

# **JOINT SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE**

“Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d’état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a “many small wars” scenario is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call “special operations” or “special forces” — the niche warriors of tomorrow.”

Alvin and Heidi Toffler

War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

## **INTRODUCTION**

Special operations (SO) are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or discreet capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Special Operation Forces (SOF) are more than just what they do. SOF are comprised of specially selected, trained, and organized special operations soldiers, sailors, and airmen from the Armed Services. Their training, education, maturity, initiative, and experience set them apart from all others. SOF personnel form the core of our nation’s ability to combat terrorism and conduct unconventional warfare. Despite their demonstrated capability and successes SOF face significant challenges in the years ahead. SOF must develop capabilities to defend the country from terrorism and other threats wherever they occur, as well as prepare to meet the uncertain challenges of the future. Transforming the force from one designed to combat specific threats to one with capabilities that can address a broad range of contingencies will not be easy, but it must be done. They must be prepared to wage war “everywhere, all the time.”

In India we have different types of Special Forces (SF) each having their own tasks, organization, equipment, training and command and control arrangements. Even the controlling ministries are different in some cases. We are using Special Forces more and more frequently. Situations like Maldives, hijacking of Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar, Akshardam temple, attack on parliament, eliminating terrorist camps in Pakistan/Bangladesh/Myanmar with or without permission of respective countries are definite probabilities. Recent terrorists actions by Chechen rebels in Moscow and Beslan are pointers to things we should anticipate and prepare for. The army has Para Commandos and Special Forces battalions and the Parachute Regiment units, the navy has Marine Naval Commandos (MARCOS). The National Security Guards, a federal contingency force not to be clubbed with CPOs or PMFs is directly under Home Ministry and Special Frontier Force and VIKAS units under cabinet secretariate. All these forces have overlapping responsibilities, different ethos, fierce pride in their outfits, dissimilar training and are controlled by different agencies. There is an imperative need to evolve a philosophy for tasking, equipping, and training of Joint Special Forces in the interest of optimal utilization and enhancement of operational efficiency as all types of war, be it conventional or unconventional , has to be fought jointly.

## **HISTORY**

“When the hour of crisis comes, remember the forty  
selected men can shake the world”

- Yasotay

Mongolian Warlord

One of the earliest recorded examples of a conventional army beset by difficulties imposed by bands of special purpose forces was during Alexander the Great's march through Afghanistan on his way to India. Ancestors of today's Mujahideen harried his rear from horseback, while others attacked him from the heights. Alexander countered by employing many of the same counter SF principles that hold true today—the employment of specially skilled, mobile light infantrymen. Alexander recruited and trained volunteer troops with mountain climbing experience who scaled the mountain peaks at night to surprise and defeat those irregular forces. Further, Alexander recruited the defeated irregulars and added them to his army, frequently to be used against the next irregulars encountered.

The need for commandos was seen early in World War II, first by the German and British. The United States formed six battalions of U S Army Rangers as well as additional battalions of Marine Raids, Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) and such units as Merrill's Marauders in the Far East. The Germans formed their Brandenburg Regiment and the British formed several different commando units: the Special Air Services (SAS), Special Boat Squadron (SBS), Long Desert Petrol, and so on.

Wingate's Chindits operations in Burma campaign is part of the folklore. However everybody was not convinced about the pay off of such operations. In Defeat into Victory, Field Marshall Sir William J. Slim concluded that most special units are

wasteful and have more disadvantages than advantages. He believed there was one type of special unit that should become an essential component of any modern army. This special unit is one that operates deep behind enemy lines, whose purpose is to disrupt the enemy, to collect information, to work with indigenous people, to sabotage enemy installations, to assassinate enemy commanders. The troops who made up this unit would require many qualities and skills not expected in the ordinary soldier and would use many methods beyond his capacity. Field Marshal Slim felt they could achieve strategic results if handled with imaginative ruthlessness.

### **Indian Scenario.**

India first formed a commando force, composed largely of Tibetan exiles, after getting the worst of it in a 1962 border war with China. As relations improved with China over the years, the "Special Frontier Force"(SFF) switched from its original mission of stirring up guerilla operations inside China, to counter-terrorism. Size (about 10,000 troops) and organization (six battalions, each of six 123 man companies plus a headquarters) of the units has not changed much in 40 years. Training is still rigorous, but there are fewer Tibetans in the unit now. There is also a para –commando battalion, used as a quick reaction force. A small (about a hundred men) National Security Guards force is organized and trained to deal with hostage situations. A very competent outfit. There are 1200 Marine Commandos. [ Courtesy [www.strategyPage.com](http://www.strategyPage.com) ]

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, an *ad hoc* commando unit comprised of volunteers from various infantry regiments was organized by Lieutenant Colonel Megh Singh of the Brigade of the Guards. The unit was nicknamed, Meghdoot Force, and performed well in combat. Thus in June 1966, the Government authorised the Parachute Regiment to form a permanent commando unit. Known as the 9th Battalion, it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Megh Singh and he used members from the Meghdoot Force as its backbone. In June 1967 elements of the 9th Battalion, were taken to form a second commando unit, designated as 10th Battalion, at Gwalior. In 1969, these battalions were renamed as the 9 and 10 Para Commando battalions.

## **OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

"It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by the dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the

great enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends himself in a worthy course; who at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory or defeat.”

---Theodore Roosevelt (Paris Sorbonne, 1910)

Special Operations are defined as operations conducted by specially trained, equipped and organised forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be undertaken independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. In this regard it is worth pointing out that special operations, usually carried out by specially formed units or teams are tactical military operations, very often with the aim of achieving a disproportionate strategic outcome of a campaign.

**Enduring Truths**. Four truths remain the cornerstone shaping the development of special operations capabilities:-

- Humans are more important than hardware. The special operations soldier, sailor, or airman is the most critical component of any special operations capability.
- Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.
- SOF cannot be mass-produced. There is no easy formula for creating special operations personnel. Experience - a key element of special operations capability - can only be produced over time.
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. Time is perhaps the most critical element involved in the creation of competent SOF: time to select, assess, train and educate personnel; and time to gain the experience necessary to perform operations with a reasonable assurance of success. Since competent forces cannot be created instantly, decision-makers must plan ahead to create forces that are sufficient in size, capability and speed of response.

**Operational Mission Criteria**. The employment of SOF in support of the joint force campaign or operation plan is facilitated by five basic criteria. These criteria provide guidelines for both conventional and SOF commanders and planners to use when considering the employment of SOF. The criterias are :-

- ✓ Is this an appropriate SOF mission?
- ✓ Does the mission support the overall joint campaign or operation plan?
- ✓ Is the mission operationally feasible?
- ✓ Are required resources available to execute the mission?
- ✓ Does the expected outcome of the mission justify the risk?

**Characteristics of Special Operations.** The various characteristics of Special Operation are:-

- Special Operations normally require operation-level planning and detailed intelligence.
- Knowledge of the culture(s) and languages of the geographical area in which the mission is to be conducted.
- Rigorous training and rehearsals of the mission are integral to the success of the mission.
- They are often conducted at great distances from the supporting operational bases.
- They may employ sophisticated communications systems.
- They frequently require discriminate and precise use of force. This often requires development, acquisition, and employment of equipment not standard for other forces.
- They employ sophisticated means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and successfully return from hostile denied, or politically sensitive areas.

**SOF Capabilities.** SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that provide a force commander with an extremely flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios. They can :-

- ❖ Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations.
- ❖ Gain access to hostile or denied areas.
- ❖ Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support.
- ❖ Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
- ❖ Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.
- ❖ Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.
- ❖ Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.
- ❖ Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.
- ❖ Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.
- ❖ Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.

**SOF Limitations.** Improper employment of SOF could result in the depletion of forces. SOF require a long lead-time to be effectively fielded. SOF cannot be quickly replaced/reconstituted nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded.

Improper employment of own resources in purely conventional roles or on inappropriate/inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of depleting these resources rapidly. SOF should normally be employed against targets with strategic or operational relevance. Such employment is congruent with the use of limited SOF resources.

SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. In most cases SOF are neither trained nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations, and therefore should not be substituted for conventional units that are able to effectively execute that mission. SOF logistic support is austere. A large number of SOF units generally cannot maintain themselves for extended periods of time without significant support from a conventional support structure.

Furthermore, in the cases where SF's have been used as counter-terrorist forces, a 'shoot-to-kill' policy has often been used (the SAS in Northern Ireland is a good example of this). In addition to potentially criminalise a soldier, that is a policy that could also undermine government's claim as upholder of law and order, something that in the long run can affect society adversely. These two contrasting positions are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is important to bear this dichotomy in mind when looking at the role of SF.

### **SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRINCIPAL MISSIONS**

First break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of the military.....second, educate the best of the military; spread a recognition and an understanding what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that you do it. Last integrate your effects into the full spectrum of our military capacity.

- Admiral William J Crowe, Jr  
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA

Nine activities have been designated as Special Operations Principal Missions. These are: Direct Action (DA), Combating Terrorism (CBT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO), and Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP). SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish these nine tasks. In our context Unconventional Warfare and Combating Terrorism takes overriding importance for SOF.

**Counter-Terrorism** . The newest, and perhaps most dramatic, area of SF activity is counter-terrorism. It is also one of the most controversial. Three basic tasks are involved here; surveillance [of terrorists], interdiction and arrests (which also could include killings) and rescuing of hostages. SOF's today are among the most engaged in operations worldwide.

## **Unconventional Warfare (UW)**

Unconventional Warfare (UW) was the mission for which Special Forces was founded. While since that time its employment has been limited and largely surrogate, it remains a large part of the essence of Special Forces, having major and important identity, psychological and training impacts. While other organizations may, at different locations and levels of effort, have roles within the board boundaries of Special Forces' other operational missions, UW remains uniquely Special Forces. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber.

- Robert M. Gates, Remarks at dedication of OSS Memorial.

UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, evasion and escape, and other activities of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. When UW is conducted independently during conflict or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives.

**UW Doctrine.** The Special Forces must address the following in its doctrine for Unconventional Warfare:-

- Intelligence activities must be given maximum importance with an emphasis on HUMINT collection in a Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) environment.
- Employment of subversion and sabotage.
- Support to insurgencies.
- Guerilla Warfare aspects including weaponization technological developments. It will continue to have some relevance for some time to come.

That UW requires a more indirect solution than conventional conflicts is almost universally reflected in all the literature available. Andrew Krepinevich, in discussing guerrilla warfare as it pertains to insurgency, states: "In conventional wars, strategy prescribes the conquest of the enemy's territory, yet this seldom occurs prior to the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle. These rules do not apply, however, against an enemy who refuses to fight for territory. In an insurgency, the way to destroy the insurgent is to attack him at the source of his strength: the population".

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

Special Operations Forces are often tasked by political leaders and monitored at the national level. These operations cross all services and need detailed planning and rapid coordination with other commands, services, and governments agencies. Because of the nature of the missions, joint ground, air, and maritime assets must communicate quickly and efficiently. Therefore, a common, responsive command and control network is needed that interconnects the various commands, and government agencies. In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:-

- Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
- Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.
- Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.
- Integrate SOF in the planning process.
- Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

Given the sensitivity and significance of their mission, Special Operations Forces chains of command are understandably abbreviated. SOF needs a clear and unambiguous Command & Control (C2) structure. Unnecessary layering of headquarters decreases responsiveness and compromises security. The mission, duration and scope of operations, security consideration, signals capabilities and the desired degree of control over special operations determine SOF command relationship. SOF commanders must be familiar with dealing with joint organizations and other services as well as our organization of national security like Cabinet Committee of Security, National Crisis Management Committee and Ministry of Home Affairs.

SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan (war or MOOTW). Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive Command and Control (C2) by an appropriate SOF C2 element. The limited window of opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions, requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or operation. Liaison between all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever assigned, is vital for effective employment of SOF as well as the prevention of fratricide.

In recent times the international terrorists, guerrillas insurgents, drug smuggling cartels, ethnic factions as well as racial and tribal gangs – are all organized like networks. Although their leadership may be hierarchical. These organizations are innovative, flexible, exhibit shared goal, focus on core competencies and are difficult to counter. Perhaps the reason that military institutions are having difficulty in Low Intensity Conflicts is because they are not meant to be fought by institutions. The lesson is – institution can be defeated by networks. It may take networks to counter networks. One of the reasons why Special Forces are remarkably successful in operations in LICO is that their organization has eliminated numbers of layers and is in the lines of networked organization.

## **Special Operation Force Structure**

A model of the Special Forces organization of the US Armed Forces may be looked at. United States special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established as a unified combatant command and commanded by a four star General. All SOF of the Army, Navy and air force based in the United States are placed under him. The organizational tree of USSOCOM is given at Appendix "A".

Each of the theater Unified geographical commands have established a separate Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its theater specific operation requirement. Theater SOC normally exercises operational control of SOF within each geographic commander in chief's area of responsibility.

## **Indian Context**

"Our nation needs SFs, which are not merely better infantry or naval or air units, but are structured comprehensively for as full spectrum capability, trained and ready for victory, or, in other words – a total force of quality officers and soldiers, Like any other country, India must decide the right type, quantity and quality of the SF it wants, after conducting an in depth study relating to the likely threats to nation, how they are to be tackled, the changing nature of war and conflict, impact of technology, the likely roles for the SF and other operational requirements for them. As the SFs expand, the specialized troops are likely to be confronted by several challenges. They would have to learn to integrate seamlessly with conventional forces, civil authorities and even international agencies." Said Pranab Mukherjee, Defence Minister while inaugurating a seminar on Special Forces organized by Centre for Land Warfare Studies(CLAWS).

Present Special Forces assets and their C2 arrangements are as under :-

- Para SF units under respective commands.
- Para Brigade for out of area contingencies under Army HQ.
- NSG under MHA.
- 4 VIKAS (Special Group) under cabinet secretariat. Provides muscle to RAW.
- Aviation Research Cell and SFF under cabinet secretariat.
- MARCOS under Navy.

Drawbacks of present system are:-

- Organisation not conducive to conduct strategic special operations.
- Compartmentalised functioning.
- No coordination of intelligence & resources at the highest level. Intelligence void.
- Lack of jointmanship.
- Special operations are being conducted at theatre level and are personality based.
- Continued commitment in CI ops.
- Manning & equipment profile of units are different.
- Outdated technology.

- Lack of fast track equipment procurement process.
- Non incorporation of SOF commanders in planning process.
- Non availability of dedicated Special Air Transportation Squadron.

The strength of Special Forces under Army, Navy and NSG are not balanced and there is no unified command except ANC, establishment of a Special Forces Command is not recommended. However a Special Operations Force branch may be raised with Operations branch of CIDS. A suggested joint SOF organization is given at Appendix B.

Since SF operations are planned and cleared at the highest level it would be prudent to place all Joint Operations Forces under CIDS. Though individual characteristics and eliteness specific to each type of forces would not be interfered, however, integration of all the services, intelligence, interaction with MOD or CCS would be easier.

Since all future operations are going to be joint, Special Operation Forces branch of CIDS may be responsible for the following:-

- ❖ Readiness of assigned forces and monitoring the readiness of SOF.
- ❖ Monitoring the professional development of all SOF personnel.
- ❖ Developing joint SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- ❖ Conducting specialized courses of instruction.
- ❖ Training assigned forces.
- ❖ Executing its own program and budget.
- ❖ Conducting research, development, and acquisition of Special Operations peculiar items. Fast track equipment procurement.
- ❖ Formalise command & control setup for all SF assets.
- ❖ Dedicated air assets for special ops.
- ❖ Intelligence to be coordinated and made available at the highest level for spec ops.

**Air Force.** Indian Air Force does not have Special Forces per se, however, it has the most important role in transportation or insertion of Special Forces, Search and Rescue mission, Fire Support, reconnaissance, intelligence and host of other activities. Earmarking of resources, close integration between components of other SOFs and air crews are must before undertaking any Special Missions as time would be of paramount importance. Our inability to block hijacked Indian airlines aircraft at Raja Sansi Airport in Amritsar is an example of how important is the time factor.

### **International Law.**

Among the issues raised by the customary and conventional international law regulating war conduct, the following have been particularly important in wars requiring special operations:-

- Denial of quarter and prisoner of war (POW) status and treatment.
- Torture and mistreatment of POWs, collective punishment, taking of hostages, terrorism, outrages against personal dignity, slavery, pillage, and threats to do these things.
- Denial to internees and detainees of reasonable treatment and due process of law.
- Starvation of civilians as a method of combat.
- Forced movement of civilians.
- Use of chemical-biological weapons.

In any clandestine operations out of the country if the operation fails and SOF personnel are caught more often than not government would deny knowledge of such operations. In such cases the welfares of next of kin of such SOF personnel must be ensured at all costs. The modalities can be worked out.

### **SOF MANDATES FOR THE FUTURE**

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change. Guided by a comprehensive, enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. As the president of AT&T once said, "When the pace of change outside an organization becomes greater than the pace of change inside the organization, the end is near."

SOF must focus on emerging threats that either exceed the capabilities of conventional forces or can be dealt with better by small, highly specialized units. We must carefully assess those threats and, as appropriate, provide an effective solution through strategic planning, resourcing, acquisition and operational support initiatives. As important, we must identify those missions no longer relevant for SOF and recommend shifting these missions to our conventional forces in order to better focus resources on critical special operations activities. SOF must be a full-spectrum, multimission force -- providing a comprehensive set of capabilities to the nation. This means that we must swiftly adapt to diverse and evolving threats from our neighboring countries and prepare for Out of Area Contingencies.

We must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined and interagency environments, yet must transcend these traditional parameters to fuse all of our political, military, economic, intellectual, technical and cultural strengths into a comprehensive approach to future challenges. This will allow SOF to tap into such diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design and commercial research and development.

We must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative and useful solutions to ambiguous problems and provide a coherent set of choices to the supported commander or joint force commander. This means training and

educating people how to think, not just what to think. SOF must examine every advantage our technological genius can supply and selectively exploit those few required for success. We must be quick to capitalize on emerging technologies with the potential for significantly enhancing the human dimension, especially low-observable/masking technologies, smarter weapons, long-range precision capability and information technologies. Merging technology with the human dimension will improve the SOF warrior's survivability, lethality, mobility and ability to access and use all relevant information sources.

We must also recognize that the benefits of technological change cannot be fully realized until they are incorporated into new organizational forms. SOF organizational innovation is as important as innovation in weapon systems. Replacing technology without replacing old structures will not work. Most importantly, we must remember that the purpose of technology is to equip the man, not simply to man the equipment. SOF people are at the heart of all special operations; platforms and equipment merely help them accomplish the mission. The fingers on our future triggers still must be controlled by willing warriors of courage, compassion and judgment -- individuals of character with strong legal, moral and ethical foundation -- organized into dynamic and agile joint SOF teams. As we move into the 21st century, we are evolving to meet future challenges. We have to lead this change by transitioning from a traditional military staff to an Information Age staff that is matrix-shaped around core functions, more flexible and better postured to resource and support global SOF requirements.

## **CONCLUSION**

If you wish for peace, understand war—particularly  
the guerrilla and subversive forms of war.

- Liddell Hart

Special operations forces are particularly suited for many emerging missions which flow from the National Security Strategy. Many of these missions require traditional SOF capabilities, while others, such as counter proliferation, information warfare and psychological warfare are relatively new and are the subject of developing SOF doctrine. In order to be as effective as possible, SOF face two major challenges: they must integrate—with conventional forces and other government agencies yet they must preserve the autonomy necessary to protect and encourage the unconventional approach that is the soul of special operations. This flexibility will facilitate meeting the other major challenges of the future. SOF's language capability, regional and cultural orientation will continue to make them a peacetime force of choice that is mature, discrete, low profile, and effective. Because of its low-cost/high-payback ratio, SOF will continue to be called upon as the nation seeks to promote stability and thwart aggression.

Faced with an increasingly volatile world, and diminishing resources, SOF will provide access and promote stability with an affordable, yet effective, force for implementing national strategies. When national interests are faced with unpredictable threats, SOF will provide flexible and precise, lethal and non lethal


options to the government. SOF will provide core competencies not available anywhere else in the military.

Reorganisation and training of Special Forces units in Indian Army are rightfully drawing lot of attention including media. Recently in an article in Outlook Lieutenant General RK Nanavatty, a former Northern Army Commander had been quoted as saying “Our present Special Forces battalions arguably are the best type of infantry units of the Army. They are robust, motivated and well-led, but despite their title, they are not Special Forces and are not capable of special operations which are distinct from special missions, commando operations and specialised operations”. In the same article Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, a former Vice Chief of Army Staff has been quoted as saying, “Club all our so called Special Forces units – be it the Army, Navy, Air Force, National Security Guards and the Special Group – and we have more manpower than what the Americans have and yet we don’t have a tenth of their capabilities”.


Like the special operations forces of yesteryear, today's special operators face unusual challenges. Our special operations forces must adjust to the nontraditional challenges we face today and, at the same time, help transform our combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape the environment and respond effectively in the face of future challenges.

**UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
(USSOCOM)**

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**RECOMMENDED COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AT THE SERVICES LEVEL**



\* Special Operation Cell at every operational Command HQs incl ANC. Cell to be established in all geographical Commands of Army, Navy and AF.

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