



Military Civil Fusion in China

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
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“We must accelerate the formation of a full-element, multi-domain, and high-return military-civil development pattern, and gradually build up China’s unified military-civil system of strategies and strategies” Xi Jinping, speaking to the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, June 20, 2017.

Introduction

Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is an aggressive national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which pursues its MCF Development Strategy to fuse its security, economic and social development strategy into an integrated national strategic system and capabilities. The Party’s leaders see MCF as a vital element of China’s strategy to become a “great modern socialist country” which includes developing a “world-class” most advanced military and becoming a world leader in science and technology (S&T). To achieve this, MCF involves a seamless flow of knowledge, technology, resources, materials and talent back and forth between the military and industrial sectors and academia. Its objectives are to develop and acquire advanced dual-use technologies for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and technology industries to strengthen them as instruments of national power. The CCP is executing this strategy through its own research and development and acquiring the world’s cutting-edge technologies, including theft.

strategy's implementation. He chairs the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development.



Source: Excerpted from NIDS China Security Report 2021: China's Military Strategy in the New Era, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan MOD, November 2020, pp. 171, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp>

U.S. Influence

China is a keen observer of western, especially American, theories and practices. It has analysed U.S. Civil-Military Integration (CMI), third offset strategy, Public Private Partnership (PPP) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). After careful scrutiny of all these concepts, China arrived at the strategy of Military-Civil Fusion. MCF caters to China's specific conditions, requirements and goals.

The term MCF looks like the opposite number to the American term CMI. However, it is far more complex. As per the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, America's CMI is "cooperation between government and commercial facilities in research and development (R&D), manufacturing, and/or operations."^[3] But China's MCF strategy is a state-led, state-directed program that leverages the state's power to strengthen and support the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Communist Party of China's armed forces. In the American ecosystem, the level of integration has emerged over the decades. In China, MCF is a state-driven rapid implementation. The full scope of MCF is much broader than the public-private partnerships that the U.S. has been promoting.

Chinese scholars feel that MCF is not a new thing. They note that the developed nations promote MCF in the following ways:-

- They adopt a whole-of-society approach to promote the informatisation of their military forces by using digital and technological platforms for their Armed Forces.
- Big defence industrial companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman maintain a high proportion of outside contractors, many of which became major enterprises in their own fields.
- In recent conflicts, the concept of contractors of the private military companies in the battlefields has become a common existence. More than 80 per cent of the U.S. Military's logistical and technical support personnel are provided by contractors.
- The national education system normally trains military cadets. In developed countries, about 70-80% of cadets come from universities. Comparatively, the PLA's proportion of cadets trained by its national education system is less than 30 per cent.
- Developed countries successfully use their civilian infrastructure for military use by constructing tunnels and service stations.

There are striking similarities between U.S. and Chinese organisations. The new Chinese Central Military Commission Technology Commission resembles the DARPA. 'Rapid response small group', established by the CMC, is reported in Chinese media as 'China's DIUX' (defence innovation unit) for innovation to improve the PLA's technological capabilities.

Priority Areas of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense Indicated by the State Council

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Space | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Major projects including large carrier rockets, nuclear power facilities, deep-space exploration, in-orbit servicing, and maintenance systems ● Yaogan [遥感] data policy; sharing of satellite resources and data between the military and civilian sectors ● Research on construction of launch sites and measuring systems |
| Cyber | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Building communications satellites and other communications infrastructure ● Improving cybersecurity as well as electromagnetic management technology and equipment ● Promoting the space-terrestrial integration information network project ● Establishing and constructing testing grounds for military electronic intelligence; researching and producing weapons and equipment and contributing them to the civil sector |
| Maritime | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coordinating testing needs of military and civilian sectors and testing facilities in the ocean and accelerating construction of deep/far sea testing sites ● Improving technologies for underwater measurements, data transmission, and security; enhancing comprehensive detection capabilities in the ocean ● Promoting construction of deep-sea stations, nuclear power offshore platforms, and deep ocean monitoring and measuring equipment ● Actively developing high-performance icebreakers, polar icebreaking research vessels, polar rescue vessels, polar semi-submersible transport vessels, polar resource exploration vessels, and core parts and materials for use in polar regions; and supporting major projects in the ocean |

Source: Excerpted from *NIDS China Security Report 2021: China's Military Strategy in the New Era*, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan MOD, November 2020, p. 68, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp>.

MCF development can contribute to the following key positive results:-

- It can support China's transformation into a powerful nation. There is an immediate need improvements in China's national defence capabilities.
- It can help China gain advantages in global technological and military competitions. China needs to catch up with the development of disruptive technologies by advanced countries.
- It provides a tremendous opportunity for the improvement of China's governance system. It will enact a governing system across sectors, government bodies and domains.
- It supports the creation of a world-class military. The MCF strategy is to work with China's other strategies in the manufacturing, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.

The Communist Party in recent years has drastically cut back on its use of the term 'military-civil fusion'. The 14th Five-Year Plan Outline of 2021 omits the phrase entirely. In March 2021, 4th Session of the Thirteenth National Congress passed the most important national strategy for China's military industry, the 'Outline of the Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People's Republic of China (The 14th Five-Year Plan)'.^[4] The 14th Five-Year Plan is the most important policy document for China's economic development over the next five or even 15 years. It is highly relevant to the defense industry priorities.

Strengthening of the preparation for wars.

Including the augmentation and integration of informatization, mechanisation and smartness.

Emphasis on the strategic capabilities in defence of sovereignty, security and development interests.

Acceleration of weaponry and equipment modernization.


There is a focus on:-

- Self-sufficiency in technology and speedy development as a technical power, encompassing innovations and the original innovation of the national defense technology.
- Speeding up of the development of strategic, cutting-edge and revolutionary technologies.
- A quicker upgrade and renewal of weaponry and equipment and the development of smart equipment.

This document is an upgraded version of China's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–20) which described the MCF as "form a basic military-civilian science and technology collaborative innovation system, and formation of comprehensive, multi-domain, and high-efficiency military-civilian technology fusion." For the completion of this objective, the plan charted following seven specific goals to:-^[5]


- Strengthen macro-coordination of science, technology, military and civilian integration. Improve the technological MCF system and mechanism. Promote coordination and integration of plans.
- Strengthen the capacity of S&T collaborative innovation between the military and civilian sectors. Co-

The graphic below illustrates the core components of the military-civil fusion deep development patte



In the military, the Military-Civil Fusion Bureau was established in the Office for Strategic Planning 2016. This bureau is the driving force behind civilian participation in the defence industries. The State Ad Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), is the force behind “eliminating barr conversion.” SASTIND is responsible for the management of national defence company policy. representative offices have been established at each level as representatives of the PLA in defence c other entities and are responsible for implementing contracts, monitoring quality control, receiving produ with the military.

Organisational Relationship Chart of MCF^[7]



China pursues MCF through six interrelated efforts. Each effort overlaps with the others and has both international components. The Party seeks to implement the MCF Development Strategy across every 1 party-state from the highest national-level organs down to provinces and township. The six system Development Strategy are:-

- **The Advanced Defense Science, Technology and Industrial Systems.** This system focuses on defence industrial base, civil industrial base, and technology to transfer mature technologies acro

Each MCF system has linkages between a number of organisations and government entities including

- Ministry-level organisations from the State Council.
- Lead military organs subordinate to the Central Military Commission.
- State-sponsored educational institutions, research centres, and critical laboratories.
- Defence industry.
- Other SOEs and quasi-private companies.
- Provincial governments.

MCF Funding

The Chinese government is promoting MCF by leveraging guidance funds as an important mechanism for capital and activities. For example, the military-civil fusion industrial development fund launched in September 2015 involved 30.2 billion RMB or \$4.4 billion in its initial funding round. According to some estimates, the total amount of wide variety of guidance funds is in the range of several hundred billion dollars. As of mid-2019, several billion dollars of funding has been allotted to MCF through funds launched in cities and provinces that include Shanxi, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Shaanxi and Heilongjiang.

Quietly, China has invested vast sums of money in Silicon Valley firms with technology relevant to national defence. Crucial defence related targets include sensitive or military-grade equipment such as computer circuitry, hardened programmable semi-conductors, accelerometers and military sensors, high-grade carbon fibre, microwave amplifiers, proprietary and export restricted technical data and thermal imaging systems. Chinese firms are mainly involved in artificial intelligence, robotics, augmented reality/ virtual reality, and financial technology. It is estimated that China participated in 10-16 per cent of all venture capital deals, including 271 early-stage investment deals worth \$11.5 billion in 2015 alone. Examples are:-^[8]

- Neurala, an artificial intelligence company, struggled to get funding from the U.S. military. It got funding from a Chinese group associated with a state-owned company.^[9]
- Quanergy, which develops sensors for military applications, accepted venture funding from the China Venture Capital.
- China's State Council financed an initial investment in Canyon Bridge Capital Partners in its attempt to acquire takeovers of Lattice Semi-conductor. Later this was blocked by the Trump administration on national security grounds.^[10]

However, China maintains strict control over inbound investment.^[11] Not all China's technology companies are willing to pursue close collaboration with the PLA. Commercial considerations drive them in a fiercely competitive market. Those with international aspirations, like Alibaba, may tend to be less transparent about collaborations with the military and defence industry, with some important exceptions. Baidu, a global leader and member of the PLA team in artificial intelligence, and the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation have started to apply artificial intelligence, big data and cloud computing to command and control measures.

MCF Espionage

To bring western innovations into its industrial ecosystem, China has increased its cyber and technological activities. Such illegal transfers can occur through exports, foreign direct investment and acquisitions, cyber espionage, traditional industrial espionage, research collaboration, talent acquisition, and influence operations. Christopher Wray stated, "Over the past decade, the FBI has seen economic espionage cases with a 300 per cent increase by approximately 1,300 per cent." There are many examples. PLA Navy submarines and frigates, and German-produced engines exported to China for commercial use.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimates that the PLA has sponsored over 2,500 military engineers to study abroad, especially in 'Five-Eyes' countries (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Since 2007. China's application of the MCF abroad threatens the democratisation of science and the philosophical openness and collaboration.

China has intensified its regulatory actions deep into private Chinese enterprises to ensure they

Ten Major Outcomes of MCF Identified by the Xinhua News Agency

| Item | Description |
|---|---|
| Tianhe-2 | Ranked the world's fastest supercomputer for six consecutive times |
| Laser gyro | Can be applied to the Long March launch vehicles |
| BeiDou | Navigation system |
| Gaofen-2 | Earth observation satellite |
| Hualong-1 | Nuclear reactor |
| Demolition equipment for civilian use and demolition integration platform | Applicable to infrastructure construction and ore mining |
| Unmanned aerial vehicle | Can be used for distribution in civilian sectors as well as for military purposes |
| Intelligent robot | Can be applied to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) |
| Driverless vehicle | Applicable to military vehicles |
| Caterpillar-tracked small unmanned platform | Firearm-mounted, night reconnaissance function |

Source: Excerpted from NIDS China Security Report 2021: China's Military Strategy in the New Era, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan MOD, November 2020, p. 68, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp>

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As China moves toward intelligentized warfare, MCF will be a crucial element of the PLA's over-achievements. China aims to achieve "complete military modernisation" by 2035 and become a "world-class" military by 2049. In July 2020, the State Science and Technology Commission issued the AI Development Plan for a New Era, which stated that China will "promote the two-way application of military and civilian scientific and technological achievements, and jointly build and share resources of the military and civilian, to form a full-element, multi-domain, and high return military-civilian development pattern." This plan specifically attempts to "direct the results of AI technology toward defence and encourage civilian S&T researchers to participate in major national defense-related AI research."

Role of PLA

The MCF strategy intends to break down the obstacles between the PLA, academia, technology, and industry sectors. This would facilitate the PLA to employ dual-use industries and technologies for military advancement and capabilities development.

The Central Military–Civil Fusion Development Commission, led by Xi Jinping, has made the Cyber Military–Civil Fusion Innovation Centre, Qihoo-360, a leading Chinese cybersecurity company. He is guided by the goal to improve national cyber defences. China wants to leverage 'cyber militias' for its cyber defence. Xi Jinping continuously emphasised the dynamism and potential of MCF in cybersecurity and informatization, calling for the PLA to "grasp the historical opportunity of the current information technology transformation and new transformation in military and civilian affairs". In April 2018, in a speech delivered at the National Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference, Xi Jinping highlighted the inherent relationships between the market and the battlefield while 'promoting the full-factor, multi-domain and highly efficient development structure for MCF'.^[13]

The PLA's Strategic Security Force (PLASSF) will have to keep pace with the rapid, disruptive technological changes, often driven by research and development in the private sector. These technological changes have led the PLA to pursue civil-military integration fusion as an integral aspect of its mission. This involves taking advantage of technological advances and leveraging civilian talent. The PLASSF recruits a large number of civilian specialist professionals in cyber defence, aerospace and artificial intelligence. Individual PLASSF units conduct research projects with universities. The quality of education at the SSF's Information Engineering University will be crucial to its cultivation of personnel for command and technical

PLASSF has been active in pursuing its goals of MCF. Some of the initiatives undertaken are:-

- Partnerships with over nine different universities and companies, such as the University of Science and Technology of China and the China Electronics Technology Group (CETC), to focus on 'fostering high-end education, training, cooperation, talent selection and exchanges.
- Signed an MCF strategic agreement with China Mobile that enables cooperation in joint construction of infrastructure, information system and resource development and utilisation, emergency communication command and dispatch, 'smart' military camps, information security and informatization talent training
- Establishment of the Military-Civil Fusion Intelligent Equipment Research Institute as a collaborative

There are concerns about the lack of access to large-scale and high-tech facilities and experimental private sector companies. It is also unclear whether the private sector companies will get permission to sensitive projects. On the other hand, some Chinese companies may try to take advantage of the resources rather than provide real contributions to military modernisation. The heavy increase in funding, including funds dedicated to MCF, can aggravate corruption in the Chinese military and defence industry.

Though there has been noticeable progress in MCF, some experts are worried that, in their current defence industrial base and the innovation base are not in a position to meet both defence and commercial. Another cause of worry is the defence industrial base's low self-sufficiency on the core, critical technology innovation base's inability to produce original innovations and breakthrough technologies. Bi Ji, Commandant of NDU between 2012 and 2017, noted the following problems:-

- "I'm willing to 'fuse' others but not willing to 'be fused' by others."
- "It is okay for others to share resources with me, but I will not share my resources."
- "My game, my turf, my rules."

Conclusion

The National Defense University of PLA observed that progress on the Development of Military-Civil Fusion in China had been unsatisfactory. The CCP had tried to pursue similar policies earlier without any success. The balance between the role of the government and the market is and will be one of the toughest challenges in implementing the MCF strategy.

MCF is an aggressive national strategy of CCP. President Xi Jinping, since he took office, has been personally overseeing the strategy's implementation. He argued that there is a pressing need to move from 'early-state fusion' to 'deep fusion', a process that had been held up by problematic mindsets, system vested interests. To effect change and drive results, Xi Jinping, at the first meeting of the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development on June 20, 2017, highlighted the task's urgency. He urged officials to "wade through dangerous shoals, move people's difficult problems, overcome obstacles, try out new ideas and open new paths."^[14]

Endnotes :

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[4] An archived version of the Chinese source text is available online at: <https://perma.cc/3KWG-VCVC>

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