

CHAPTER 3

The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Radicalism

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Introduction

“God is our purpose, the Prophet our leader, the Qur’an our constitution, Jihad our way and dying for God’s cause our supreme objective”¹ is the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood or “Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimum” (in Arabic) represents the “mother movement”² of the Islamic fundamentalist. With branches in “70 countries all over the world,”³ the Muslim Brotherhood is the most pervasive grass roots Islamic fundamentalist movement in the world. The Brotherhood was the first wide-ranging, well-organized, international Islamic movement of modern times.

The Muslim Brotherhood requires scrutiny because most of the leaders of the world’s Islamic terrorist groups have their roots in this movement. Ramzi Yousef, the leader of the terrorist cell that attempted to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993, was recruited into the Brotherhood when he attended colleges in Wales. Osama bin Laden was similarly recruited while attending university classes in Saudi Arabia. They, and thousands of others now in terrorist organizations, have embraced the radical Islamist vision articulated by the Brotherhood.

If one is to understand the thinking of activists in al Qaeda, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and other extreme Islamic groups, the understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood is the place to begin.

Although recent statements by Brotherhood leaders articulate non-violent means for social change, Brotherhood members have resorted to violent measures. One of the most notable episodes of violence was the

assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in October 1981 by Muslim Brothers. This organization serves as the breeding ground for both direct and indirect support to a wide variety of terrorist organizations, from Al-Takfir Wal Higma in Egypt to Hamas in Jordan and Lebanon. The Brotherhood is not a monolithic phenomenon. Internal factions and divergent approaches on a general theme characterize it.

The common theme within the Muslim Brotherhood is the rejection of the secularist approach that limits religion to a relationship between man and his creator. The Brotherhood views Islam not just as a religion but as a holistic system dealing with all aspects of life. Spreading the principle that Islam is "Creed and state, book and sword, and a way of life,"⁴ it seeks to move Islam from the confines of the Mosque to the halls of government. Establishment of the Islamic sharia (law) as the controlling basis of the society and state is the first pillar of the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood seeks the creation of a Muslim state, the liberation of Muslim countries from imperialism, and the unification of Muslim nations as its second pillar. Through informal social programs focused on the disadvantaged low and middle class, the Brotherhood courts individuals, families, and communities in the creation of a state within a state of like-minded Islamists. The Brotherhood seeks to change the nature of the society and state in moderate pro-western governments of the Middle East through manipulation of the political process and infiltration of key institutions.

The group's international structure, history of violence, connections to terrorists, plan of action and beliefs, and its current political activism make the Muslim Brotherhood a major non-governmental strategic rival in the world. Within the Middle East, the secular pro-western moderate governments of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan face a substantial challenge from the Brotherhood. These governments are key to United States policy in the Middle East. This analysis will provide insights into the history, objectives, strategy, and organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. Also to be explored are the linkages between the Muslim Brotherhood and today's Islamic terrorist threats. Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood is important if U.S. policy-makers are to make informed Middle East engagement choices.

Evolution of the Middle East and Modern Fundamentalists

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is rooted in events in the Islamic religion and during the formation of the nations of the Middle East. The legacy of reform in Islamic communities is considerable. In the 18th and 19th centuries Muslims saw a continual erosion of their traditional society by foreign colonial maritime powers and the influences of the Ottoman Empire's overlordship of the Arab world. The Ottoman Empire during the 18th century included Egypt and the area of the western Arabian Peninsula region of Hejaz, along the Red Sea. Through control of Hejaz, the Ottomans gained religious prestige and custodianship of the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca. The Ottomans appointed local sharifs as the protectors and administrators of the holy cities.

It was in this setting in 1745 that one of the most pervasive radical reform movements was begun by Abd al-Wahhab, who began preaching a purification of Islam from the external influences of foreigners and their modern thinking. Abd al-Wahhab was heavily influenced by the thirteenth century teaching of Ibn Taymiya from the Hanbali school. Ibn Taymiya sought to eliminate any historic transformation of Islam and return to strict adherence to Sunna or traditions as practiced in the seventh century by Muhammad and the first four caliphs or successors.

Abd al-Wahhab was expelled from his home community for preaching the return to the strict Hanbali school of Islamic law and purification of polytheism from Islam. He resettled in Ad-Dir'iyah under the protection of its chief, Muhammad ibn Saud, and newest convert to Wahhabism.

Muhammad ibn Saud used the Wahhab's ideology to consolidate power and authority over the nomadic Bedouin tribes of central Arabia who had no nationalistic or unifying interests. Saud used warrior-preachers, Ikhwan, to spread the Wahhab fundamentalist revival throughout the center of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Ikhwan (Arabic for "brothers") established colonies of agricultural settlements and lived among and converted individuals, families, and tribes to an uncompromising Islam. The Ikhwan weaved the Wahhab ideology into the social fabric of the Bedouin tribes through teaching, fighting, and social integration.

The union of Wahhabism and Muhammad ibn Saud marked the beginning of a religious ideology used by three Saudi dynasties that vied for power and control of Arabia and the Holy Cities. Wahhabism and the Saud dynasty in the twentieth century created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and they drove the Hashemite family, the Sharifs of Mecca and Medina, from the Holy Cities.

Since the tenth century the descendents of the Hashemite family had served as Sharif of Mecca, Guardians of the Holy Places of Islam. The Hashemite families are direct descendents of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali, who was also the Prophet's cousin. They were entrusted with the guardianship of the Holy Cities. From 1916 to 1918, through the efforts of T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn 'Ali aligned with the British to challenge and push the Ottomans from Transjordan and Syria in the Arab Revolt. By 1918, Husayn and his two sons, Faysal and Abdullah, had succeeded in dislodging the Ottomans. Faysal established a government in Damascus.

In 1920, the Conference of San Remo (Italy) created two mandates that separated the area covered by present day Israel and Jordan from Syria and Lebanon. The British mandate encompassed present-day Israel and Jordan. The French mandate encompassed Syria and Lebanon. The French with their mandate pushed Faysal from power in Damascus in 1920. In 1921, with British support, Faysal established himself as King of Iraq and Abdullah became the emir of Transjordan. The Hashemites, in disagreement with their benefactor, Britain, refused to agree to the terms of the Balfour Declaration approving a national homeland in Palestine for the Jews.

During the period from 1921 to 1924, the Saudi Wahhabis consolidated power on the Arabian Peninsula. Without the support of the British and allied Arabian factions, the Hashemites were not able to stem the expansion of the Saud dynasty into the Hejaz region. In 1924, the Saudi Wahhabis marched into Hejaz, ending the Hashemite rule over the Holy Cities. The British, in a protectorate role, acknowledged the sovereignty of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1923 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1927.

The Wahhabis wanted to continue their expansion in the Arab world by expelling the British and French. Ibn Saud broke with the Wahhabis in

1927 when the Wahhabis denounced him for selling out the cause. Ibn Saud seeing the reign of terror begun by the Wahhabi religious police, fearing loss of his country in a fight with the colonial powers, and desiring to pursue oil exploration concessions, began a brutal repression of the Wahhabis and many of the Ikhwan fled to Egypt and other Arab countries. Saudi Arabian Wahhabism played a critical role in the formation of the modern state of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and in the spread Islamic fundamentalism across the Red Sea to Egypt.

With the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 the British established de facto control of Egypt through military occupation and political maneuvering centered on the protection of the canal as a vital link to the British Empire. To prevent capture by Turkish or German forces, the United Kingdom formally expanded its role in 1914 by decreeing that Egypt was a British Protectorate.

Following World War I, an intense Egyptian resentment flowered against the British and the Suez Canal Company. The Wafd nationalist political party, the monarch proponents, and the British occupation forces struggled continuously to maintain control of Egypt from 1918 until 1956.

Egyptian society experienced a succession of different forms of government from constitutional monarchy to royal decree, characterized by intense rivalry among competing Egyptian political factions. Ever present was the British influence with the threat of military intervention to protect their Suez Canal holdings. In the backdrop of foreign influences, political instability, social upheaval, and Wahhabis influences the Muslim Brotherhood came to life.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Growth in Egypt

In 1928, armed with his devout Islamic family upbringing and formal education as a teacher at the Dar Al-Uloum School in Cairo, Hassan Al-Banna began preaching the principle that Islam was a comprehensive way of life to commoner patrons of cafes and coffee shops in towns along the Nile. Al-Banna's message struck a popular cord among all classes of Egyptian society. With a small group of six devout followers, Al-Banna formed the organization Al-Ikhawns Al-Muslimums, with the first goal of "fighting against the secular Egyptian constitution of 1923 to obtain the

creation of an Islamic society on the pattern set up in the Arabian Peninsula by the Wahabites Ikhwans.”⁵

The history of the Brotherhood unfolded in five phases. The first phase from 1928 to 1940 is the period of growth as a religious and social reform movement focused on gaining members through grassroots programs that established schools, youth clubs, centers, factories, and mosques. The organization’s social welfare network distributed free meals to the needy. The path to change used by the Brotherhood was “mass Islamization through education, and information, acts of charity and welfare on behalf of the community.”⁶ This period marked the Brotherhood’s establishment of a state within a state, filling a void in the government’s social programs. Many influential future leaders of Egypt fell under the spell of Al-Banna, including a future Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Early in his career Sadat invited Al-Banna to teach his soldiers and he secretly participated in Al-Banna’s seminars.

Key events in Phase I of the Muslim Brotherhood’s growth were:

1928: Organization was founded by Hassan al-Banna as a youth club.

1936: The Muslim Brotherhood took a pro-Arab position following the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the start of the Palestinian uprising against Zionist settlements in Palestine.

1939: The Muslim Brotherhood was defined as a political organization, that based itself on the Koran and the Hadith as a system that is applicable even for the modern society.

1940: The Brotherhood passed 500 branches, each with its own centre, mosque, school and club.⁷

In its second phase, from 1940 to 1948, the Brotherhood became politicized in the fight against the British occupation and the monarchy of King Farouk. When World War II started, El Banna sent two letters and emissaries to gain support from Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini for the “ejection of the British enemy and the downfall of the corrupt regime of King Farouk.”⁸ In 1942, Al-Banna convened the sixth Congress of the Muslim Brotherhood where he called for the establishment of an Islamic government through the political process in the future Parliamentary elections. During the Second World War, the Muslim Brotherhood formed an internal radical paramilitary wing “The Secret Apparatus”⁹ that

stole weapons, started clandestine military training, and collaborated against the British and the Egyptian monarchy. When the Parliamentary election was held in 1945, the Brotherhood candidates were defeated amidst vocal claims that King Farouk's men rigged the elections. This failure and the corruption of the election process spurred the Brotherhood's more militant apparatuses into action. They instigated riots, burned Jewish businesses, threatened journalists, bombed movie theaters, and murdered judges and ministers. After Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi outlawed the Brotherhood, they assassinated him.

Following the assassination, the Egyptian Government repressed and outlawed the organization, forcing many Brothers to move to Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Thus began the globalization of their cause. Egyptian universities educating religious Arab men from all over the region also served as a means of exporting the Brotherhood ideology to other Arab countries. "Quickly there shot up branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Sudan, Jordan, and in other countries."¹⁰

On the eve of the first Arab-Israeli War there were 38 branches in Palestine alone.¹¹ It is through the inspiration of the Muslim Brotherhood that the Palestinian Students Union was formed in Cairo. The Union membership included many of the future leaders of the PLO, including Yasser Arafat, Salim Zannat, and Abu Iyad. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, father of today's Hamas terrorist organization, headed the growth of the Brotherhood in Gaza and Palestine under the name, Muslim Association. Following Al-Banna's guidance "... when words are banned, hands make their moves,"¹² thousands of Brothers joined Arab forces and fought in the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948.

Key events in the second phase of the Brotherhood's development included:

1940-45: During the World War II, the Brotherhood experienced a fast growth, and was joined by individuals from the lower and middle strata of the society.

1946: The Brotherhood claimed to have more than 5,000 branches, over 500,000 members and even more sympathizers, estimated at over three million. Over 50 branches were established in Sudan to begin the international expansion of the Brotherhood.¹³

1948: Brothers joined the Palestinian side in the war against the Zionists of Palestine. Many Egyptian officers were exposed to their ideology during this war.

The Brothers blamed the Egyptian government for passivity in the war against the Zionists and launched terrorist attacks inside Egypt.

December: The Muslim Brotherhood was banned by the authorities.

December 28: Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi was assassinated by a Brotherhood member. This leads to even more repression from the government.¹⁴

The third phase, 1948-1953 was marked by the Brotherhood's cooperation with revolutionary movements leading to the ousting of the monarchy by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's Free Officers coup and its uprising against the British control of the Suez Canal. After this period of violence, Al-Banna realized he had lost control of the paramilitary wing. He stated that those who carried out the violence were "neither Brothers nor Muslim."¹⁵ Despite his denunciation of violence, this episode was a harbinger of the future of the Brotherhood. The Brothers who had picked up arms in 1948 had the experience and the tools to pursue a more violent course. With Al-Banna's death the door was open for the development of a more violent ideology within the Brotherhood.

Key events in phase three of this movement were:

1949 February: Hassan al-Banna was killed in Cairo by Farouk's agents in retaliation for the assassination of Prime Minister Nokrashi.

1950: The Brotherhood was legalized as a religious body.

1951: Hassan Islam al-Hudaibi, a moderate, was elected leader of the Brotherhood.

1952 January: The Brotherhood actively supported the anti-British riots in Cairo.

July: Free Officer's coup toppled King Farouk's monarchy. As a reward for their cooperation, the Brotherhood was not banned by the Free Officer's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).¹⁶

The fourth phase, 1954 to 1981, was characterized by violent confrontation with Nasser's government, the second outlawing of the Brotherhood, and the rise of an extremist ideology within the Brotherhood that promoted violence to change the government from the top down. These Brotherhood members formed the violent offshoot terrorist organization that assassinated Anwar Sadat.

The Brothers blamed Nasser for failing to take a more aggressive posture against Israel, failing to institute Sharia (Islamic Law), and for the perceived unsatisfactory results of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 concerning control of the Suez Canal. A cycle of assassination attempts by the Brotherhood was followed by brutal repression, arrests, detentions, and executions by the Nasser government. During the crackdown, the third leader of the Brotherhood, Sayed Qutb (aka, Seid Kutub Ibrahim, Sayyid Qutb) was imprisoned.

Qutb was a virulent opponent of Nasser's socialist regime. While incarcerated, his writings were smuggled out of prison and attracted a following. Qutb's message in some twenty-four different books advocated the same program: destruction of the secular governments, revolution from the top down to establish an Islamic state, and the uncompromising pursuit of these goals by all means including violence. "With the infusion of Qutb's ideology, the Brotherhood became a powerful opponent of Nasser's regime."¹⁷ Statements in his book "*Landmarks*" led to his arrest, conviction, and execution in August 1966 for plotting to overthrow the government. Following Qutb's death and the stinging Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, opposition continued to grow.

After Nasser's death, Anwar as-Sadat appeased the Brotherhood with conciliatory gestures and the liberalization of Egypt's political system. Sadat's 1973 War with Israel to regain bargaining power and prestige brought significant domestic frustration. Although Sadat's efforts did facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai, the Brotherhood was strongly opposed to Sadat's 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) and the 1978 Camp David accords normalizing relations with Israel and establishing a framework for resolution of the Palestinian issues. Economic benefits from the United States aid that began in 1975 and reached one billion dollars by 1980 could not replace the loss of Arab funding that resulted from Sadat's peace overtures to Israel. Expulsion from the Arab League only heightened popular

resentment. Sadat's democratization did not produce the level of economic revitalization needed. Economic hardships resulted in riots in Egypt's major cities in 1977. The government response left 79 people dead, 1,000 injured, and 1,250 in jail. In September 1981, Sadat, alerted by intelligence reports predicting another uprising, jailed another 1,300 members of the political elite who were made up mainly of Brothers.

In the shadows of this unrest and armed with Qutb's ideology, militant Brothers founded the Egyptian Jihad organization under the leadership of Mohammed Abed Alsalem Faraj. Participants in this group included Sheikh Omar Abed Elrahman, later convicted in connection with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and Iman Zawahari, the reputed right hand operative of Osama bin Laden. On October 6, 1981, the Egyptian Jihad executed their plot to topple Sadat's government in a three-day campaign of terror that began with the assassination of Sadat. They then killed 120 soldiers at prayer in a mosque and another 90 police and security personnel at other locations. Vice President Hosni Mubarak with the help of loyal forces quelled the violence and began his twenty-year rule as the President of Egypt.

Key events in phase four of the Muslim Brotherhood included the following:

1954 February: Due to differences over by Egypt's system of government and law, Sharia or secular law, the Brotherhood was banned again.

October 23: A Brotherhood activist, Abdul Munim Abdul Rauf, tried to assassinate President Nasser, but failed. Following this, he and 5 other Brothers were executed, 4,000 members were arrested. Thousands fled to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon.

1962-1967: Egypt engaged in armed conflict against Saudi Arabia in the Yemen civil war. Saudi Arabian supporters provided financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Expatriated Brotherhood members in Saudi Arabia were influenced by Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood eventually published and distributed the Wahhabist books "Minhaj al-Muslim" by Jabir al-Jaza'iri and "Fath al-Majid" (The "Gospel" of Wahhabism) by Ibn Abd al-Wahhad.¹⁸

1964: A general amnesty was granted to imprisoned Brothers. Nasser wanted them to join the newly formed government party, the Arab Socialist Union, to ward off the threat of communism. This conditional cooperation policy did not succeed, and Nasser was the target of 3 more assassination attempts by Brotherhood members.

1966: The top leaders of the Brotherhood were executed, and many other members were imprisoned.

1968 April: Around 1,000 Brothers were released from prison by President Nasser.

1970: With the death of Nasser, the new president, Anwar as-Sadat, promised the Brothers that Sharia shall be implemented as the law of Egypt. All Brotherhood prisoners were released.

1976: The Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to participate in the general elections, so many Brothers ran as independent candidates or as members of the ruling Arab Socialist Party. Altogether they gained 15 seats.

1979: The Brotherhood strongly opposed the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

1981 September: About 2,000 dissidents were arrested, of which a majority are Brothers.

October 6: Four Brothers assassinated President Sadat.¹⁹

The fifth phase, from 1981 to the present, of the group's evolution has been characterized by the Muslim Brotherhood's shift from the violent active revolution ideology of Qutb back to Al-Banna's more moderate approach. The Muslim Brotherhood has tried to distance itself from the violent splinter groups spawned from the earlier Brotherhood ideology. The Brotherhood repudiated violent means as a method of creating their Islamic society. Now the focus of the Brotherhood is on changing the system through the existing political system. Although the Brotherhood remains outlawed as an official political party, they continue to create alliances with sanctioned opposition parties to gain seats in the Egyptian Parliament. They have successfully gained representation in the Egyptian Parliament and control the majority of Egypt's professional associations, despite counteractions by Mubarak's government to limit their influence.

Operating under twenty years of emergency law and Mubarak government domination, thousands of Brothers remain incarcerated in a swelling prison population numbering in the tens of thousands. As extremist groups executed a wave of violence designed to topple the Egyptian government through the destruction of the three billion dollar²⁰ tourist industry, the Muslim Brotherhood has been caught up in the extensive counter-insurgency efforts of the government.

Since rising to power President Mubarak has walked a hard-line on the liberalization of the political process and control of groups viewed as dangerous to the secular government. While allowing known Brotherhood members to participate in elections as individuals, the elections have always been marred by allegations of irregularities and impropriety by his ruling party. He has struggled with the question of how to channel violent opposition groups into a peaceful political process. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood often cites the lack of access to the political process as the major cause of the violence.

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood has been checked by the strong popular support given to Mubarak in the most recent elections. With 79 percent of the population voting, he received 94 percent approval in the referendum. Economic success, along with a growing disaffection for the radical Islamists, bolstered Mubarak's popularity. The economic boom in Egypt is one of the strongest in the world registering a 6 percent increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 2 percent higher than the world average, and exceeding the population growth rate of 1.8 percent. The GNP per capita has increased every year since 1996 reaching 3.8 percent in 1999. Mubarak is continuing a privatization program that should continue to spur the economic improvement. He has also embarked on an infrastructure-rebuilding program that is gradually improving conditions in the country. With strong military and security forces support, business leader support, popular support, and international support, Mubarak has limited the Muslim Brotherhood's appeal.

Key events in the fifth period in the Muslim Brotherhood's evolution include:

1984: Brotherhood formed a coalition with the New Wafd party to gain eight seats in the 360 member People's Assembly.

1987: Brotherhood formed a tripartite alliance with the Liberal and Labor parties to gain 36 seats in the People's Assembly.

1990: Election law was changed that allowed individuals, as opposed to parties, to participate in elections. Previous law required parties to received eight percent of the votes to gain representation. Brotherhood boycotts the election at the national level but continues to field candidates at the local level.

1992: Brotherhood unveiled the "Islam is the solution" political campaign slogan signifying a major push in the political circles for the 1995 elections. The Brotherhood gained control of the prominent Lawyers' Association further solidifying their control of the major professional organization including the doctors', engineers', and pharmacists' professional associations. The Brotherhood controlled the majority of Egypt's 21 professional associations.

1993: Syndicate Law 100 was enacted that required 50 percent of the membership to vote for the election to be official.

1993: Brotherhood condemned the attempted assassination of the Minister of Information Safwat al-Sharif and the Minister of the Interior Hasan al-Alfi. They stated that, "the attack was a devaluation of the human soul...Religion cannot justify it."²¹

1995: Brotherhood fielded 150 candidates in a coalition of 120 Labour Party candidates to form the second largest force in the 1995 elections.

1995: Fifty-four Brotherhood members of professional organizations were arrested and sentenced to five years in jail for belonging to an illegal group and trying to control the professional organizations.

1995 June 26: Extremists were suspected of an attempted assassination of Mubarak while visiting Ethiopia.

1997 November: Gunmen attacked and killed 18 Greek tourists in Cairo. Mubarak security forces engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign that resulted in over 1,200 casualties between the militants and the police. Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (the Islamic Group) and Islamic Jihad killed 58 foreign tourists at

Luxor. A government crackdown led to a swelling prison population estimated to be over 20,000.

1999: al-Gamaa al-Islamiya leadership renounced violence and declared it will cease all anti-government activities.

1999 October: Authorities arrested 16 Muslim Brotherhood members for plotting to infiltrate and subvert professional organizations.

2000: The Muslim Brotherhood won 17 seats in the People's Assembly, making it the largest opposition faction.

Brotherhood's Organization, Strategy, Objectives, and Regional Implications

The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood is not widely known outside the membership of the organization for reasons of security and self-preservation. While the exact number of members is not known, there are other indicators of the memberships' relative strength. In Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, and Lebanon admitted Muslim Brotherhood members hold public office; this is an indicator of the organization's extensive strength and internationalism. A more sinister indicator of strength is the estimated number of Brotherhood members and sympathizers killed in Syria, 10,000 to 30,000, and the number of persons displaced, 800,000, in 1981. The bulging prison population of Muslim Brothers in Egypt is estimated to exceed 15,000. The rising number of Brotherhood non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Islamic Relief, Mercy International, Muslim Association, Muslim Arab Youth Movement, and the Holy Land Foundation are just the identifiable tip of the iceberg of the Muslim Brotherhood's worldwide NGO support efforts. The Brotherhood's identifiable presence on college and university campuses spans much of the world, University of South Florida (US), Oxford College (UK), West Glamorgan Institute of Higher Education (UK), Cairo and Al Azhar University (Egypt), Khartoum University (Sudan), Amman University (Jordan), the University of Medina (started by the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia),²² University of Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), and Islamic University (Pakistan). While these examples and figures do not give an exact number of members, the sheer global nature of the organization suggests a membership in the many millions.

The Brotherhood uses an informal social network that is relatively impervious to authoritarian state control. The informal network is an indelible component of the Middle East social fabric. The basic building block is a five-man cell known as a “family”²³ in which the initial indoctrination to the Brotherhood occurs. Through everyday interaction the networks serve as the focal point for a mobilizing collective action. The Brotherhood uses weekly small group meetings (Halaqua), monthly multi group meetings (Katibah), trips, camps, course of instruction, workshops, and conferences to indoctrinate and educate members and coordinate action. The Brotherhood describe their organization as a spiritual worldwide organization that is:

- (1) a “dawa” (call) from the Quran and the Sunna (tradition and example) of the Prophet Muhammed;
- (2) a method that adheres to the Sunna;
- (3) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul;
- (4) a political association;
- (5) an athletic association;
- (6) an educational and cultural organization;
- (7) an economic enterprise; and
- (8) a social concept.²⁴

The Brotherhood’s worldwide branches work in accordance with the country’s local circumstances to achieve their objectives. The leadership structure in each country is based on the guidance of the Supreme Guide or General Guide that is chosen by a shura council (advisory board). The Supreme Guide must be a member of the shura council. The shura council that chooses the Egyptian Supreme Guide has representation from branches outside of Egypt. This shura council has “120 members from the various governorates.”²⁵ Because of the outlaw nature of the Brotherhood in Egypt, little information is available about the representation on the shura council. What is known is that the “shura council has not met in the past five years.”²⁶ Current indications are that the shura membership is shifting to a younger generation called the doves that will push for a moderate Supreme Guide to replace the more hawkish Mustafa Mashhour. Essam El-Eryan, a senior Brotherhood figure stated, “Eighty percent of the Brothers elected to the People’s Assembly (Egyptian Parliament) are under the age of 45.” This is another indication

that a younger, less violent group is taking over the leading roles in the Brotherhood. They are working within the confines of the political system to address their desires for change.

Deputy guides that work in functional areas or “secret bureau”²⁷ cells support the Supreme Guide. The actions, procedures, and policies of the organization are outlined in statutes outlined by Al-Banna in 1928 and amended in 1992. The Brotherhood uses a structure of charitable non-governmental organizations to formally pursue their youth, health, religious, education, and social welfare service programs. They establish small businesses and factories to generate income, employ members, and employ sympathizers. The Brotherhood uses membership in formal professional organization and syndicates as a vehicle to influence the national infrastructure.

The main objectives of the Brotherhood are:

1. Building the Muslim individual: brother or sister with a strong body, high manners, cultured thought, ability to earn, strong faith, correct worship, conscious of time, of benefit to others, organized, and self-struggling character [3].
2. Building the Muslim family: choosing a good wife (husband), educating children Islamically, and inviting other families.
3. Building the Muslim society (thru building individuals and families) and addressing the problems of the society realistically.
4. Building the Muslim state.
5. Building the Khilafa (basically a shape of unity between the Islamic states).
6. Mastering the world with Islam.²⁸

The basic pillars or long-term plan of action of the Muslim Brotherhood includes, first, the establishment of Islamic Sharia law; second, establishment of Muslim states; and third, the unification of Muslim nations. These steps are directly tied to their Islamic doctrine. Likewise, the Brotherhood’s objectives, goals, and funding are also directly related to Islamic doctrine. The first and foremost source of Islamic doctrine is the Quran or Koran. Muslims believe the Quran is the infallible word of God revealed through divine revelations to the Prophet

Muhammad in the seventh century A.D. The Quran identifies five pillars of faith: Profession of Faith to Allah and his apostle, Prayer, Almsgiving (*zakat* and *sadaquat*), Fasting, and Pilgrimage (*hajj*).²⁹ The Quran is organized in chapters or *suras* that are revered as the recited words of God. The *suras* constitute the basis for the ritual prayers performed by devout Muslims five times a day. This pillar of the Muslim faith serves as a unifying focal point for the Muslim Brotherhood. Prayer at mosques built by the Muslim Brotherhood provides a frequent forum for contact and promulgation of their fundamentalist ideology.

The Quran is a “doctrine of the absolute oneness of God”³⁰ that “refers to, and is concerned with, three religious groups: heathens, Jews, and Christians.”³¹ Since Islam’s inception the “absolute oneness” and unyielding belief that the Quran expresses the literal words of God, served as a unifying point for the community of believers or the *umma*. Living among rival religions and hostile tribes necessitated a strong bond between like-minded believers. Physical struggles with non-believers forced Muslims to band together. While there are divergent sects and local variations in the practice of the Islamic faith, a clear distinction exists between believers and non-believers. The Muslim Brotherhood capitalizes on this unifying force as an ideology for the creation of a greater Muslim state and Islamic world. The Muslim Brotherhood exploits and promotes this communal religious unification as a protection measure, recruiting tool, and a call to arms for Muslims to defend their brethren throughout the world. It is this sense of religious ideological unity that mobilized the “Arab Afghans” to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. From Bosnia to Sudan to Indonesia to the Philippines, protection of the *umma* is a familiar call to arms for militant Islamic fundamentalists and the Muslim Brotherhood. The protection of the *umma* is tied to the Islamic concept of *jihad*.

Jihad is word that is difficult to translate from Arabic to English. Its best translation is “ a sincere and noticeable effort (for good); an all true and unselfish striving for spiritual good.”³² *Jihad* is a multi-dimensional concept with the primary focus on the individual.

At the individual level it is striving to live a good life in accordance with the Quran, being just, performing righteous deeds, protecting people’s rights and freedoms, spreading the faith, and personally defending the faith. It is about the individual’s spiritual struggle for “submission” (English for Islam) to God’s will that is good and just, not evil.

At the collective level it is the development, expansion, and protection of a global Islamic community. Jihad at this level may involve addressing injustices through fighting to deter an attack, protecting the freedom to practice Islam, freeing the oppressed, and protecting oneself.

According to the Quranic verses, “God accepts only justice, fighting in the name of God is fighting in the name of justice.”³³ The Quran does not consider war to be holy. In fact, the essence of the whole religion, submission to God’s will, is predicated on peace not war. The Muslim Brotherhood’s inclusion of “jihad our way” in their slogan has multiple meanings. It promotes a non-violent individual struggle for submission to God’s will while allowing for the application of violent means, war in the name of God, when fighting a perceived injustice.

To fill the voids left by the Quran in the direction of everyday life, Islamic doctrine relies on two other documents, the *sunna* and *hadith*. The sunna is “the practice of the prophet or a tradition recording the same.”³⁴ The hadith is “a technical term for a tradition of what the prophet said or did”³⁵ that is the underpinning of the sunna. The sunna-hadith are compilations of sayings, actions, and traditions attributed to the prophet that were formalized in the *Salih* compiled by al-Bukhari in the two hundred years following the prophet’s death.³⁶ It combines ancient customs with past practices to outline the “ideal behavior of the prophet as enshrined tradition.”³⁷

The Muslim Brotherhood organization “adheres to sunna” as a main tenet of their operations. Within the Muslim scholarly world there is considerable debate about the importance and validity of specific meanings in the sunna-hadith. Because they were developed well after the prophet’s death through reconstruction of hearsay evidence about Mohammed’s actions, sayings, or practices, some scholarly Muslims express concern about the validity, interpretations, and the lack of appreciation for historical reasons, situations, or real intent. Questions arise about the application of the sunna-hadith in an evolving modern society. The Muslim Brotherhood’s belief in strict adherence to sunna-hadith parallels the beliefs and demonstrates the influence of the Saudi Arabian Ikhwan Wahhabist.

Bard E. O’Neill, in his book *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a “reactionary-traditionalist”³⁸ type of insurgency because of their insistence

on the strict adherence to ancient religious customs, traditions, and practices. O'Neill states,

“Traditionalist insurgences also seek to displace the political system, but the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones, rooted in ancestral ties and religion...Within the category of traditionalist insurgents one also finds more zealous groups seeking to reestablish an ancient political system that they idealized as a golden age.”³⁹

This description applies to the Muslim Brotherhood considering its avowed desire to reestablish Sharia law and the Caliphate. Sharia law is a compilation of sacred laws resulting from *ijima* or consensus decisions by leading Islamic scholars, *qiyas* or analogy reasoning by judges, lawyers and scholars, the sunna-hadith, and the Quran. The Caliphate was the religious, military, and political structure that governed the Muslim people and lands after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632. The caliph, or successor to the prophet, served as the ruler of the Muslim community.

Through the first four caliphs the Muslim community rapidly spread through acts of conquest. Then an inter-tribal feud over the succession of the caliphate started a long period of conflict, hostilities, and division within Islamic community. One of the lasting results was a split in the Muslim community between the Sunni and Shi'a (or Shiite) Muslim sects over the rightful lineage of the Caliph. The caliphate for the next 600 years exercised varying degrees of control and influence over the Muslim community that stretched from India to North Africa to Spain and to Eastern Europe. Significant internal conflict existed during this period. The position of Caliph shifted between rival factions, resulting in the seat of power moving between a variety of locations, to include Medina, Damascus, Baghdad, and Egypt.

While the title Caliph extended to 1924, the actual influence and control of the entire Muslim world community was minimal after the thirteenth century. The Muslim Brotherhood's desire to see the return of the Caliphate raises substantial questions concerning their historical point of reference and definition of the Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood's desire to reestablish the Caliphate hinges more on pan-Arab revivalism than on acknowledgement of the turbulent nature of the Caliphate following the first four Caliphs.

In Islam, almsgiving or charity represents one of the five pillars of the faith. Charitable donations are as important as praying. Typically, Muslims give “2.5 % of their annual income”⁴⁰ to charitable causes. This is known in Arabic as “zakat.” Much of this funding goes directly to grass root non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts. The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy relies heavily on this pillar of the Islamic faith to fund their social welfare programs that provide their base of popular support.

The Muslim Brotherhood draws heavily for financial support from diasporas from countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Syria where repression of the Islamic fundamentalists has resulted in massive relocations and emigration to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Europe, and America. A prime example of the magnitude of this phenomenon is Syria. In February 1981, the Syrian government, following a wave of Muslim Brotherhood inspired violence, brutally repressed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood movement. The Syrian government’s repression resulted in the complete destruction of the town of Hama and the estimated death of some 10,000 to 30,000 men, women, and children. Following this brutal suppression over 800,000⁴¹ Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members and Islamic fundamentalist sympathizers fled the country to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.

In Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt the aggressive repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamic fundamentalist organizations resulted in a massive emigration to Europe, the Middle East, and America. During recent decades, the Muslim population of France has grown to over five million.⁴² Over one half of these emigrants hail from North Africa.

According to U.S. Immigration records, over 78,000 legal immigrants from Egypt and Syria entered the U.S. between 1989 and 1999. In both Europe and the United States these new immigrants, driven by a religious requirement, channel their charitable donations back to country organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood that have both a charitable and a political agenda.

When “zakat” is destined for charities outside the immediate local area or a person wants to transfer diaspora funds outside legal channels, the funds are transferred through an ancient Arab trader banking system known as “Hawala.” Hawala is derived from the “Arabic word meaning change or transform.”⁴³ “Hawala is a credit system for transferring funds

over long distances, and it is centuries older than the Western banking.”⁴⁴
This is how it works:

“The hawala banker who takes a deposit writes down the phone number or address of the payer’s representative in the receiving country. Then he instructs his partner—a money trader or group of traders in that country—to pay out the required sum. Generally the contact is made by telephone or email. A code word, or a recognized face or voice, is all that is required to complete the transaction. No cash is moved through the legal channels. The hawala money trader and his partner simply keep straight between themselves who owes what to whom and settle their own debts—in cash, gold or other commodities—when convenient.”⁴⁵

“The former Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Winer estimates that 25% to 50% of all transactions in the Middle East and South Asia are done outside formal banking channels.”⁴⁶ Not only does this system allow money transfers to non-governmental organizations or NGOs, it has been linked to the money transfers of terrorist organizations. According to U.S. prosecutors, the hawala firm Dihad Shill⁴⁷ served as the al Qaeda funding conduit for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. Hawala bankers have also moved funds to mujahedin guerillas fighting from Bosnia to Afghanistan. The hawala system provides a banking conduit, without legal oversight, that is equally adept at moving funds for NGOs and terrorists. Illegitimate NGOs can use the hawala banking system to move funds to terrorist organizations from virtually every corner of the world without the threat of government interference.

The Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) terrorist organization, which describes itself as the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, is skilled in the use of charitable organizations in the U.S. to channel funds to Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood programs and to support the Hamas infrastructure in the Middle East. In the United States, Hamas operates a series of non-profit charitable organizations that serve as “a financial conduit for Hamas.”⁴⁸ Steve Emerson, an investigative reporter and producer of the PBS documentary “Jihad in America,” gave testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee that clearly shows the ideological, funding, and leadership ties between two supposed charitable organizations, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief

and Development and the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) and the Muslim Brotherhood and its militant wing, Hamas.⁴⁹ Emerson's testimony lays out the linkage between Hamas and Musa Marzook, a principal founder and key leader-founder of the two organizations Holy Land Foundation and IAP. Marzook was arrested in the U.S., detained for twenty months pending deportation to Israel for terrorist crimes, and was then deported to Jordan as part of the political bargaining that led to the Oslo Peace Accords.

The organizations he founded were under FBI investigation but continued to operate until December 4, 2001, when their assets were frozen by President Bush's Executive Order 132224 that targeted terrorist financing. Years after Emerson's testimony, U.S. investigators discovered that in the year 2000, the Holy Land Foundation provided over 13 million dollars from U.S. sources to Hamas. Emerson reported that 23 of the 26 charities receiving Holy Land Foundation funding "are run by known Hamas activists."⁵⁰

Emerson also points out that the Holy Land Foundation provides critical support to Hamas by giving financial support to the families of Hamas suicide bombers, deportees and detainees. The Holy Land Foundation actively pursued financial support for suicide bombers families from the Muslim Arab Youth Association that is "one of the largest constituent organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood"⁵¹ in the U.S. The Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) has chapters and has held conventions in Oklahoma, Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and Missouri.⁵²

Investigations revealed that Marzook was initially responsible for establishing the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in the U.S. that included the MAYA and the de facto Muslim Brotherhood lobby arm, the American Muslim Council, located in Washington, DC. He resigned from that position to take a more active role in Hamas activities. As part of his Hamas efforts, he sought to identify Muslim students within the MAYA that had the educational backgrounds, technical skills, and ideological mindset to support the production of conventional bomb, chemical, and biological weapons for Hamas's arsenal.

Marzook is now the second in command of Hamas operating out of Syria. In a recent interview with *60 Minutes* he confirmed that Hamas was developing a six-mile range missile to attack Israel from the

occupied territories.⁵³ In a *Time Magazine* interview in August 2002, he espoused his unflinching support for his Hamas suicide bombers responsible for the rising death toll in Israel.⁵⁴

The Muslim Brotherhood and the more violent organizations it has created, like Hamas, have found a very permissive, lucrative, and hospitable operational environment in the United States. They are following their organizational doctrine to build a coalition of likeminded fundamentalists whose non-violent, overt actions camouflage their acceptance and support of terrorist violence to accomplish their common objectives. The United States affords freedom of action, superb communication capabilities, a wealth of funding opportunities, and a recruitment base of educated talent.

Working through non-profit and tax exempt foundations, the Muslim Brotherhood has constructed a network of organizations. While there is no hierarchal command structure, they share a linkage through their core Muslim Brotherhood beliefs. These organizations provide the infrastructure that facilitates dissemination of propaganda, indoctrination of members, communication between organizations, appeals for financial support, access to a larger contact population, and the conscription of future terrorist recruits.

The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood provides a vehicle through which terrorist organizations can cooperate on a local level without the use of the traditional pyramid command structure. As was seen in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, terrorists of five different nationalities, different organizational affiliations, and different agendas, were able to find a common ideological base in the doctrine espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood's preferred course of action is to gain control of the governments through the ballot box. With control of the government secured, they then seek to institute their objective of "Islamizing" the nation. To accomplish this task the Muslim Brotherhood use a two-pronged approach. At the "intelligentsia" level, they seek to control social institutions by infiltrating and attaining prominent positions in professional organizations, government offices, institutions of higher learning, and labor unions. At the "proletariat" level, they seek to develop popular support through charitable and religious programs. The Brotherhood seeks to indoctrinate the population with their ideology in

order to form a sympathetic voting block to push their objectives through the political system. Their slogan, “Islam is the solution,” is a clever tool for drawing popular political support for their cause and is also a call to stem the modernization and globalization promoted by the Western world.

The Middle East, with over 260 million people, is increasingly urban, young, uneducated, and poverty stricken. Fifty-one percent live in cities,⁵⁵ 43 percent are under the age of 15,⁵⁶ 48.7 percent are illiterate,⁵⁷ and 33 percent earn less than a dollar a day.⁵⁸ These demographics describe a society with large segments of disaffected, disenchanting, disillusioned, disgruntled, and disappointed people. This embittered population sees the Western modernization and secular governments as unresponsive to their plight. The Muslim Brotherhood promotes a return to strict Islamic doctrine as the way to correct growing social inequities.

In countries like Jordan, where they have access to the political system, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained a moderate and generally non-violent orientation. “To date the Brotherhood’s most significant strategy in Jordan is its willingness to work within the system for the advancement of its goals.”⁵⁹ The fear among secular or democratic governments is that if Islamic fundamentalists are elected and control the governments they will use their monopoly on power to set aside democratic institutions. These fears led the governments of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt to become undemocratic to prevent the Islamists from “revoking democracy itself.”

In Algeria in 1992, the first round of the National Assembly elections was nullified by a Algerian military coup d’etat to prevent the Islamic fundamentalists, who won 188 of 231 seats, from taking power in the second round of elections. This put the Algerian military ostensibly in the position of “destroying democracy to save democracy.”⁶⁰ The underlying reasons for the Islamic fundamentalists success had very little to do with religious fervor, but were instead a result of the dissatisfaction of the people with the incumbent political party and their failed socioeconomic programs.

The Algerian National Liberation Front or FLN was the political faction that fought the French for independence from 1954 to 1962. After independence, the FLN was the only political force and the only legal party in Algeria from 1962 to 1988. When the Algerian political process was opened to a multi-party participation in 1988, the Islamic fundamentalists were in the best organizational position to take

advantage of the new system. The Islamic fundamentalists with their grassroots Muslim Brotherhood organizational structure were the only organization that could quickly and effectively present opposition political candidates. In Algeria's case, the circumstances have more to do with electioneering, dissatisfaction with incumbents, and anti-establishment attitudes than with theology.

In North Africa and Middle East, the transition from colonial or authoritarian governments has not left a wealth of strong democratic institutions or historical experience in self-governance. Consequently, the rigid structure espoused by the Islamic fundamentalist is an alluring alternative to potential chaos and lawlessness. The underlying problem is that threatened governments lack electoral accountability, an independent judiciary, a clear definition of individual rights, and strong parliamentary representation. Without these institutional tools, the existing governments are ill-equipped to mitigate the potential authoritarian goals of the Islamic fundamentalist.

Additionally, the governments cannot get Islamic fundamentalists to identify their definitive positions on key socio-economic issues and programs. Writer Asad AbuKhali illustrated this when he asked the Hizballah leader Sheikh Muhammad Husayn to define his programs for the impoverished Shi'ite of South Lebanon.⁶¹ Husayn said, "We do not need programs. We have the Quran."⁶² Muslim fundamentalists lack a comprehensive plan to deal with the pressing social and economic difficulties of their constituencies. As AbuKhali states, "While clerical leaders can afford to claim to rely solely on the Quran in their lives, poor peasants and workers can not use the Quran to pay their bills and feed their children."⁶³

The lack of a coherent socio-economic strategy, and their uncompromising dogma, is creating challenges to the Islamists' legitimacy. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, following initial electoral successes, saw the removal from office of three of their most influential activists after their first-term rhetoric was not translated into meaningful programs that benefited their constituents.

The rising number of elected moderates in Iran is another indicator that the fundamentalist agenda is failing to produce the results desired for their constituents. In Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired military regime of General Umar al-Bashir has broken its ten-year ties to the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood political party led by Hassan al Turabi.

Turabi's fundamentalist political party was responsible for the "Islamization" of Sudan that began in 1989. His agenda produced a rapid decay of Sudan's society and economy. Turabi was the power behind the Presidency until his Islamization programs lost the support of the population and the military. Turabi is now under house arrest. In July 2002, President Bashir met with rebel Christian leaders for the first time in an effort to end the nineteen-year civil war between Islamists and the southern Sudanese Christians who constitute one-third of the country's population. Bashir is aggressively attempting to improve relationships with the United States, his African neighbors, and is trying to distance himself from al Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist organization that once used his country as a sanctuary.

Syria, Egypt and Algeria with their weak democratic institutions lack the government controls, checks, and balances to allow a full accommodation with their Muslim fundamentalists in the political process. They rightfully fear the grass roots organizational capabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood. They know that through poor voter participation, the Muslim Brotherhood could gain political influence and control disproportionate to their actual political support from the population as a whole. The lack of details in the fundamentalists' governing agenda does little to assuage the apprehension of the governing leadership. These governments have also witnessed the violence used by Islamic fundamentalist splinter terrorist groups and fear that this violent behavior would increase if they were to gain more power.

These governments face many tough dilemmas. How does a secular government maintain a checks and balances system that nurtures political pluralism while preventing the radical overthrow of the governing system by participants bent on creating an authoritarian regime? How do they accommodate the fundamentalists' demand for the return to religious fundamentalism that links the mosque with the government through the legal system? How does a nation attract investment capital to address its social and economic problems if it transforms to an Islamic economic system that does not permit the charging of interest for investment loans? Capital investment is essential to create new jobs for the 300,000 Algerian and 500,000 Egyptian youth that enter the job market yearly. These core issues motivate secular governments to repress, ban electoral participation, and outlaw Islamic fundamentalist organizations. These coercive actions

by governments are, in turn, met by radicalization and the creation of violent terrorist groups from the ranks of the Islamic fundamentalists.

Muslim Brotherhood's Terrorism Connections

The Muslim Brotherhood has ideological connections, leadership connections, and shared modus operandi with many terrorist organizations. The most common linkages between Islamic terrorist organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood are the shared goal of establishing an Islamic state or nation and the shared view of jihad as a means to this goal. Of the thirty-three organizations listed on the U.S. State Department's Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization List,⁶⁴ sixteen are engaged in terrorism to force the creation of an Islamic state.

The leadership and founders of many of the modern terrorist organizations had their early indoctrination in Islamic fundamentalist ideas through the Muslim Brotherhood. Ramzi Yousef, convicted in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, "admitted he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but left the group in the 1990s after deciding they were not adequately committed to the revolutionary Islamic cause."⁶⁵ He is believed to have received his indoctrination to the Muslim Brotherhood while attending college in the United Kingdom in 1986. Elements of the Muslim Brotherhood based in Britain were actively seeking mujaheddin for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After spending the summer of 1989 in the victorious fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Yousef began a global terrorist career that would take him to America, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. Osama bin Laden, founder of the al Qaeda terrorist network, recognized Yousef's terrorist talents. Bin Laden sent Yousef to the Philippines to teach bomb making to Islamic terrorists. Thus, a former Muslim Brotherhood member was instrumental in forming an alliance between two terrorist organizations seeking the creation of radical Islamic theocracies.

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood is evident in the leadership, strategic objectives, and methods of the al Qaeda (The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders) terrorist network. This organization is a fusion of several groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,

Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and Abu Sayyuf.⁶⁶ Some of the major militant influences on the organization, and its leader Osama bin Laden, were expatriate Muslim Brotherhood members in Saudi Arabia. Born in 1957, bin Laden was first exposed at an early age to a blend of Wahhabism and to the radical teaching of Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb, the “father of militant jihad.”⁶⁷ In the 1970s, bin Laden was taught by Sayyid’s brother, Dr. Mohammad Qutb, and a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood member, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, the reported founder of Hamas. Azzam’s ideas of non-compromise, violent means, and organizing and fighting on a global scale formed the basis for bin Laden’s al Qaeda methodology.

During the Afghan war, bin Laden encountered many Muslim Brotherhood recruits who formed the nucleus of the “Afghan Arabs” numbering between 14,000 and 17,000.⁶⁸ One third, or about 1,000 Afghan Arabs under bin Laden’s control, were from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.⁶⁹ A prominent member of the Islamic Jihad was a former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who had a history of Brotherhood activism stretching back to 1966, when he was arrested at the age of fifteen.⁷⁰ He was also arrested in 1984 and jailed for three years for his involvement with the Islamic Jihad’s assassination of Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Al-Zawahiri joined the “Arab Afghans” shortly after his release from prison and, in Afghanistan, he and bin Laden forged a lasting relationship. Al-Zawahiri traveled with bin Laden to Sudan at the invitation of Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood leader Hassan al Turabi who was the political leader behind Sudan’s military regime. In Sudan, bin Laden observed the Turabi’s Muslim Brotherhood organization and their Islamization of Sudan’s society. Bin Laden was allowed to establish his terrorist network complete with business, banks, and training camps. Al-Zawahiri is considered to be bin Laden’s intellectual and ideological mentor and second-in-command. Al-Zawahiri is considered the planner behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1998 Luxor, Egypt attack by Islamic Jihad that killed 58 tourists, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania by al Qaeda, and the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack by al Qaeda operatives. These examples point to the significant roles that Muslim Brotherhood members have played as leaders of terrorist organizations, where they have adopted many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s methods.

The use of charitable organizations and small businesses by the al Qaeda in the U.S., Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan illustrates the Muslim Brotherhood's method of gaining financial resources and sustaining popular support. The Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) in Columbia, Missouri is an example of their subversion of a charitable relief organization. This organization claims to provide aid to children and refugees in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It has even received funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other U.S. government agencies totaling \$5.8 million in 1998 and 1999. Their web site states: "Please help us to help victims."⁷¹ A later U.S. Treasury Department investigation revealed the Islamic American Relief Agency funded foreign affiliated groups, such as Help African People and Mercy International Relief, employing people with ties to the al Qaeda terrorist network. It is now known that Ziyad Khalil, a U.S. fundraiser for the Islamic American Relief Agency, "supplied a satellite telephone that bin Laden used to plan the deadly bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998."⁷² "Khalil also worked for the company that leased the charity's its web site domain name."⁷³ The activities of the IARA became known only after Khalil's arrest in Jordan and his subsequent cooperation with the FBI in the embassy bombing cases. The Islamic American Relief Agency still claims to have no ties to terrorists and boasts nearly \$2.9⁷⁴ million in annual contributions despite the cancellation of U.S. government grants. Its web site emphasizing its accomplishments states it "steps in to provide the basic material necessities to the victims"⁷⁵ when tragedy happens.

Since the 1998 embassy bombing in Tanzania and Kenya and the 2001 World Trade Center attack, the linkage between Islamic NGO organizations and terrorist groups has attracted a great deal of attention. Because of this attention and the investigation these Islamic NGOs, the Al-Rashid Trust and Wafa Humanitarian Organization were placed on the U.S. Terror Exclusion List for their ties and support of al Qaeda. Both the Al-Rashid Trust and Wafa Humanitarian Organization are directly patterned on the Muslim Brotherhood's model and method. They use charitable donations and businesses to fund overt civic programs and covert violent terrorist groups. The Al-Rashid "charity" follows the Brotherhood's model by:

1. Providing financial and legal support to jailed militants around the world;
2. Pushing the World Food Program (WFP) out of Afghanistan so that they could take over “155 bakeries”⁷⁶ set up to feed over 300,000 needy people;
3. Sending 1,000 sewing machines to war widows;
4. Establishing a network of radical Islamist schools called madrassases in Afghanistan and “actually runs many of the madrassas and mosques in Pakistan;”⁷⁷
5. Constructing 25 mosques along the Afghanistan highways leading out of Kandahar;
6. Setting up computer centers in Afghanistan catering to students;
7. Opening a medical clinic in Kandahar;
8. Sending 70 truckloads of relief supplies to the Taliban in Afghanistan;
9. Sacrificing \$900,000⁷⁸ worth of livestock on the eve of Id-ul-Azha, a Muslim religious holiday involving the sacrifice of animals;
10. Establishing hundreds of offices in Pakistan to actively work with “vulnerable minorities,”⁷⁹ including opening a clinic in Pakistan, to provide medical care to minority orthodox Muslims in an area occupied by the Ahmedi who are considered a heretics by the orthodox Muslims;
11. Sharing offices and common fund raising cadres with the Jaishi-I-Mohammad, a militant Pakistani religious group that is on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List;
12. Producing the radical Islamist newspaper, Zarb-I-Momin, that praises the Taliban, al Qaeda, Jaishi-I-Mohammad, and Harakut-ul-Ansaar (listed on U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List) activities while spewing anti US, Western, Hindu, Christian, and Jewish “ultra – venomous propaganda;”⁸⁰

13. Raising funds from the expatriated Pakistanis from around the world, the Middle East, Africa, and the United States to be used by al Qaeda,⁸¹ advertising that shows that guns, jewelry, and money donated by the Pashtun tribes is “intended to be used for the Afghan holy war against the U.S.”⁸²

14. Aiding “widows and orphans of martyrs”⁸³ that experts believe provides direct financial support to families of suicide bombers and terrorists killed in pursuit of their cause;

15. Providing “jihad fighters with shelter and medicine inside Afghanistan.”⁸⁴

Although Al-Rashid does do charitable work, its efforts are specifically designed to promote a political agenda bent on violence, conflict, and support of terrorism. The pattern of mixing charitable NGO work with political and violent terrorist activities represents the most recent applications of the Muslim Brotherhood’s model for “Islamizing” the world.

Responding to the Brotherhood’s Challenge

The Brotherhood is a global organization with insurgency objectives and methods that threaten existing secular governments in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic objective is the Islamization of society in strict adherence to selected Islamic doctrine and the establishment of Islamic theocracies.⁸⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological ties to, and involvement in, the leadership of terrorist organizations threatens the security of U.S. citizens at home and abroad. The Muslim Brotherhood represents a challenge to U.S. goals of “enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.”⁸⁶ The Brotherhood represents a challenge to the U.S. values of freedom of religion, separation of church and state, equality of the individual, and human rights.

The Brotherhood’s lack of definition as to how they would use power is a significant concern. Would they use power to reverse the democratic

process to create theocratic authoritarian regimes? Their stated objectives leave little room for the democratic concepts of political compromise, majority rule, and minority rights. The Brotherhood everywhere advocates the integration of their interpretation of Islamic precepts into the existing secular government structure, the establishment of Islamic theocracies, the use of international terrorism to further their cause, the manipulation of NGOs to support their cause, and the use of Muslim Brotherhood mujahidin to serve as a Brotherhood foreign legion in the internal conflicts of other Islamic states.

Everywhere it exists, the Muslim Brotherhood's activities range from political party activism to promoting an insurgency that uses terrorism as a tool.⁸⁷ The Muslim Brotherhood's past strategies pointedly show how this supposedly non-violent organization aids and sustains radical Islamic groups who resort to violent means if their popular efforts are subverted. From the ranks of the Brotherhood, members have answered the call to "Jihad" in Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Chechnya. In Algeria, Syria, and Egypt the Brotherhood serves as the umbrella organization promoting armed struggles.

The Brotherhood in different states moves between different phases of a classical insurgency. In some Islamic states they remain in the initial organizational phase where they initiate a pattern of organized activities and minor incidents. In other states, they operate at a second phase where the level of violence has grown to guerrilla warfare interspersed with terrorist acts to undermine the existing regime. Finally, in several states the Brotherhood has participated in a third phase, where there is open fighting between organized armed insurgent forces and the armed forces of the existing authority. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Egypt, and Israel provide examples of the Muslim Brotherhood's movement through successive insurgent phases. Syria and Egypt also demonstrate the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to revert to an earlier phase when government actions have defeated the insurgency and driven it underground.

With the population explosion, economic disenfranchisement, illiteracy, and under employment, the draw to religious fundamentalism will only increase in Muslim states. The United States and its allies must address the underlying issues that presently make the Brotherhood's slogan, "Islam is the solution," an alluring ideology. An

alternative solution is needed to remedy the underlying socio-economic grievances that are not currently being addressed by the threatened governments. The seven characteristics of insurgency outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, FM 31-20-3, relating to leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns provide a useful construct for the development of an engagement and containment strategy.

Engaging the Brotherhood in dialogue is an important first step to reducing the potential for destabilization in many states. Jordan has long had an open dialogue with their Muslim Brotherhood organization that has prevented the escalation of violence and even served as a moderating influence on the more radical Islamists in their midst. Through very careful monitoring, regulation, and control the Jordanian monarchy has successfully prevented the radicalization of many attracted to the Brotherhood. Jordan has provided the Brotherhood with access to the political process as an opposition party loyal to the government. Meanwhile, Jordan also has strengthened its parliamentary institutions to limit the Brotherhood's potential impact through the democratic process. The Jordanian policy of accommodation with controls is a less volatile engagement strategy than found in Egypt, Syria, or Algeria. By gaining oversight of the funding and implementation of the Brotherhood's grass roots NGO social welfare programs, the Jordanian government minimized subversive influences. Additionally, the Jordanian government gained and maintained additional public support because of its involvement with the Brotherhood's programs.

Through engagement, work can begin on defining "Islam is the solution" in the context of a workable solution in the world today. The major challenge to Egypt and Jordan is working with the Brotherhood to define their objectives in specific terms. In the case of Egypt, they must first recognize the existence of the Brotherhood as a political party. Once the Brotherhood is openly recognized, work could begin on identifying areas of congruence and divergence leading to political strategies of compromise and cooperation. One major step would be codifying Islamic jurisprudence in terms of legal, economic, and governmental processes. This would bring to the forefront open discussion and

definition of the controversial issues of human rights, freedom of religion, economic structure, and governmental system.

Along with engagement, a deliberate program of containment to minimize the Brotherhood's influence is necessary. The United States should provide aid resources to threatened countries for the expressed purpose of filling the needs of the societal niche the Brotherhood targets for their popular support. Such aid must help replace the social services now monopolized by the Brotherhood. Education of children in the skills to succeed in the modern world and providing them follow-on opportunities is an essential component. Reversing economic decay through aid programs that establish sustainable economic growth and promote the redistribution of wealth is another essential element. These efforts require the deepest commitment, but will provide the greatest long-term benefits.

The containment program should also address the Brotherhood's support to "oppressed" Brothers in other countries. The containment program should seek to promote an information campaign supporting non-violent forms of "Jihad" in accordance with the Islamic values of peace, human life sanctity, and non-violence. The information campaign should support and promote the ideas of moderate scholars, leaders, and clerics with non-violent views. Aggressively countering the message of virulent clerics is an essential step in stemming the propaganda of violence.

Transforming Jihad into a war of words instead of terrorists and soldiers is an important step in undercutting and preventing militancy in the Muslim Brotherhood. The containment program should attempt to limit the international flow of mujahidin fighters from one country to another through the establishment of international immigration controls. While the United States supported mujahidin activity in the 1979–1989 Afghan-Soviet War, the longer term second and third order effects of this policy were not understood at the time. Facts show that many of these fighters too often became the core elements of future terrorist organizations.

The containment program also must find ways to limit and curb NGO external support to the Muslim Brotherhood. An alarming trend is the concealment of terrorist activities under the appealing banners of Islamic relief organizations. The misuse of so-called humanitarian organizations, aliases, information technology, and the Internet, have provided terrorist

groups with support and worldwide access to potential contributors while concealing their more violent objectives.

Non-government organizations have in recent decades filled many of the voids in governmental social programs. As a result, the number of NGOs has skyrocketed, more than doubling since 1978. There are twenty times more NGOs than existed in 1951.⁸⁸ In 1999, the Union of International Associations reported that there were 16,586 such international NGOs in existence.⁸⁹ National NGOs have grown at an even faster rate and number in the hundreds of thousands. Bangladesh has 16,000 registered NGOs;⁹⁰ the Philippines, 21,000;⁹¹ and Brazil, 100,000.⁹² France has 54,000⁹³ NGOs. Britain's NGO community is growing at a rate of 4,000⁹⁴ per year. The bottom line is that the number of NGOs has overwhelmed the ability of governments, international government organizations, watchdog agencies, and the donor community to monitor NGO motives and operations.

The lack of NGO oversight, availability of new information technologies, and the use of aliases and misleading organization titles all-too-easily conceal the illegitimate organizations in this sea of NGOs. The NGO community, which is resistant to government oversight and involvement, is now at odds with governments over the issues of accountability, transparency, control, code of conduct, and ethics.

NGOs have access to billions of dollars from government, private, corporate, and religious donors that terrorists seek to divert to their activities. Terrorist organizations use the informal Hawala banking system of the Middle East and South Asia to move charitable donations from the "front" NGOs to more nefarious operators without any accountability trail or government interference. What is the answer to this challenge? Clearly the NGO community, United Nations, and national governments must work together to correct this situation and bring these nongovernmental organizations under greater control.

Several corrective steps need to be taken, namely:

1. Define what constitutes a legitimate NGO in both international and national laws.
2. Provide governmental oversight and access to NGO financial records, donor records, charters, objectives, and membership roles.

3. Enforce a code of ethical performance.
4. Outlaw NGOs that are unwilling to provide full disclosure of their activities and who they fund.
5. Develop a policing program that prevents unlawful organizations from exploiting the Internet and using the Hawala banking system.
6. Deny illegitimate NGOs access to public forums.
7. Provide more aid through legitimate NGO programs to reduce the poverty, illiteracy, poor health, and sense of despair among the disaffected in society where illegitimate NGOs and terrorists best operate.
8. Carefully evaluate the secondary effect of NGO programs to prevent inadvertent assistance or support to terrorists.

These actions will not be easy or inexpensive. They require unity of effort, money, a policing and oversight organization, and international cooperation. However, a new approach and operating environment is needed to prevent terrorist and political subversion of the NGO community. New programs of accommodation, engagement, oversight, and containment are essential to curb the influence of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. The NGO community must work with governmental agencies to close the current paths by which terrorist are exploiting NGOs.

Summary

“I must tell you, this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a by-product of our own, illegal Muslim Brotherhood—whether it’s al-Jihad, Hizb’allah, in Lebanon, or Hamas. They all sprang from underneath the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. They say they have renounced violence, but in reality, they are responsible for all this violence, and the time will come when they will be uncovered”⁹⁵

President Mubarak, The New Yorker, 1994

The worldwide Muslim Brotherhood is the source of the core beliefs underlying most of the Islamic international terrorists. Its history demonstrates the influence of both internal and external factors that lead to violent militancy. It has also shown an ability in cases like Jordan to adapt and use peaceful means to address Muslim Brotherhood grievances. Although its objectives present many problems to secular governments, ignoring Brotherhood issues does not make those issues go away. Instead of waiting to become embroiled in Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations," the United States needs to work with its Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian allies to engage and marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood with a mixed policy of controlled accommodation, engagement, and containment. To combat the Islamic terrorism of today, the United States and its friends must address the root of the problem, the Muslim Brotherhood.

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