

# Strategy Research Project

## DEVELOPING 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY SENIOR LEADERS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **DEVELOPING 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY SENIOR LEADERS**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The Army needs sound educational programs in order to ensure strategic leaders are developed in the broader, more complex, politico-military 21st century environment. This volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment requires unconstrained thinkers to address unconventional challenges. We need to develop successful leaders to anticipate and adapt to cultural environments of the enemy. The quality of the education, officers and civilians, receive at the senior service colleges are of the highest standards and some suggest higher than most academic institutions across the United States. The educational task at hand is to replicate the challenges of the current complex strategic environment. We need senior leaders who can understand, act, assess, adapt, consolidate, and transition from one challenge to another. One of the strengths is that student's have an opportunity to interact with other students from diverse backgrounds such as other departments in the U.S. government, foreign militaries, and other sister services. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) will examine the individual development of 21<sup>st</sup> Century leaders and propose recommendations to meet the challenges of the future.

## DEVELOPING 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY SENIOR LEADERS

A leader of men must make decisions quickly; be independent; act and stand firm; be a fighter; speak openly, plainly, frankly; make defeats his lessons; co-operate; co-ordinate; use the best of any alliance or allies; walk with active faith courageously toward danger or the unknown; create a staff; know, love and represent the best interests of his followers; be loyal, true, frank, and faithful; reward loyalty; have a high intelligent and worthy purpose and ideal. Do justice; love, mercy; fear no man but fear only God.

—John W. Dodge<sup>1</sup>

Successful senior leaders possess certain character traits, professional knowledge and experience that distinguish them from other leaders. Senior leaders deal in the upper levels of leadership and the outer edges of situations—the gray areas.<sup>2</sup> To be successful, leaders should have the boldness, vision, creativity, and mental agility to make critical decisions based on information received from those upper levels and gathered from gray areas.

The environment in which a strategic leader operates will consist of diverse actors, hybrid threats, unpredictable indigenous partners, global media, and interagency partners.<sup>3</sup> Academic education, self-education and personal experience opportunities provides superior education that broadens senior leaders perspective and prepares them to meet future challenges. The main purpose of this education should be to develop future strategic leaders and critical thinkers. The purpose of this paper is to address the development of 21st Century leaders. The paper will cover leadership, development of senior leaders, selection and placement of senior leaders and specifically, what can be changed in order to develop a more professional senior leader corps.

Leadership begins with setting direction and aligning people, as well as motivating them to success.<sup>4</sup> Based on an extraordinary collaboration between Steve Forbes, chairman, CEO, and editor in chief of Forbes Media, and classics professor John Prevas, *Power Ambition Glory*, the following provides intriguing comparisons between great leaders of the ancient world and contemporary business leaders.<sup>5</sup>

Great leaders not only have vision but know how to build structures to effect it. Cyrus the Great did so in creating an empire based on tolerance and inclusion, an approach highly unusual for his or any age. Jack Welch and John Chambers built their business empires using a similar approach, and like Cyrus, they remain the exceptions rather than the rule.<sup>6</sup>

Great leaders know how to build consensus and motivate by doing what is right rather than what is in their self-interest. Xenophon put personal gains aside to lead his fellow Greeks out of a perilous situation in Persia—something very similar to what Lou Gerstner and Anne Mulcahy did in rescuing IBM and Xerox.<sup>7</sup>

Character matters in leadership. Alexander the Great had exceptional leadership skills that enabled him to conquer the eastern half of the ancient world, but he was ultimately destroyed by his inability to manage his phenomenal success. The corporate world is full of similar examples, such as the now incarcerated Dennis Kozlowski, who, flush with success at the head of his empire, was driven down the highway of self-destruction by an out-of-control ego.<sup>8</sup>

A great leader is one who challenges the conventional wisdom of the day and is able to think out of the box to pull off amazing feats. Hannibal did something no one in ancient world thought possible; he crossed the Alps in winter to challenge Rome for

control of the ancient world. That same innovative way of thinking enabled Serge Brin and Larry Page of Google to challenge and best two formidable competitors, Microsoft and Yahoo!<sup>9</sup>

A leader must have ambition to succeed, and Julius Caesar had plenty of it. He set Rome on the path to empire, but his success made him believe he was a living god and blinded him to the dangers that eventually established his demise. The parallels with corporate leaders and Wall Street master-of-the-universe types are numerous, but none more salient than Hank Greenberg, who built the AIG insurance empire only to be struck down at the height of his success by the corporate daggers of his directors.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, leadership is about keeping a sane modest perspective in the face of success and remaining focused on the fundamentals - the nuts and bolts of making an organization work day in and day out. Augustus saved Rome from dissolution after the assassination of Julius Caesar and ruled it for more than forty years; bringing the empire to the height of its power. What made him successful were personal humility, attention to the mundane details of building and maintaining an infrastructure, and understanding of limits. Augustus set Rome on a course of prosperity and stability that tested for centuries, just as Alfred Sloan, using many of the same approaches, built GM into the leviathan that until recently dominated the automotive business.<sup>11</sup>

Leaders of the ancient world and modern corporate leadership have taught us that leadership has not changed over time. Character is the essential foundation upon which good leadership is built.<sup>12</sup> While most leaders are not born to lead, many attain the same qualities. Most show high intelligence and their academic achievements were in direct relation to their success in their careers. Successful leaders are able to make

decisions quickly and well. Great leaders have sound judgment in decision making and the feel it is as a result of study and preparation. Most crave responsibility.

Gardner<sup>13</sup> defines leadership as “the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers.” He describes the tasks of leaders as envisioning goals, goal setting, and motivating.”<sup>14</sup>

The German Reichswehr’s manual TF 33 *Truppenfuehrung* (Troop Leadership), written in 1933, explained that war subjects the individual to the most severe tests of his spiritual and physical endurance.<sup>15</sup> Hence, military leaders must have judgment, combined with clear vision and foresight. They must have the ability to make decisions independently and then carry them out unwaveringly and positively.<sup>16</sup> Such leaders must be impervious to changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders. The Germans emphasized that an officer is in every sense a leader and a teacher. Despite technology and weaponry, the decisive factor is the value of the individual Soldier; the wider his experience in combat, the greater his importance.<sup>17</sup>

When reviewing leadership literature, the contents are full of long lists that give the reader the indication that the leader must know everything to be successful. These lists are problematic in nature. Leaders’ tenets are the foundation of the leader’s ability to lead in a complex environment. The leaders must be able to formulate, coordinate and apply strategic ends, ways, and means in order to lead the organization in developing and executing a strategy. In general, senior leadership is built on the foundation of

leadership requirements at the lower levels.<sup>18</sup> The development of one's leadership traits and styles start before the individual enters the government or military service.

One of the requirements for success at the strategic level is to think broadly. Such ability, which the Germans aptly call "*operatives denken*", is usually not an innate trait of a leader.<sup>19</sup> History shows numerous examples in which leaders have failed or their unwillingness to think strategically which resulted in failures of their organizations. The Prussian general Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst (1755-1813) observed that "one has to see the whole before seeing its parts. This is really the first rule, and its correctness can be learned from a study of history."<sup>20</sup>

Leadership tenets are behaviorally specific; leadership styles vary significantly at the levels of direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. Moreover, strategic thinking requires a basic level of knowledge which then expands through mental agility, exploration, and experience. This highly developed capability is usually termed genius. Clausewitz claims great commanders need resolution, self confidence, and coup d'oeil. This latter capability refers to commanders' ability to perceive an advantageous situation with a single, quick glance.<sup>21 22</sup>

Carl von Clausewitz went on to state, the higher the military rank, the greater the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by intellect, by insight.<sup>23</sup> This explains why it is so rare in the higher ranks, and why it is all the more admirable when found there.<sup>24</sup>

The *Strategic Leadership Primer* points out; the current pace of change is an addition to the complexity of the strategic environment.<sup>25</sup> Strategic leaders must remain constantly aware of the environment and remain engaged in the process of adapting to

the environment.<sup>26</sup> To adapt to the current strategic environment, leaders' rely on their strategic thinking to build consensus and to create teams of diverse players.

While interpersonal skills are important at all levels of leadership, leaders are greatly challenged to use these skills effectively. Their enormous responsibilities and vast authority seem to transcend their ability to personally influence the organization. Not only are their responsibilities and authorities greater and have more impact, but they are also far more complex. Interaction with outside stakeholders such as governmental organizations, outside agencies, and foreign governments add a level of complexity that seems to exceed interpersonal relations. However, the *Strategic Leadership Primer* asserts that “strategic leader interpersonal competencies include the ability to build consensus within an attempt to shape or influence the external environment, and the ability to communicate internally and externally.”<sup>27</sup>

While leadership is easy to explain, strategic leadership is not so easy to practice. It seems pretty obvious that while there are some things you must be born with; there is a lot of what you need that may be learned. Consider these examples of leadership abilities and actions.

Today there is overwhelming evidence of how strong leadership is vital to securing and maintaining leadership. General Petraeus and General McChrystal are renowned for their leadership in prosecuting the “war on terrorism.” Leaders such as Petraeus and McChrystal must be good strategic thinkers and practitioners. Few are both but Petraeus would be considered one.

No matter how great a leader is, he will not succeed if his talent is not sponsored. General Marshall being recognized by General Pershing is a great example of this in

the Great War. Another example is General Casey's sponsorship of General Petraeus in Iraq. In each of these examples "sponsorship" was the result in knowledge, intelligence, and the recognition of talent and trust in the individual's ability to accomplish the task at hand. In the corporate leadership world this myth has surfaced lately.

Senior leadership begins to emerge at the higher levels. Unlike leaders at lower levels, the leader is concerned with both the internal and external context in which the organization functions. They effectively deal with external environments to determine the social, economic, and political impacts upon the organization's mission. Leading becomes much more complex as it demands integration between the internal and external environments. Senior leaders set the direction for the organization and work with legislature and heads of states. Leaders guide organizational change over long periods. Their missions extend from today to 15 years or longer. They focus on the overall needs of the organization as a whole; they integrate the efforts of teams. As Jacques states, "Success requires the ability to think abstractly, to perform a high level of analysis, and to exhibit a masterful understanding of the operating environment."<sup>28</sup> Senior leadership is the greatest step in terms of complexity. Leaders work and coordinate contributions of multiple organizations rely on longer term vision, team-building, and networking skills. They understand their organization holistically and project its future role.

Military history is filled with examples of unsuccessful leaders who did not fully measure up to their leadership positions. Only relatively few commanders have been both brilliant senior thinkers and practitioners.<sup>29</sup> Many excellent thinkers fell short as

practitioners because of defects in character or because they lacked some key personality traits necessary to successfully convert their knowledge of operational art into practice.

The leader doesn't develop these capabilities over night. Although it is true that each officer is responsible for his or her own education and professional development, the institution can contribute to officers' development into senior leaders. For example, one of the difficulties the North had in the initial phase of the American Civil War (1861-1865) was too many officers lacked professional education and training. Only after General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies in March 1864 did that highly unfavorable situation began slowly to improve. Yet shortly before the end of the war he still complained to President Abraham Lincoln of the inadequate professional education of many of his subordinates.<sup>30</sup>

General Ulysses S. Grant's greatest strength lay in the fact that he faced facts as they were, and not as he wished they might be. A visionary leader may dream visions of the future and articulates them with great inspiration, but a strategic leader is good with actions as well as words and he may bring that vision into a common commitment of the institution. General Grant was not originally an abolitionist, and he probably could not originally have defined his views as to State sovereignty; but when the Civil War was on, he saw that the only thing to do was to fight it to a finish and establish by force of arms the constitutional right to put down rebellion.<sup>31</sup> General Dwight Eisenhower admitted in 1946 that he had long thought General Grant was an alcoholic but after going through WWII he had changed his mind, knowing a drunkard could never have waged and won the Civil War. In 1945, Eisenhower wrote to the author of Grant of

Appomattox, William Brooks, commenting on USG's report to the Secretary of War in 1865: That report impressed me mightily...ever since I read that report my respect for Grant has been high, in spite of the many bitter criticisms that I have read both of his military ability and his personal habits. With respect to this last item I am delighted that you have handled it so carefully and logically. It never seemed possible to me (and I have thought about it often during the months since December 1941) that a man who so constantly under the influence of liquor could have pursued a single course so steadfastly, could have accepted frequent failures of subordinates without losing his equilibrium, could have made numbers of close decisions which involved a nice balance between risk and advantage, and could have maintained the respect of such men as Sherman, Sheridan, Meade and, above all, President Lincoln.<sup>32 33</sup>

The Army should consider how to educate and develop senior leaders to deal with the senior level of complexity. In reality, by the time a person achieves a senior position, they should have achieved some understanding of grand strategy and full integration of the nation's military, economic, and diplomatic/political instruments of power.<sup>34</sup>

Leadership development occurs through experience, institutional training, education (both military and civilian), and self development. While not everyone achieves the senior level of leadership, it is possible to fully develop each individual's leadership potential. Two very useful tools for assessing leadership potential are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and Kirton Adaption Innovation Inventory (KAI).

The greater the leaders' self-awareness is, the better they are able to manage themselves and their relationships with others, both professionally and personally. The

MBTI provides developing leaders with self-awareness feedback through confidential advice to individuals on their leadership practices as perceived by their peers, subordinates and supervisors. The MBTI indicates individuals' preferences on how they deal with the world. It was developed on the basis of Carl Jung's "Psychological Type Theory" that revolves around how information is taken in and how that information is organized and used to draw conclusions<sup>35</sup>

The MBTI indicates individuals' preferences in collecting, assimilating, and acting on information. The tool identifies tendencies that may indicate role suitability and identifies tendencies within each preference that may hamper individual effectiveness. The MBTI is a validated, self-report instrument that helps the leader to understand personality preferences and differences.<sup>36</sup> It guides the leader to understand and appreciate his unique and natural strengths and possible areas for development, as well as the differences in others.<sup>37</sup>

The MBTI can be used to assist strategic leaders on how personality influences effect their decisions and also how their organization can be effected. For example, the way the leader leads, the way they make decisions, the way they react to change, and how they can find career satisfaction.<sup>38</sup> Another effective tool is Kirton Adaption Innovation Inventory (KAI). The tool provides feedback assessments to the leader to develop personal awareness of their strengths, weaknesses, and habits based on how peers, subordinates, and superiors see them. This knowledge can then help them develop their leadership capacities to make a bigger and more positive impact on their organization.

So, one way to develop a senior leader is to begin with a self assessment to determine individual strengths and areas on concern.<sup>39</sup> The MBTI and the KAI are two tools proven to be effective in measuring those areas.

Furthermore, the professional institution is vital in the development of the senior leader, because of the human age and experience level of U. S. War College attendees. The adult learning model serves as one of the best models for learning. The curriculum involves issues strategic leaders' will face and the environment in which they will work. The professional instruction encompasses case studies from current and past history. The relevancy enhances and increases the learning and transfer of knowledge. Every student's point of view is respected and encouraged and they get to explore different possibilities. The students actively engage in discussion with diverse seminar groups of military and civilian leaders who will leave the intuition to become critical thinkers and senior leaders.

In "*A Jewel to Treasure*", it is stated that what is taught in the senior service college cannot be taught anywhere else.<sup>40</sup> This element cannot be replicated at any civilian college or university. The faculty doesn't offer solutions; they offer options and help facilitate the discussions. The school introduces current thinking and theory on topics and blends that with the views of instructors to provide a blend of theory and practical application that increases transfer of learning. The civilian faculty with military background brings the advantage of familiarity with military issues and organizations.<sup>41</sup> They are also more comfortable in the Professional Military Education (PME) environment. The book further states that civilian professors are generally much better instructors on strategy and policy or force planning.<sup>42</sup> However, they generally lack

knowledge and understanding of the military decision-making process and operational planning, in particular. <sup>43</sup>

In contrast, one of the major arguments by critics is that civilian universities provide a better education. These critics cite the examples of General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Department of Defense, and General David Petraeus, Commander United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Both are service academy graduates from West Point, but they completed their senior service requirements with civilian intuitions. Some leaders are stereotyped as possessing idealistic and supernatural qualities that render them capable of leading organizations in the face of uncontrollable operational forces. But, senior leaders are not instinctive individual mastermind, as Clausewitz stated. The cognitive and interpersonal attributes required to lead have not changed because of technology. Reliance on this type of thought is irresponsible. Senior level leadership is developed as an individual gains experience throughout their careers.

The senior service colleges serve many functions other than providing academic education. It provides important diplomatic contacts that foster ties with foreign militaries. The relationships developed during the year are concrete relationships and cannot be replicated in any civilian college or university.

In *"Return of the Jedi"*, it is proposed that most of the proven senior thinkers share a remarkably common provenance.<sup>44</sup> Very early in their careers, they learned to think critically and communicate by attending a government-financed graduate program at a top-tier civilian university. Later, most of them sharpen these skills by teaching at a service academy. They all share the obsession for reading history and studying the art

of war. The reality is that educational reform hinges on the ability to create a path for the intellectually gifted to be promoted to flag rank. But the climate today tends to reward tactical rather than senior excellence. The author of "Return of the Jedi" argues that we must change if we are to develop better senior leaders.<sup>45</sup> The vast majority of the officer corps is tracked in the command track; most are identified early in their careers on the basis of their tactical competencies. After a command assignment at the lieutenant colonel rank, those selected are sent to one of the senior service colleges or are granted fellowships. Most of the graduates are ill-prepared to perform jobs at the senior level. Many senior level intuitions prefer individuals with academics from top-tier universities verse the officers and civilians for the practical track of learning.

In the *Armed Forces Journal* article calling to keep the service colleges open, the author cites operational art and theory as reasons why we should not abolish the service colleges. He then claimed that, another major negative impact of abolishing service colleges would be its impact on education of future operational commanders and staff officers in military theory and operational art.<sup>46</sup> Instruction in the capabilities of U.S. forces, service/joint doctrine, operational planning and war gaming would be reduced to a history lesson. Abolishing service colleges would deliver an enormous blow to the professional military education process.<sup>47</sup> For all practical purposes, the U.S. officer corps would be deprofessionalized. No U.S. colleges could replace the service colleges in teaching these critically important subjects. The author then noted that one of the main purposes of senior service college education<sup>48</sup> on the intermediate and especially senior level is to educate future commanders and staff officers in the theory and practice of operational warfare - a component of military art concerned with the

theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations, and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or senior objectives. The author goes on to state service colleges don't produce strategists; they produce operational artists.<sup>49</sup>

There is research that agrees that leadership can be developed through formal education.<sup>50</sup> However, institutional development is only one facet of senior leader development. Developing senior leaders is a career-long process. It relies on three means: individual learning, institutional learning, and personal learning. Future leaders of 2030 are already in the government and department of defense. The future Joint Chief of the Staff is currently commanding a battery or company in one of the services and future Senior Executive Service (SES) is currently in civil service.

The growth and development of a successful military leader is achieved through a thorough and pragmatic leader development strategy of education, training, and experience. The Army trains leaders and Soldiers to perform the tasks that they know are a part of defending our Nation, and they teach them to succeed in the complexity of the contemporary operating environment against blended threats. The professional military training system is designed to provide Army officers the opportunities to gain knowledge required to succeed one to two levels beyond their rank in a progressive manner.

Purpose and mission of resident officer professional military education (PME) is to provide a group of leaders who are fully qualified in technical, tactical, and leadership skills, knowledge, and experience.<sup>51</sup> It helps leaders enter key transitions along their career progression; particularly transitions from direct to organizational and

organizational to strategic levels of leadership. Officer leader development is a continuous process that begins with pre-commissioning /pre-appointment training and education. The Officer Education System prepares commissioned officers for increased responsibilities and successful implementation to better lead formations, exercise judgment, and accomplish missions. They are knowledgeable of how the Army runs, prepared to operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments, and demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility. These leaders can also operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change, build effective teams amid organizational and technological change, and adapt to and solve problems creatively. This is a life-long journey that also includes self-development.

Is the system achieving its objectives? The evidence that this system of professional military education is achieving its goals is seen in the performance of the United States Army in its current fight.<sup>52</sup> Our Army is performing magnificently in these most demanding times and this is because of the superb leadership seen at every level of command or staff position. The Army has learned, innovated, adapted, anticipated, and changed to meet new challenges while holding tightly to its Army values and warrior ethos. All the lessons of history teach the Army what today's conditions reaffirm, that it cannot abandon the development of its leaders for the expedient demands of today's missions. This reinforces the notion that a balance of education, training, and experience is much preferable to focusing predominately on a single pillar.

All indications are the professional military education system is in fact achieving its objectives. However, the schools continuously adjust to meet current and anticipated

future demands. The Army recognizes that not everyone is getting the PME courses in a timely manner due to capacity challenges and current wartime demands. For example, the Army has identified a backlog issue for the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Additionally not all of the officers are attending Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College in a timely manner. They recognize this affects full implementation of their PME and are taking proactive measures to address this particular shortfall. One measure of note is to align PME with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model to more closely match PME throughput with deploying unit cycles. The Army's Leader Development Strategy is specifically aligning educational outcomes and objectives to characteristics in our Joint and Army doctrine to further ensure we develop the leaders our force needs. FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, articulates clear and relevant.<sup>53</sup>

### Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposed to incorporate into the "*Leadership Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army.*"

*Strategic Leadership Program (SLP)*. Recommend the senior service colleges start a strategic leadership program which truly develops senior leadership. A strategic leadership program strategy will ensure the future Department of Army is allowed to achieve the right breadth and depth to meet the needs of the services and other interagency organizations. If the Department of Army changes its approach it may be able to put the right skills in the right job at the right time. The Department of Army needs to identify positions where senior service school competencies are required or desired and establish management processes to fill them. Leaders with responsibility at the national level must understand joint operations, and interagency, intergovernmental,

or multinational actions. Those selected will benefit from increased understanding of the culture, environment, and processes of agencies outside the Department of Army. This program will need to expand culture and foreign language training. The department must adequately fund resident professional training and leadership courses plus the infrastructure that supports these programs. Distribution of time and money to build this corps of senior leaders will require sustained commitment and oversight. The career path for an individual in the SLP will proceed through three developmental levels of training and education—entry, intermediate/management and senior/strategic leadership. Using a phased approach, starting with 10-to-12 year mark and upper pay band 3 all personnel would undergo a mid-level development course and upon completion of the mid-level development course, all would be offered advanced civil schooling in the area in an area of expertise that the institution needs. Followed by a 2-year rotation to an interagency or assignment abroad. Prior to selection to Colonel, the leader must have completed a senior leadership development program. This would include either the selection to one of the war colleges, or a fellowship. Upon completion of the education, the individual would be placed in a Deputy (or above), senior leader, advisor or planner position within one of the Department of Army or national agencies.

*Combination of Development.* There are many more examples of successful senior leaders and critical thinker who have not attended advanced civil education and received their doctoral degrees. A combination of the two might be better fitted to make a more successful senior leader. Thus, send the developing senior leader to a civilian university followed by a 10-month senior war college experience to focuses on military academics. The potential leader would seek an advanced degree in history, foreign

languages, foreign policy, diplomacy, and geopolitics, international economy, or religion. To ensure that innovation flows both ways, students would interact in global classrooms, relying on their international classmates and faculty to connect with educational institutions abroad through travel, the Internet, and video conferencing. Assignments must be deliberate and targeted to senior leader competencies needed by the department and the individual. The department will need to manage developmental experiences at each phase in an individual's, from entry level to flag officer positions. The Department of Army must integrate military and civilian members at the same schools in the same courses when members are pursuing the same proficiencies. This type of program must include: (1) a training/development program; (2) a rotational process that included challenging jobs; (3) an improved recruitment process such as the special forces branch has; (4) and an career advancement program that is managed.

*Consolidation Senior Service Colleges.* Another option would be to consolidate all senior service colleges at one location. Then streamline redundant courses and add classes such as foreign policy, resource management, diplomacy, geopolitics, international economics, ethnicity, religions, and cultures. Such a program would focus more on developing senior theorist and practitioners and less on strategic leaders, since so few really become strategic leaders. Additionally, senior service colleges to emulate a corporate development model for senior development. Identify and assign formal mentors (SSC graduates) to work with students during the academic year and during transition to their new assignments and to provide the networking necessary to successes in the new assignment. Thus, ensuring the student fine-tunes the new skills, seek out new shared knowledge and refine the officers' new direction. The education

provides formal learning and training through institutions and on-the-ground experience. Additionally, mentorship provides informal education through the interaction with a well seasoned professional. Mentorship is an extremely powerful learning tool that can help improve the officers' core competences, leadership skills, self-awareness and morale. This mentor can help navigate the officers' career.

*Placement.* Under the current education and placement system, the institution does a great job developing their new leaders but they need to ensure the assignment officers place the senior leaders in one of the 600 authorized positions and not in a generalist (01A) position. With a selection rate of seven percent to the senior service colleges there are more than enough other officers to fill the general positions. In other words link the SSC selection process to a validated post-graduation placement assignment. The Department of Army needs to establish an active inventory of all required positions containing "required SSC." Use this list to ensure the system is policed by the Senior Leader Development (SLD) and branch managers through the validation process that is currently used in the Human Resource Command (HRC).

*Leadership Development Policy.* We must develop policy that defines the professional domain of the senior leader. There needs to be an enterprise-level approach to determining what manning the Department of Army will need. This policy should define the type of senior leader requirements, identify the current inventory, and assess any short-comings. Department of Army needs to set policy, procedures, and developmental programs to achieve specified objectives and eliminate any short-comings in requirements. There is no enterprise approach to missions, requirements, structure. Department of Army needs to clearly define the career paths of these future

leaders. Department of Army will need to synchronize the careers in education, training, and experience across the whole cohort.

### Conclusion

Current service colleges produce senior leaders who work as organizational managers, leaders, and operational artist. Department of Army should have a more focused, separate and distinct educational program for senior leaders and their development. The department must develop a strategy that commits ample resources, incorporates appropriate policy, and evaluates existing educational programs and force structure towards that development.<sup>54</sup>

The enhancement of Senior Leader Learning and development will allow the Army to best achieve the goal of building strategic leaders who have mastered the major core competencies in Leadership. Consideration of the recommendations reflected in this paper will enhance future development of senior leader skills in the broader, more complex, politico-military arena required in the complex 21st century security environment.<sup>55</sup>

### Endnotes

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