

# Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil

Conference Report  
Monterey, CA, May 29 - June 1, 2002

The CCC convened a conference on asymmetric conflict in South Asia at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California from 29 May to 1 June 2002. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and other U.S. Department of Defense agencies sponsored the event. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Asia Foundation (San Francisco) provided additional support.

## Project Objectives

The conference was part of the ongoing [CCC Kargil Project](#). The Kargil Project aims to develop new insights into the causes, conduct and consequences of the 1999 India-Pakistan war in central Kashmir, and to draw from these insights a better understanding of India-Pakistan military rivalry, asymmetric conflict, and the role of nuclear weapons in crisis dynamics. The project will develop new empirical findings and engage theoretical debates about deterrence and the impact of nuclear proliferation. This CCC undertaking is the first effort to study the Kargil conflict from a scholarly, international perspective. Participating in this project is a team of 13 internationally recognized political scientists, security analysts, and military officers from India, Pakistan and the United States.

The Monterey conference analyzed numerous aspects of the 1999 India-Pakistan war in Kargil and examined the relevance of this eventful conflict to the current strategic situation in South Asia. The conference deliberation included presentation of papers by the CCC project authors and discussion by Indian, Pakistani and U.S. government and military officials and scholars.

## Conference Participants

Editors: [Dr. Peter Lavoy](#), Director CCC and [Dr. Sumit Ganguly](#), University of Texas.

Authors: Dr. Rajesh Basrur (Center for Global Studies, Mumbai), Dr. Mohammed Zafar Iqbal Cheema (Oxford University), Colonel Jack Gill (U.S. National Defense University), Ms. Chris Fair (RAND), Dr. Timothy Hoyt (Georgetown University), [Mr. Surinder Rana](#) (Naval Postgraduate School), Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi (Defense Analyst, Lahore), Dr. Shafqat Saeed (Columbia University), Mr. Praveen Swami (Frontline Magazine, India), and [Dr. James Wirtz](#) (Naval Postgraduate School). (Another author, Dr. Robert Jervis, Columbia University, was unable to attend the

conference. Mr. Joseph McMillan, U.S. National Defense University, and Dr. Rodney Jones, U.S. Defense threat Reduction Agency, were added as chapter authors subsequent to the Monterey conference.)

Panel Chairs and Discussants: Mr. Zamir Akram, Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C., Ambassador Shankar Bajpai, Stanford University, Lt Gen (ret.) Y. M Bammi, United Service Institution of India, Dr. Navnita Behera, Brookings Institution, Mr. Kent Biringer, Sandia National Laboratory, Dr. Jonah Blank, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Pradeep Chibber, University of California, Berkeley, Dr. Richard Elster, Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Devin Hagerty, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Mr. Hussain Haqqani, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mr. Mushahid Hussain, National Kashmir Committee (Pakistan), Dr. Rifaat Hussain, Stanford University, Adm. (ret.) Verghese Koithara, Stanford University, Dr. Michael Krepon, Henry L. Stimson Center, Gen. (ret.) V.P. Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, India, Dr. Shireen Mazari, Islamabad Institute for Strategic Studies, Mr. Joseph McMillan, U.S. National Defense University, Dr. T.V. Paul, McGill University, [Dr. Doug Porch](#), Naval Postgraduate School, Mr. Alok Prasad, Indian Embassy, Washington D.C., Brigadier (ret.) Shaukat Qadir, Dr. Scott Sagan, Stanford University, Col. S.C. Tyagi, United Service Institution of India.

Additional Attendees: Brigadier Shafqaat Ahmed, Professor Jim Armstead, Dr. Charles Ball, Dr. Ann Clunan, Capt. Eric England, Major George Farfore, CDR Kevin Farrell, Mr. Bill Hatchett, Mr. Bob Hehl, Lt. Col. Osamah Jammal, Prof. Terry Johnson, Dr. Rodney Jones, Mr. Gaurav Kampani, Professor Charles H. Kennedy, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, Prof. Jeff Knopf, Mr. Idris Kothari, LT COL Debra Little, Mr. Stu Maas, Mr. Doug Makeig, Ms. Elizabeth Manak, Dr. Bill Monning, Mr. Madhav Panwar, Mr. Tom Pochari, Lt. Mary Ponce, Mr. Kanwal Rekhi, Mr. Jeffrey Schneider, Ms. Resha Shah, Mr. Sushil Sharma, CPT Lawrence Smith, Mr. H.H.S. Vishwanathan, Lt. Col. Ken Wisian, Dr. Glynn Wood.

Conference Support: Ms. Anjali Bhattacharjee, [Ms. Iliana Bravo](#), Mr. Kyan Bharucha, Ms. Claire Rak, [Ms. Elizabeth Skinner](#), MAJ Steve Smith, Ms. Izumi Wakugawa.

## Agenda

The conference consisted of a welcome reception on 29 May, paper presentations and panel discussions on 30 and 31 May, and a workshop for project authors on 1 June.

### Introduction and Orientation

The NPS Provost, Dr. Richard Elster, welcomed the participants and inaugurated the conference with his introductory remarks. Dr. Peter Lavoy then provided an overview of the Center for Contemporary Conflict and the Kargil Project. Lavoy explained that the aim of this conference was to facilitate a free exchange of ideas among conference participants in a scholarly and collegial manner. He indicated

that all remarks, with the exception of those made by the paper authors, would not be attributed. Therefore, the discussion highlights offered below do not indicate the speaker of the remarks.

## Scene Setter

Colonel Satish Tyagi provided a 20-minute audio-visual presentation on the terrain, geography, cartography, and weather of Kargil region. Col. Tyagi also described the nuances of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, reviewed areas of military operations during the Kargil Conflict, and discussed the impact of the Kargil region's unique terrain and climate on military operations.

## Historical Background to Kargil

Dr. Sumit Ganguly observed in his paper and presentation that from the severity of conflict and number of casualties, Kargil could be characterized as a war. He argued that Kargil was another manifestation of continuing India-Pakistan hostility over Kashmir. Kargil occurred because of the growing unease among the Pakistani military elite, who believed that the Indian army's successful management of insurgency in Kashmir was diluting their Kashmir cause, and also because they felt emboldened by an assumed annulment of Indian conventional superiority through Pakistan's nuclear acquisition. According to Ganguly, previous India-Pakistan wars were not as severe as Kargil because both sides then did not possess firepower at current levels, had not developed offensive doctrines, did not possess nuclear capabilities, and due to generational affiliations across the India-Pakistan border, were more able to reach intra-war accords. Ganguly reasoned that any future India-Pakistan conflict would be more severe and violent. However, Ganguly conceded that the Kargil conflict showed that, despite the increased lethality of their military arsenals, Indian and Pakistani leaders might feel compelled to confine the theater of operations in a future conflict for fear of an escalatory spiral culminating in the resort to the threat of use, or actual use, of nuclear weapons.

One discussant contended that the 1971 war had resulted in increased Pakistani public hostility towards India, a condition that required further analysis from a societal perspective. He also indicated that conflict in South Asia had taken on a new character after the Afghan conflict in the 1980s and the consequent shift in Pakistan's Kashmir policy during President Zia-ul-Haq's rule. These factors have made current conflict between India and Pakistan much more violent and emotionally charged.

A senior, retired Indian diplomat disagreed with the contention that Pakistan's Kashmir strategy changed only after 1989. He quoted Zia-ul-Haq as saying in 1977, "In 1965, we made a mistake in assuming that the Kashmiris will help us; for the next time, we have to prepare the ground." The discussant implied that the Kashmiri insurgency of 1989-1999 was the ground preparation and the Kargil operation was the apparent Pakistani masterstroke along the lines of Pakistan's effort to seize Indian-held Kashmir 1965.

## Why Was Kargil Planned?

Dr. Mohammed Zafar Iqbal Cheema noted in his paper and presentation that the Pakistan government's silence on the Kargil conflict had forced him to rely mostly on secondary sources. He argued that Kargil was the continuation of the five-decade old India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. According to Cheema, a small number of senior officials in the Pakistan army planned the Kargil operation as a reaction to the Indian army's forward military policy, which culminated in occupation of the Siachin Glacier in 1984. He contended that Pakistan's military planners worked on the premise that occupation of un-held areas in Kargil would enable them to choke Indian defenses in Leh and Siachin. Hence it was the Siachin dispute that eventually spilled over into a new territorial dimension in 1999 - the Pakistan's army's intended control over the Kargil heights.

A Pakistani discussant agreed with Cheema that Siachin was an important factor in the Pakistan army's calculations for launching Kargil, but it was not the all-important factor. Other concerns, which ranged from the operational, such as alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley, to the strategic, such as reviving the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir, colored Pakistan's decision making prior to and during the Kargil conflict.

A senior retired Indian official pointed out that Cheema's paper does not adequately explain what were the immediate compulsions for Pakistan Army to intrude across the LOC in Kargil sector, which had remained peaceful since 1971.

The discussant also contested Cheema's claim in the paper that the Kashmir dispute was the underlying cause for Kargil, by quoting the results of an opinion poll published in Pakistan's Herald magazine on 27 January 2002. The opinion poll said that only four percent of Pakistanis, who participated in the opinion poll, said that Kashmir is the pressing issue for Pakistan, remaining said that socio-economic problems were more pressing. A discussion ensued about the reliability of opinion polling in Pakistan.

One Indian scholar argued that the Pakistan army had planned Kargil apparently to scuttle the India-Pakistan peace process initiated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, which had led to the 1999 Indo-Pak Lahore agreement. According to the retired general, Kargil was the Pakistan army's attempt for regime sustenance by creating a war-like situation with India. At least one other Indian participant contended that Pakistan had initiated the Kargil conflict in an attempt to internationalize the Kashmir question in the wake of the nuclearization of the subcontinent.

In the open discussion different opinions were heard about Pakistan's motives to launch Kargil. Most participants seemed to agree with one Pakistani scholar who stated that the initial expectations of Pakistan's military planners, their calculation of the outcomes of Kargil, and their perspective on the unexpected political and military difficulties they encountered all require further analysis.

## Why Was Kargil Not Expected?

James Wirtz and Surinder Rana argued in their presentation that there is a sharp military asymmetry between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, which is the weaker power in this equation, naturally finds surprise an attractive option. But because achieving surprise is a risky proposition and because it allows the weaker party to consider initiatives and outcomes that otherwise are beyond its capabilities, the victim of surprise (in this case India) often dismisses potential surprise scenarios as improbable.

Wirtz and Rana argued that the Indian army was indeed surprised, but under certain circumstances every organization is susceptible to surprise. At the heart of the problem are the limits to human cognition that constrains an organization's ability to anticipate unexpected and novel development, especially if the future fails to match existing analytical concepts, beliefs and assumptions. Idiosyncratic factors, the "ultra-syndrome," the "cry-wolf syndrome," denial and deception, or unavoidable signal-to-noise ratio, complicated Indian institutional efforts to perform intelligence analysis and produce finished estimates regarding the Kargil intrusion. These authors argued that the Indian intelligence apparatus suffered from glaring problems prior to Kargil, such as lack of coordination, lack of coherence, lack of accountability, and poor transparency. The Indian government and armed forces have lived with these systemic weaknesses over the years; however in the changed regional security situation - especially with the induction of nuclear weapons - such anomalies, if not overcome, could lead to catastrophic results.

Several discussants commented that the paper's analysis should include more on the extent to which Indian intelligence agencies have improved their organization, coordination, analysis and communication. Such changes would make it easier to avoid Kargil-like surprises in the future. One discussant also observed that the authors should examine the degree to which Pakistan exhibited "irrationality" in launching the Kargil incursion, and the extent to which such behavior could be deterred in the future. Finally, a Pakistani participant argued that questions could be raised about the extent to which the Indians were genuinely surprised.

In the open discussion, a senior American scholar said that one reason Kargil was unexpected was that the same subset of Indian individuals who performed the military tactical objective analysis was also responsible for strategic political analysis, which entailed a set of skills and tasks for which they most probably were not adequately trained or experienced.

## Military Operations in Kargil

Colonel Jack Gill stated in his paper and presentation that the Kargil conflict falls in the gray zone between low intensity conflict and full-scale war. He argued that the combat was intentionally limited by both sides within a small geographical area, in terms of the quantity of forces involved, in terms of the duration of fighting, and also in terms of the type of weaponry used. Gill further argued that the struggle for the forbidding heights around Kargil has important future implications, shedding light

on how each side perceived the war and its outcome, particularly as these perspectives relate to the Indian concept of "limited war" and future operations in Jammu and Kashmir by either country.

Gill described some of the key military operations of the conflict. But he observed that many significant uncertainties remain, such as what would have occurred had the Indians not achieved their military operational objectives when they did. What form of military escalation would India have pursued? And what would Pakistan's military response have been? What would have been the likely outcome of the Indo-Pak war that likely would have occurred?

One discussant said that Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was briefed about the Pakistani military operations in Kargil by Pakistan's army leadership on 12 March 1999, not in April 1999, as mentioned in Gill's paper

Another discussant observed that an important element of international mediation is that the United States involved itself in South Asian affairs during the Kargil conflict with Indian concurrence and Pakistan's reluctance - which reversed the pattern of U.S. intervention witnessed in previous years. Washington's diplomatic intervention thus should be seen in the context of the emerging U.S.- India strategic relationship.

Another participant noted that in strategic decision making, India and Pakistan have misread each other's motivations and intentions on many occasions. He disagreed with Colonel Gill's assertion that the U.S. is capable of influencing Pakistan's decision-making, by citing the example of Pakistan's testing of nuclear weapons in May 1998 despite U.S. pressure to the contrary.

## The Role of Jehadi Insurgents

Chris Fair in her paper said that while it seems clear that the Pakistan army's Northern Light Infantry (NLI) executed the preponderance of the Kargil operation, there are significant and compelling reasons to believe that various militants were employed. Quoting some Pakistan media reports, she observed that Jehadi groups such as Tehrik-e-Jehad, Al-Badr, Harkut-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba had participated in the Kargil conflict. She further argued that the role of insurgents was limited to logistical support. For the execution of military operations, Pakistani army leaders relied on NLI cadres drawn from the Northern Areas of Pakistan.

An American discussant said that the key research task is to ask why the Pakistan government claimed (and still claims) that the fighters of Kargil were all Mujahideen, and also why the Pakistan army did involve some Mujahideen in the operation. What role could Jehadi groups play in future Pakistani operations? If nuclear weapons brought symmetry to the India-Pakistan military equation, several discussants noted that the Jihadis represent an asymmetric force.

A Pakistani discussant said that it was wrong to assume that Kargil happened to

revive the insurgency in Kashmir. He argued that the presence of 750,000 Indian troops in Kashmir and sham elections there are no signs of normalcy. The discussant, who was an important Pakistani government functionary, quoted Indian sources by saying that there was tacit cooperation between India and Pakistan to keep the Kargil conflict limited. Furthermore, for political and operational reasons, both sides did not want to escalate the conflict.

An Indian participant commented during the discussion that Mujahideen had no role in the Kargil conflict. He said that irregular troops, or Mujahideen, could not have possessed heavy weapons, such as artillery, and long-range communication equipment. The same participant said that Pakistan aimed to block Indian highway 1-A, which had strategic implications. Therefore, he observed that Kargil was a strategic and not a tactical military operation.

During open discussion, one Pakistani participant commented that it would be prudent to research the literature published by Mujahideen groups, in which they had published the list of those who had died in Kargil conflict. Fair responded that she had conducted some research along these lines but found that several Mujahideen organizations had claimed much more active participation in Kargil than actually was the case. Their claims of numerous deaths of their members were concocted to provide the groups more political support.

Finally, the discussion turned to the most accurate way to describe the individuals who supported the Pakistan army in Kargil. They should not be labeled "Jehadis" or Mujahideen because they were not likely motivated by religious or ideological considerations. Rather, from what information is available, Fair concluded that it is most appropriate to describe these individuals as "civilian combatants."

## Why Kargil Did Not Produce General War

Peter Lavoy observed in his paper and presentation that according to Western scholars, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a region of conflict is supposed to create a logic of military escalation avoidance and thus produce such caution among decision makers that the opposing sides in a crisis will curtail their coercive behavior well short of war. He argued that Pakistan's defiance of this logic led to the Kargil conflict. In fact, the calculations of Pakistani military planners seemed to follow the logic of the "stability-instability paradox," according to which the side that is willing to run greater risks is able to use military force to obtain territorial or political gains, thereby placing the pressure on the other side to escalate to the nuclear, or near-nuclear, level - which, the logic goes, it will refrain from doing.

However, full-scale India-Pakistan war was prevented in 1999 through a combination of factors such as India's eventual battlefield successes, Pakistan's decision not to support its fighters (or perhaps they were not in a position to provide this support), official and back channel diplomacy, and international mediation through the aegis of the United States.

Lavoy further argued that Pakistan's decision makers apparently perceived Kargil as mainly a tactical military operation, which was launched by a small group of

Pakistani army leaders under the guise of ongoing militancy in Kashmir. Pakistan's strategy was based on the premise that due to the new nuclear factor, international pressure would force the cessation of hostilities, leaving Pakistan in an advantageous position on the ground. Based on this premise, the Pakistan government approached China and then the U.S. for support after the fighting started. China adopted a neutral posture, whereas the U.S. government gave a conditional commitment for mediation after Pakistan withdrew to its side of the Line of Control (LOC). In the end, however, Pakistan's military behavior and its diplomatic efforts were sometimes contradictory and inconsistent, and, in the end, ineffective. India, on the other hand, managed to combine effective military measures involving all three armed services, with consistent and coherent diplomacy.

A discussant from India maintained that the main factor of success in India's conflict management strategy was a unity of civilian and military organizations and a well-defined strategy from both military and diplomatic perspectives. The Indian armed forces pursued a clear and simple mission: to evict the intruders, nothing more and nothing less. Within these well-defined parameters, all Indian organizations worked in coordination within the full glare of international and the domestic media, which led to the success of India's strategy.

A Pakistani discussant argued that the nuclear dimension ensured that both sides would exercise considerable restraint in Kargil and in future conflicts. He argued that the Kargil issue manifested a deeper crisis, and unless the main issue (Kashmir) was resolved, the crisis will continue to persist. There would be many more Kargils in the future, he predicted.

## Nuclear Dimension of Kargil

Tim Hoyt argued in his paper that India and Pakistan each view their nuclear capabilities as largely political, rather than military tools. Decision makers in both states have made assumptions about the impact the nuclear demonstrations of May 1998 would have on regional security, but these assumptions were mutually contradictory: on the one hand, Indian and Pakistani leaders have affirmed their pursuit of "minimum deterrence" postures, but on the other hand, they have spoken of and actually undertaken preparations for nuclear use under a wide range of circumstances. Hoyt said that India's continuing development of military doctrine, including the post-Kargil "limited war doctrine," and Pakistan's efforts to re-define nuclear "red lines" during the Kargil war and even thereafter, suggest that the subcontinent may be moving toward a low-level arms race.

One discussant commented that one should avoid attempts to characterize what this or that "government" thought during the time of the Kargil conflict: different individual and organizational actors hold different ideas about how safe it is to use conventional and nuclear weapons. He also observed that military activities entail very complex processes, which civilian authorities often have difficulty in understanding, thus it is crucial to study the initiative of military officers in relation to military decision making. This discussant also stated that when analyzing nuclear threats, it is necessary to examine who exactly says what, why these threats were

made, and how much weight the individual issuing the threat carries in the state's decision-making apparatus.

A Pakistani discussant warned that unless the Kashmir conflict was resolved soon, the threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan would remain a real possibility. Kashmir is the only issue over which the two states have any reason to fight. And even if using nuclear weapons were "irrational," this might be the outcome of a rapidly escalating conventional conflict.

An American scholar pointed out that a lack of discipline in military activity during crises, such as missile testing, could lead to misunderstanding between India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is imperative that Indian and Pakistani leaders become more careful not to send misleading signals to the other side.

A very interesting discussion over perceptions of the success or failure of deterrence policy then ensued. Senior retired military officials from both India and Pakistan acknowledged that nuclear deterrence was much harder than they had been led to believe it would be. They also expressed that their countries actually had become less secure since the covert introduction of nuclear capabilities in the 1980s and the overt demonstration of these capabilities in the late 1990s.

## Impact of Kargil on Pakistan's Domestic Politics and Security

Dr. Saeed wrote in his paper that the Kargil conflict -- and subsequent Indo-Pakistani crises -- exposed the scope and scale of the Pakistan state's involvement with militant religious groups. The conflict also brought to the surface the absence of consensus among the highest echelons of Pakistan's political and strategic decision-making. According to Saeed, the Kargil conflict affected Pakistan's politics and society in many ways: first, it deepened the already brewing distrust between the military and the political establishment; second, it produced tensions between the military and religious groups; third, it raised questions about the responsibility and reliability of the Pakistani state among the community of nations; fourth, it damaged the professional reputation of Pakistan army, allowed the international media to portray it as a rogue army; and fifth, by deliberately keeping the public in the dark about the government's involvement in the Kargil conflict, the Pakistan government's political strategy had an adverse societal impact. This problem was exacerbated by the government disowning the remains of dead NLI soldiers, which caused resentment among families of those who were killed or wounded in combat.

An Indian scholar raised a pertinent query for the author: was Kargil a defining moment in social and political lives of India and Pakistan, or was it merely another moment in the history? A Pakistani commentator said that in Pakistan the political impact was a deepening of mistrust between the army and the political establishment, and hence it was a defining moment for the country and its leading institutions.

## Impact of Kargil on India's Domestic Politics and Security

Praveen Swami said in his presentation that Kargil was the first major armed conflict in the sub-continent that was fought in the full glare of domestic and international media. Certain regions of India, such as the South and Northeast states, which hitherto had remained immune to previous India-Pakistan conflicts, were also affected because of the government's policy of sending the dead for last rights in their native places. Swami argued that although Kargil became an issue in the national elections that followed the conflict, no particular political party actually benefited from this issue. Public sensitivities on a national issue such as Kargil are evident from the record 5,000 million rupees contributed by the public toward the war effort and the rehabilitation of those affected by the Kargil conflict.

Swami further argued that in India, the media influence on education is enormous; hence the nationalistic fervor among the educated lot is predominant. A leading American scholar commented that research on American public opinion showed that people reading newspapers select what information they read, while people watching TV tend to be more balanced in their opinion. The implication was that a broad cross-section of the Indian population, those that do not read newspapers, still had detailed knowledge of the Kargil conflict, and, as a result, became much more patriotic and loyal to the government.

## Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India

Rajesh Basrur provided the Indian perspective on the issue of lessons learned from the conflict. According to him, the lessons learned by India are discernible from the organizational and policy changes in the Indian security and political system. Indians perceived Kargil, which was planned even as the Lahore peace process was underway, as a betrayal by Pakistan; and ever since then they have hardened their posture over dialogue with Pakistan. Even the failure of Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf to reach some agreement at Agra is also attributable to this hardened posture.

In the wake of Kargil, India has instituted various changes in its higher defense management, operational deployments in Kashmir, and nuclear command and control structure. The concept of limited war has become a buzzword of Indian strategic thinking, which also is the outcome of the Kargil conflict. Basrur argued that Indian sincerity in the peaceful resolution of Kashmir with Pakistan is evident from its cease-fire offer to militants, and also its initiation of dialogue with the Musharraf regime at Agra.

An Indian discussant did not see a strategic shift in India's policy after to Kargil. He suggested that the issue of strategic space between limited war and the nuclear threshold needs further analysis. According to this scholar, the biggest casualty of the Kargil conflict was the trust between India and Pakistan.

## Lessons of Kargil as Learned by Pakistan

Providing the Pakistani perspective on the same issue, Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi pointed out in his paper that there is sharp divergence of viewpoints on the Kargil

conflict within Pakistan's official and non-official circles. Officials still view Kargil as a diplomatic success for Pakistan, which according to them resulted in the internationalization of Kashmir. Rizvi argued that a major lesson of the Kargil conflict is that no military expedition could be a success if it is undertaken without accounting for the totality of the environment, which includes domestic, political, economic, and international opinions and sensitivities.

One participant asked whether Pakistani military officials had learned anything at all from the Kargil debacle. Did Pakistani military officers truly believe that Pakistan would have defeated India in the battle for the Kargil heights had Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not agreed on 4 July 1999 to President Clinton's demand that he withdraw Pakistan's forces? All participants agreed that the coup that deposed Nawaz Sharif and brought General Musharraf to power was in a large degree the result of the prime minister's handling of the Kargil conflict.

## How Deterrence Operates (or Does not Operate) in South Asia

The concluding round-table discussion addressed the subject of the stability-instability paradox. The majority viewpoint indicated that nuclear weapons have produced more instability in South Asia, because there is stark incompatibility in how India and Pakistan view their nuclear capabilities. Indian scholars were unanimous in their view that deterrence is operable only in rational perspective, and rationality does not go hand-in-hand with sub-national wars and actors. A senior Pakistani scholar said that unless sub-national conflicts are politically solved, it would lead to the next level of conflict.

## Conclusion

Peter Lavoy and Sumit Ganguly, the editors of the Kargil book project, thanked the participants for coming to Monterey for the conference. They said that this process of dialogue on asymmetric warfare in South Asia will continue in the form of forthcoming CCC events, including a planned September 2002 workshop in India, and a November 2002 workshop in Washington D.C.

Peter Lavoy, Surinder Rana, Sumit Ganguly