

LEADERSHIP IN 21ST CENTURY

Whatever a great man does, the same is done by others as well. Whatever standards he sets, the world follows.

Slain, you will obtain heaven;
Victorious, you will enjoy earth;
Therefore, stand up, O son of Kunti,
Resolved to fight

-- The Bhagawad Gita

Introduction

The nature of future operations will be more complex, volatile, and lethal than ever experienced. Information flow will be quick and detailed. The advances of technology have reduced friction and uncertainty in certain areas of warfare. The Global Positioning System allows individual soldiers and forces to maneuver and know locations more accurately regardless of weather and terrain. Networked systems allow commanders to pass information faster vertically and horizontally and to share the same battlefield visualization. However, as new technology reduces friction and uncertainty in some ways, friction and uncertainty reemerge in others. While it is vitally important to take all possible measures to reduce uncertainty and friction, it is equally essential to recognize those factors that preserve uncertainty as a basic feature of war.

However, despite all the technological advances in warfare and the continuous debate on the extent to which there has been a revolution in military affairs, the nature of man has not changed. Regardless of the vast technological advances that warfare will undergo, its conduct always will be in the hands of human beings. This means that individual actions, human imperfections, performance thresholds and varying personalities will still influence and determine a conflict's outcome. Personal leadership skills will remain essential for the officer of the 21st century. Leaders must think strategically, impart organizational goals, foster group cohesion, enforce discipline, and make pragmatic decisions in stressful situations. There is no substitute for hands on guidance when training, motivating, and directing people

Battle Command

Much of battle command is inherently intellectual because people must transform data into information, then knowledge—and they must do it quickly. Mental acuity and the intellectual component of battle command will become critical as our future Army increasingly depends on the benefits of knowledge.

- Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

Battle command is the commander's ability to think conceptually, analytically, and critically in an uncertain environment to visualize an end state and articulate this vision to his staff and subordinate leaders. The leaders must learn not only how to act differently but how to think differently in the anticipated environment of the 21st century. Battle command incorporates two vital components -- the ability to decide and the ability to lead. Both demand skill, wisdom, experience, and courage. Battle command applies the leadership element of combat power. It is principally an art that employs skills developed by professional study, constant practice, and considered judgment. Commanders, assisted by the staff, visualize the operation, describe it in terms of intent and guidance, and direct the actions of subordinates within their intent. Future leaders need the following cognitive skills: the ability to think strategically, conceptually, analytically, and to think clearly about complicated issues and to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, identifies visualization and decisionmaking as key qualities of battle command to make a decision. To visualize a military operation from beginning to end, a commander relies on mental skills to translate raw information into relevant information. When planning operations or facing uncertainty, visualization requires the commander to make successful decisions based on his training, experience, competence, intuition, and imagination. Commander's continuous ability to execute the "visualize, describe, direct" process binds battle command qualities. Battle command is a dynamic and iterative process.

TENETS OF BATTLE COMMAND

A tenet is a basic truth held by an organization. A commander's success on and off the battlefield depends on his ability to operate in accordance with nine basic tenets.




Figure 1. Tenets of Battle Command

Art of Battle Command. Command is the art of war within the domain of the commander as given in Figure 2.




Figure 2. The Art of Battle Command

Leadership Traits

Master the mechanics and techniques; understand the art and profession; and be smart enough to know when to deviate from it

- General Anthony Zinni

Napoleon developed a list of 115 qualities of leadership and the common belief is he stopped before completing the list. U.S. Army's doctrinal leadership manual, FM 22-100, Army Leadership, has a cumulative list of forty-one competencies. There is huge amount of literature available on military leadership. Almost every military leader while writing has given their list of leadership traits for a successful leader.

The three critical pillars of leadership have always rested on the following : -

- What a leader must be: the values that form character (e.g., loyalty, duty, respect) as well as the mental, physical, and emotional attributes needed to support these values.
- What a leader must know: areas of knowledge ranging from very general (e.g., interpersonal, conceptual) to very specific areas of expertise and skill over a range of disciplines.
- What a leader must do: the kinds of actions leaders must take to make their organizations accomplish their tasks and function effectively (i.e., influencing, operating, and improving the units and systems under their control).

Leaders not aligned with these fundamental pillars of leadership will fail, notwithstanding their fine technical or operational skills, because their subordinates will not follow them. Beyond this foundation, challenges posed by the new operational

environment call for somewhat more emphasis on certain kinds of leadership skills and background.

Something New: Adapting to the Contemporary Operating Environment.

To meet the challenges posed by the new operational environment the skills and background that might better enable leaders to meet those challenges are :-

- ✓ Specific operational skills.
- ✓ Intellectual and cognitive abilities.
- ✓ Breadth of knowledge and perspective.

Specific Operational Skills. Analysis of recent and ongoing operations suggested several skill areas that now require more emphasis because they have become more important, more complex, or required at lower echelons of leadership. These skills include :-

- Facility in joint and combined arms operations.
- Dealing with civilian populations.
- Force protection.
- Operations in urban or restricted terrain.
- Understanding the enemy situation.
- Using technology for situational awareness.
- Integrating joint forces.
- Interacting with media.

Intellectual and Cognitive Abilities. The contemporary environment places a heightened premium on making decisions quickly, in unfamiliar situations amid greater ambiguity and uncertainty than leaders faced in the not so distant past. In such circumstances, leaders have to reduce the time consuming decision making processes taught in training institutes, instead they rely on less formal “recognitional” decision making, based on models from their experience. Research on actual decision processes has found that recognitional decision making is used successfully in many high stress environments, but it requires several other competencies that support it. They are :-

- Pattern recognition.
- Ability to gain situational understanding.
- Facility with mental simulation.
- Critical thinking.
- Adaptability.

Breadth of Knowledge and Perspective. While intellectual abilities are essential, they are not sufficient for effective decision making. Leaders also need a broad base of experience and background knowledge to inform their decisions, particularly in fluid and unfamiliar environments. This base includes both a tactical or operational component and a broader intellectual component.

Skills or Competencies for CI Ops or Proxy War. We must take drastic non doctrinal approaches to the professional development of our officer corps. “We must teach these leaders how to think and not what to think!” The recommended skill sets or competencies required for our officers to sustain operations in the CI Ops or Proxy War arena are given below. Many of the subtasks identified below apply to multiple tasks.

- **Cross Cultural Awareness / Language Training**
 - ✓ Local / Tribal and Ethnic Relationships.
 - ✓ Political Sensitivities.
 - ✓ Relationship Building / Source Development.
 - ✓ Negotiations.
- **Civil Military Operations**
 - ✓ Cultural Awareness.
 - ✓ Civic Actions.
 - ✓ Governance.
 - ✓ Relationship Building.
 - ✓ Contracting.
- **Intelligence Operations**
 - ✓ Link Analysis / Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
 - ✓ Low Level Source Operations.
 - ✓ Situational Awareness / Reconnaissance Operations.
 - ✓ Interrogation Operations.
- **Information / Psychological Operations**
 - ✓ Ability to Exploit Friendly Success.
 - ✓ Marginalize Friendly Failures.
 - ✓ Capitalize on Enemy Mistakes.
 - ✓ Marginalize Enemy Successes.

Recently US Army has finalised their concept for the pentathlete. A pentathlete at the brigade and below level possesses five key skills: a competent full spectrum warfighter; a creative thinker; a skilled leader in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy; a general awareness of cultures with a focus on a particular area of the world and a builder of leaders and teams. This pentathlete also possesses five key attributes: decisive, with integrity and character; rapid, informed decision maker

amidst uncertainty and confusion; empathetic; dedicated to life-long learning and an effective communicator (see Figure 3.)

Growing Army Leaders in the 21st Century "The Pentathlete"




Figure 3. The Pentathlete

Leader, Manager and Peace Time Soldiering

To every person, there comes in their lifetime that special moment when they are tapped on the shoulder and offered that chance to do a very special thing, unique to them and fitted to their talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds them unprepared and unqualified for the work that would be their finest hour.

-- Winston Churchill

There can be no better explanation than what has been given out by British Field Marshall Lord Slim on Leadership and Management :

There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural, and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product with neither so romantic, nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision—its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetables, and routine—its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential.

Leadership and the development of effective leaders are neither easy nor well understood. Growing or developing excellent leaders is not the same thing as producing excellent managers and it does not occur in the same way. Managers and leaders produce certain outcomes that are essential to their times and their circumstances. Good managers produce outcomes that exemplify the very best of

bureaucracy— predictability, order, efficiency, and consistency. Managers achieve such consistency through occupational core competencies and expertise in the functions of planning, budgeting, organizing staffing, controlling, and problem solving. It has long been recognized that a peacetime army differs in many ways from that of an army at war. In a study carried out on officers of equal caliber, matched on intelligence and other measures of effectiveness but differing in fundamental personality style the following styles were identified :-

<u>Type A</u>	<u>Type B</u>
Adventuresome	Dependable
Imaginative	Conscientious
Innovative	Detail Oriented
Daring	Punctual
Decisive	Selfless

The table above lists the positive features of each style. Their limitations are that they possess to a lesser degree the features listed for the other style.

The variables at play in the peacetime Army tend to attract and maintain cluster B individuals while repelling and punishing cluster A personnel. Cluster B personality style is motivated mainly to harm avoidance. They thrive in garrison, are drawn to the security of the military system, the guaranteed employment and often by a sense of duty or obligation. A military composed of largely cluster B individuals offers fewer disciplinary problems and will score higher on most measures of garrison function. They often have great difficulty with two things; taking risks and making decisions. Sometimes a decision can be reduced to following a rule or a formula, which they will do quite well. However, the ambiguity and fog of war make such rules hard to follow.

Officers from cluster A are less disabled by anxiety and is motivated mainly by mastery and goal attainment. The personality attributes that make for a war hero are primarily from cluster A. These people do not function as well in garrison. Such individuals thrive on challenge and require constant stimulation. Cluster A individuals are drawn by the potential for excitement and adventure.

The tension between wartime and peacetime personalities is unavoidable. Cluster A sees potential for great victory on the battlefield, the cluster Bs are preoccupied with thoughts of avoiding great defeat. However, cluster A individuals are not without their flaws. They tend to demand immediate gratification and be less reliable for the completion of mundane tasks than their cluster B counterparts. The point is how do we identify, preserve and nurture those leaders who would be invaluable in combat situations but a little bit of misfit in peace time zero error situations?

Indian Situation. Sir B H Liddelhart once said, “we learn from history that we don’t learn from history.” If we don’t take lessons from our past mistakes, history is destined to repeat itself. Indian Army has fought four major wars in 1948, 62, 65 and 71. We have fought a limited war in Kargil. We are fighting Counterinsurgency Operations (CI Ops) in different parts of our country for the last 50 years. There is no reason why if we have to fight we will not be able to fight well. We have to do critical introspection as to why while there is no dearth of brilliant combat leadership in

tactical or junior officers level, but at higher operational and strategic level we find extremely conservative and defensive leadership. Very little boldness, tactical brilliance, innovation, ingenuity, risk taking and maneuver warfare capabilities are evident at higher level. Of course there is the glorious exception of Lt Gen Sagat Singh who as GOC, 4 Corps in 71 operations showed audacity, unconventional approach, aggressive spirit, creative maneuver, initiative and genius as an operational level commander with all its sparkling hues. In the annals of military history crossing of Meghna river by an air bridge with 12 helicopters with the initiative of that great air warrior Gp Capt Chandan Singh is part of the folklore. Post World War II, there is not many example of such brilliant operational maneuver. Surely it is the world's finest example of operational art in the 20th century. However this tremendous feat was never played up or advertised a la McArthur et al. One can only think of Israeli Corps Commander Sharon's bold initiative at Deversoir in Yom Kippur War in 1973 as an example of similar magnitude. It is interesting to note that Sagat Singh showed his mettle as battle commander as 50 Para Brigade Commander in Hyderabad, GOC 17 Mountain Division in 1967 in the face off with China in Nathula and CI Ops in Nagaland Mizoram before the grand finale.

This brings out the point that there are not many examples like this. History of Indian Army is full of rigid attritional warfare. We have to ask, for example, why after Lt Col Hayde's (3 JAT) brilliant foray across the Ichhogil canal in the 1965 war in the Amritsar- Wagah sector could not be exploited by senior commanders. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the then Western Army Commander had to sack most of his brigade commanders in 65 operations. Has the situation changed in selecting our senior leadership, what are we doing about our marked anti intellectualism? We should carry out a detailed study and take remedial action.

Fourth Generation Warfare(4GW)

"I don't need someone who's only good at the killing and breaking, I need somebody that has the breadth of education experience and intellect to take on all the rest of these missions that he or she is going to be saddled with when the shooting stops or when it subsides to some level. They're the ones that are going to count on the ground out there, more than anything else. And I think that's the issue in any discussion as to what happens to our military from here on out."

[Gen Anthony Zinni, Address at the Marine Corps Association and Naval Institute: Forum 2003]

Generations of War. First Generation war was fought with line and column tactics. It lasted around the time of the American Civil War. Its importance for us today is that the First Generation battlefield was usually a battlefield of order, and the battlefield of order created a culture of order in state militaries. Second Generation war was developed by the French Army during and after World War I. It dealt with the increasing disorder of the battlefield by attempting to impose order on it. Second Generation war, also sometimes called firepower/attrition warfare, relied on centrally controlled indirect artillery fire, carefully synchronized with infantry, cavalry and aviation, to destroy the enemy by killing his soldiers and blowing up his equipment. Third Generation war, also called maneuver warfare, was developed by the German Army during World War II. Third Generation war dealt with the disorderly battlefield not

by trying to impose order on it but by adapting to disorder and taking advantage of it. Third Generation war relied less on firepower than on speed and tempo.

Fourth Generation Warfare has changed everything. It pits nations against non-national organizations and networks -- including oppressed ethnic groups, mafias, narco-traffickers and extremist quasi-religious cults. 4GW is the chosen weapon of the weak, the downtrodden, the criminal and the fanatic. Its evolutionary roots may lie in guerrilla warfare, the Leninist theory of insurrection and old fashioned terrorism, but it is rendered more pervasive by the technologies that the age of computers and mass communication has spawned. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Tactically, fourth generation war will be fought in a complex arena of low-intensity conflict, include tactics/techniques from earlier generations, be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks, be fought worldwide through these networks and involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors.

Three Levels of War. The three classical levels of war -- strategic, operational and tactical -- still exist in Fourth Generation war. But all three are affected and to some extent changed by the Fourth Generation. One important change is that while in the first three generations, strategy was the province of Generals, the Fourth Generation gives us the "strategic corporal." Especially when video cameras are rolling, a single soldier may take an action that has strategic effect.

Leadership Imperatives

As the Army transforms to meet emerging security challenges, and we ponder new weaponry, formations, doctrine, and training, it is imperative we also examine our approach to educating our officers. Proficiency in 4GW requires leaders to be able to operate comfortably in a decentralized organizational structure, lead in the absence of SOPs or regulations, understand and thrive in a chaotic environment. They also need to not only process a vast quantity of information rapidly but discriminate between what information is relevant and what is not; then form logical decisions. There are several new sciences that would form the foundation for the reform of our current officer education system. Complexity, Chaos Theory, Network Science and Information Technology should be an integral part of the core curriculum.

The American military learned in Afghanistan and Iraq that the center of gravity of this new style of war rests with the ability to control and influence the attitudes of indigenous peoples. Thus the art and science of killing must be refined such that when necessary it is done with great discretion, precision and speed. Restraint, patience and a willingness to accept less than complete destruction of an enemy force must become essential ingredients of the fighting doctrine. One significant source of complexity is the number and nature of roles that junior officers must fill in counterinsurgency and nation-building operations. When examining the roles required of junior officers in OIF, the question is not which role, but how many? One officer commented, "You are not just trying to learn one job, you are trying to learn several dozen jobs. Everything from being a politician to being a war commander. That is just an incredible amount of information for someone to carry around in their head."

Lieutenants and captains have conducted missions for which they never trained, executed operations that have outpaced Army doctrine, shifted constantly from counterinsurgency to patience demanding nation-building and received very little detailed guidance or supervision in the process. The result of this experience is a cohort of junior officers that is learning to be adaptable, creative, innovative, and confident in their abilities to handle just about any task thrown at them.

Today's junior officers are not afraid to lead in ambiguous conditions. They can execute a mission with minimal guidance. They are an incredibly valuable resource. The challenge for the Army is to encourage and leverage this priceless potential.

As former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Major General (Retd) Robert Scales pronounced during a recent testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee, "So far we have spent billions to gain a few additional meters of precision, knots of speed or bits of bandwidth. Some of that money might be better spent in improving how well our military thinks and studies war in an effort to create a parallel transformational universe based on cognition and cultural awareness. Today's junior leaders require a robust ability to understand and effectively influence individual and group dynamics across a wide spectrum of cultures. To arm junior officers and provide them the tools needed to succeed as platoon leaders and company commanders as well as negotiators and village mayors, Army training and education must provide them an advanced understanding of human dynamics. One way to fill this new requirement is to establish a voluntary graduate level education program, possibly a partnership program with local universities, which provides young officers the opportunity to study these critical skills while simultaneously acquiring the necessary military skills they receive at training institutes. War is a thinking man's game and only those who take the time to study war are likely to fight it competently. Soldiers need time for reflection, time to learn, teach, research and write. In this new age of warfare we must do more to prepare soldiers to think as well as act."

Strategic Leadership

Military organizations that remain totally enmeshed in the day-to-day tasks of running their administrative business, that ignore history and serious study, and that allow themselves to believe their enemy will possess no asymmetric approaches are, frankly, headed for defeat.

Dr. Williamson Murray, "Culture Does Matter."

The Army's Officer Education System does not produce the leader competency of intellectual sophistication necessary to operate at the strategic level. Many officers never progress or develop their intellect beyond basic undergraduate education requirements, primarily because there is no policy or formal mandate imposed by the Army. The officer does not develop the intellectual sophistication to make the transition from tactical / operational leader to strategic leader. A huge paradigm shift is required if we expect conventional forces to operate effectively within an irregular warfare environment. Historically, a crucial element of success in this type of environment is the ability of leaders and forces to think unconventionally while operating in a decentralized manner away from traditional command and control headquarters. Tactical competence may be sufficient for success at the battalion or

even brigade level, but those same officers have to perform equally well as division and corps level staff officers where operational and strategic level thinking is required.

In its Strategic Leadership Primer, the US Army War College provides a list of strategic leader competencies using the “Be, Know, Do” typology. The list is extremely comprehensive and appears to capture every possible aspect of leadership. They are :-

BE (Disposition—Values, Attributes)

- The Values Champion—the standard bearer beyond reproach.
- Master of the Strategic Art—ends, ways, means.
- Quintessential Student of History.
- Comfortable with Complexity.
- High Personal Stamina—physical, mental, stress management.
- Skilled Diplomat.
- Possesses Intellectual Sophistication— alternative frames of reference, pattern recognition, and able to see 2d, 3rd, and 4th-order effects.

KNOW (Disposition—Skills) **Conceptual**

- Envisioning-anticipating the future, proactive thinking—practices critical, creative, reflective thinking.
- Frame of Reference Development— including systems understanding, scanning, pattern recognition.
- Problem Management—competing issues, no right answers, ability to recognize and ignore irrelevant issues.
- Critical Self-Examination.
- Critical, Reflective Thought.
- Effective within Environment of Complexity.
- Skillful Formulation of Ends, Ways, Means.

Interpersonal

- Communication—to a much broader audience; negotiations, consensus-building across a variety of stakeholders; systems knowledge; sophisticated persuasion skills.

- Inspire Others to Act.
- Organizational Representation—to internal and external audiences/stakeholders.
- Skillful Coordination of Ends, Ways, Means.
- Master of Command and Peer Leadership.

Technical

- Systems Understanding—political, economic, cultural, logistical, force management, and joint/combined interrelationships, etc.
- Recognize and Understand Interdependencies—systems, decisions, organizations.
- Information-age Technological Awareness—next generation awareness, sophisticated time/space selection.
- Skillful Application of Ends, Ways, Means.

DO (Action—influencing, Operating, and Improving)

- Provide for the Future—visioning (long term focus, time span, perspective).
- Initiator of Policy and Directive.
- Shape the Culture—Values-based organization, leverage diversity, understanding and accepting differences, multiple perspectives.
- Teach and Mentor the Strategic Art.
- Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency Relationships.
- Manage National-Level Relationships.
- Represent the Organization.
- Leverage Technology.
- Lead and Manage Change—creating and building “learning organizations”.
- Build Teams and Consensus at Strategic Level (can’t dictate action at this level)— co-opting, coalition building, negotiating, etc.
- Practice the Strategic Art—allocate resources, develop and execute strategic plans derived from the interagency process.

Training, Education and Learning Organisation

Preparing for war is an expensive and burdensome business- yet there is one important part of it that costs little—**Study.**

Field Marshal Sir Bill Slim

On the traditional battlefield, training prepares a soldier to deal with expected situations. Education prepares a soldier to deal with uncertainty. On the asymmetric battlefield soldiers know that they will have to be capable of performing specific tasks and following their orders in order to survive. However, they will also be expected to demonstrate resourcefulness, initiative, creativity, and inventiveness demanded by a battlefield on which confronting the unexpected and new is considered to be routine. Training for the asymmetric battlefield must develop these skills as well as those associated with traditional tactical tasks. Conventional wisdom suggests that we “train for the known and educate for the uncertain.” This division is no longer adequate. We must train and educate within an uncertain environment to prepare a force to adapt.

The current shortfalls lie in the means available for leaders at all levels to gain access to knowledge. While the current method of education and leadership development through the traditional means of classroom instruction clearly provides merit and warrants continuation, the Army needs to enhance, support, and reward its ability to provide on line education.

The Army's leader development system contains three pillars: institutional , operational and self-development. In our army there is no facility created for self development. We must create knowledge centers configured to support professional education of leaders both at home stations and with deployed forces as one of the major means of leader development. ARTRAC must take responsibility for distance education. The huge infrastructure of IT already in place should be optimally used for this. Efforts have been made strictly with individual initiative in the line of US Army's Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and an excellent knowledge portal Eastern Command Knowledge Online is available in Eastern Command's website in Army's intranet for the last two years. Anybody having Army Intranet connection can access it. All the brigade headquarters of Eastern Command including those in remote locations are already connected in Army Intranet and use this portal. Most of these places do not even have internet connectivity. Indian Army's traditional training institutions are too slow to react. They still, in this age, believe in hoarding knowledge. All the major training institutes have their websites in Army Intranet or Internet. All the dissertations of the best and the brightest of the army undergoing DSSC / Army War College / College of Defence Management / National Defence College are submitted in soft copy form. It takes hardly any effort to upload these in the respective websites. Same is applicable for the respective Journals. Classified papers, which are very few, need not be put. One can see and download all the dissertations of student officers of US Army / Navy / Air Force / National War Colleges in Eastern Command Knowledge Online. The finance models of the journals will in no way be adversely affected. These two actions must be done immediately. Is somebody listening?

In future wars, C4I platforms should be considered for real-time operational knowledge transfer, including lessons learned during fighting. Indeed a hierarchy

needs to study to learn, whilst a terrorist organization is an intuitive 'learning organization'. The need to learn from the battlefield, to creatively innovate operational knowledge, to shorten learning cycles and speed up the dissemination of lessons learned – are imperative in contemporary warfare. We must learn, preserve and enhance the real time learning mechanisms and the methodology of operational knowledge management developed before and during this war, before the next conflict occurs. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) has successfully implemented this during the recent Lebanon conflict with Hizbollahs.

Conclusion

War is a thinking man's game and only those who take the time to study war are likely to fight it competently. Soldiers need time for reflection, time to learn, teach, research and write. In this new age of warfare we must do more to prepare soldiers to think as well as act.

- Major General Robert Scales

In future conventional warfare with nuclear backdrop would be far more lethal with increased battlefield mobility, fluidity and uncertainty. We are already fighting CI Ops and proxy war. Leaders will be required to move seamlessly between all levels of war and will acquire the ability to shift without interruption or pause from fighting to humanitarian tasks and back again as the exigencies of war demand. The demands of future conflict will continue to place great responsibility on future Army leaders at all levels, requiring mature judgment, even while they are still gaining experience. Leadership abilities should include creativity, adaptability, innovation, and life-long learning so that leaders can better adapt to the volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) environment that our Army faces today and tomorrow. Central to these leader abilities is the development of mentally agile leaders. Leaders must be able to think on their feet, make rapid and accurate decisions, take the initiative, be more aware of their capabilities and adapt instantly to rapidly changing even chaotic situations using divergent thinking to process enormous amounts of information to reach an acceptable solution that will deal effectively with the circumstances.

We should continue to acquire and develop leaders with the character traits and values that have always been the underpinning of effective leadership. Beyond that essential base of leadership, considerably more needs to be done to prepare leaders to meet the challenges of the contemporary environment and to continually learn and adapt to new circumstances

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