is important because it sets the stage for future wars. Overwhelming force and counter-insurgency doctrine are strategies for occupation. But all imperialist occupations face the same political problem. They are opposed by local people who yearn for independence and self-determination. This fundamental truth is something no Washington think-tank or Pentagon general can admit to, not even to themselves. They always believe in the rightness of their cause, be it the white man's burden or the war against terror.

Hubris blinds military/industrial intellectuals time and time again. Their understanding of conditions is always framed by the bias and dogmas formed in the imperial center, leaving them ignorant to the complexities of local dynamics. National chauvinism that originates in power and wealth never accepts that less powerful, less wealthy and less technological endowed societies can run their affairs better than the imperialist center, so defeat always seems unimaginable.

Just listen to the eloquent arrogance of Richard Perle shortly before the war; *"Those who think Iraq should not be next may want to think about Syria or Iran or Sudan or Yemen or Somalia or North Korean or Lebanon or the Palestinian Authority...if we do it right with respect to one or two...we could deliver a short message, a two-word message, 'Your next.'*" (Perle "Next stop Iraq.")

This arrogance was evident in the refusal of the White House to recognize the populist character of the Iraq insurgency. The US was unable to train a competent new Iraq army, yet the insurgents, labeled “dead-enders” by Cheney, had no problem with motivation. One of Rumsfeld’s close advisors, General Jack Keane, now working for the AEI and a major spokesperson for the surge strategy says, “What we didn’t plan for is what happened,” (Peter Boyer, “Downfall” The New Yorker, 11/20/06, p.63) It sounds like a broken record left over from Viet-Nam.

Foreign occupations have a poor record of planning when it comes to defeating home grown insurgencies. Those insurgencies that are defeated are most often the result of internal wars with no or limited direct foreign military presence. This was a major difference in the success of guerrilla wars in Africa and their failure in Latin America. The post WW II colonial struggles in Africa liberated Algeria, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. But the internal revolutionary insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s fought in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela were all defeated.

Below we can take a partial survey of the success and failure of guerrilla insurgencies beginning in W.W. II. These are limited to wars in which national liberation and/or socialism were at issue and not civil wars based on ethnic or religious divisions or rivalries over the spoils of war. Besides Iraq important insurgencies that continue unresolved today would include Palestine, Colombia, Turkey, Sri Lanka and the Philippines.

Insurgent victory against occupation	Insurgent victory in internal wars	Insurgents defeated in internal wars	Internal war settlements	Foreign occupation with internal settlement
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Albania	China	Argentina	El Salvador	Ireland
China	Cuba	Brazil	Guatemala	
N. Korea	Nicaragua	Bolivia	Nicaragua	
Yugoslavia	Ethiopia	Mexico	S. Africa	
		Peru	Nepal	
India		Uruguay		
Algeria		Venezuela		
Angola				
Eritrea		Burma		
Guinea		Malaysia		
Bissau		India		
Kenya		Thailand		
Mozambique				
Namibia				
Zimbabwe				
Cambodia				
Laos				
Viet-Nam				
Afghanistan				

Realist Resurgence

Mainstream foreign policy elites have long been part of the realist school that advocates US leadership of an international alliance with a combination of hard and soft power. As the debacle in Iraq grew deeper their voices became louder culminating in the Baker-Hamilton report which called for a regional diplomatic solution and a phased withdrawal of US troops.

Realists see global order as a balance of power set in a framework of alliances that recognize legitimate areas of influence for national competitors. For example, during the cold war Soviet influence in Eastern Europe or today Iranian influence in the Middle East. Containment and engagement are its policies of choice with wars limited to peripheral areas of the Third World or vital national interests. In the Middle East they seek a renewed balance of power that maintains US interests.

Understanding the war in Iraq as the greatest strategic blunder in US history will result in the realist pushing hard to keep hegemonist out of the White House after 2008. Richard Haass , president of the Council on Foreign Relations, states that the “US dominance of the Middle East has ended...It is one of history’s ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second war, a war of choice, has precipitated its end.” (Richard Haass, “The New Middle East” Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2006) Adds another CFR member Ray Takeyh, “This has got to be the most incompetent administration in history.” (Guy Dinmore, “White House hunts for a way into Iran talks” FT, p. 5 1/16/06) Such harsh conclusions by the CFR has important impact in Washington. CFR is a major center for foreign policy and has been since its founding in 1918. As Hossein-zadeh writes, “the organization is composed of wealthy, influential and largely global-oriented corporate leaders, with networks and ties to major industrial, financial, and trading corporations, as well as with elite academic and legal experts in Ivy League schools and Wall Street law firms.” (Hossein-zadeh, p. 42)

The strongest argument for the realists was the success of Desert Storm lead by George Bush after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bush senior built an effective international coalition including many Arab states with the intention of reestablishing stability and security to the Middle East not regime change.

The war held to the Powell Doctrine that asks eight fundamental questions:

- . Is a vital national security interest threatened?
- . Do we have a clear, attainable objective?
- . Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- . Have all other non-violent policy means been exhausted?
- . Is there a plausible exit strategy?
- . Have the consequences been fully considered?
- . Is the action supported by the American people?
- . Does the US have broad international support?

Most of these questions were answered before the start of Desert Storm, and just as completely ignored in the Iraq invasion. The Powell doctrine was developed to avoid large-scale on-going occupations similar to Viet-Nam and used to argue against small scale “humanitarian wars” favored by the globalists.

Global Alliances

Beyond realist/globalist opposition to aspects of hegemonist military policies are two fundamental disagreements concerning the importance of alliances and the role of nation-building. For hegemonists alliances restrict US power, forcing compromise and curtailing US objectives. If any one issue resonated on realist sensibilities it was this.

As the CFR and the NDU were holding their post-Iraq symposium the Army War College published an important paper titled "Alliance and American National Security." The paper helps define foreign policy principals for the post-Bush years and was part of the realist push to get beyond the war.

Author Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall defends the central importance of alliances as a strategic orientation that is multifaceted and set within cooperative international arrangements. Characterizing the hegemonist approach as "sloppy thinking" she argues the difference between a "coalition of the willing" and long-term alliances "could not be starker" and are "two entirely different organisms." (Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American national Security." October 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, p.3)

For Sherwood-Randall alliances are akin to "long marriages" in which the perspectives and interests of each partner bears on common decision making. As she writes, "*in developing policy initiatives and in deciding on course of action, the United States explicitly would give allies more voice and more capacity to influence their own future.*" (p28) Yet Sherwood-Randall still advocates a hegemonic US role arguing, "*The purpose of alliances in US national security policy must be fourfold: To generate capabilities that amplify American power; to create a basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power; to avert impulses to counterbalance American power; and to steer partners away from strategic apathy or excessive self-reliance.*" (p. 10)

The author seems trapped between two eras. On one hand adhering to a US lead international system with strong roots in the cold war, yet recognizing fundamental changes in the post WW II system . Attempting to come to grips with the new world she writes, the "United States must accept the reality that its allies no longer depend as they once did on the American security guarantee (and that the US) needs to spearhead a sustained initiative to reconcile the tension between the regional rootedness of its partnerships and the increasingly globalized nature of the 21st century." (p. 25)

But she fails to realize is that allies will be more independent in a globalized world whether the US allows it or not. A hegemonic relationship no longer based on a common threat makes Washington the bully. This will become particularly evident as time goes on. The European generation that welcomed US troops to fight Hitler and invited them to stay to counter balance the Soviet Union will soon be gone. In its place will be those who see US foreign policy as the wars in Viet-Nam and Iraq. Such enduring memories will provide little attraction to US leadership. Iraq has become the defining foreign policy experience of today's youth and around the world an "Iraq syndrome" will develop similar to the aversion to war after Viet-Nam.

In addition, while the author calls for a world spanning network of alliances, somehow China is excluded from this project. Again, this shows how realists fail to fully understand the extent of globalization in which there will be no stability without the inclusion of all major powers. Sherwood-Randall's definition of security is also too narrowly defined in military and nation-centric terms. There is no recognition of security issues such as the environmental crisis and pandemic diseases. Yet global warming, according to the prestigious Stern report, may create 150 million refugees. How can any country be secure in such a world without a common global effort?

Globalist's views have a more restrained attachment to US power and allow greater room for a polycentric political order. Speaking at the CFR Iraq symposium Dana Allin argues that working with Europe gives the US additional capacity, legitimacy and restraint. These are linked by "embedding our power in the imperfect order of global institutions and governance (and) allowing ourselves to be restrained by international opinion – a restraint that would be good for us. If we had accepted it in 2003, we might have avoided disaster in Iraq. If we accept it now, we might avoid future disasters." (Dana Allin, "Appeasement or Restraint? The Transatlantic Dialogue after Iraq." Council on Foreign Relations 10/6/06)

Another symposium speaker Ronald Steel, also voiced support for a polycentric world order. When asked if the US should seek a trilateral policy with Russia and China he replied, "I think it's all very well to talk about the case for American hegemony and the case for Goliath is reassuring, but it isn't reassuring and it doesn't work. Therefore, I think the only truly intelligent policy would be precisely to move towards a concert of powers."

(Steel, "The Direction of US Foreign and Defense Policy after the Intervention in Iraq." Council of Foreign Relations, Oct 6, 2006)

A Globalist Alternative?

Building a common strategic security project may be the hardest task for transnational capitalists and globalist intellectuals. Security and military power goes to the very essence of nation-state identity and purpose, and the attacks of 9/11 have strengthened the nationalism and militarism still inherent in the old international system. Yet terrorism has forced security questions into a qualitatively different context traditional statist realities and superpower stand-offs. As a non-state threat terrorism necessitates a global response based less on overwhelming might than on cooperation, coordination and mutual reliance. Rather than military occupations and unilateral hegemony, police actions and a cultural war for the ideological hegemony of universalist human rights is essential. When asked what he thought about the French revolution Zhou Enlai famously stated, "Its too soon to tell." His words ring true today as the political and social ideas that developed out of the enlightenment are challenged by many forms of fundamentalist thought.

Faced with both military and cultural challenges is the TCC capable of developing a security and military doctrine for globalization? The TCC seeks to build a stable environment for the expansion of capital into every nook and cranny in the world. Countries that challenge their global empire and attempt to follow a different logic of development are labeled rogue states needing to be discipline, often through intervention. Both terrorism and regional stability are rationales for military action. But while globalist rely on hard power, they believe in balancing military force with soft power. As Joseph Nye points out, the attraction of cultural and ideological power is as important as the coercion of missiles and tanks. The globalist approach is actually close to the Marxist theories of Antonio Gramsci who showed the most effective method of capitalist rule combines both cultural hegemony and force. (Nye)

The problem is developing a strategic vision that aligns military institutions to soft/hard power polices. The most successful attempt to do so was the Clinton years. It was during this period that "humanitarian intervention" was promoted hand-in-hand with nation building projects. (Harris, "Dialectic of Globalization") This produced small wars that sought to intervene in

ongoing civil conflicts and stabilize countries through institution building and economic integration with global accumulation. The US military was still the main actor on the world stage but most often in coordination with the United Nations or Nato. Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo sought justification as humanitarian efforts to stop bloody civil wars, as was the US occupation of Somalia. In Haiti the US invasion attempted to stabilize the country by reinstalling Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president. But while important components of a globalist policy were forming 9/11 cut-off its full-blown articulation. As a result globalist's military doctrine stands with one foot in the nation-centric international system and one foot in a swamp of half-suggestions and partial policy.

Such "humanitarian interventions" under Clinton were never supported by the realists or hegemonists who criticized them as unnecessary adventures outside of US vital interests. And both attacked nation building as beyond the role of the military and as a waste of effort and money. Furthermore, as they see the centrality of international relations as nation-centric competition they also reject the globalists definition of vital interest as common interest. The biggest win for the globalists is recognition by realists and hegemonists of the importance of nation-building, economic reconstruction, political stability and civil institutions. But this only came about with the terrible price paid in Iraq and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.

In addition, the globalist appropriation of human rights rhetoric remains problematic in a world of economic inequality and military intervention. The transnational capitalist class may have room for Chinese, Indians and Brazilians, but capitalism is a system built upon structural inequalities. At its very core is the expropriation of wealth from the labor of others. In turn rebellions and alternative models will continue to confront their global project.

There are three global military institutions, the US armed forces, Nato and the UN. Any fully articulated globalist military doctrine would need to promote a coordination of action and policy between these three institutions. In addition countries of growing importance, not only in economic but also in military terms, would need to be part of any configuration. This would include Russia, China and India, through UN participation. In 2006 the UN had 100,000 soldiers, police and civilians under its control overseeing the second largest deployed force after the US. Costs topped \$5 billion with an expected \$7 billion to be spent in 2007. The UN has been involved in the

Congo, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia-Eritrea, East Timor, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and in 2006 sent 10,000 troops to Lebanon that included Italy, France and Germany. Still, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the three top global contributors to UN forces. In all there are 18 ongoing UN-led deployments. (Mark Turner, "Peacekeeping blues", FT Weekend, 12/9/06) But peacekeeping not war fighting is the UN mandate. Military interventions are to provide space and time for a political process to unfold between belligerent sides. In addition, UN forces specialize in nation-building projects, oversee elections and help in economic reconstruction.

Nato is the other military force essential for any globalist doctrine and is struggling to define its expanded role in the world. Their greatest thrust into global affairs is the presence of 33,000 Nato troops in Afghanistan. Meeting in Riga in 2006 the alliance pushed its mandate to include peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and dealing with failed states. The globalist argue Nato should evolve into a military consortium for the world's democracies. Writes Ivo Daalder and Robert Schuman, "genuine co-operation and burden sharing – real multilateralism – *is* possible and, indeed, necessary...An effective Nato is the sine qua non of democratic multilateralism...Only by beginning to develop Nato as a global institution of democracies will the allies be capable of not just talking the multilateral talk, but actually walking the multilateral walk." (Ivo Daalder, Robert Schuman, "America and Europe must learn about alliances." FT, 12/05/06, p. 13) Ron Asmus, executive director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center, calls on Nato to reinvent itself for a "strategic leap to a new era...to become a more global alliance that takes it to places beyond the European heartland and on missions beyond the imaginations of the founding fathers." (Ron Asmus, "Nato must go global to have a meaningful purpose." FT 2/7/07, p. 11)

The big test for Nato is Afghanistan where British, Canadian, Dutch, Estonian, Polish and US forces are involved in fighting a resurgent Taliban. In addition French, German , Spanish, Turkish and Italian troops are also present but show reluctance to engage in combat. Taliban attacks on Nato forces increase by 270 percent in 2006 and their area of operations increased four fold. Calls to increase Nato and US forces are being voiced. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues for "immediate increases and to create a fully resourced long-term plan to fight a long war," (Anthony Cordesman, "Stop denying the seriousness of the Afghan threat" FT, 1/22/07, p. 13)

But a split divides Nato between advocates of political and military solutions. As a senior Nato diplomat explains, “There are basically two camps in Nato – the countries that emphasize the need for more military resources for Afghanistan and the countries that emphasize a greater political effort.” (Daniel Dombey, Demetri Sevastopulo, “Nato allies consider extra troops for Afghanistan.” FT, 1/18/07, p. 8) Pakistani officials also insist that an accommodation needs to be reach with the insurgency. “Instead of fighting Taliban militants, foreign troops should reconcile themselves to this reality. If the western world makes the mistake of prolonging this war, we would only see a never-ending conflict.” (Daniel Dombey, Stephen Fidler, Farhan Bokhair. “Nato discord mars modest headway on Afghan mission.” FT 11/30/06, p. 5) The parallels to Iraq are obvious, expand the war or seek a political solution.

There is no way out of this contradiction for either unilateral or global imperialism. Globalists may desire stability as the best world to insure uninterrupted accumulation, but since capitalism engenders inequality instability results from the inherent nature of the system. This leads to military interventions which often end-up on the road of unintended consequences, prolonged occupations and as a result -- greater instability. Faced with such circumstances globalists tend to split into two camps, one relying on multilateral military force, the other defining security issues more broadly as economic development, global warming and world poverty. Splits between hard and soft power advocates appear as sharp tactical differences. But the real question is wheter or not they will develop into deeply rooted strategic differences as globalism further integrates world economies.

Nation Building

The flip side of military occupation is nation building. Those who argue for a greater use of soft power see nation building as the policy that can best produce stability and long-term peace. Those who wish to rely on military might see nation building as the second phase of war and as the exit strategy from occupation. But even hegemonists have recognized that nation building is an “essential component” of occupation. (Kagan, p.4) Although the debate over nation building has move in favor of its advocates realities in Iraq and Afghanistan make a concrete application difficult.

Moreover, the basic drive for profits within the military/industrial complex cuts against this doctrine. The arms industry has billions of dollars sunk into

the production of weapons. For example, The proposed military budget for 2008 would enable the Pentagon to spend \$1.2 million a minute and be the world's 16th largest economy, right behind the Netherlands. (Demetri Sevastopulo. "Bush sets Pentagon spending at \$623bn." FT. 2/6/07, p. 5) Nation building would redirect government funds towards different types of skills and commodities that would be in direct economic competition with the military/industrial complex. Given the influence of such corporations as Lockheed Martin inside the Pentagon the push for weapons contracts and military solutions to world problems will continue unabated. (Ismael Hossein-Zaden)

A total disregard for nation-building was deeply embedded in Rumsfeld's Pentagon. Their lack of planning was evident from the start when three weeks of looting erupted in Baghdad that destroyed 17 out of 23 ministries and caused \$12 billion in damage. Rumsfeld's response was "stuff happens." In the autobiography of the invasion's commander, General Tommy Franks, hundreds of pages go over the planning and execution of the war while only a page and half is on the planning for reconstruction. In this short space Franks simply states that he received neither the policy guidance nor funding to adequately plan for stability. Such astonishing disregard for the social impact of war is still apparent in 2007. There are only 345 officials working on provincial reconstruction compared to the 8,100 deployed during the Viet-Nam war. With two million Iraqi refugees and another two million internally displaced the US has budgeted a mere \$500,000 for refuge aid. This is what the military will spend in two and a half minutes on the war and so-called reconstruction effort. (FT, "Iraqis refugee crisis is nearing catastrophe." 2/9/07, p. 10)

Although realists and hegemonists made clear their opposition to nation building efforts during the Clinton years their dogmatic rejection went beyond simple party politics in Washington. There were two fundamental reasons for disagreement. The first being the military is not trained for peacekeeping missions, it's built as a fighting machine that excels in destroying the enemy not police work and opening schools. The second reason is an ideological commitment to neoliberalism and market solutions for economic construction. Hegemonists don't want to build a government that helps to direct the economy. The idea for Iraq was a vast privatization of state held assets, mainly into US hands. Let Halliburton and others rebuild even if waste and corruption are endemic.

Hegemonist were painstakingly slow to understand the importance of nation building. It took four years of war for hegemonists to realize it is near impossible to rebuild a nation and a stable political environment without a strong centralized state. Coming to the realization that local people needed jobs, schools and health care the White House was still trapped by its ideological dogma. Military escalation continues to be perceived as the path to stability. As Bush stated in somewhat Orwellian terms, "The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms...we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling." (Michael Gordon, "Fighting Future Wars: the Mismatch between Doctrine and Capability." 10/6/06, Council of Foreign Relations)

Yet reality has its own way of enforcing itself on dogma. Under the new counter-insurgency doctrine the job of on-the-ground troops in Baghdad was described in the following manner, "In their new role, the Americans find themselves acting as jailers and doctors, construction workers and garbage men, guardians and detectives---all in the effort to restore lasting order." (Marc Santora, "In the Vortex of Baghdad, Staying Put This Time." New York Times, 1/23/07)

Economic reality is also starting to impact on-the-ground military officers. Paul Brinkley, a senior Pentagon official, has started to push the revival of state-owned Iraqi enterprises. The government still owns 192 companies outside the energy and security sectors and continues to pay at least part of the salaries of 600,000 employees, although many worked at factories now closed. Little of the \$38 billion in American reconstruction money has gone to local companies and unemployment rates are put somewhere between 30 to 60 percent.

But American ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, part of the neo-conservative circle in Washington, argues that the United States should use private enterprise before government companies because, "That's obviously the right thing to do." (James Glanz. "Iraqi Factories, Aging and shut, Now Give Hope." NTY, 1/18/07) The New York Times reports that Green Zone officials have "retained their unbending orientation toward privatization." When asked why the US was buying buses abroad when a struggling state-owned firm makes similar vehicles a US official answered, "We've denied these people access to the global free market for 15 years; I'm not going to go back to them and say that you've got to buy buses from some state-owned enterprise." On the otherhand, Brinkley argues that when factories

“are laying idle due to our policy of shutting them off, we have an obligation to restore them to the Iraqi people.” (Ibid.)

Lt. General Peter Chiarelli, a major proponent of the counter-insurgency doctrine, also calls for expanded social, economic and agricultural programs to employ Iraq’s “angry young men.” Chiarelli calls this “nonkinetic policies” arguing that, *“a lot of people say ‘If we just go down and kill and capture them everything will be O.K’ ...I’m not saying that every insurgent is going to take a job making 55-gallon drums. But my point is, do you try and reintegrate them into society, or do you just believe that everybody around here wants to have a gun...”* (John Burns, “US General Says Jobs and Services May Curb Iraq Violence.” NYT, 12/13/06)

But nation-building efforts are often in conflict with battlefield conditions. The Pentagon’s new “FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency” doctrine states, “Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. The best weapon is sometimes none at all. The prime objective is not to kill as many insurgents as possible but to maximize support from the local population.” In order to get “close to the population” troops should be thought of as “nation-builders as well as warriors” involved in “armed social work” with political and cultural workers attached to each company. (The Economist, “Think before you shoot.” 12/23/06, p. 42-43). That the Bush administration accepted this strategy, which shares so much language from the Clinton years of “humanitarian intervention,” indicates just how desperate they have become.

The new strategy may sound all well and good. But heavily armed young men are trained in the “warrior ethos” where each soldier declares “I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America.” What will be the reaction of these troops in an environment where they can be “greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade”? (Ibid) Similar circumstances in Viet-Nam created a common military outlook that every Vietnamese was the enemy leading to widespread attacks on civilians, and there is plenty of evidence that these same feelings run deep among US soldiers in Iraq. A twenty year old Marine will find it hard to engage in “armed social work” with his buddy dead at his feet. Chiarelli tries to put a human face on imperialist occupation believing that the US is a benign force for good. The view from the Iraqi side is something all together different. It’s hard to paint foreign occupation as anything less than a Western war on Islam. Attempts at humanitarian nation-building are already far too late.

The same problem confronts US and Nato forces in Afghanistan. Since the defeat of the Taliban there has been little attention paid to the humanitarian needs of the local population. As one Western diplomat pointed out, "Reconstruction projects were planned, but never materialized... We are all scratching our heads as to why the aid has not rolled out ... It's not for a lack of resources. We are meeting basic needs, but when it comes to sustainable livelihoods and jobs, it's not happening.'" (Carlotta Gall, "NATO's Afghan Struggle; Build, and Fight Taliban." NYT, 1/13/07)

With the Taliban resurgence fighting has spread and so has civilian deaths caused by Nato troops. Although Nato is guided by a counter-insurgency doctrine that calls for the winning of hearts and minds, battlefield conditions contradict the strategy. As the New York Times reports, "As suicide bombings have taken their toll on troops... the soldiers have frequently resorted to lethal force, calling in airstrikes and firing on approaching cars, often killing and wounding civilians and further worsening the public mood." (Ibid) Caught in the cross-fire between Nato and the Taliban local anger is boiling over against foreign troops. Speaking out about British troops village elder Hajji Abdul Ghafar says, "They did not come to bring peace for us, they came to destroy us." (Ibid.)

As in Iraq the White House only grudgingly recognized the need for greater reconstruction aid. Asking Congress for \$10 billion more in 2007, \$8.6 was earmarked for military purposes. Desperate for any turn in policy towards nation-building one EU diplomat said of US efforts, "The US has really taken account of the European point of view." (Daniel Dombey. "US bows to pressure with \$10bn for Afghanistan" FT, 1/27/07, p. 4) But for the Bush administration nation-building is poorly understood and regarded simply as a rear guard action in a deteriorating situation.

It's not that the US lacks the ways and means to do large-scale humanitarian reconstruction, the problem is political will. The US had no problems building its own state within a state inside the Green Zone in Baghdad. The US embassy covers 104 acres, six times larger than the UN complex in New York. It employs 1,000 people plus private-sector body guards, provides its own water, sewers, electricity, maintains six apartment buildings, a Marine barracks, swimming pool, shops and 15 foot thick walls. (Guy Dinmore, "US twists civilian arms to fill its Fortress Baghdad." FT, 1/8/07, p. 2) Yet when it comes to the needs of the Iraqis little is accomplished, as late as 2007 electrical power had not returned to pre-war levels.

The mess in Iraq and Afghanistan has made nation-building a primary concern for US foreign policy elites. The Council on Foreign Relations convened a task force under the leadership of retired General William Nash as well as Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger, both top figures from the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. Among task force members were representatives from RAND, Brookings, the World Policy Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Also represented was the National Defense University, the Marine Corps and transnational corporations such as Citigroup, Goldman, Sachs, and Co., and Bechtel.

Their report, “In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities,” argues nation-building is “not just a humanitarian concern, but a critical national security priority that should be on par with war-fighting and urges the United States to equalize the importance of the two.” (Council on Foreign Relations Press, Task Force Report No. 55, Sept. 2005) The report goes on to state that “Stability and reconstruction needs to be understood and treated as a mission as important to America’s security as high-intensity combat operations.” And furthermore recommends the establishment of a “multilateral reconstruction Trust Fund” of one billion dollars managed by the Group of Eight with a board that includes the UN and World Bank. In addition they recommend a new undersecretary of state responsible for stabilization and reconstruction. (Ibid)

The report is a mixture of realists and globalist views and reflects the majority ruling class consensus on the strategic direction the US should take in the post-Bush years. It is also an important statement on how far mainstream realists have come to accept nation-building and how deep their split goes with neo-realists like Cheney and Rumsfeld. Even so the report still accepts the possibility, even the probability, that the US will be involved in military occupations. But its primary focus is on creating a multilateral global regime to maintain world stability through humanitarian intervention.

Following the publication of the report in September 2005 the CFR convened a number of symposiums to promote its policy initiatives pointing out the nation-building lessons of the 1990s were “disregarded with devastating consequences” by the current Washington leadership. As Scowcroft explains, “*From the military standpoint they want to focus on their primary mission. You know, the term that was the ‘shock and awe’ and so on: ruthless force, overwhelming. And we don’t want to train paratroops*

to escort kids to kindergarten. Well, those are slogans and the facts is if you look at the likely nature of conflict over the next generation its going to be much more this mixed kind of conflict than 'shock and awe'...war-fighting does not solve the problems...after the shooting stops you have the problem of what you do, how you put that political entity on a course of reform, stability and reconstruction to make it a useful member of the international community rather than a running sore.” (Council on Foreign Relations. “Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities: Report of an Independent Bipartisan Task Force.” July 27, 2005, Federal News Service)

The Scrowcroft-Berger report was a precursor to the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study group. Both were efforts by mainstream realists and globalists to stop the runaway train to disaster the hegemonist engineered. With their efforts dismissed with little more than a hidden sneer, realists will likely treat hegemonists in a similar manner when Bush is out of the White House. But the underlining imperialist logic of all capitalist factions will continue to generate instability and opposition. The main difference is “humanitarian intervention” is less likely to produce the large scale wars of the hegemonists. But certainly wars and occupations will occur, particularly so if globalists continue to compromise with the Hobbesian nation-centric competitive fears that drive the realist worldview.

The Battle for Energy

Oil has been of key importance to US foreign policy for many years, but particularly so after 1972 when US oil production began to decline. Since then reliance on foreign oil has increased to 56 percent of total US needs compared to self-sufficiency during W.W. II. Access to oil is a concern that reaches far beyond the oil industry itself. It is of strategic importance to the entire economy and therefore viewed as a national security matter. It is a commodity different from all others and one that fuels 97% of US transport needs encompassing cars, trucks, planes and ships. In addition the military itself, entrusted to safeguard world access, is dependent on oil to fuel its own global capabilities and industry. (Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Metropolitan Books, Henry Hold and Company, NY, 2004)

For some in the military establishment oil is the very essence of America. For example, Captain Donald Root writes; “*The economy is the heartbeat of the American society and way of life. Energy keeps that heartbeat strong and oil is the blood it pumps...A thriving US economy is the embodiment of the*

spirit of the American way of life; a strong economy supports political freedom, economic freedom, the unlimited potential of the people and the projection of those ideas across the globe. Individual prosperity and security is the backbone of US national security.” (Cpt. Donald Root, US Navy. “For the Want of a Nail: US Dependence on Foreign Oil and National Security.” US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2/6/05, p. 2) This entanglement of oil, the “American way of life” and US ambitions to remake the world in its image creates an cultural essentialism and destiny tied to the control of foreign energy sources. A dangerous mix that justifies war and occupation no matter the cost and a reflection of the hegemonist worldview.

Realists may avoid such visionary and apocalyptic language, but they see energy as the object of worldwide national competition. Consequently China’s deepening economic ties to Iran, Africa and Latin America are a threat and political challenge. While Russia’s desire for a fair oil price from the Ukraine becomes nationalist interference with the market. In addition, the underbelly of the old Soviet Union has become a hotbed of military and political competition over oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea region. It is not only access that drives geopolitical fear but concern over how oil profits are used. China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia are all outside of US political control with economic models or political priorities that are viewed with suspicion or outright hostility. As pointed out in a report by the CFR countries from “ Russia to Iran to Venezuela are able and willing to use their energy resources as leverage to pursue their strategic and political objectives. Because of their oil wealth, these and other producer countries are free to ignore US policies and to pursue interests inimical to our national security.” (CFR, “US Energy Dependence Undercutting US National Security, Council Task Force Warns.” October 12, 2006) If realist’s geopolitical views continue to dominate oil security concerns nation-centric competition will become more pronounced and insecurity increased. With the US position weaken in a post-Iraq Middle East greater tension will result in every region of the world as the US seeks to shore-up its power and access.

But none of this makes sense when viewed from a globalist perspective. In an integrated world economy with cross-border investments and production what is needed is a stable energy market with open access for all. When China imports more oil from Angola and Iran it suits the needs of US transnationals all of whom have manufacturing facilities in China that cry out for more energy. Competition continues and will be fierce, but is this

between global corporations or national economies? Energy is a highly integrated transnational economy of markets, trade, exploration, development and production. Much of this is under the control of nationally owned corporations dealing with some of the world's biggest and most profitable corporations. State ownership of 80 percent of the world's oil and land based resources gives the market its particular geopolitical character. In fact, the six largest state controlled companies have ten times the reserves of six largest oil transnationals. Consequently there is a dual nature to the market, one rooted in nationally identified economics, the other in the growing transnational economy. Therefore strategic military policies can promote or retard either accumulation model depending on the political agenda of the class faction in control of the state. This corresponds to the transitional character of the era and the contradictions between transnational and nation-centric capitalism.

How is this all reflected in future US energy security policy? A growing sector of corporate, military and political elites are pushing a strategy of energy independence. Battered by the war in Iraq and with fears over global oil instability their answer is to back away from geopolitical competition and recognize "the realities of global energy interdependence." The most important statement of this strategy is "Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing US Oil Dependence" by the Energy Security Leadership Council (ESLC). The Council is made-up of former high ranking generals and important corporate representatives including those from Goldman Sachs, UPS, Dow Chemical, FedEx and Southwest Airlines.

Unlike the hegemonist who see geopolitical competition over oil as a way to assert US leadership and provide profits to the military/industrial complex the Council takes the opposite view. Insecurity and economic waste are the results of a global spanning military network to protect oil access. As the report argues, "*The magnitude of our dependence on oil provides leverage to our strategic adversaries, makes us vulnerable to terrorist actions, exacerbates geopolitical competition, creates additional military requirement, and undermines efforts to support democratic polices worldwide. Each year the US expends enormous military resources protecting the chronically vulnerable oil production and distribution network while also preparing to guarantee international access to key oil-producing regions. Americans would be well served to recognize that the current struggle for oil security gives rise to burdens that are not reflected in the retail price of gasoline.*" (Energy Security Leadership Council.

“Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing US Oil Dependence.” Dec. 2006. p.)

Therefore reducing oil consumption (particularly in transportation), developing energy alternatives (ethanol) and increasing US production (Alaska and the continental Shelf) are all ideas emphasized by the report. Such policies are nationally directed and independent of foreign oil. Globally the report recommends a broad mutual defense of international energy flows that should include India and China. As the ESLC notes in an “interconnected and interdependent world economy” open markets and reciprocal foreign investments are a factor for stability. While advocating certain environmentally friendly policies this is not an environmentalist strategy but a geostrategic policy concerned with security. The report is a hybrid of nationalist and globalist concerns. As Herb Kellehner, chairman of Southwest Airlines said, “Two or three years ago I wasn’t preoccupied with these issues but I have become more sensitive to them, especially our oil dependency, I’ve become a crusader from a patriotic standpoint.” (Caroline Daniel. “Bush faces pressure on carbon emissions.” FT, 1/2207. p. 4) But this patriotism is not defined as world hegemony but rather as independence from foreign involvement and global “oil peacekeeping” as the best arrangement for stable and competition.

The CFR argues for a similar although somewhat more aggressive plan. Convening a task force under the direction of John Deutch, former head of the CIA and John Schlesinger, former Defense and Energy Secretary, the CFR included representatives from Lockheed Martin, Lehman Brothers, the Scowcroft Group, the Soros Fund and other business and think tank elites. Their report parallels the ELSC in recommending biofuels, slowing transport consumption and expanding domestic drilling. Energy independence is also the main concern of the CFR Task Force. As the report states, “America’s dependence on imported energy increases its strategic vulnerability and constrains its ability to pursue foreign policy and national security objectives” thus the US must “begin the transition to an economy that relies less on petroleum.” (CFR, “US Energy Dependence Undercutting US National Security, Council Task Force Warns.” October 12, 2006)

But the realists at CFR cling to their nation-centric fear of foreign powers. Reliance on oil means concessions to Russia, Venezuela and Iran, seen as nasty political choices that can be avoided by energy independence. So rather than encouraging multilateral security aimed at “oil peacekeeping” the

CFR advocates a new “energy security directorate” that can “integrate energy issues with foreign policy” by coordinating policy on energy security between the “National Security Council, Defense and State departments and intelligence community.” (Ibid) The Task Force doesn’t turn its back on the international community and argues for a revitalization of international institutions, but places less emphasis here than the ELSC.

Preparing for Defeat

As Bush talked of expanding the war others were already talking of defeat. Retired General Zeb Bradford, past senior military fellow at CFR and now an executive with Citigroup, argued that if diplomatic efforts fail the US “must then be prepared to negotiate a withdrawal or redeployment (and) to recognize our own limitations.” (Zeb Bradford, “Why more troops will not solve the crisis in Iraq.” FT. 11/16/06, p. 13) An early critic of the war retired General William Odom wrote “What’s wrong with cutting and running? There is no question the insurgents and other anti-America parties will take over the government once we leave. But that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any government capable of holding power in Iraq will be anti-America, because the Iraqi people are increasingly becoming anti-American.” (William Odom, “What’s wrong with cutting and running” ASK THIS, 8/3/05)

Even as 21,000 more troops were being rushed to Baghdad factions inside elite foreign policy circles readied plans for retreat. In early 2007 the Brookings Institute issued an analysis paper titled “Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From an Iraqi Civil War,” and the CFR published “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq.” The main thrust of both papers was containing the disaster in Iraq through a pull-back to neighboring states and working with regional and world powers to prevent violence spilling over into the entire Middle East.

“Things Fall Apart” by Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack was issued in January 2007. Their study is an encompassing analysis of civil wars throughout the world and draws a grim picture of spreading violence and chaos to neighboring states. These include massive flows of refugees, greater terrorist activity, radicalization of neighboring populations, secessionism, economic loss and regional interventions. Their conclusion is that “the only rational course of action, horrific though it will be, is to abandon Iraq’s population centers and refocus American efforts from

preventing civil war to containing it.” Byman and Pollack suggest a variety of steps including both military and diplomatic options. These include simultaneous military warnings and diplomatic openings to Syria and Iran in an attempt to stabilize the region. But with sizeable Shia populations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain and Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iran and Syria the authors feel the danger of regional war is “considerable.” (Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack. “Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From An Iraqi Civil War.” Analysis Paper Number 11, Brookings Institute, Washington DC, January 2007)

“After the Surge” by Steven Simon is the result of a CFR task force study. The report presents a grim assessment of internal Iraqi conditions although its regional analysis is not as dark as Byman and Pollack’s. As it states, “The crisis has now moved beyond the capacity of Washington to control on its own.” Bush’s troop surge will fail to prevent further deterioration and yet there is “no alternative policy with the potential to turn things around.” Simon’s analysis of the situation goes beyond battlefield tactics. As he lays-out, *“Saddam’s rule dismantled civil society before twelve years of sanctions hollowed out Iraq’s middle class. US intervention decapitated its leadership, swept aside its remaining institutions, and created the security vacuum that empowered militias and reduced society to a state of Hobbesian misery. Iraqis have thus been stripped of the capacity to build a post-Ba’athist state.”* (Steven Simon. “After the Surge, the Case for US Military Disengagement from Iraq.” Council On Foreign Relations, Washington DC, February 2007)

There is evident anger in the report that speaks volumes to splits within the US ruling class. As the author bitterly states, “Military disengagement will be a severe blow to the United States, which staked its prestige and defined its security on the basis of a war to disarm Iraq and transform its politics. Disengaging will signify the inability to achieve these strategic goals...Some disasters are irretrievable.” Who is to blame? “Amateurish American leadership imbued with a grandiose conception of its power and committed to a flawed political program.” The results? An American presence “floundering ineffectually in Iraq while supplying the Muslim world with iconic images of seeming weakness and cruelty... incapable of restoring Iraq even to the relative stability of the Ba’athist era.” (Ibid)

Facing up to defeat the report argues for disengagement “without reference to Iraqi progress toward national reconciliation,” and a containment policy

carried out through diplomacy. This effort would include Syria and Iran, UN participation as well as China, Russia and the European Union. Simon's hope to limiting the civil war and preventing its regional spread is based in the self-interest of Middle Eastern powers and their desire for stability. Motivating Simon is the desire to avoid a Viet-Nam like debacle that takes decades to recover from. He argues in the following manner, "*There are also compelling strategic reasons to draw down in a deliberate fashion. In disengaging, the United States must seek to shape the narrative of its intervention in Iraq in order to preserve the greatest possible credibility in a painfully compromising situation. Thus, the United States would want to avoid the appearance of a rout or panicky departure...shaping the narrative comes down to ensuring that no American leaves under fire from the embassy roof in a helicopter...Better to withdraw as a coherent and somewhat volitional act than withdraw later in hectic response to public opposition to the war.*" (Ibid)

All this draws attention to the weakening of US power and an end to the unipolar moment in history. The world has entered a period neither under the hegemony of Washington nor guided by the old cold war international system of alliances. Yet the world also lacks a clearly defined globalist political/military strategy under the leadership of the transnational capitalist class. Realists may want to rebuild a system of US lead allies but the world is rapidly changing as economic clout becomes diffused in a transnational system. Furthermore, hegemonist arrogance has driven away former allies and made emerging powers such as China and Russia ever more aware of the need to balance US power. (Daniel Dombey. "Imperial sunset? America the all-powerful finds its hands tied by new rivals." FT, 2/13/07 p. 11)

Typical of Pentagon double think is Commander Ben Shevchuk's who writes, "the US intends to take advantage of its prolonged hegemony to influence global events toward increased freedom." (Commander Benjamin Shevchuk, "Military Implications of Moral Objectives in the national Security Strategy of the United States of America." US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 3.18/05.) One would normally think that hegemony and freedom are two exclusive concepts.

The disdain traditional realists have for neoconservative moral campaigns is evident in this statement by Dimitri Simes, head of the Nixon Center. “*The debacle that is Iraq reaffirms the lesson that there is no such thing as a good crusade...This was true a thousands years ago when those European Christian knights tried to impose their faith and way of life on the Holy Land – pillaging the region in the process – and it is equally true today.*” (Guy Dinmore, “A uniform trend? How democracy worldwide is on the backfoot.” FT 1/17/07, p. 9)

Widespread disagreement with Rumsfeld’s neo-realist doctrine can be seen in any number of military papers published by the Army War College.

. *On preemptive war:* “Preventive attacks are generally ineffective, costly, unnecessary, and potentially even counterproductive.” (Don Reiter, “Preventive War and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History.” April 2006, Strategic Studies Institute, AWC).

. *On the RMA:* “these may be neat slogans, but they reflect a sense of sophomoric chest-pounding totally inappropriate as doctrine and reflect shallow thinking about the present realities now confronting us.” Dr. Douglas Johnson II, “Doctrine That Works.” Strategic Studies Institute, Opinion Editorial, August 2006.)

. *On the permanent occupation of Iraq:* “Any US expressions of interest in long-term bases may seriously hurt the already fragile legitimacy of the Iraqi government (and) be strongly outweighed by the disadvantages associated with such a policy. Additionally, anti-American radicals in both the Shiite and Sunni communities would be given the gift of a major issue with which to rally their followers.” (W. Andrew Terrill, “The Danger of Seeking Permanent US Military Bases in Iraq.” Army War College Opinion Editorial, November 2005.)

This inability and unwillingness to recognize the diminishing role of the US is present in the Democratic Party as well as among Republicans. Sherwood-Randall worked as chief foreign affairs advisor for Democratic presidential candidate Senator Joseph Biden. Congressman Rahm Emanuel, close to Bill and Hillary Clinton and a leading strategist for the center-right Democratic Leadership Council suffers the same problem.

Emanuel writes, *“We need to use all the roots of American power to make our country safe. America must lead the world’s fight against the spread of evil and totalitarianism, but we must stop trying to win that battle on our own. We should reform and strengthen multilateral institutions for the twenty-first century, not walk away from them. We need to fortify the military’s ‘thin green line’ around the world by adding to the US Special Forces and the Marines, and by expanding the US Army by 100,000 more troops.”* (Rahm Emanuel and Bruce Reed, “The Plan: Big Ideas for America.”) This post 9/11 rhetoric is common throughout Washington leaving hegemonists lingering influence even as they prepare to vacate the White House.