SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

"To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds".

- Mao Tse Tung, on Protracted War, 1938.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history surprise and deception have played a major part on the outcome of all major military conflicts. It is the desire of every military commander to achieve victory against the enemy with minimum attrition to own forces and equipment. In striving to realise this goal, military thinkers both past and present, have recognised the vital role which surprise action and deceptive practices play in achieving the objective. Although surprise itself cannot guarantee ultimate success in war, surprise combined with creative and military planning, adequate firepower and manpower, audacity, innovation, boldness, unconventionalism and perhaps a little bit of luck does provide an important foundation for eventual winning .

Because of its importance, surprise has been one of the principles of war since ancient to modern times. Surprise and deception are the most important tools that enable the military commander to dominate the will of his enemy. He achieves this through moral ascendancy. Surprise enables psychological dislocation of the enemy's command system. Surprise in war is a force multiplier. While increment in force or firepower provides arithmetical advantage, successful surprise gives geometrical advantage. Analysts have concluded that surprise changes ratio of casualties in favour of the attacker from about 1 : 1 to about 5 : 1.

Surprise can be achieved by speed of action alone, but it is most usually achieved by deception alone [1] . Deception can be put as subset of surprise. Deception on its own has not been included as a separate entity amongst the principles of war. However, Deception Operation is being considered as one of the five pillars of Command and Control warfare, itself a subset of Information Warfare, along with Operational Security, Psychological Operation, Electronic Warfare and physical destruction.

AIM

The aim of this essay is to analyse the concept of surprise and deception at the strategic, operational and tactical level and suggest measures to achieve the same.

<u>**SCOPE**</u>

The essay will study surprise and deception critically at strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and their interrelation. Keeping in view the battlefield scenario in the next millennium the measures to achieve surprise against the enemy and safeguarding measures against being surprised by the enemy would be analysed.

<u>**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**</u>

From ancient times surprise and deception have been the most critical features in winning a battle. In Mahabhararta times, Lord Krishna used deception to darken the horizon enabling king Jayadratha to come out of his hiding so that Arjun could kill him. Hannibal crossed the Alps, in 218 BC in winters with 30,000 men, horses and elephants catching Romans completely off balance. Success of Allied Egyptian Expedition Force in Palestine(1917 – 1918),. Ardennes offensive by the Germans, Pearl Harbour, Japanese advance in Malaya, planned deception in Battle of Alamein, success of Operation Fortitude in the Normandy Invasion, Incheon landing, both 1967 and 73 Arab Israel wars, Battle of Dien Bien Phu at IndoChina and the Gulf War are some of the shining examples of use of surprise in winning the battle.

<u>**Deception Operation in the Persian Gulf.**</u> In the gulf war deception operation was given its due importance. Throughout the planning process of Operation Desert Storm General Schwarzkopf emphasised the need for a comprehensive plan to deceive Iraq's forces regarding coalition intentions and to conceal the coalition scheme of maneuver. The deception plan was intended to convince Iraq that the coalition main attack would be directly into Kuwait, supported by an amphibious assault. The plan also sought to divert Iraq's forces from the coalition main attack and to fix Iraq forces in eastern Kuwait and along the Kuwait coast.

Among the activities planned to support the deception were Navy feints and demonstrations in the northern Persian gulf, Marine landing exercises along the Gulf and Omani coast, positioning of large amphibious task force in the Gulf and air refueling and training activities. The absence of air attacks on some western targets was also to contribute to the impression that the coalition main attack would come from the vicinity of Saudi – Kuwaiti border and from the sea. When the actual attack went in from the West, Iraq was caught completely off guard. [2]

<u>**Indian Scene**</u>. India has a long history of getting surprised by the enemy. Babur surprised the then emperor of India by imaginative use of the canon. In 1962 we were strategically surprised by China. In 1965 Op Gibraltar launched by Pakistan was a surprise to us and latest is the Kargil episode where we have been surprised again.

<u>**Relation Between Surprise and Deception.**</u> Surprise and deception are two inter related ingredients of strategy that are applicable in both peace and war. Deception is an ongoing process of understanding one's opponent and seeking to influence his

perceptions about one's intentions and capabilities. Surprise can be achieved both on and off the field.

Surprise can be created by manipulating enemy's expectations through deception as in the case of Egyptian attack across Suez canal in 73 Yom Kippur war. Deception facilitates surprise and is not an end in itself. Achieving surprise is critical, for it brings rapid combat resolution and needs fewer resources. Once surprised enemy has difficulty in taking correct action. It must be remembered that surprise can be achieved without deception. However, deception is an important means to achieve surprise as it plays a supportive role to surprise.

SURPRISE

"Every military plan and its execution should be
conceived in view of the necessity of surprise "[3]

Surprise can shock and paralyse the enemy's mind. It enables superiority and concentration of force at a decisive point to destroy the enemy. Some of the measures that achieve surprise are: -

(a)   Speed of operations, which facilitates retention of initiative.

(b)   Mobility and firepower play an important role. Troop mobility determines the tempo of combat operations. High tempo operations enhance surprise.

(c)   Night Operations.

(d)   Initiative.

(e)   Creativity.

(f)   Mental and Physical agility.

(g)   Good staff planning.

(h)   Intelligence.

(j)   Secrecy.

(k)   Deception.

(l)   Audacity.

(m)   Maneuver.

(n)   Innovation.

Doctrinal Surprises.   Developments of new concepts based on weapons sometimes catch the adversary on the wrong foot as it is not able to adjust to new forms of warfare. The German Blitzkrieg against France in their Ardennes offensive is an ideal example of doctrinal surprise. Though the allies had more and better tanks the Germans used tanks as offensive weapons. Use of its mobility, firepower, and protection coupled with use of air and innovative use of self propelled artillery, engineers and signals elements made these Panzer forces invincible at least in this initial stages of Word War –II.

Technical Surprise.   Advancement in technology has influenced battlefield at crucial times. Detonation of atom bombs by   USA to end second world war, use of Enigma machines which allowed the allies to intercept classified German communications, use of water hose by Egyptians to create ramps on the banks of Suez Canal for armoured vehicles to pass are some of the examples how technical surprises have been achieved in the past.

Levels Of Surprise [4]

Strategic Surprise.   Depending upon the level it is conceived and likely to affect the adversary, surprise can be classified as strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic surprise can be defined as, "The concealment of the intention to launch an offensive and/or its timing; it is achieved at the highest politico-military level through large scale deception operation, regroupings and concentrations, concealment of troops and installations misinforming the enemy ". A typical example of achieving strategic surprise is concealment of its war preparation and impending attack by Egypt on Israel in October 1973.

Operational Level Surprise.   Operational level surprise is normally conceived, planned and coordinated at Corps or equivalent level. It can be achieved by successful concealment of timing, strength, direction and mode of the offensive. An apt example of this is the initial move of the Israelis during this 1956 Sinai Campaign by a daringly planned para drop by a battalion group approximately 70 Km from the Suez Canal at the entrance of Mitla Pass.

Tactical Level Surprise. Tactical surprise is normally undertaken at the divisional level and below. It involves concealed occupation of start up position for attack, skilful exploitation of terrain and weather, time of launching the attack, unexpected application of fire of all types, conduct of counter attack and audacious raids on enemy's important tactical complexes.

DECEPTION

> I make the enemy see my strength as weakness and my weakness as strength while I cause his strength to become weakness and discover where he is not strong. I conceal my tracks so that none can discover them, I keep silence so that none can hear me.
>
> -   Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Shukracharya, ancient military writer of Vedic age had written as one of the forms of warfare are Kuta Yudha i.e. war by Subterfuge and Tusrim Yudha i.e. Silent Warfare conducted by spreading disaffection in the ranks of enemy forces. During Mahabharata Kuta Yudha using bluff and connected was practised[5].

Deception   is the primary means to influence the adversary commander's decisions through distortion, concealment and or falsification of friendly intention, status, disposition, capabilities, course of action and strength. The goal of deception is to cause the opposing military commanders to act in a manner that serves own commander's objectives.

Deception can   be defined   as "Actions executed   to deliberately   mislead adversary's military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific action (or inaction) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission".

It is often said that skills on deception have deteriorated over a period of time . Our army has not developed concepts and doctrine on deception nor has it acquired equipment related to deception. There are three keys factor that contributed to demise of deception related skills : -

*   Developments in technology are perceived to make successful deception more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

*   Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources, including time, to tasks that are considered less essential.

*   Force modernisation being primarily focused on high cost equipment, low cost perceived intangibles like deception has been pushed into back ground.

Some unfounded beliefs or myths on deception are :-

- Surprise comes from luck . Not true at all. Deception almost certainly results in surprise.

- Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers.

- Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent. The truth is, that greater the intelligence collection capabilities the greater is the opportunity to feed the enemy false information.

- Deception is only for combatants. It is not true In 1973 Arab Israel war, the Egyptian attack was aided by 150 deception ploys in economic, political and military forms.

Depending upon the factors viz. mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, the objectives of deception operation are :-

- Mask increase or redeployment of forces and weapon systems.

- Block the enemy perception and identification of new weapons of force levels being inducted.

- Distract enemy's attention from other activities.

- Overload enemy intelligence collection and analytical capabilities.

- Create the illusion of strength where weakness exists.

- Condition the enemy to a particular pattern of friendly behaviour that can be exploited at an appropriate time.

- Confuse enemy expectations with regard to size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment and intent to affect surprise.

Deception Means

Deceptions means are the methods, resources and techniques used to convey or deny information to the enemy. It provides false indication to the enemy. The enemy would collect battlefield information through visuals, olfactory, sonic and electronic methods.

Visual. Much of the intelligence is based on what is seen on ground physically or through aerial or satellite photographs. Two items commonly used for visual deception are dummies and decoys. It is not always necessary to use specially manufactured equipment for use as dummies. Unserviceable/damaged items made out of salvage

stores may also be used. It is the distance from where the enemy is observing that dictates the degree of realism required.

Camouflage.   When employing visual deception we may camouflage all or part of real or false military objects to project the desired effect. When portraying a particular unit, the use of camouflage must be consistent with that units prior camouflage signature. The simple use of camouflage means are very effective to deceive own intentions. Innovative use of camouflage means with knowledge of US spy satellites enabled us to hoodwink US intelligence about Pokharn-II blast.

Smoke.   Smoke helps confusing the enemy. Smoke facilitates deception operation in the following way :-

- Screening the site of an activity.

- To simulate installations or situations or activities that normally employ smoke.

- Reducing the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition means.

- Simulating damage.

    If the enemy is to believe a deception activity he should be able to see it. It is also critical that real activities are concealed from the enemy view.

Olfactory.   It is the deception projected by odour. Some smell common to every military force are food, explosive and fuel, oil and lubricants. The enemy must be close enough to smell the simulated battlefield odours.

Sonic.   Sonic deception is the projection of sounds to produce battlefield noise. It is directed against the enemy's sound ranging equipment and the human ear. What enemy sees must be reinforced by what he hears. We have used tractors at night to simulate movements of tanks effectively during Indo-Pak war of 62 and 71.

Electronic Warfare.   Electronic Warfare is used to support deception actions like feints, demonstrations and display. The positioning of majority of a commander's EW system in a particular area can be used to create an indicator of the commander's intended main effort. The deception of an adversary's intelligence and command communications capabilities can facilitate the insertion of deception information. EW attack on intelligence collection and radar systems can be used to shape and control enemy's ability to see certain activities.

Electronic Deception.   In today's digitised battlefield, electronic deception means are the most important . It should be remembered what the enemy collects electronically must agree with what he has seen, heard and smelled. Some of the useful electronic techniques are :-

- Manipulative Electronic Deception.

- Simulative Electronic Deception

- Imitative Electronic Deception.

Manipulative Electronic deception.   It involves changing the electromagnetic profile of own forces. It takes action against enemy EW and signal intelligence activities. By modifying technical characteristics and profiles it manipulates own electromagnetic emission. Also it denies or deceives the enemy of own intentions. This is done in both communication and non communication fields. Manipulative Communication Deception Techniques include :-

- False traffic level.

- False peaks and lows in communication.

- Traffic Padding.

- Routing

- Electronic Cover.

- Controlled breaches of security.

      Manipulative Non Communication Deception also use the same principles but in place of communication emitters non communication emitters are used.

Simulative Electronic Deception.   Used to mislead the enemy about actual strength, deployment and composition of own forces. It simulates non existing units at false location by simulating communication and non communication emitters.

Imitative Electronic Deception. It puts false and misleading information directly into enemy communication networks by gaining access to enemy's communication systems. It includes insertion of planned messages, cryptographic intrusion, nuisance and deception jamming. In the non communication field it is directed against the target acquisition, surveillance and electronic reconnaissance systems. The imitation must be realistic and should include :-

- Output as per equipment profile.

- Net should be realistic.

- Volume of traffic should be matching the operation being projected.

- Unique characteristics of the unit.

- Portrayal of secure and insecure communication.

- Representation of proper echelons of command and control.

Hiding own Operation.   For any deception operation to be successful it is essential that own tactical situation is hidden from the enemy sensor .   Enemy   sensor can be a man with a binocular on an observation post or a patrol leader to satellites or Unarmed Aerial   Vehicles. The most communally used techniques and materials to prevent deception are :-

- Camouflage.

- Suppressive and absorptive screens.

- Smoke.

- Shielding and/ or making various types of emitters.

- Using terrain to mask units and their movements.

- Signal security procedure.

- Electronic Warfare.

Today our adversaries have acquired state of the art high tech intelligence to snoop on us. With the proliferation of sophisticated technology on space easily available from commercial sources on payment, obtaining real tactical picture has become much simpler. Today tactical deception should be capable of hoodwinking such high tech intelligence as :-

- High resolution photo satellites.

- Unmanned Air vehicles(UAV).

- MTI Stand -off radars.

- Tactical air reconnaissance .

- Radar and radio locator.

- Magnetic, sonic ,and heat sensors.

- Imaging radars.

- Infrared.

Techniques of Deception

Basically there are four types of deception techniques viz. feints, demonstration, ruses and display.

Feints.   Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy to give the appearance of a real attack .   The main aim is to mislead the enemy of own intention and main effort. In army's parlance it may be termed as diversionary attacks also. In tactical level it may cause the following :-

- Commit the enemy's reserve or keep the reserve where it is located.

- Shift the enemy's fire support from the main attack causing dilution of fire support.

- Reveal enemy's defensive weapons.

- Confuse the enemy.

Demonstrations.   It is a show of force on the battlefield where a decision is   not sought. It attempts to gain enemy response to an area where own force is exhibited without getting into a conflict.

Ruses. These are tricks to deceive the enemy to get an advantage. Rommel used German Volkswagen vehicles to look like tanks and mixed them with real armoured units. This made the British to believe that he was stronger in tanks than he actually was.

Displays.   A unit can be tasked to conduct a display as part of the deception story. The unit may use simulations, disguises, portrayals or any combination of the above.

Deception and Operational Security

Almost all historical examples of operational deception have concealed both the decision to deceive and the details of the plan from their own troops. As a high ranking German General wrote, " As a rule, the intention to deceive the enemy should be concealed from one's own side.   Deceiving one's own troops is very often, perhaps even generally, necessary   for effective deception."

Strict possible security measures have to be taken for all deception operations. Any leak can provide the enemy an input which may result in a disastrous twist with deceiver unwittingly becoming the deceived. If the troops employed in deception

operation are informed about the nature of operation they are taking part, there is every chance that their actions may undergo some subtle change which can give away the deception plan.

However, there is a paradox here. For good coordination at every level there is requirement of involving appropriate responsible persons and they would be knowing the complete plot. So a trade off and fine balance have to be made between the two conflicting needs of security and coordination.

There is probably no better albeit extreme example of a commander who appreciated the advantages of tight security in both deception and actual operation than Field Marshal Erwin Rommel . Rommel assured the security of his plans by a simple expedient : he kept his own counsel, informing neither his own staff nor the German High Command about the deception plan.

Legal Considerations

Deception operations are constrained but not forbidden by international agreements. The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts is sometime very thin. However, since our adversaries are know to be no respecter of internationally agreed conventions like Geneva Conventions it is necessary to understand the legal implication of such operations.

Some of the actions which are forbidden are :-

- Improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, the military insignia or the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.

- Use of emblem of the Red Cross must be limited to indication or protection of medical units and establishments. Following would be improper use of the emblem :-

  ➢ Using a hospital as an observation post or military office.

  ➢ Firing from building or tent displaying the emblem of the red cross.

  ➢ Displaying the emblem on vehicles carrying ammunition or other such stores.

Legitimate Ruses. Some of the legitimate ruses may be transmitting false or misleading radio or telephone messages, deception of the enemy by bogus orders, making use of the enemy's signals and passwords, deliberate planting of false information, use of spies and secret agents, putting up dummy guns, vehicles, mines, removing unit identification from vehicle and uniforms and psychological warfare activities.

Deception in Low Intensity Conflict Operations(LICO). In LICO, sabotage, espionage, subversive agents and terrorist activities by Anti National Elements are major threats to deception. Our primary target in LICO is adversary's Human Intelligence (HUMINT). However, they also have developed significant capability in Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). Specific HUMINT, SIGINT and insurgent threat must be identified and exploited. In LICO, deception may be designed as a subtle disinformation or propaganda campaign designed to enhance secrecy .

Some of the methods of disseminating deception information in LICO are :-

- Using vernacular and local media to give appropriate information.

- Leaking information to the media.

- Using double agents.

- Deliberate leaking of information to known sympathisers or agents.

- Deliberately leaking information to local workers who wittingly or unwittingly further disseminate the information.

MEASURE TO ACHEIVE SURPRISE [8]

Strategic.

Surprise at the strategic level has to be planned and implemented jointly with all the three services at the highest national level. It is the most difficult to achieve. To achieve strategic surprise all the ingredients of diplomatic, political, intelligence, media, leadership, technology and policy/doctrine would be required to coordinate a plethora of activities, while maintaining absolute secrecy.

Military Means.

- **Mobilisation**. Since large volume of our forces are in hinterland we should be able to move all our forces using all air, rail and surface transport means of communication at the shortest possible time frame. Bottlenecks in all communication means be it road or rail will have to be identified and action taken to remove them. It can also be carried out in the guises of collective training including operational alert exercises or use cover of Internal Security duties.

- Launching of an operation at unexpected time and not during the traditional campaign season .

- Creation of viable amphibious capability by carrying out pre-emptive amphibious operations.

- Use of air borne operation to achieve strategic surprise.

- Nuclear operations.

- Strategic air and naval operations like attacking of enemy nuclear installations or commercial ports.

Operational

In the formulation of planning at operational level no political leadership is involved. Operation surprise would be easily achieved if preceded by strategic surprise. However, it can also be achieved on its own.

Military Means. It should preferably be a joint effort of all the three services as applicable. There are a number of facets of warfare which can be exploited. Some of them are innovation in strategy and tactics, new armament, application of force, grouping and organisation, time and spatial domains, ground, shock and very importantly bold action or audacious plan. Some of the measures to achieve operational surprise are :-

- Concentration and assembly of force over a wide frontage outside enemy's Sideways Looking Airborne Radar(SLAR).

- Contact the enemy on a wide front .

- Simulation of concentration of forces by using actual troops, equipment along with dummies, decoys, electronic means and other activities. Also masking of increase in deployment of forces and weapons .

- Continuation of normal peace time activities.

- Switching of forces from one theatre to another or laterally with unexpected speed.

- Air reconnaissance over a wide front or in an area where we want the enemy to believe main offensive is coming.

- At the initial stages main and subsidiary thrust should have almost equal force level. Diversionary thrust should be synchronised with these to have the desired effort on the enemy.

- Suppression of enemy's air defences.

- Late movement of guns, one night prior to an offensive.

- Dumping of ammunition over a period of time by moving ammunition only at night so that build up of artillery ammunition is not discernible by the enemy.

- Launching operation directly from cantonments or from Concentration Areas.

- Creation of a strike force from the existing resources immediately before or during the war by reorganising formations.

- Wide use of air, electronic means and Psychological Warfare.

Tactical

Techniques applied to achieve tactical surprise are short time innovations and improvisations. Some of the measures adopted at operational level are also equally applicable at tactical level. Measures that can be taken to achieve surprise are :-

- **Intelligence** . Obtain information about the enemy by all possible methods like patrols, aerial/satellite photographs, electronic means etc.

- Strict adherence to Electronic Emission Policy and security measures.

- Unorthodox tactics like feint attack, creating a false front.

- Speed, audacity and unorthodox timing of attack.

- False or silent registration of artillery.

- All normal activities including electronic means to continue as late as possible .

- Attacking in adverse weather conditions.

- Use of airborne / heliborne operations

- Use of dummies or decoys. There are examples of our armoured forces getting inordinately delayed due to presence of barbed wire and dummy minefield in 65/71 operations

- Special operation using specialist forces or commandos or ghataks.

- Use of camouflage means both natural and technical. Today only camouflage nets would not suffice . We must have sound camouflage ,heat camouflage and

radar and radio camouflage to defeat hostile acoustic   reconnaissance, heat ranging instruments and radar and radio reconnaissance respectively.

- Use of Microlight, Powered Hang Gliders and unarmed Aerial Vehicles for specific tasks.

Preventive Measures Against Surprise.

Surprise has some major psychological components. It disrupts adversary's inner equilibrium depriving his ability to react quickly and effectively. He experiences psychological disorientation. Confusion allows time to complete own specific mission. It also causes illogical and chaotic behaviors by the side surprised leading to inactivity or unnecessary futile actions.[9]

Surprise causes panic and degradation of troops morale. To prevent being surprised some of the measures recommended are :-

- Eliminate the factors which promote surprise by the enemy like troop inactivity, miscalculation of potential threats and unfounded self confidence .

- Increase knowledge about the enemy .

- Encourage adaptability and flexibility, avoid rigidity   in planning.

- Maintain combat readiness at all time. Utilise all resources creatively.

- Increase knowledge of   surprise and carry out practical training should surprise occur.

TRAINING

Surprise is a creative art and not exactly a science or technique . The very success of surprise depends on one of the key factors - deviation from routine action. Unpredictability in the battlefield with innovation, daring, boldness, unconventionalism open the door to surprise. However,   how does one learn this art? The military environment does not promote audacity, boldness, unconventionalism ,innovation, creativity ab initio. It needs stability of conformity during peacetime. There is a dichotomy here. How do we pick   up such officer with the above qualities from the crowd during peace time. A structured   organised training program in training establishments would convert this important aspect into a Standard   Operating Procedure. This would then cease to be an art.[10]

Some of the measure which can be undertaken to develop surprise consciousness are :-

- Exposing the officer cadre to various campaigns in military history where surprise was a major factor.

- Use of surprise and deception in all training activities. One way of practising active measures is use of one of the discarded courses of action to be developed as deception plan.

- Use of wargames and partially controlled exercises to practice surprise and deception.

- Conduct training exercises in the condition of information void, chaos and confusion increasing "fog of war".

- Improve troops performance in dispersion, camouflage and concealment, night movement and track discipline.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Today we do not have our concepts and doctrine on surprise and deception. Resources have to be identified to carry out deception operation. In U S Army there is a 19 men cell at Divisional level and a 12 men cell at Corps level for deception operations. It is considered too large for planning and too small for execution of deception operation. In our context deception operation should be planned at Corps level. To start with an officer and a clerk should be posted with operations branch with the intelligence branch providing the necessary input on threat, evaluation and analysis. It is envisaged that not enough money would be available for procurement of equipment like decoys, dummies when there is shortage of more important items or equipment. A deception company can be squeezed out of Corps Engineers resources. Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTRAC) may take on the task of making a pamphlet on Deception. Emphasis should be placed on use of improvised decoys and dummy position at low cost.

The following measures are recommended :-

- Establish a deception cell at the highest level of Military Operations directorate. They will coordinate with signal and military intelligence, other two services, Intelligence Bureau and RAW regarding deception operation.

- Incorporate DRDO in developing decoys and dummies.

- "Camouflage and concealment" para in any order and instruction should be changed to "Deception Plan".

- Increase the scope of all arms camouflage course conducted at College of Military Engineering, Pune to lay much more emphasis on deception.[11]

CONCLUSION

On 12 July 1941- with Pearl Harbour only five months away - a memo from Lieutenant General Walter Short at   Hawaii's Fort Shafter to the Adjutant General's Office in Washington reported : There is definite need for camouflage treatment   of airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken on any air base in the department

Again , no action resulted from his appeal, and everywhere the camoufleurs met with the same regretful litany : No funds available.[12]

Let us learn from military history and prove Liddel Hart's dictum " From history we learn that we do   not learn from history "- wrong. We must get down to basics and take measures for making active and passive deception activities effective.   It does not cost   huge money, but basic ingredients have to be made available to troops on ground . Surprise and deception are not lost arts. If we have to fight with and defeat an increasingly   sophisticated   intelligence gathering technology available   to our adversaries within the fiscally constrained environment, we must get the best out of our equipment, manpower and concepts .

Surprise goes a long way in changing the culture of an Army from attrition to maneuver warfare. Surprise can shock and paralyse the enemy's mind.   This decisive factor in battle can be achieved by cumulatively   exploiting secrecy, boldness, innovation and by misleading the enemy with careful, timely and thorough preparation, speed in execution and preparing oneself for the unexpected[13].

Deception has often been termed as the key to   success in battle. If employed carefully it can act as the   most powerful force multiplier . To sum up in Sun Tzu's words, "All warfare is based on deception . Hence when able to attack, we must seem unable ; when using our forces we must seem inactive ; when we are near, we   must make the enemy believe that we are away ; when far away we make him believe that we are near . We must hold out baits, entice the enemy, feign disorder and crush him.''

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