

## TRANSFORMING AN ARMY AT WAR TO AN ARMY PREPARING FOR WAR

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**TRANSFORMING AN ARMY AT WAR TO AN ARMY PREPARING FOR WAR**

by

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United States Army

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The U.S. Army has established a troubling trend of failing to develop future requirements associated with the capabilities necessary to defeat future threats. As a result, since WWII, Army leadership has done a poor job in preparing the force to decisively defeat or even disrupt its foes without a costly and exhaustive effort. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a limited environmental scan in order to identify trends within the Army's future threat environment. From that point, utilizing lessons learned from US historical examples and current guidance, conduct an analysis of what actions will be required to prepare the force to fight and win against future threats to the nation's interests.



## TRANSFORMING AN ARMY AT WAR TO AN ARMY PREPARING FOR WAR

“Si vis pacem, para bellum” – “if you want peace, prepare for war”

— Flavius Vegetius Renatus<sup>1 2</sup>  
Roman military writer, 4<sup>th</sup> century AD

The U.S. Army has established a troubling trend of failing to develop future requirements associated with the capabilities necessary to defeat future threats. As a result, since WWII, Army leadership has done a poor job in preparing the force to decisively defeat or even disrupt its foes without a costly and exhaustive effort. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a limited environmental scan in order to identify trends within the Army's future threat environment. From that point, utilizing lessons learned from US historical examples and current guidance, conduct an analysis of what actions will be required to prepare the force to fight and win against future threats to the nation's interests.

In 1999 the Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak was quoted as saying, “The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable for their complexity...”<sup>3</sup> He was one of many visionary strategic leaders who had begun to consider the drastic changes in the strategic environment brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The elements he mentioned in his quote were instrumental in creating the conditions for Al Qaeda to successfully attack the U.S. mainland in 2001 and President Bush's directive to begin combat operations. This was a clear example of

failure to aggressively analyze the storm of activity outside the nation's windows in an effort to prepare for an enemy that would challenge the U.S. Army like no other.

Nine years later, the Army is preparing to "RESET" the force following President Obama's directed draw down in Iraq and the likewise mandated future draw down in Afghanistan. RESET will involve recapitalization and modernization of equipment and systems. It will also include the restructure of some organizations and changes in the doctrine associated with these organizations. Leaders at all levels must come to a conclusion of what that restructure should look like. Strategic leaders will have to consider guidance from all available sources with interests in the situation and lessons learned from the past as well as recent lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They will have to develop models and concepts that depict what the ever changing contemporary operating environment will resemble in ten to twenty years. In doing so they will have to predict how technology and other factors will affect the capabilities of both current and emerging threats and what affect that will have on the Army's ability to defeat them.

Three broad options will become clear as this discussion develops. The first is to continue to prepare the force in its current direction. That is, continue to build and improve a counterinsurgency force with the capability to engage unconventional threats in unpredictable small wars in disparate locations. Another is to return to a force designed to engage in major combat operations or large scale industrial war. This was the force design prior to the Gulf War and was formed to defeat conventional threats in highly predictable wars against near peer rivals. The last option is to develop a force designed to engage a hybrid threat. Hybrid is a term framed by Frank G. Hoffman in his

book, *Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. It refers to a future threat that uses conventional weapons in unconventional ways and has the ability to transition from regular to irregular warfare in order to gain or maintain an advantage.<sup>4</sup>

These options can best be described as operational approaches that address a defined problem. In order to properly arrive at the correct conclusion one must follow the four steps in the analytical process of developing these approaches, which are: understand the strategic guidance, understand the operational environment, define the problem, and developing the approach to address the problem.

### Strategic Guidance

The sources of higher level guidance used for the purpose of this paper were the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) and the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM). All four documents give broad general guidance that U.S. forces must be flexible and adaptive in order to be capable of confronting the full range of challenges that could emerge from a complex and dynamic security environment.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) goes on to direct U.S. forces to be able to operate in six mission areas. Of those, one is most appropriate for the Army to lead in joint/coalition execution; succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations. The other five are primarily joint actions where the Army will assume a supporting role. The NDS directs U.S. forces to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which they possess in conventional combat.<sup>6</sup> The NSS gives the same type directive, only in clearer language. It states that U.S. forces must maintain conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats.<sup>7</sup> The authors of the QDR recognized the requirement for specific

enablers to succeed in future conflicts. Therefore, the QDR called for military forces to be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners.<sup>8</sup>

The QRM offers a refinement of the guidance from the previous documents. Within it the SecDef has determined that training in irregular warfare techniques best addresses the majority of the effects of the current and future threat environment. The Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. Those who employ irregular warfare favor indirect and asymmetric approaches. But they may also employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.<sup>9</sup> The primary tools used to defeat this type warfare are foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and stability operations. These activities occur across the spectrum of irregular and conventional warfare operations.

### Operational Environment

In the Foreword to the U.S. Army's current rewrite of Field Manual 3-0, General William S. Wallace, the former commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, described the current and future environment as, "...an era of "persistent conflict"—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends."<sup>10</sup> These surroundings will be heavily influenced by globalization enhanced by advanced technology. These two enablers avail all of the previously mentioned stake holders the opportunity to influence, recruit, and fight worldwide. Another critical element to mention is that many of these same stake holders will not be recognized by the international community; therefore, they will not be restrained by international law.

The National Defense Strategy characterizes the future strategic environment as a global struggle against violent extremist ideology. The actors that operate within this environment will judge costs and benefits differently than we do. They will be eager to die for their radical ideological, religious, and ethnic beliefs. These actors will ignore national borders and remain unbound by the conventions of the developed world. These characteristics will leave little room for negotiations or compromise.<sup>11</sup>

Insurgent groups and non-state actors will seek to exploit the instability within this environment. They will pursue safe haven within the ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas that exist because of the resultant instability.<sup>12</sup> If not countered these insurgents and non-state actors will continue to grow and gain power. Their efforts will be enhanced by globalization that has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wide range of actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies.<sup>13</sup>

Drastically changing world demographics will also have sweeping effects on the future strategic environment. The world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s. Ninety-five percent of that increase will occur in developing countries. The more important point is that the world's troubles will occur not only in the areas of abject poverty but also to an even greater extent, in developing countries where the combination of demographics and economy permits populations to grow, but makes meeting rising expectations difficult.<sup>14</sup>

Continued growth of youthful populations (youth bulge) within the areas of abject poverty will have significance for the employment of U.S. forces called upon to feed the starving and mitigate suffering. Where economic growth fuels but does not satisfy

expectations, the potential for revolution or war, including civil war, will be significant. Recent events in the Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa are prime examples of the potential of this statement. The growing youth population coupled with high unemployment is causing the geopolitical landscape to change accordingly.

Cyberspace is the final dimension of the future strategic environment that must be explored. Cyberspace allows one combatant to attack another, indirectly, from thousands of miles away and cause as much relative damage as a conventional two thousand pound bomb. In August 2010 the Pentagon released a report to the media that described cyber attacks and espionage emanating from China toward the U.S. Some of these attacks were in the form of viruses specifically targeting defense contractors, critical industries, or government agencies.<sup>15</sup> It is not a far reach to conclude that with each intrusion they learn more about the vulnerabilities inherent in their opponent's defenses. At a point when the sway of national interests is strong enough and the opportunity presents itself, they could opt to execute a concentrated attack with the goal of destroying or disabling U.S. national markets or defense systems.

*Relevant History.* The description of the future strategic environment thus far illustrates a world of persistent conflict. In this environment U.S. forces will have to make maximum effort to deter hostile actors from threatening U.S. interests. In the event deterrence fails war will require a multilateral effort from U.S. and coalition allies. Relevant historical examples of how U.S. forces have transitioned to counter a new and emerging threat environment can readily be found in documentation on the Vietnam War. The challenge then was much the same as it is now and will likely not change in

the 2030s. That challenge was to simultaneously fight a war while creating the conditions for a lasting peace. U.S. forces had to succeed at these two tasks while learning the characteristics of a new enemy.

The Vietnam War was one of the best learning environments for the effort to secure peace while fighting a war. One method of executing this strategy was through the creation of special commands with dedicated missions. In Vietnam this command was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The lessons learned from its operations are now being applied by the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan.

MACV was established on February 8, 1962, as a unified command subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. The unit had the mission of assisting the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in maintaining internal security against subversion and insurgency and in resisting external aggression. With its headquarters in Saigon, MACV controlled all of the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam. MACV was involved in two basic activities. Its forces conducted seek and destroy operations on the ground and territorial waters of the Republic of Vietnam, which, in turn provided assistance to the constitutional government of Vietnam in building a free society capable of defending itself.<sup>16</sup>

MACV was developed from an earlier organization with a similar name, Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG). This command's mission was to assess France's requests for military aid and advise on strategy in support of the war in Indochina. MAAG was also responsible for assisting in training Vietnamese soldiers. But they were ineffective because the French believed their presence was an intrusion. For this reason the French commanders did not allow MAAG advisers to train with the

Vietnamese soldiers and they likewise did not share information on their strategies to defeat the North Vietnamese.

The greater purpose of the MAAG was to assist the French in applying lessons learned from the Korean War. There, the U.S. achieved success by training and employing South Korean troops along with U.S. forces in an aggressive offensive strategy. The advisers encouraged the French commanders to adopt this same aggressive tactic in concert with making political concessions in order to win popular support from the South Vietnamese people.<sup>17</sup> The refusal of the French to adopt either of these tactics resulted in their eventual forced withdrawal and the U.S. assuming the lead role in the Indochinese war.

Once in charge, the MAAG unintentionally made similar mistakes by misinterpreting the situation. The U.S. advisers' initial estimate of the North Vietnamese was that they were incapable of supporting an insurgency that would threaten the government in the south. This was reinforced by the relative quiet in the countryside and what seemed to be an environment of support for the South Vietnamese government. This caused the MAAG advisers to concentrate training the south's army to fight a conventional force instead of a guerrilla force. This was reinforced by the U.S. advisers' recent experience in Korea.<sup>18</sup>

The next mistake came as the result of a disagreement on the design of a Civil Guard force to maintain internal security in the south. The commander of MAAG wanted a paramilitary force trained and equipped to keep peace in the countryside, prepared to combat a guerrilla force if necessary. The government advisers from Michigan State University sought a small group trained and equipped for police duties. Washington

supported the Michigan State group and the Civil Guard never developed beyond squads equipped with .38 caliber pistols and night sticks.<sup>19</sup>

These initial flaws coupled with the U.S. government's failure to understand the South Vietnamese culture allowed the North Vietnamese insurgency to gain a foot hold and flourish in the south. This led the U.S. to replace MAAG with the larger redesigned Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The new organization was large enough to add advisers down to the battalion level in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Bolstered by this new saturation of support the ARVN undertook offensive operations to defeat the North Vietnamese main force units. Simultaneously, the U.S. backed government created the strategic hamlet program to protect the local villagers from the insurgents. In this program villagers were uprooted from their ancestral lands and issued identification cards in order to safeguard them from insurgent infiltration. This program only served to add to the discontent of the local population which allowed the insurgents to expand their control over the villagers.<sup>20</sup>

The South Vietnamese Government's next attempt to address the underlying issues of the population and reduce support for the insurgency came with the Revolutionary Development (RD) program. RD teams were trained to mirror the tactics of the insurgents in the villages. Through the use of propaganda and social service initiatives the teams carried out hundreds of tasks to build popular support for the legitimate government and undermine the guerrillas.<sup>21</sup> This program, like the earlier ones, was hampered by the lack of security. Many times RD teams would be terrorized by local guerrillas. This was a result of the lack of coordination between the military operations and pacification.

The previous paragraphs detail examples of U.S. and ARVN efforts to secure the population while conducting combat operations. The lack of coordination between military operations and pacification efforts were a major contributor to the U.S failure to gain and maintain the initiative throughout the war. The result was the much publicized withdrawal of U.S. forces under the Nixon administration.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam demonstrates the importance of the continuous study of the operational environment. Failure to scan the environment in search of significant changes resulted in being ill prepared for the fast learning guerrilla tactics of the Viet Cong. The U.S., critical of the French handling of the war, arrogantly stumbled into the same mistakes. The key lesson was that military forces that structure themselves for conventional warfare will not succeed in protecting and hence earning the support of the populace. As a result of not changing to meet the requirement before them the Army failed to mass effects to protect the critical battleground over which the campaign was being fought: the people.<sup>22</sup>

More recent historical example demonstrates that a hybrid threat may be the most likely enemy doctrine that the U.S. will encounter in the next conflict. The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah revealed a disturbing trend. Since the U.S. invasion and subsequent routing of Iraqi forces many state and non state actors, who have hostile intentions towards U.S. interests, have spent significant time and effort in upgrading their military capabilities. They have demonstrated the ability to study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of U.S. and other Western style militaries.<sup>23</sup>

During the 2006 war Hezbollah was able to use a mix of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely packed urban centers to inflict significant damage to the invading

Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Their fighters deployed in decentralized cells and exploited the urban terrain to conduct ambushes and evade detection. They used Iranian anti armor rocket propelled grenades to disable and destroy IDF tanks and support vehicles. Hezbollah also launched armed unmanned aerial vehicles as part of their defense. There is also evidence that they acquired signals intelligence equipment to monitor IDF cell phone calls and may have possibly managed to de-encrypt frequency hopping radio traffic. In this short war Hezbollah was able to illustrate the vulnerabilities of existing U.S. or Western style doctrine and operating concepts.<sup>24</sup>

### Define the Problem

An analysis of the prevailing guidance and the description of the future threat environment reveal several implied/specified tasks and trends that must be addressed in any potential solution of how the future Army should be postured. These tasks and trends will form the basis for the development of capabilities required to address a future threat and establishes how the future force will operate. The tasks include but are not limited to: build partnership capacity using general purpose forces; establish forward basing and prepositioned assets; develop expeditionary mindset/capability; prepositioned assets must be tailored to meet the requirements of specific contingencies, i.e., humanitarian supplies, wheeled vehicles for ground transport, etc.,.

The trends that appear within the future threat environment are perils that range from regular and irregular wars in remote lands sponsored by state and non-state actors seeking to influence established governments by creating instability; crisis zones that will require relief and reconstruction; general unrest created by population surges in developing areas, uneven distribution of wealth, and international competition over the global commons.<sup>25</sup>

With the above tasks and trends in mind the problem statement that results should read as follows.

Adversaries with capable militaries, including access denial, information operations, advanced conventional, WMD and irregular warfare capabilities may creatively use them in new ways to coerce or attack friends or Allies, threaten regional stability, or take other actions that pose an unacceptable threat to the United States. The US military must be capable of defeating such adversaries while minimizing the prospects for unintended escalation and considering the burdens of post-war transition and reconstruction.<sup>26</sup>

### Operational Approaches

At the beginning of this paper three broad operational approaches were discussed as possible solutions to the developed problem statement. The first was to continue to prepare the force in its current direction. The second was to return to a force designed to engage in major combat operations. The last option was to develop a hybrid force designed to engage a hybrid threat.

Now that more specific information has been introduced to the discussion these broad areas can be more narrowly focused in order to better address the problem statement. Some may even be eliminated following the next stage of analysis. The next phase will start with a review of current and emerging doctrine.

The Army has developed two broad operational constructs to better define the military operations required to engage and defeat threats in the future environment. They are wide-area security, which includes irregular warfare and combined arms maneuver which encompasses major combat operations. Wide-area security is defined as the application of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set

conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. Combined arms maneuver is defined as the combination of elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantage over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.<sup>27</sup>

Following this doctrine three options have appeared in recent articles that may provide viable solutions to the future force design of the Army. The first is the “traditional” view that recommends a re-establishment of the pre-Desert Storm focus on major combat operations, fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Proponents of this strategy do not ignore the existence of irregular warfare in the future operational environment but believe that if U.S. national interests are not at stake, U.S. forces should not intervene.<sup>28</sup>

This strategy seeks to preserve the U.S. Army’s current competitive advantage in large-scale conflicts and avoid the protracted nature of stability operations and nation building. This line of thinking has two immediate flaws. The first is that it ignores the U.S. role as the leader of the free world and its unwritten obligation to use its military as a global stabilizing force in places where diplomacy and deterrence fails. Closely linked to this fact is that traditional forces are ill-suited to engage irregular forces. The head of the U.S. Mission to South Vietnam, General Harkins, claimed in September 1962 that what was required to defeat the Viet Cong within three years were “Three Ms” – men, money, and material. The result of this approach was an escalating and indiscriminate use of military firepower as well as the eventual alienation of the affected civilian population.<sup>29</sup> If this option were adopted it could cause a repeat of the U.S. initial experience following Desert Storm in Iraq.

The next strategy is called the division of labor. The proponents of this strategy argue that irregular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes of conflict that require distinct forces with different training, equipment and force design. They believe in placing high emphasis on deterrence, stability operations, and investing in indirect forms of security forces with a great degree of specialization in security cooperation tasks and war fighting.<sup>30</sup> They differ from the traditionalist thinking because they believe the U.S. should engage in small wars in order to preserve global stability. In this way they are even more closely associated with the pre-Desert Storm Army because they adhere to the thought that Special Operations forces should focus on irregular warfare, allowing conventional forces to focus on large scale war with near peers.

Units within the division of labor strategy will have high levels of readiness due to their narrowed individual focus on the mission essential tasks required for stability type operations and conventional warfare. However, because this option produces forces that are optimized on different ends of the spectrum of war, threats in the middle such as hybrid threats, pose a significant risk. Hybrid threats would have the ability to capitalize on their lack of depth and sustainability in a protracted conflict.<sup>31</sup> With the spread of hybrid warfare following the success of Hezbollah against the Israeli Defense Force the associated risk to the forces make this a less than desirable option.

As with most course-of-action development scenarios the third option is either a throw away or one that is a blend of the better of the first two. In this case author LTC Tim Watson offers a blend with his concept of rebalancing Army forces. In this strategy Watson has taken the best of the first two options as well as input from Hoffman's "utility

infielder” strategy to suggest a force design that has agility, addresses threat scenarios across the spectrum of conflict, and attempts to answer the mail on the tasks directed by higher guidance.

LTC Watson’s strategy is built on the wide-area security and combined arms maneuver concepts. These concepts together cover the full range of the spectrum of conflict with overlapping capabilities in the middle. They include the polar opposites of irregular warfare and major combat operations (conventional warfare). The theory is that the Army should designate Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) primarily for wide-area security missions while Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) would be designated primarily for the role of combined arms maneuver. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) would be trained and prepared to execute either mission.

The IBCTs would be terrain or population focused while HBCTs focused on threats associated with the nation’s near peer competitors. This allows for tailored combinations to be employed in situations where a division level operation is required. In situations where hybrid forces come into play the SBCTs can be added as they are best equipped and trained for this type of enemy.

In comparison to the previous two options the rebalancing Army forces option seems to capture all of the good and addresses the bad traits of each. Rebalancing allows the Army to regain and retain combined arms maneuver skills that have atrophied over the past decade.<sup>32</sup> This option also provides for a deterrence capability by maintaining a lethal conventional force. Deterrence is enhanced by the availability of general purpose forces within the IBCTs that can be trained in security cooperation tasks. In doing so rebalancing forces recognizes the U.S. responsibility to assist with

maintaining global stability. Last, rebalancing provides forces that have relevant capabilities that span the full spectrum of war which includes areas where hybrid forces may inject themselves. In sum, the rebalancing forces option seems to offer the Army the best capability to cover the widest range of contingencies.

Regardless of which option is selected to transition the Army to a force capable of defending against the widest range of future threats, change is required. That change, at the cultural and institutional level, will also be the greatest obstacle to the success of implementing either strategy. In order to succeed in making any major design change to the U.S. Army one must have a cursory understanding of the characteristics of some of the subcultures that make up the force.

During the Cold War period it was widely believed that any violent exchange would be between heavy armored forces with Infantry supporting to secure the flanks. Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent and subsequent proliferation of irregular warfare the Infantry or light subculture has understandably taken a lead role in defeating asymmetric threats.

This has left the Armor or heavy subculture in a fight for relevance. How do they fit into the current fight? Should their numbers be reduced to make room for more light units? Since the Armored Corps demonstrated such proficiency in the Gulf War will anyone engage the U.S. in open field battle ever again? These are questions that are valid and in the forefront of any analysis of a future force.

That said, there are still nation states in the world that pride themselves in the ability to field large conventional standing armies consisting of tanks, personnel carriers, and mobile field artillery supported by even larger numbers of light infantry. Among

these are aggressive states such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This is justification that a conventional solution is still viable.

As the current War with Al Qaeda progresses a new Army subculture is developing with a different view of what the future may look like. This culture embraces the rebalanced forces design. One that has the capability to conduct conventional major combat operations then transition to stability operations to counter an ensuing insurgency. This force will also have the capability to defeat hybrid threats such as Israel experienced at the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Interpretation of the previous data indicates that the Army leadership must continue to adapt to meet the challenges ahead. Success appears to be in developing a force with a balanced capability to address the widest range of threats in the future environment. The Army will first have to change its cultural mind-set. There can no longer be vast distinctions between light and heavy units. Victory will come through organizations with full spectrum capability whether they ride, jump or walk into the fight. One definite fact is that the singularly symmetric battlefield is a thing of the past. The Army as an institution must embrace the fact that it must transform into an adaptive, learning organization to keep pace with new threats.

Part of the Army becoming adaptive involves training all leaders to operate in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment. This includes agencies such as the State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Information Agency (USIA), the Central Intelligence Agency, and others. Leaders must have a comprehensive

understanding of what each of these JIIM partners should contribute in conflicts.<sup>33</sup> They bring vital enablers to the battlefield in both major combat and stability operations.

Although total change is not necessary, some reorganization is required. In his 2007 article, "*Learning from Our Modern Wars*," General Chiarelli stated,

...Because of the complexity of our current wars, some believe we should reorganize...into two types of units: those that work only at the high-intensity level...and those designed...for the low intensity fight... Due to limited resources this is both unsustainable and unaffordable. As part of increasing its full spectrum capability the Army should consider increasing the number and adjusting the proportions of specialized units such as civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations.<sup>34</sup>

The goal of this paper was to conduct an environmental scan of the operational environment in order to develop options for preparing the Army to fight and win the next war against an undefined future threat. Initial results of the scan indicated that defining a single specific threat would be impossible due to the myriad of actors involved. The better method of using the data presented was to identify trends instead. From those trends, requirements were developed which led to identification of capabilities needed to succeed in the future operational environment.

The overall conclusion was that the Army will have to develop a RESET design that will allow it to defend against the widest range of threats in the future environment. Analysis revealed that a good enough solution is the better answer when attempting to redesign the force. That said the "rebalanced forces" model seemed to be the most feasible in providing the widest range of capability to address the widest range of threats. The Army must also endeavor to change its cultural mind-set in order to successfully implement any redesign. It will have to shift its culture from one that separates irregular, conventional, light, or heavy forces trained to execute a symmetrical

fight against a predictable enemy to a culturally unified force with a full spectrum enabled capability. This force will have to be JIIM savvy, agile, and adaptive to the ever changing operational environment. The security of the nation and its interests depends on it.

## Endnotes

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<sup>5</sup> Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 18.

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<sup>22</sup> John Nagl, "*Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*," (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 30.

<sup>23</sup> Hoffman, *Conflict In The 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 35.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 36-41.

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Watson, "Rebalancing Forces," 19.

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.