

# **MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS**

If you are sure that you are overwhelmingly stronger than the enemy, by all means engage in an open fight. But if the enemy is more powerful, with a sound of what is going on in the enemy's camp, you may adopt a great variety of ruses. One of the ways is to deceive the enemy into thinking that your army is about to break from famine or disaffection and thus induce him to leave a strong position and attack you where he is at a disadvantage .

-- Kautilya in Arthashastra

## **INTRODUCTION**

Deception has been an integral part of warfare since warfare came into being .Wise military planners throughout history have used deception. It is a low cost and effective way to cause the enemy to waste his efforts. Imaginative use of deception, coupled with aggressive training, improves combat effectiveness at all levels. It is the desire of every military commander to achieve victory against the enemy with minimum attrition to own forces and equipment. Though military commanders are expected to include deception in their operational planning, they are not taught its principles and methods. Deception on its own has not been included as a separate entity amongst the principles of war. However, Deception Operation is being considered as one of the five pillars of Command and Control Warfare, itself a subset of Information Warfare, along with Operational Security, Psychological Operation, Electronic Warfare and Physical Destruction.

Deception is rarely an end unto itself. Deception is most often used in coordination with other methods to create windows of opportunity that expose the enemy. The importance of deception has surely not diminished over the millennia and, in fact, may be gaining in importance. Military deception is a proven force multiplier that can shape the battlefield by providing surprise and security for military operations and forces.

## **AIM**

The aim of this essay is to analyse the concept of Military Deception Operations at the strategic, operational and tactical level and suggest measures to achieve the same.

## **SCOPE**

The essay will study Military Deception Operations critically at strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and their interrelation. Keeping in view the battlefield

scenario in the next millennium the measures to carry out deception operations against the enemy and safeguarding measures against being surprised by the enemy deception operations would be analysed.

## **HISTORY**

To guess at the intention of the enemy; to divine his opinion of yourself; to hide from both your intentions and opinion; to mislead him by feigned maneuvers; to invoke ruses, as well as digested schemes, so as to fight under the best conditions— this is and always was the art of war.

- Napoleon

From ancient times surprise and deception have been the most critical features in winning a battle. In Mahabharata times, Lord Krishna used deception to darken the horizon enabling king Jayadratha to come out of his hiding so that Arjun could kill him. Shukracharya, ancient military writer of Vedic age had written as one of the forms of warfare are Kuta Yudha i.e. war by Subterfuge and Tusrim Yudha i.e. Silent Warfare conducted by spreading disaffection in the ranks of enemy forces. During Mahabharata Kuta Yudha using bluff and conceit was practised. Success of Allied Egyptian Expedition Force in Palestine(1917 – 1918), Ardennes offensive by the Germans, Pearl Harbour, Japanese advance in Malaya, success of Operation Fortitude in the Normandy Invasion, Incheon landing, both 1967 and 73 Arab Israel wars, Battle of Dien Bien Phu at Indo China and the Gulf War are some of the shining examples of use of successful deception operations.

**Indian Scene.** India has a long history of getting surprised by the enemy deception operations. Babur surprised the then emperor of India by imaginative use of the canon. In 1962 we were strategically surprised by China. In 1965 Op Gibraltar launched by Pakistan was a surprise to us and latest is the Kargil episode where we have been surprised again.

**Deception Measures Adopted By Pakistan in Kargil.** Apart from keeping the plan top secret, Pak decided on the following measures of deception:-

- Not to induct any fresh troops into the FCNA for the proposed operation. Any large scale troop movement (two-three battalions) would have drawn our attention.
- The artillery which was inducted into the FCNA, during the heavy exchange of fire in July-September 1998, was not de-inducted. Since firing continued thereafter, though at a lower scale, this was not considered extraordinary.
- No reserve formations or units were moved into FCNA till after the execution of the plan.
- The administrative bases for the intrusions were to be catered for from existing defences.
- Logistic lines of communication were to be along the ridge lines and the Nullahs, well away from the tracks and positions of own troops.

## **BACKGROUND**

Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable, and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force.

—Niccolo Machiavelli

Deception can be defined as “Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary’s military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific action (or inaction) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission”. It is often said that skills on deception have deteriorated over a period of time . Our army has not developed concepts and doctrine on deception nor has it acquired equipment related to deception. There are three key factors that contributed to demise of deception related skills : -

- ❖ Developments in technology are perceived to make successful deception more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
- ❖ Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources, including time, to tasks that are considered less essential.
- ❖ Force modernisation being primarily focused on high cost equipment, low cost perceived intangibles like deception has been pushed into back ground.

Some unfounded beliefs or myths on deception are :-

- Surprise comes from luck . Not true at all. Deception almost certainly results in surprise.
- Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers. This is incorrect.
- Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent. The truth is, that greater the intelligence collection capabilities the greater is the opportunity to feed the enemy false information.
- Deception is only for combatants. It is not true. In 1973 Arab Israel war, the Egyptian attack was aided by 150 deception ploys in economic, political and military forms.

## **CATEGORIES OF MILITARY DECEPTION**

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.

-- Sun Tzu

There are five types of deception operations. The categories of deceptions and their objectives and characteristics are tabulated below :-

Category	Objective	Characteristics
<b>Strategic Military Deception</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies and operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducted by and in support of senior military commanders</li> </ul>
<b>Service Military Deception</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.</li> <li>Protects friendly force personnel, material, equipment, and Information Systems (INFOSYS) nodes from observation and surveillance using natural or artificial material.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducted by the Services that pertains to service support to joint operations.</li> <li>Imitates, in any sense, a person, object or phenomenon to deceive adversary surveillance devices or mislead adversary evaluation.</li> <li>Targets sensors and weapon systems.</li> <li>Employed against systems.</li> </ul>
<b>Operational Military Deception</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Results in adversary actions favourable to the originator's objectives and operations.</li> <li>For Army forces, a subcategory of Service military deception</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducted in theater of war to support campaigns and major operations</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Influence an adversary commander to act in a manner that serves our</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targets adversary decisionmakers at any level of command.</li> </ul>

<b>Tactical Military Deception</b>	tactical objectives. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For Army forces, a subcategory of Service military deception</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports battles and engagements.</li> <li>• Integral to the concept of operations.</li> <li>• Requires feedback planning.</li> </ul>
<b>Military Deception Support of Operational Security (OPSEC)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Degrades adversary capability to discern OPSEC vulnerabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centrally monitored and controlled.</li> <li>• Targets adversary intelligence functions.</li> <li>• Employed against all forms of ISR operations.</li> <li>• Supports force protection.</li> <li>• Derived from the concept of operations.</li> <li>• Feedback not always required.</li> <li>• Decentralized control and Execution.</li> </ul>

**Figure 1. Categories of Military Deception Operations**

**PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DECEPTION**

I make the enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is not strong.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Following the principles of Military Deception (MD) Operations contributes to successful operations. Applying them consistently and creatively enhances any deception’s credibility and increases its chances for success. However, they are not a checklist that guarantees success. Commanders and staffs use judgment to apply them.

Principles of Military Deception are :-

- Focus on the target.
- Cause the target to act.
- Centralize control.
- Employ variety.
- Enforce strict OPSEC.
- Minimize falsehood/leverage truth.
- Ensure timeliness.

- Ensure integration.
- Exploit target biases.
- Avoid windfalls.
- Utilize space effectively.
- Work within available competencies and resources.

### **Deception Means**

Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. It provides false indication to the enemy. The enemy would collect battlefield information through visuals, olfactory, sonic and electronic methods. There are three categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative.

**Physical means.** These are activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. Physical means provide indicators that adversary ISR systems report. Physical means include :-

- Reconnaissance unit operations.
- Alert and movement of forces.
- Training, testing, evaluation, and rehearsal activities.
- Dummy and decoy equipment, devices, and displays .
- Smoke and obscurants.
- Logistic, stockpiling, and repair activities.
- Feints, demonstrations, and ruses.
- Sonic indicators, which reproduce common noises of military activity. (Such noises are directed against adversary sound ranging sensors and the human ear. Sounds can be real or simulated. The deception plan may also require that the adversary not hear certain sounds; such instances require strict noise discipline).
- Olfactory indicators, which project battlefield smells to deceive human and technical sensors. (Examples of olfactory deception measures are the creation of odors common to military units and operations, such as those of food, explosives, and petroleum products).

**Camouflage.** When employing visual deception we may camouflage all or part of real or false military objects to project the desired effect. When portraying a particular unit, the use of camouflage must be consistent with that unit's prior camouflage signature. The simple use of camouflage means are very effective to deceive own intentions. Innovative use of camouflage means together with knowledge of US spy satellites enabled us to hoodwink US intelligence about our own Pokharn-II blast.

**Technical Means.** These are military materiel resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to the deception target through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particle.

### **Electronic Deception.**

Electromagnetic deception is an important technical means. Electromagnetic deception includes :-

- **Manipulative Electronic Deception.** Actions to eliminate revealing, or convey leading, electromagnetic indicators.
- **Simulative Electronic Deception.** Actions to simulate friendly, notional or actual capabilities to mislead adversary forces. After a sixteen – day battle, many Al Qaeda forces, probably including Osama Bin Laden, escaped across the Pakistan border. Bin Laden’s bodyguards used his cell phone transmissions to misdirect the manhunt aimed at capturing the Al Qaeda Leader.
- **Imitative Electronic Deception.** The introduction of electromagnetic energy into adversary systems that imitates adversary emissions.

### **Administrative Means**

These are resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary or other physical evidence to the deception target. An example of administrative means is planting bogus material.

### **Perceptions**

Perceptions are mental images the commander wants the deception target to believe are real. They include the personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions about friendly force intentions, capabilities, and activities that the target uses to make decisions. There are two types of perceptions: desired and supporting. A desired perception is what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. Supporting perceptions are mental images that enhance the likelihood that the deception target will form the desired perceptions and accept them as true.

### **PLANNING**

It is very important to spread rumors among the enemy that you are planning one thing; then go and do something else . . .

- Emperor Maurice, The Strategikon

History shows that successful deception plans are executed prior to the start of actual operations. The actual execution of the deception planning process moves in the

reverse direction: informational elements being manipulated are transmitted (or obscured), creating

the story, in the mind of the targets, to achieve the objective. Planning for deception operations must start prior to the beginning of a conflict. Without a file or data base of certain information concerning friendly and enemy forces, it is impossible to conduct a successful deception effort. Deception planners must have detailed information on what friendly forces look like to the threat, available enemy sensors, and the enemy commander and his troop control cycle.




Figure 2. The Deception Planning Process

## **COMPONENTS OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION OPERATIONS .**

There is no more precious asset for a General than a knowledge of his opponent's guiding principles and character, and anyone who thinks the opposite is at once blind and foolish... In the same way the commander must train his eye upon the weak spots in his opponent's defence, not in his body, but in his mind.

- Polybius.

The planning for combat operations and battlefield deception is similar. Each component of the deception plan varies in scope, but is applicable at operational and tactical levels. The following doctrinal components of deception, are listed in order of development.

**Objective.** The deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation and is presented as a mission statement. The objective specifies what action or lack of action the enemy must be made to take at a specific place or time on the battlefield.

**Target.** The target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decisionmaker who exercises the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective desired



by the friendly commander. The target for the deception effort at Corps is normally a formation commander, although in some cases the target might be an Army commander. What is his personality profile? What is his educational background and how has he grown up? What sensors does he trust the most? Is he enamoured by high tech sensors or does he believe reports from scouts or operatives? We must know him if we want to deceive him!

**Story.** The deception story is the friendly intention, capability, or disposition which the enemy is made to believe to be true.

**Plan.** The deception plan outlines what specific operations, displays, or concealments must be taken to convey the deception story to the target.

**Events.** Deception events are friendly indicators/actions that present specific parts of the total deception story to the enemy's intelligence gathering sources.

**Know Yourself.** The deception planners at corps and division must have available to them the profiles of friendly units and installations within their area.

**Know the Enemy.** A deception plan must be based on detailed knowledge of the enemy. Most of the knowledge required can be developed in peacetime. We must know our target -- the specific enemy commanders controlling the forces we want to influence, the enemy sensors, and how the sensors feed the enemy.

**Sensors.** We must know the capabilities of enemy sensors. What frequencies do they operate on? What is their doctrinal mode of operation (day, night, intermittent, or on a schedule, etc.)? What is their range? Where are they positioned on the battlefield? Are they in line of sight or non-line of sight? Which ones are organic to the formation and which ones are controlled by higher headquarters?

**Decision Cycles Versus Troop Control Cycles.** One problem facing Corps planners is whether a deception effort, other than higher headquarters directed, is feasible considering available time. Since the result of deception is action/inaction by enemy forces, consideration must be given to time available to influence troop control cycles. The deception plan must be developed, coordinated, executed, sensed by enemy sensors, input into the enemy's decision cycle, orders promulgated, and actions taken by enemy forces -- all on a time constrained battlefield.

**PLANNING GUIDE.** The ability of planners to develop an effective deception effort within the time constraints of the Corps planning cycle is facilitated by a structured approach to planning. A sample Deception Planning Guide is given at Appendix. Though designed for use of a Corps this guide can be modified for any formation.

**COORDINATION.** There must be close coordination between the deception plan and the corresponding operations plan. Deception activities must be coordinated with other agencies and commands that support the operation and/or may be impacted by the

deception. Any unit which could inadvertently compromise an operation through normal actions must also be contacted or controlled. The commander must decide the trade-off between a fully coordinated plan and the security/risk associated with full coordination. Based on his decision, the GS(Ops) Branch is responsible for ensuring that the plan is coordinated as desired and integrated into the operation.

**Hiding Own Operation.** For any deception operation to be successful it is essential that own tactical situation is hidden from the enemy sensor. Enemy sensor can be a man with a binocular on an observation post or a patrol leader to satellites or Unarmed Aerial Vehicles. The most commonly used techniques and materials to prevent deception are :-

- Camouflage.
- Suppressive and absorptive screens.
- Smoke.
- Shielding and/ or making various types of emitters.
- Using terrain to mask units and their movements.
- Signal security procedure.
- Electronic Warfare.

Today our adversaries have acquired state of the art high tech intelligence to snoop on us. With the proliferation of sophisticated technology on space easily available from commercial sources on payment, obtaining real tactical picture has become much simpler. Today tactical deception should be capable of hoodwinking such high tech intelligence as :-

- High resolution photo satellites.
- Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV).
- MTI Stand-off radars.
- Tactical air reconnaissance.
- Radar and radio locator.
- Magnetic, sonic and heat sensors.
- Imaging radars.
- Infrared.

**Deception and Operational Security.** Almost all historical examples of operational deception have concealed both the decision to deceive and the details of the plan from their own troops. As a high ranking German General wrote, "As a rule, the intention to deceive the enemy should be concealed from one's own side. Deceiving one's own troops is very often, perhaps even generally, necessary for effective deception." Strict possible security measures have to be taken for all deception operations. Any leak can provide the enemy an input which may result in a disastrous twist with deceiver unwittingly becoming the deceived. If the troops employed in deception operation are informed about the nature of operation they are taking part, there is every chance that their actions may undergo some subtle change which can give away the deception plan.

However, there is a paradox here. For good coordination at every level there is requirement of involving appropriate responsible persons and they would be knowing the complete plot. So a trade off and fine balance have to be made between the two conflicting needs of security and coordination. There is probably no better albeit extreme example of a commander who appreciated the advantages of tight security in both deception and actual operation than Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Rommel assured the security of his plans by a simple expedient : he kept his own counsel, informing neither his own staff nor the German High Command about the deception plan.

### **SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS**

We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, withholding and concealing the truth.

- V I Lenin

### **Legal Considerations**

Deception operations are constrained but not forbidden by international agreements. The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts is sometimes very thin. However, since our adversaries are known to be no respecter of internationally agreed conventions like Geneva Conventions it is necessary to understand the legal implication of such operations.

Deception is in principle coordinated with Command and Control (C2W) warfare, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs to harmoniously advance own interests. The generation and dissemination of patently false or misleading information is a complex, evolving and legally murky issue. It is generally accepted that deception is employed against hostile forces with impunity (in a legal or ethical sense). However, we cannot deliberately misinform or mislead public or decision makers. In between these two poles is a great grey area that may have a significant impact on military outcomes. What about employing deception against neutral or unfriendly forces not directly involved in the operations ? Against Who ?

### **Deception in Low Intensity Conflict Operations(LICO).**

Enemy sabotage, espionage, subversive agents, and terrorist activities are major threats to deception. In LIC, the local civilian population is important because of the difficulty identifying insurgents and guerrilla forces interspersed throughout the local population. Coercion, brutal force, and extortion are all used by the insurgents to gain the cooperation of local citizens. Deception in LIC may be designed as a subtle disinformation or propaganda campaign designed to enhance secrecy. It may be an active operation designed to cause the enemy to attack a decoy position or move into a position where our fire and maneuver can destroy him.

Some methods of disseminating deception information in LIC are uniquely suited against enemy HUMINT . These methods include--

- ❖ Using local newspapers and periodicals to give appropriate information.
- ❖ Leaking information to the media.
- ❖ Using double agents.
- ❖ Deliberately leaking information to known sympathizers or agents.
- ❖ Deliberately leaking information to local workers who wittingly or unwittingly further disseminate the information.

## **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.**

In wartime, the truth is so precious that she should always be  
attended by a bodyguard of lies.

- Winston Churchill

Battlefield deception and psychological operations (PSYOP) are both directed toward the enemy. However, they target different audiences and use different channels to reach these audiences. Battlefield deception is directed toward the enemy commander and his staff. It is primarily intended for the attention of the enemy's intelligence organization. PSYOP are directed toward enemy forces in general. Propaganda a tool of PSYOP, is disseminated by such media as leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets, loudspeakers, radio, television, and rumors. PSYOP support the deception operation by disseminating information that confirms or supports the deception story presented to the enemy through his intelligence channels. Prior consideration should be given to the possibility that such use may degrade or jeopardize the credibility sought or achieved by PSYOP supporting tactical forces. It is important that PSYOP in support of deception be thoroughly coordinated at all levels of command during the planning and execution phases of the operations.

**Psyops and Deception.** There have been instances where Psyops have been enlisted to assist deception schemes. There is a fundamental difference between the two. The underlying principles of good psyops is that to be most effective, they must deal with the truth and nothing but the truth – although not necessarily the whole truth. Deception deals with lies and its aims are fundamentally at odds with those of Psyops. The latter can assist deception by helping to provide it with the “bodyguard of truth necessary to protect the lie”.

## **Counter Deception.**

Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to  
deceive!

—Sir Walter Scott, Marmion

Counter measures to deception are necessary and should be treated as seriously by modern commanders as their own deception schemes. Good intelligence would lead them some way towards uncovering a deception and intelligence staff should be able to distinguish deceptive threats from genuine ones. A skillful attacker will tailor his

deception to confirm the view the defender already has of him before doing something completely different.

Tactics are taught in a way that seek to exploit the best ground, but if the enemy knows what the best ground is, he is likely to plan accordingly. Choosing second best terrain, by contrast, creates an opportunity for a deception that may yield enormous results : Surprise and consequent success at much less cost.

### **New Technology and Information Warfare.**

Modern warfare is seeing enormous increase in the quantity of information, there is also a marked reduction in the time available to intelligence staff to analyse it and disseminate the resulting intelligence. Modern deception measures should take advantage of the targets vulnerability to paralyse through data saturation.

No matter how radical a technological innovation may be, a counter technology will soon be developed. Infra red sensors designed to detect that can be countered by something as simple as treated hessian cloth used in conjunction with camouflage net. Sensors cannot differentiate between a genuine hot engine and simulations made from a can filled with sand and petrol. Under some circumstances latest technology can remain vulnerable to surprisingly unsophisticated deception strategies. During Kosovo conflict very simple decoys and dummy sites led the most powerful Air forces in the world to overestimate grossly the effectiveness of their campaign against Serb armour, on ground. Serbs did not possess state of the art camouflage and deception equipment. Many of the decoy materials were knocked together from local materials. 'Tanks' for example, were made from black logs on old lorry wheels. High technology is not a panacea nor an end in itself; more traditional human intelligence sources may yet have a significant role to play in the future.

### **TRAINING**

The training of armies is primarily devoted to developing efficiency in the detailed execution of tactics. The concentration of tactical techniques tends to obscure the psychological elements. It fosters a cult of soundness rather than surprise. It breeds commanders who are so intent not to do anything wrong, according to the 'book' that they forget the necessity of making the enemy do something wrong.

- Liddell Hart

Training in deception involves teaching commanders to make the enemy make mistakes, a task that requires imagination. Most soldiers tend to consider personal camouflage as the limit of their deception responsibilities. Deception is given short shrift in terms of the time soldiers spend learning or practicing the art of the ruse. Deception techniques should be cultivated with the same level of emphasis we place on basic firearm skills.

Some of the measure which can be undertaken to develop deception consciousness are :-

- Exposing the officer cadre to various campaigns in military history where surprise and deception were a major factor.
- Use of surprise and deception in all training activities. One way of practising active measures is use of one of the discarded courses of action to be developed as deception plan.
- Use of wargames and partially controlled exercises to practice surprise and deception.
- Conduct training exercises in the condition of information void, chaos and confusion increasing “fog of war”.
- Improve troops performance in dispersion, camouflage and concealment, night movement and track discipline.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

I feel that deception and cover plans are fully justified and that the employment of cover and deception should be an accepted and organized procedure for any campaign.

- General George S Patton

Today we do not have our concepts and doctrine on deception. Resources have to be identified to carry out deception operations. In U S Army there is a 19 men cell at Divisional level and a 12 men cell at Corps level for deception operations. It is considered too large for planning and too small for execution of deception operation. In our context deception operation should be planned at Corps level. To start with an officer and a clerk should be posted with operations branch with the intelligence branch providing the necessary input on threat, evaluation and analysis. It is envisaged that not enough money would be available for procurement of equipment like decoys, dummies when there is shortage of more important items or equipment. A deception company can be squeezed out of Corps Engineers resources. Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTRAC) may take on the task of making a pamphlet on Deception. Emphasis should be placed on use of improvised decoys and dummy position at low cost.

The following measures are recommended :-

- Establish a deception cell at the highest level of Military Operations directorate. They will coordinate with signal and military intelligence, other two services, Intelligence Bureau and RAW regarding deception operation.
- Incorporate DRDO in developing decoys and dummies.

- “Camouflage and concealment” para in any order and instruction should be changed to “Deception Plan”.
- Increase the scope of all arms camouflage course conducted at College of Military Engineering, Pune to lay much more emphasis on deception.

## **CONCLUSION**

“To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind  
And deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to  
Distraction by creating confusion in their minds”.

- mao tse tung, on protracted war

Deception has often been termed as the key to success in battle. If employed carefully it can act as the most powerful force multiplier. Deception can shock and paralyse the enemy’s mind. This decisive factor in battle can be achieved by cumulatively exploiting secrecy, boldness, innovation and by misleading the enemy with careful, timely and thorough preparation, speed in execution and preparing oneself for the unexpected. The exact success of any given deception operation is often very difficult to measure. Deception is probably less important than good intelligence and no war was ever won by either, but only by hard fighting.

We must get down to basics and take measures for making active and passive deception activities effective. It does not cost huge money, but basic ingredients have to be made available to troops on ground. Surprise and deception are not lost arts. If we have to fight with and defeat an increasingly sophisticated intelligence gathering technology available to our adversaries within the fiscally constrained environment, we must get the best out of our equipment, manpower and concepts.

**DECEPTION PLANNING GUIDE**

1. **Current Situation.**

- Brief description of enemy situation.
- Brief description of friendly situation.
- What are Corps objectives?
- What is known about the enemy commander? (strength, weaknesses, information requirements, biases).
- What enemy peculiarities, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities have been identified?
- What enemy collection assets have been identified?
- What are the enemy's battlefield perceptions of the Corps?
- Are there indications that the enemy expects us to take a certain Course of Action?

2. **Courses of Action.**

- Given the present situation, what are the possible courses of action available to the enemy?
- Which is most likely?
- Which is most dangerous?
- What are the possible courses of action available to friendly forces?

3. **Based on the above information, does the enemy appear to be vulnerable to deception?**

- Is there adequate time (Troop Control Cycle) for the enemy to see and react to the deception? (How much time is available?)

4. **What do we want the enemy to do and whom do we want to deceive?**

- Deception Objective.
- Deception Target.
- What are feasible courses of action upon which to build a realistic deception? (possible stories).
- Is there a logical opportunity to implant this deception into the current situation?

5. **What do we need to tell and show the target commander to make him do what we want?**



- Deception Story.
6. **What resources are available to convey the deception to the target?**
    - Units.
    - Equipment (real and decoy).
    - Time.
  7. **Operational Security Considerations.**
  8. **How is the enemy likely to react to the deception? (Possible Courses of Action).**
  9. **What are the risks to own forces?**
  10. **Will compromise of the deception significantly degrade actual operations?**
    - Can we use the deception as an alternate course of action if the deception is not successful?
  11. **Based on the above, is there an opportunity to perform deception?**
  12. **If the opportunity exists:**
    - Prepare the plan (Annex to the Operational Orders/Instructions).
    - Prepare feedback on deception efforts.
    - Task units to perform the deception (integration of specific tasks/events into basic Operational Orders/Instructions and functional annexes).
    - Coordinate efforts; manage mission.
    - Modify deception based on feedback, if necessary.
    - Phase out operations.

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