

Conflict Termination and Regime Change

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Conflict Termination and Regime Change by Major James J. Handura.

Many US military operations since the end of the Cold War have ended improperly; the failure has not been due to a flaw in doctrine. Instead, senior civilian and military leaders have chosen to ignore or have neglected the complexities of termination. The US seemingly began Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom with no apparent exit strategy. Senior US civilian and military leaders in the Bush Administration erroneously presumed that some other entity would assume responsibility for termination. Their decision was in direct conflict with doctrine, which clearly outlined the responsibility to plan for termination. Consequently, the United States was forced to assume responsibility for nation building.

The research sought to explain why senior military or civilian leaders have neglected the specification of termination criteria. To provide the answer, it was necessary to explore four possible explanations. The first possible explanation is simply that military doctrine never addressed termination or that military theory neglected war termination. A second possible explanation was that both civilian and military leaders did not see termination as a responsibility of the US military. The next possibility was that the US did not intend to create a long-term commitment to the stability of a particular government. Lastly, the failure to define termination may have been simply a consequence of unforeseen unique circumstances.

The research assessed US doctrine and operations in the pre-September 11, 2001 environment with post September 11, 2001 operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The object of the study was to review the lessons learned from earlier operations and determine if they were applied to planning for Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Operation Just Cause in 1989 and Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994 were chosen because both operations focused on regime change. Termination for operations in Panama, although executed poorly, ended successfully. Termination for operations in Haiti, based on a time based transfer of responsibility to the UN, ended poorly.

A review of US military interventions aimed at regime change since 1989 revealed that foreign policy decisions prevented clear definition for termination. Consequently, because senior US military leaders disliked nation building, they used this unclear termination guidance as justification to avoid their obligation to properly plan for termination.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Conflict Termination Prior to September 11, 2001	5
Conflict Termination and Operations in Panama	5
Theorists and Scholars on Termination	7
Conflict Termination and Operations in Haiti	15
US Joint Doctrine	15
Conflict Termination Post September 11, 2001	22
Conflict Termination and Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq	22
Conclusion	37
Bibliography	39
Books and Journals	39
Public Documents	40
Websites	41
Interviews	41

Introduction

On May 1, 2003, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush gave his famous “mission accomplished” speech. In that speech, President Bush proclaimed that major combat operations in Iraq were complete. The president’s speech signaled a transition to Phase IV of the US Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) Plan for the Invasion of Iraq.¹ Phase IV was expected to last 45 months and culminate with the redeployment of all US military personnel. The date for termination of operations in Iraq was scheduled for December 2006.² Although the President’s May speech was a defining moment, it later came back to haunt him and his administration. The May speech praised the US military for achieving a quick decisive victory in both Afghanistan and Iraq during the early stages in the War on Terror. The military success also appeared to vindicate President Bush’s decision to commit troops, by proving wrong the naysayers who predicted a “quagmire”. Unfortunately, the military situation was not as it then seemed.

Today U.S. troops still operate in both Afghanistan and Iraq seemingly “stuck” in Phase IV whose duration has been significantly longer than planners anticipated. The extended military involvement has caused the public and some politicians to criticize the Bush Administration for failing to provide an “exit strategy” for both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In military terms, what the critics were calling for were viable termination criteria for both operations. Their call seems a sensible request but in the contemporary security environment, it is a request seldom answered.

Public impatience with an open-ended military commitment is not new. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has had a consistently poor record for restoring civil

¹ CENTCOM, POLO STEP Briefing Slides Phase IV, August 2002.

² Ibid.

government and implementing a viable exit strategy. The term “exit strategy” is a generic term, which seems equivalent to the US doctrinal term conflict termination. Joint Publication 1-02 *Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Terms*, defines conflict termination as “the specified standards approved by the President and or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.”³ Professor Fred Ikle, in his book, *Every War Must End*, underscored the importance of planning for conflict termination by stating, “not only military leaders are sometimes guilty of designing wars as if they had to build a bridge that spans only half a river. Civilian leaders, too, may order the initiation of a military campaign without being troubled by the fact that they have no plan for bringing their war to a close”.⁴ In other words, both civil and military leaders tend to focus on the opening military operations and the broad goals for those operations and neglect to define the conditions that will end the use of force.

Conflict termination is a topic military and civilian leaders have wrestled with since the beginning of warfare. In fact, the Spartan King Archidamus, prior to the outset of the Peloponnesian War, cautioned his fellow citizens and allies against rushing into war, and reminded them that it was hard to predict how and when the war would end.⁵ In an extended conflict, the challenge is to end a conflict on terms while maintaining the support of the impatient governed. The annals of history have shown that starting a war is the easy part. Finishing it is an entirely different matter. Carl Von Clausewitz, the Prussian military officer and theorist, stressed the importance of planning for conflict termination when he stated “No one starts a war --- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so –without first being clear in his mind what he intends

³ JP 1-01, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Associated Terms*, (12 April 2001), 551.

⁴ Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 2nd Rev. Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 6.

⁵ Robert B. Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 45-46.

to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the later its operational objective.”⁶

Clausewitz argues that warfare is divided into two interlinked elements, the political element and the military element. A nation preparing for war must clearly think through both the political and the military element before going to war. The first step is to determine the political element because the political element determines the end-state of the war including the desired national goals and objectives. The second step is to determine the military component. The military component details how the military will go about prosecuting the war in order to achieve the political endstate of the war.

Although many US military operations since the end of Cold War have ended improperly, the failure has not been due to a flaw in doctrine, but because senior civilian and military leaders have chosen to ignore or have neglected the complexities of regime change and termination. Politicians often hope the security objectives can be achieved and the troops brought home quickly to appease the voters. Frequently the political concerns have resulted in inadequate termination criteria based largely on time rather than realistic benchmarks that measure the ability of a local population to protect its citizens and provide basic services. Consequently, the employment of the US military has not always translated into lasting accomplishments favorable to US Foreign Policy once the military is withdrawn.

The research reported in this monograph sought to explain why senior military or civilian leaders have neglected the specification of termination criteria. To provide the answer it was necessary to consider four possible explanations. The first possible explanation is simply that military doctrine never addressed the requirement or that military theory neglects war

⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

termination. A second possible answer was that difficulties in terminating military operations were seen by both civilian and military leaders as not within the purview of the military; something that should be addressed by the Department of State, the National Security Council, or the United Nations. Next, there is a possibility that many of the US military interventions were not intended to create a long-term commitment to the stability of a particular government; e.g. Bosnia in 1995. Consequently, the failure to define clear termination criteria may be a virtue. Finally, extended military commitments may simply be the consequences of unique circumstances that were not foreseeable when planning began.

Each of the hypothesized explanations is plausible. The task was to discover what answer the evidence supports. To get at the root of the issue it was logical to begin by investigating military doctrine. That task was complicated by the fact that military doctrine changes periodically so if two decades of US military interventions were to be examined then the doctrine had to be revisited from time to time to determine whether guidance had changed or lessons from military operations had been captured. Thus, doctrine is examined in conjunction with the individual case studies. In contrast, the military and political theory that had an impact on US planning predates the invasion of Panama and thus, only influenced the early doctrinal efforts. Lastly, some salient cases of US military intervention prior to September 11, 2001 were examined to assess whether those cases taught any lessons that either were learned or were learned poorly. US operations in Panama and Haiti were selected for review because both dealt with regime change. A review of these operations revealed that regime change complicates the task of planning and execution of termination criteria. The lessons learned from these operations provided a preview of what to anticipate for subsequent regime change operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. A review of US military interventions aimed at regime change since 1989 reveals that foreign policy decisions prevented clearly defining termination criteria. Consequently, because senior US military leaders disliked nation building, they used this unclear termination guidance as justification to avoid their obligation to properly plan for termination.

Conflict Termination Prior to September 11, 2001

Conflict Termination and Operations in Panama

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 assigned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) responsibility for preparing joint doctrine. It took some time to develop a body of joint doctrine. When the US was planning operations in Panama, 1988-1989, joint doctrine did not discuss termination criteria. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the United States*, published in 1991 makes only a vague reference to termination. In chapter III of Joint Pub 1 conflict termination was discussed in conjunction with the importance of linking strategy and policy goals to the military endstate.⁷ This initial doctrinal reference is significant because it is the first time senior military leaders and planners were introduced to the concept. Secondly, this initial reference is important because it emphasized achieving unity of effort between military and civilian leaders to accomplish the military and political endstate.

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992 first used the term conflict termination in a document entitled “A Doctrinal Statement of Select Joint Operational Concepts”. Gen. Powell stressed the need for commanders to review continually the impact of operations on conflict termination objectives. He further cautioned the commander that the outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.⁸ General Powell’s document was important because it laid the foundation for the joint operating concept, and in doing so emphasized the commander’s continual assessment of termination criteria while planning operations. Unfortunately, Gen. Powell’s discussion of concepts did not explicitly acknowledge that the decision to terminate operations was ultimately a political

⁷ US Government, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1991), 22.

decision. The review of US operations in Panama and Haiti clearly demonstrate that the military commanders were not sufficiently prepared to halt operations when instructed to do so by the president. As a result, the conditions were not set to ensure that US goals attained through force endured once the military redeployed.

When the US was planning the invasion of Panama in 1988-1989, US Army doctrine, like Joint Doctrine, did not address termination criteria. US Army Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*, dated 1986, did not discuss termination. Although Field Manual 100-5 discussed operational art, it did not include the concept of termination as a characteristic. The manual only hinted vaguely at the significance of termination in an appendix. Appendix A specified the need for the president and the Congress to determine the political aim of the war as an important step for war planning. Once the political aim was determined, it was critical for the military leader to understand the political aim in order to develop strategic and tactical objectives.⁹ Army doctrine's failure to identify termination as an important planning factor might have been the reason senior civilian and military leaders' neglected termination.

The review of doctrine available for use in planning for the invasion of Panama supports the explanation that doctrine did not address the importance of termination. If doctrine had discussed termination during the planning for Panama, the senior civilian and military leaders in the Bush Administration might have focused more of their planning efforts on the post combat phase of the invasion. Doctrinal emphasis on termination may have enabled the creation of a viable exit strategy at the start of the operation to allow for a smoother establishment of a new Panamanian Government.

⁸ Colin Powell, "A Doctrinal Statement of Select Joint Operational Concepts, 10 November 1992, 5.

⁹ US Government, Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 1982), B-2.

Theorists and Scholars on Termination

Both Joint and Army military doctrine might not have ignored the importance of conflict termination had doctrine writers paid closer attention to available military theory. The US Army had shown an interest in the work of Carl von Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz a Prussian General and theorist wrote about the importance of the interrelationship of policy and strategy in his book *On War*, during the 1830s. Clausewitz, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, was influenced by the carnage and suffering of war. His goal in writing his book was to make sense of war, to define it and to describe the purpose of war.¹⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz convincingly points out the linkage between policy and strategy when he stated,

“War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. The Political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and means can never be considered in isolation of their purpose.”¹¹

In other words, war is a tool to be utilized to achieve the political goals of a country. Therefore, war and politics are inextricably linked together, senior civilian leaders and senior military leaders must not separate the two. Clausewitz’s argument might have informed US doctrine about including termination among significant planning factors.

Clausewitz defined war as “the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”¹² Clausewitz argued that the political objective (the justification for the war) determines both the military objective and the amount of energy or effort required to reach this end. He pressed the point to achieve the objectives of the war; the country’s leadership (political and military) must

¹⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *The Art of War* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), 108.

¹¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

¹² Ibid, 75.

focus on three factors with regard to the opponent. These three factors are the armed forces of the adversary, the country of the adversary (government and the citizenry), and the will of the enemy. Clausewitz was convinced that a nation needed to either overthrow the enemy and defeat or convince the enemy through multiple means (conflict or coercion) to negotiate a settlement. Achieving a settlement was possible by undermining the enemy's will to continue the fight. Clausewitz's writings clearly emphasize the importance of termination even though he did not specifically use the term. This is important to note, because Clausewitz's writings on termination were read by senior military and civilian leaders so it was unlikely termination criteria was overlooked because these leaders were uniformed. However, the evidence shows that Clausewitz's ideas on ending a war were not included in military doctrine. Although military doctrine overlooked termination criteria US policy makers were not unaware of the importance of defining the conflict termination goals.

Professor Fred Ikle argued that determining how to end wars was something that most governments did not spend enough time considering prior to conflict. Professor Fred Ikle, was a former professor of political science and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration (1981-1988) and had devoted a long career to the field of national security policy.¹³ He wrote the first edition of *Every War must End*, during the height of the Nixon Administration efforts to transfer control of the Vietnam War to the South Vietnamese Government under the "Vietnamization Policy."¹⁴ His book was a study of the complexity of bringing to successful close wars in the modern age and the implication for future conflicts. He illustrated how many governments had spent a great deal of time developing detailed plans for the

¹³ Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Public Domain, www.csis.org, (accessed 10 April 2009).

¹⁴ Lewis Sorely, *A Better War*, (New York: Harcourt, 1999), XIII.

conduct of a military campaign, but had devoted insufficient time linking these means to the ends.¹⁵ Planning for the ending of conflict is complicated.

According to Ikle, the senior civilian and military leaders must take a whole of government of approach to planning for the outcome of war. The government must think beyond purely military implications and focus on other impacts such as the internal and external politics of the adversary and whether or not other countries will intervene.¹⁶ Fred Ikle postulated that when a country decides to go to war one of the first questions that must be answered is how the conflict serves long-term national objectives.

Professor Ikle demonstrates that the internal political struggle within a country directly affects the decision to termination operations. This political struggle is normally between the hawks (politicians who endorse military action), and the doves (politicians who opposed military action). He also emphasizes the importance of developing termination criteria during pre war planning. Professor Ikle argues that a country must ask itself two fundamental questions, which are critical to termination. The first question is “how might the enemy be forced to surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the war?”¹⁷ The second question is “how does one’s own military strength compare with that of the enemy, taking into account the resources that might be mobilized?”¹⁸ Professor Ikles’ work on termination disproves the explanation postulated earlier that senior military and civilian leaders neglected to plan for termination because military theory did not address termination. The evidence shows that Professor Ikles’ work influenced the public policy of the US during planning for operations in Panama.

¹⁵ Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 17.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 18.

Operation Just Cause, the US Invasion of Panama from January 1989 to January 1990, provides a good example for lessons learned concerning the challenge of planning and conducting conflict termination following regime change. This operation was historically significant because it was the first large scale use of military force (approximately 25,000 troops) since the end of the Vietnam War.¹⁹ General Noriega and his Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) were removed from power. The major combat operations phase (Operation Just Cause) lasted from December 20, 1989 to January 11, 1990. The post conflict phase named Operation Blind Logic (later renamed Promote Justice) lasted until December 1990 and focused on nation building and establishing a democracy in Panama.²⁰ The initial combat operations were a success. However, due to poor planning for termination, the objectives achieved during major combat operations were almost negated during the stability operations phase

Achieving conflict termination in Panama resided with the goal of the Promote Liberty portion of the operation.²¹ The planners divided Promote Liberty into three phases. The first phase focused on civil affairs support to the combat operations and civilian efforts to reestablish public health and safety. The focus of the second phase was toward restoring essential services and turning over their control to the Panamanian and US civilians. The last phase, the long-range phase, envisioned civil affairs efforts in conjunction with the new Panamanian Government to reconstitute a new Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), reducing its size and power, and institutionalizing its loyalty to the civilian government.²² The fact that the Southern Command

¹⁹ Richard H. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama Following Just Cause*, (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1993), 2.

²⁰ Lawrence Yates, "Panama, 1988-1999, The Disconnect between Combat and Stability Operations", *Military Review* (May-June 2005) 46-52.

²¹ *Ibid*, 21.

²² *Ibid*, 9.

Plan consciously addressed termination proves that the senior administration leaders and senior military leaders did consider termination a US military responsibility.

The planning for Promote Liberty unfortunately did not progress smoothly. General Woerner, the Commander of US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was relieved of his duties in the fall of 1989 when planning was well along. President Bush replaced General Woerner because he criticized the administration's handling of Noriega. General Woerner felt the Bush Administration lacked a sense of urgency to address the growing problem with Panama. General Woerner based his criticism on the Bush Administration's failure to appoint an assistant secretary of state for Latin America affairs in a timely manner. He also argued that the Bush administration focused on a military solution for Panama, when in fact a political solution was the more prudent course of action.²³ The abrupt replacement of General Woerner resulted in numerous problems for those planning the operations in Panama. The first issue was a change in the concept of operations for Blue Spoon. The Blue Spoon plan was changed from a sequential series of events characterized by a methodical seizure of objectives to a swarming approach in which the 27 targets were attacked near simultaneously.²⁴ US SOUTCOM's new approach did not ensure public order, which resulted in widespread looting and other acts of violence during the invasion. These incidents proved politically embarrassing for the US Administration. The methodical approach developed by General Woerner utilized US military forces to maintain civilian law and order while the PDF were methodically destroyed or neutralized. General Thurman did not assume responsibility of the post conflict portion of the plan. This was partially

²³ Edward M. Flanagan, *Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause*, (New York: Brassey's, 1993), 23.

²⁴ Joel T. Fisher, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1992), 26

because he was not briefed on the post conflict plan Blind Logic.²⁵ His focus and that of the subordinate Joint Task Force South (XVIII Airborne Corps) was on the combat operations portion of the plan as detailed in Blue Spoon. Because General Thurman did not link the combat operation to the termination objectives he made some mistakes in designing the command relationship for Operation Blind Logic Phase. He initially appointed the SOUTHCOM J5 BG Gann the commander of the Civil Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF). General Thurman placed the COMCMOTF in charge of nation building. This was puzzling because the J5 was a staff officer. Later General Thurman realized his error and attempted to replace Brigadier General Gann with the US Army South (USARSO) Commander, Brigadier General Cisneros.²⁶ Although General Thurman focused too much attention on major combat operations, Southern Command, nevertheless, produced termination criteria in the post combat phase of the operation. The planning and execution of Operation Promote Justice serves as evidence that civilian and the military leaders have not always failed to address conflict termination because they did not think that nation building is a military task. Nation building and termination were integral to the plan from the beginning.

Important assumptions made during planning for Operation Just Cause later proved false and adversely effected conflict termination. The first one was that the US military would be in charge of the country for 30 days at which time the newly elected President Endara and his two deputy vice presidents would assume responsibility. This later proved to be problematic because the planners did not understand how deeply the PDF controlled the government. Thus, when the PDF ceased to exist, so did much of the government. The second major assumption that proved

²⁵ Brian M. De Toy, *Turning Military Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign*, (Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 173.

²⁶ Joel T. Fisher, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (US Army War College, 1992), 27-28.

false was that the infrastructure of Panama was in adequate shape. In fact, control measures were included in the Blue Spoon plan to limit collateral damage to infrastructure. It was later revealed that the infrastructure had badly decayed during years of neglect and required a great deal of reconstruction money, expertise and skilled labor to restore.²⁷ The third erroneous assumption was that reserve soldiers and the State Department would augment the Civil Military Operations Task Force. A failure to call up reserves and the lack of State Department personnel left the CMOTF understaffed. These flawed assumptions resulted in a longer troop commitment and extended the termination timetable. However, this evidence undermines the hypothesis that interventions are extended because unique circumstances. In the case of Panama, had the staff reviewed their assumptions, they would have realized that they had assumed away actions that were required and were easily anticipated.

The execution of Blind Logic had its own problems. The COMCMOTF was in charge of Blind Logic for one month. Although the Blind Logic planning documents give the COMCMOTF, a guidebook for restoring essential services, it was nevertheless incomplete. It did not restoration of public order, or the establishment of a police force, court system or jail system. The lack of interagency planning created a dilemma for the US military. US laws prevented the US military from training national police forces. However, the US Justice Department had not been involved in the military planning. The problem was resolved by the US Justice Departments International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The ICITAP provided police trainers and the military provided military police and Special Forces for joint patrols. General Lindsay commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) helped to save the reconstruction phase of the operation. He informed General

²⁷ Richard A. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama following Just Cause*, (Maxwell, AFB, Air University Press, 1993), 23-24.

Thurman of his concern of the lack of progress for restoration phase of the operation. General Thurman allowed him to send a fact-finding team from USSOCOM to assess problems facing the COMCMOTF.²⁸ The fact-finding team from USSOCOM demonstrated the adaptability of US military commands when committed to a mission.

At the conclusion of the fact-finding mission, the team leader recommended the establishment of a Military Support Group (MSG) to oversee the restoration phase of the operations.²⁹ The fact-finding team derived the MSG concept from the Security Assistance Force as detailed in FM 100-20.³⁰ General Thurman activated the Military Support Group on 17 January 1990. The Military Support Group's mission was to "conduct nation building operations to ensure that democracy, international standards of justice and professional public services are established in Panama". General Thurman also tasked the Military Support Group with development of a comprehensive Panama strategy.

The MSG was a diverse organization. It consisted of a police liaison group, a civil affairs element, a psychological operations element, a joint special operations task force, and a military police brigade. The MSG developed a three-phase strategy. Phase I covered 1990 and focused on consolidation of democracy.³¹ The second and third phase consisted of some vague ideas on how to stabilize and sustain democracy by 1999. After making great progress, the military support group deactivated on 17 January 1991. SOUTCOM J5 continued its efforts under the auspices of Joint Task Force Panama, which reported to the US Country team under the direction of the US

²⁸ US Government, *OPERATION JUST CAUSE, The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1995), 9.

²⁹ Richard A. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama following Just Cause*, (Maxwell, AFB, Air University Press, 1993), 33-34.

³⁰ Joel T. Fisher, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (Carlise, US Army War College, 1992), 70.

³¹ Richard A. Schultz, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama following Just Cause*, (Maxwell, AFB, Air University Press, 1993), 33-34.

Ambassador to Panama.³² The result of Operation Promote Justice was a success, despite insufficient conflict termination and a poor transition between phases. Dr Yates, later observed that despite a sluggish start in post conflict operations including US aid, the economy recovered, the population remained largely pro American, pockets of resistance were eliminated, elections occurred and a new government achieved control.³³ The creation of the Military Support Group was unique because its creation indicates that in the case of Panama senior military and civilian leaders did not neglect termination planning. The creation of the military support group was important because it supports the hypothesis that conflict termination is often extended because senior leaders of the administration do not see the military intervention as a long-term commitment.

Conflict Termination and Operations in Haiti

US Joint Doctrine

Three years after Operation Just Cause and two years after General Powell's statement about operational concepts, the Joint Staff published Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Joint Publication 3-0 was available when Southern Command began planning for the invasion of Haiti. Chapter of that publication devoted two and half pages to the discussion of conflict termination and its relationship to US strategic goals. Joint Pub 3-0 stated, "properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure."³⁴ The 1993 version of Joint Pub 3-0 also discussed the design of termination criteria and

³² Joel T. Fisher, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, (Carlisle, US Army War College, 1992), 52.

³³ Lawrence A. Yates, "Panama 1988-1999: The Disconnect between Combat and Stability Operations", *Military Review*, (May – June 2005), 52.

³⁴ US Government, Joint Publication 3, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1993), I-II

when to terminate operations.³⁵ Chapter one of Joint Pub 3-0 went further and divided conflict termination into two dimensions, political considerations and military considerations. The political dimension of termination focused on planning prior to the operation. In the political realm, a government must decide the means and methods to achieve the political aim through military intervention. The 1993 version of *Doctrine for Joint Operations* echoed Carl von Clausewitz's remarks and discussed two ways to achieve the national objectives; first, by imposing a settlement on an adversary, and second, by negotiating a settlement.³⁶ The military considerations emphasized the duty of the commander to inform the politician about the feasibility, and the consequences of terminating operations. The doctrine also stressed the responsibility of the commander to seek clarification from the politician whenever termination criteria was unclear.³⁷ In chapter 3 of that same publication conflict termination is listed as a component of operational art. That chapter instructs the military planner to develop termination criteria. The planner must balance the desire for a quick victory with the achievement of political goals.³⁸

1993 also saw the publication of a new version of US Army Field Manual 100-5 *Operation*. Field Manual 100-5 provided a simple definition of conflict termination calling it "the process and period during which military forces transition from active combat operations to post conflict activities and from post conflict activities to redeployment operations."³⁹ US Army Doctrine also devoted one page in chapter six (planning and executing operations) to discussing conflict termination. The chapter 6 section provided a short, albeit sufficient description detailing

³⁵ Ibid, I-II.

³⁶ Ibid, I-I2.

³⁷ Ibid, I-13.

³⁸ Ibid, III-31.

the importance of linking military objectives with the strategic objectives to end a conflict. The section also assigned the senior military leader the responsibility for recommending to the senior civilian leaders the opportune time to terminate a conflict. Finally, Field Manual 100-5 emphasized the decision to terminate operations was political.⁴⁰ Thus, both joint and Army doctrine provided guidance on conflict termination and made clear its planning importance before invasion of Haiti. If military leaders overlooked conflict termination, it was not because it was neglected in planning doctrine.

The review of the doctrine available for planning of the US invasion of Haiti is significant. The doctrinal review refutes the explanation that doctrine did not address termination. When Joint Pub 3-0 dated 1993 was published, the importance of termination criteria was growing. The joint doctrine clearly showed that the senior military leader had an important role to play in the development of termination criteria with the senior civilian leadership. The doctrine also stressed that viable termination criteria was key to ensuring US objectives achieved using military intervention endured. In the end, the senior civilian and military leaders in the Clinton Administration developed termination criteria based largely on time instead of measure of success. Consequently, whatever was achieved through the military intervention did not endure.

Operation Uphold Democracy, the US intervention in Haiti lasted from 1994 to 1995. The intervention is a good case from which to draw lessons learned about conflict termination in peacekeeping operations involving nation building, democratization and transfer of authority from a US led force to a United Nation's led operation. Operation Uphold Democracy was historically significant because its genesis was a United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, which was the first time the United Nations had approved invasion of a country in the Western

³⁹ US Government, Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army 1993), Glossary 2.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 6-23.

Hemisphere to conduct regime change.⁴¹ Uphold Democracy is also unique because it began as a peace enforcement mission and changed at the last minute prior to execution into a peacekeeping mission. The operation involved over 20,000 US military personnel from all the military services.

The Clinton administration labeled Operation Uphold Democracy a success. The US led Operation Restore Democracy ended March 31, 1995 with the formal transfer of peacekeeping responsibilities from the US to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. Although transfer was based largely on a specified time, the transfer of responsibility appeared to be successful. The Clinton administration avoided a repeat of the criticism leveled against it for actions in Somalia, concerning mission creep. Unfortunately the success was short lived. The United Nations Mission in Haiti ceased operations on June 30, 1996 when its mandate expired. Haiti then appeared well on its way to developing a stable government, under the leadership of President Aristide. In 2000, the situation in Haiti began to deteriorate after the reelection of President Aristide. The opposition party challenged the legitimacy of the election. Opposition to President Aristide continued to grow, and eventually resulted to civil war. Following President Aristide's exile from Haiti in 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1529 calling for a multinational stability force to intervene. As a result, Operation Secure Tomorrow, a US led force reentered the country on February 29, 2004.⁴² The reentry of US forces was in effect recognition that Operation Uphold Democracy neither secured US interests nor created a stable Haitian democracy.⁴³

Planning for Operation Uphold Democracy began in January 1994. President Clinton authorized the formation of Joint Task Force 180 to begin planning for possible military intervention in Haiti. The stated US strategic objectives for the operation were: to ensure Haitian

⁴¹ US Government, *Joint Military Operations History*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1997), VII-2.

⁴² USSOUTHCOM Press Release dated 22 March 2004.

Police and Armed Forces complied with the Governor's Island Accords, to protect US citizens and Haitian citizens, to restore civil order, to assist in the reorganization of the Haitian Police and military, and to assist in the transition to a democratic government.⁴⁴ President Clinton's Presidential Directive 25 dated May 16, 1994, authorized US military involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.⁴⁵ The US entered into dialogue with the UN Security Council to justify military action to end the human suffering in Haiti.

In response to those negotiations, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, and thereby authorized a multinational force and the use of all means necessary all means necessary and force to remove Cedras regime, facilitate the timely return of President Aristide, and establish a safe and secure environment in accordance with the Governor's Island Accords.⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 975 dated 30 January 1995 transferred those peacekeeping operations in Haiti from the US to the UN effective March 31, 1995.⁴⁷ Resolution 975 was a blessing to the senior military officers because it established precise date for departure. However because the exit was based strictly on a specified date, the departure would later be seen as undermining US interests in Haiti. In January, however, the planning was not predicated on a swift exit.

United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) developed two separate plans for the invasion of Haiti. Operation Plan (OPLAN) 2370 assumed a US forced entry operation into Haiti

⁴³ US Government, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2001), I-10.

⁴⁴ US Government, *Joint Military Operations Historical Collection*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 15 July 1997), VII-2.

⁴⁵ PDD 25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm> (accessed 10 April 2009).

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm> (accessed 20 April 2009)

⁴⁷ **Ibid, 71.**

in a non-permissive environment, and Operation Plan (OPLAN) 2380 assumed a permissive environment. Operations Plan 2370 was a five-phase operation anticipated to last 24 days. Termination was planned for phase IV with a transition to follow on operations and then redeployment of forces in phase V.⁴⁸ Operations Plan 2380 was a five-phased operation anticipated to last 180 days. Termination was planned for phase V with a transition to United Nations control and the redeployment of forces.⁴⁹ The operation sought to replace the General Cedras was regime change, restore President Aristide and create a safe and secure environment.

In September 1994, having lost patience with General Cedras, President Clinton presented an ultimatum. However, Democrats in Congress were not pleased by the prospect of a military invasion. In response, President Clinton dispatched a diplomatic team consisting of Colin Powell, former President Carter, and Senator Nunn, to Haiti for one last attempt to achieve a peaceful transfer of power. Cedras agreed to the terms of the Carter-Jonassant Agreement. The Carter-Jonassant Agreement dictated that Cedras would turnover control of Haiti to President Aristide within 45 days of signing the agreement. That agreement forced LTG Shelton to adjust his plans and implement a hybrid of the OPLAN 2380.⁵⁰ The planning for the regime change in Haiti supports the claim that US senior officials believed that United Nations was responsible for determining when military action would end due the complex nature. Although, to be fair, the duration for the Phase V, 59 days, (transfer to UN control) demonstrates that the planners acknowledged the importance of setting the conditions for termination.

Joint Task Force 180 entered Haiti on September 19, 1994. JTF 180's task was to develop a foundation for security. That foundation included the return of the restoration of the

⁴⁸ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baum, Joel T. Fisher, *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth, CSGC Press, 1998), 49-50.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 57-58.

legislature, judicial and police reform, and a reduction in violence. Accordingly, the military's primary mission was security. The reestablishment of the police force and the government was to be done by the other agencies such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and the Department of State and the UN International Police Monitors. During the operation, some of the agencies were slow to assume their responsibilities. Fortunately, US Army Special Forces and US Army Reserve Civil Affairs soldiers with requisite skill were able to assist with reconstituting the police force and Government of Haiti (GOH) agencies until the other agencies were able to assume control. As the mission progressed, the military role became less prominent and the Department of State, USAID and other agencies began took the lead.⁵¹

Lieutenant General Kinser, US Army, led the transfer of control to the United Mission In Haiti. The transfer of control was completed on March 31, 1995. US JTF 190 continued to serve in Haiti under the UN command.⁵² The UN assumed the responsibility for stability and democracy in Haiti. Later JTF 190 transferred its remaining responsibilities to US Support Group Haiti (USSGH), which carried out civil military operations while US forces were withdrawn.

The events and actions taken by the United States during Uphold Democracy makes clear that senior leaders in the US administration saw the success of the overall operation as the responsibility of the United Nations. However, the military planners were cognizant of the importance of setting the conditions to enable a smooth transition to the United Nations as evidenced the interagency approach to planning. Additionally the military plan clearly indicates a conscious decision by the senior US civilian and military leaders to avoid a long-term US military

⁵⁰ John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, (Westport: Praeger Press, 1998), 99.

⁵¹ Ibid, 122.

⁵² Ibid, 163.

commitment. Coming as it did only a year after the US withdrawal from Somalia, the decision was clearly influenced by the Somalia experience. The good news story at this point was that doctrine continued to emphasize the importance of termination planning in the post September 11, 2001 world. However, the bad news was that that the senior US civilian and military leaders did not follow the doctrine.

Conflict Termination Post September 11, 2001

Conflict Termination and Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were being planned, Joint Doctrine clearly emphasized the importance of conflict termination. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, dated 2001 stated, “when the use of military force is considered, that use should be linked to discernible national interests; have a clearly defined and achievable endstate, termination conditions and exit strategy; and include overwhelming and decisive force”.⁵³ Joint doctrine was also clear on the roles and responsibilities of the senior commander concerning conflict termination. According to Joint Pub 1, “military leaders have fundamental responsibilities in developing national assessments of the strategic situation. Specifically, in the US system of civil-military relations, senior military leaders provide recommendations on the feasible military options; resources required and anticipated consequences of military action, and the military requirements for conflict termination.”⁵⁴ The 2001 version of Joint Pub 1 clearly assigned the senior military leaders the responsibility to clarify to the President and the Secretary of Defense the military aspects of operations. Their advice was to include how military force would be used to achieve political objectives, terminate

⁵³ US Government, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2000), IX.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, IX.

military action and provide for follow-on operations. Joint Pub 1 stated combatant commanders were responsible for executing the military component of conflict termination.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, dated 2001 also influenced planning for OEF and OIF. Joint Pub 3-0 identified termination of operations as a vital link between the US national security strategy, national military strategy, and the national goals in both war and operations other than war.⁵⁵ The 2001 version of Joint Pub 3-0 also discussed the importance of planning for termination prior to the commencement of operations. Just as the 1993 version of Joint Pub 3-0, the 2001 edition divided conflict termination into two subcategories, the political aspects and military aspects. Joint doctrine stressed the two main types of termination: an imposed solution when the US dominates the opponent militarily and or overthrows the opposition's regime, and the negotiated settlement, when the opposition is persuaded to come to the bargaining table.⁵⁶ Joint Pub 3-0 made communication with the enemy a key requirement for termination.⁵⁷ The manual also stated that successful termination was dependent on knowing what type of war the United States was planning to get involved in.⁵⁸ *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, dated 2001 grouped the nature of war into interest-based wars concerned with territory, economic advantages and value based wars of ideology, religion, culture or ethnicity.⁵⁹ Joint Pub 3-0 told planners that interest-based wars were more conducive to negotiations, coercion, or persuasion, than values based conflicts because values based were less amenable to negotiation. Doctrine also noted the nature of war was often a mix of values based and interest based.

⁵⁵ US Government, Joint Publication 3, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2001), IX.

⁵⁶ Ibid, I-10.

⁵⁷ Ibid, I-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid, III-24.

However, despite the recent publication of Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operation*, had not been updated since 1995. Nevertheless, Joint Pub 5-0 did reflect the experiences of both Panama and Haiti. Joint Pub 5-0 listed conflict termination objectives as one of the fundamentals of campaign planning.⁶⁰ That version of Joint Pub 5-0 stated that the military component of conflict termination was an essential element in the national strategic assessment directing operations across the full spectrum of military operations.⁶¹ The 1995 version of Joint Pub 5-0 also emphasized the importance of termination in establishing conditions necessary to support the post conflict strategic objectives and the national interests of the US.⁶²

Apparently, campaign-planning doctrine was deemed inadequate because the joint staff published Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning Joint Pub 5-00.1 on 25 January 2002. Joint Pub 5-00.1 was a guide for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The campaign planning doctrine emphasized that the decision to terminate military operations was political. Joint Pub 5-00.1 further stated it was the duty of the military commander to discuss with the senior civilian leadership the conditions for termination. The senior military commander was obligated to advise the political leadership on the consequences (both positive and negative) of terminating operations at various points during the military intervention.⁶³ Finally, military leaders were obligated to provide the NCA with the short term and long-term assessments of the consequences of stopping hostilities at

⁵⁹ Ibid, III-24.

⁶⁰ US Government, Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 1995).

⁶¹ Ibid, II-6.

⁶² Ibid, V-4.

⁶³ US Government, JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2002), II-4.

any point during the conflict or operation.⁶⁴ Finally, JP 5-00.1 also cautions the military planner to know what constitutes an acceptable political-military endstate for an operation.⁶⁵

In addition to joint doctrine guidance, US Central Command had available to it Army Doctrine. US Army Field Manual 101-5-1 *Operational Terms and Symbols*, dated 30 September 1997 embellished the definition of conflict termination found in FM 100-5 dated 1993. Field Manual 100-5-1 described conflict termination as “the point at which a conflict ends and post conflict activities begin. The enemy should be both unable and unwilling to resist. Strategic, operational, and political goals established at the beginning of the conflict should either be secured, or their securement is the immediate result of the end of the conflict.”⁶⁶ *Operational Terms and Symbols* dated 1997 defined post conflict activity “as those stability and support operations which are conducted in the period following conflict termination.”⁶⁷ US Army Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations*, dated 1994, stressed termination planning as an integral part of the campaign plan.⁶⁸ The same manual also stressed the importance of planning for the termination of operations also planning for the transition between phases to reach the desired termination endstate. Field Manual 100-23 reminded the reader that transitions were not always clean and were blurred between operations such as peacekeeping to peace enforcement or combat operations.⁶⁹ US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, dated 2001, described conflict termination as,

⁶⁴ Ibid, II-4.

⁶⁵ Ibid, II-4.

⁶⁶ US Government, Field Manual 101-5-1 *Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 1997), 1-37.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 1-122.

⁶⁸ US Government, Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 1994), 31.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 31.

the point at which the principal means of conflict shifts from the use or threat of use force to other means of persuasion. Conflict termination may take several forms: for example, the adversary may surrender, withdraw, or negotiate an end to the conflict. Commanders and staffs consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans. If the endstate is a situation that promotes economic growth, for example, commanders consider the effects of destroying the economic infrastructure. Regardless of how the conflict ends, it often changes into less violent, but persistent forms of confrontation.⁷⁰

Army Field Manual 3-0 observed that conflict termination was a much broader concept than merely achieving the military endstate. *Operations* dated 2001, described how the military endstate directly supports the achievement of the US national strategic endstate. Field Manual 3-0 cautioned the military planner when developing campaign plans to account for more than just reaching the military endstate. The campaign plan also describes how other elements of national power contribute to the attainment of the endstate. FM 3-0, emphasized the critical nature of post conflict phase of an operation. According to US Army Doctrine, that period began at the end of conflict and ended once the last U.S. soldier departed. According to Field Manual 3-0, during the post conflict phase the Army transforms battlefield victories into long-term strategic gains for the U.S.

The documentary evidence establishes that during the planning for OEF and OIF, more than adequate guidance was available for planning. Joint doctrine in use at the time of planning for conflict termination of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom emphasized the importance of planning for conflict termination. It clearly stressed that the method utilized to end a conflict or military intervention is important for achieving a long-term settlement that ensures that US strategic goals and interests endure. Joint doctrine also stressed the importance of a collaborative effort among the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the senior military leaders; particularly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant

⁷⁰ US Government, Field Manual 3-0 *Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of the Army, 2001), 6-87.

commander. Collaboration was key because it permitted ensures development of viable termination criteria. Unfortunately, the post September 11, 2001 focus on combat operations and regime change undermined the increased doctrinal emphasis on termination.

The September 11, 2001 attacks on US soil spurred President George W. Bush and developed an urgency to respond against the Taliban Government and Al Qaeda. US Special Operations Forces along with airpower supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to rapidly defeat and remove from power the Taliban regime. The US and United Nations assisted with the creation of a fledging interim Afghanistan Government. Initially, Operation Enduring Freedom appeared on course to achieve a successful conclusion. A rapid transfer of responsibility to the United Nations would allow the US to focus their efforts on Iraq. As result, eight years later the United States continues to maintain a brigade size or greater force in Afghanistan, and is the process of increasing the number, with no clear exit criteria. Following the dramatic fall of the Taliban Regime, Afghanistan became a forgotten war to the Bush Administration as they shifted their focus to Iraq. Consequently, the Bush Administration saw the Afghanistan operation as a successful template in terms of conflict termination, which they would later apply to Iraq with even greater complications.

In the eyes of the Bush Administration, the United States was justified in overthrowing Saddam Hussein. The administration based its justification on Saddam's continued defiance of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions following the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Additionally, the US Congress committed the US to regime change when they passed the "Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998."⁷¹ Saddam's long history of defiant acts fed into President Bush's "preemption policy", which he adopted in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. President

⁷¹ Library of Congress, "Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998", <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c105:H.R.4655.ENR>; (accessed 4 May 2009).

Bush viewed regime change as the strategic opportunity to implant democracy in Iraq.⁷² Initially, Operation Iraqi Freedom appeared to be just as successful as Operation Enduring Freedom. United States and coalition forces quickly invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam's regime. However, disjointed planning and poor execution marred the rapid success achieved during combat operations. Similar to the supposedly winning formula for Afghanistan, the US attempted to transfer quickly the of nation building task over to an outside entity. Consequently, the US strategic objectives achieved with astonishing success during major combat operations were undermined in the stability phase. In the end, the US owned responsibility for termination and nation building. Today, six years after the invasion, deployed troop strength still exceeds 100,000 troops. The US operations in Iraq lacked a clear exit strategy after 2003 but gained coherence in 2007 when the Status of Forces Agreement was signed. The Status of Forces Agreement dictates that the US will withdraw all troops by the year 2011. Despite the improved condition in Iraq, neither situation has been completely resolved. The slow resolution may be a consequence of President Bush's guiding foreign policy.

George W. Bush campaigned for the presidency in 1999 committed to avoiding no nation-building but at the same time dedicated to the spread of democracy.⁷³ These two policies may have been contradictory and may have complicated the employment of military in OEF and OIF. During the 1999 campaign, George Bush criticized President Clinton's practice of dispatching military forces to protect human rights in countries such Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁷⁴ It is perhaps ironic that he criticized President Clinton for deploying troops to Bosnia. President Bush thought Bosnia was a poor choice for military intervention especially because there was no

⁷² Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 73.

⁷³ Commission on Presidential Debates, Bush Gore Debate 11 OCT 2000, <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html> (accessed 10 April 2009).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

clear exit strategy.⁷⁵ Secretary State Colin Powell were later coined the term “the Pottery Barn Principle” to describe the responsibility of the USG to own the problem if they intervene in a country to overthrow the regime.⁷⁶ President George W. Bush’s firm stance against nation building reflects a long-standing US policy of leaving nation building and peacekeeping to the United Nations. President Bush’s strong desire to avoid nation building clearly affected planning for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The US strategic goals developed for Afghanistan were limited to the Taliban government and destroying Al Qaeda. There was no mention of nation building. Additionally, Secretary Rumsfeld pressured General Franks, the commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) to develop a plan that could be executed quickly.⁷⁷ The approved USCENTCOM plan called for a combination of air and missile strikes coupled along with the insertion of Special Forces and CIA Paramilitary Teams to work with the Northern Alliance.⁷⁸ General Franks developed a four-phased plan. Phase IV was titled “Establish capacity of coalition partners to prevent the reemergence of terrorism and provide support for humanitarian assistance”.⁷⁹ Because senior Bush officials were mindful of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, the US would fight a different war than fought by the Soviets.⁸⁰ US officials focused on employing only a small force exploiting and exploiting high tech weaponry to accomplish the mission quickly and to redeploy, thus avoiding the label of occupier. The US intended to conduct the combat operations and then hand over the reins to the United Nations to

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 71.

⁷⁷ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 43.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 98.

⁷⁹ Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*, (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 270-272.

conduct nation building. The Bush Administration envisioned the deployment of a UN force into Kabul to secure the capital and to provide security, while other UN elements helped the Afghans stand up a new government.⁸¹ As was the case in Haiti in 1994 US senior leadership viewed termination operations responsibility of the United Nations. This view was also extended to the invasion of Iraq.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks began examining plans for intervention in Iraq in December 2001.⁸² At the time, General Franks reviewed US Central Command's plan 1003, which called for a long slow build up of forces in theater followed by an attack to defeat the Iraq military and topple Saddam's Regime. That plan called for approximately 500,000 troops and a massive amount of armor units.⁸³ Because Rumsfeld and Franks were impressed by the swiftness of success in Afghanistan, which in their minds validated the strategy of employing high technology with a small amount of ground troops, they began to rewrite the plans to focus on a lighter agile force emphasizing speed and technology.⁸⁴ Later, the approved hybrid plan labeled 1003V combined both a "running start option" with a generated start option". This plan involved the introduction of approximately 210,000 troops into Iraq. The intent was to swiftly drive to Baghdad to seize the capital, and in turn to collapse the Iraqi regime. General Frank's plan envisioned four phases. Phase V defined post hostilities and focused on termination.⁸⁵ The key to the success of General Frank's plan was predicted on the rapid establishment of a new Iraqi

⁸⁰ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 53.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 231.

⁸² Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*, (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 315.

⁸³ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 4.

⁸⁴ Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 67.

⁸⁵ Polo Step Slides, "Modified Plan" Timeline slide 5.

Government. Both Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks envisioned a non-DOD agency or the United Nations assisting the Iraqi populace with this task.

USCENTCOM further subdivided the Phase IV operations into three sub phases entitled Phase IVA during which the land component commander was in charge, Phase IVB was a transition to a new Coalition Joint Task Force. The final Phase, Phase IVC, was to be led by a new Iraqi Government.⁸⁶ CENTCOM plan anticipated the total duration of Phase IV to be 45 months.⁸⁷ Within this period, CENTCOM anticipated the transfer from US control to Iraqi Government after approximately 27th months. After the transfer the US would provide security assistance to the new Iraqi Government.⁸⁸ Some of the key tasks included in the briefing slides for Phase IV were support for the establishment of a new government of Iraq; ensuring the territorial integrity of the borders, the transfer of civil-military operations to international government organizations, non-governmental organizations and the host nation, and support for establishment of new Iraqi armed forces.⁸⁹ The USCENTCOM plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom based termination on a rapid turnover of power to the Iraqi Government.

During planning for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, General Franks focused his energy on major combat operations. He paid little attention to either post combat operations or termination. He was reported to have told DOD and the Joint Chiefs, “you pay attention to the day after and I will pay attention to the day” his term for the removal of Saddam.⁹⁰ Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks were fixated on Phases I-III and their fixation also affected the military planners. A majority of the intellectual energy in both USCENTCOM and CFLCCC

⁸⁶ Ibid, 73.

⁸⁷ OPERATION POLO STEP, Phase IV Actions Slide, 94.

⁸⁸ OPERATION POLO STEP, Phase IV Actions Slide, 94.

⁸⁹ OPERATION POLO STEP SLIDES , Phase IV Operations Slide, 16.

staffs focused on planning for Phases I-III, with a bulk of their time spent on Phase III major combat operations. Consequently, post combat operations and termination criteria for Phase IV suffered. The other problem was that when CENTCOM and CFLCC attempted to focus their efforts on Phase IV, they were constantly reacting to questions from both the President and the Security of Defense about other matters.⁹¹ Because staff could not focus on post hostility actions, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command did not publish its Phase IV plan named Eclipse II until April 12, 2003; a week after Coalition forces entered Baghdad.⁹² Both Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks were committed to upholding President Bush's stated policy of not using the US military for nation building. General Frank's failure to assume responsibility for termination was in direct conflict with doctrine.⁹³

There are two possible explanations for General Frank's failure to attend to termination. First, General Franks had no experience in either peacekeeping or stability operations in Bosnia or Kosovo and as a result had no frame of reference to understand the complexities of these types of operations.⁹⁴ Secondly, General Franks shared the disdain for stability operations and nation building held by his boss Secretary Rumsfeld.⁹⁵ In both theaters, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks were intent on conducting major combat operations with the fewest number of troops possible. During Phase IV, of the plan the troop strength would rapidly decrease.⁹⁶ Secretary

⁹⁰ Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 70.

⁹¹ Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 70-71.

⁹² *Ibid*, 77.

⁹³ US Government, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2001), III-24.

⁹⁴ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 25.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 25.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 459.

Rumsfeld and General Franks justified the reduction in US troop strength by their conviction other entities would fill the void. The Bush Administration planned to hand off termination in Afghanistan to the United Nations. In Iraq, Rumsfeld and Franks placed the responsibility for termination on the Iraqis themselves. These major assumptions later proved false and came back to haunt the United States. The key assumption for post war Iraq anticipated employing the Iraqi army and police to assist with security and reconstruction. This assumption also proved false when the police melted away after the invasion and the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army. The US plan gambled heavily and lost on the ability of the Iraqi security forces to provide law in order in order to enable the establishment of a new Iraqi government.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Bush Administration appeared to solve the problem of termination and nation building by transferring operations to the United Nations and NATO. The US placed its faith in a quick and smooth transition to stability operations under UN and NATO control. Because the Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan, instituted 5 December 2001 seemed to guarantee the transfer of authority. The Agreement called for the creation of an interim government. The Bonn Agreement also called for the establishment of an International Security Force to not only train a new Afghan Police and military force, but also a UN Mandated Force to provide security in Kabul and the surrounding areas as necessary to set the conditions conducive to the growth of the fledging Afghanistan Government. The Bonn Agreement also called for the international community of nations to provide support monetary support and otherwise to assist the rebuilding of Afghanistan.⁹⁷ The Bonn Agreement on the surface appeared to solve the Bush Administration's termination problem. However, the problem with the Bonn agreement was that

⁹⁷ Provisions of the Bonn Afghanistan Agreement, (<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>, accessed 7 MAR 2009).

not all countries who pledged to provide support did so, which left the United States with a great deal more responsibility for stability tasks than originally anticipated.⁹⁸

The problem created by the Bonn Agreement was an International Security Force that did not have enough combat power to affect security outside of the confines of Kabul. Additionally, there were no significant Afghan national police or military forces after the Taliban were overthrown. In most areas, the only authority was the local warlord who employed his own army to control his territory. Thus, as the United States attempted to draw down forces, it was stuck with maintaining a sizeable force (approximately two combat brigades) to provide security for the cities of Kandahar and Bagram. As a result, two distinct organizations operated side by side with similar tasks. The US led Coalition Joint Task Force conducted stability operations outside of Kabul, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO command conducted stability operations in the area of Kabul City. The United States expectation that the Bonn agreement meant the United Nations would conduct nation building and termination operations was never realized. The shortfalls in the Bonn agreement required the United States to extend its presence in Afghanistan and has revealed the shortcomings of the concept of termination.

Absent a Bonn Agreement for Iraq, President Bush designated the Department of Defense the primary lead for post war Iraq in National Security Presidential Directive 24 issued in January 2003. Up until this point General Franks had assumed that the Department of State had the lead for post war Iraq.⁹⁹ In an effort to make up for the neglect to plan for Phase IV, Rumsfeld rapidly established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on 20 January 2003, which was only 60 days prior to the start of the Iraq invasion.¹⁰⁰ In the time that

⁹⁸ William Flavin, "Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan", (23 March 2002), 13.

⁹⁹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II*, (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 138.

¹⁰⁰ Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 149.

remained, Jay Garner scrambled to put together a staff and develop a campaign plan for what would take place in Iraq. From the start, ORHA's planning was hamstrung. ORHA was short staff and had too little time to develop a coherent plan.¹⁰¹ Also hampering planning was ORHA's newness itself. US government agencies did not understand ORHA's role. According to *On Point II*, "the US Government did not anticipate that ORHA would become the headquarters of the occupying power charged with upholding The Hague and Geneva Conventions."¹⁰²

Jay Garner understood that his main role was to avert a humanitarian crisis like the one he dealt with at the end of Desert Storm and to assist the Iraqis in their efforts to restore governance.¹⁰³

In reality, ORHA became the lead agent for restoring Iraqi governance. However, Secretary Rumsfeld provided Jay Garner little guidance from on how to assist the Iraqis with creating a new government, let alone guidance on repairing and rebuilding infrastructure.¹⁰⁴ The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance efforts were delayed from the start because of a deteriorating security situation following the overthrow of Saddam. The deteriorating security situation is directly attributable to the decision by Rumsfeld and Franks to use employ a small number of troops and to rely on Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army for security. In reality once coalition forces toppled Saddam's Regime, the standing police force and army dissolved, leaving a security vacuum, which the coalition was unable to fill.¹⁰⁵ The absence of law and order precipitated large scale looting and caused substantial damage to the infrastructure

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 152.

¹⁰² Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 151.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 151.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 150.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 79.

in Iraq; estimated at approximately \$12 billion US.¹⁰⁶ The security vacuum and violence prevented ORHA from making progress toward restoration of Iraqi governance, and that in turn prolonged termination efforts.

Because ORHA found it difficult to make progress, it only lasted a total of four months. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replaced the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance on May 12, 2003. The Bush Administration entrusted the CPA with running the country. Their goal was to transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqis as soon as possible. The CPA was in control of the country from 12 May 2003 until 28 June 2004, at which time sovereignty was transferred to a new interim Iraqi Government. The initial disjointed nature of planning for post war appears to have resulted from the US Department of Defense's continued ambivalence toward nation building.¹⁰⁷ President Bush's decision to create the CPA was significant in that it signaled to the world community that the US would finally assume responsibility for Iraq as an occupying power under the Hague and the Geneva Convention until the installation of a new Iraqi Government.¹⁰⁸ The creation of the CPA was also important for termination because it finally signified a determined effort to move the process of termination forward.

The US planning for termination operations in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrated the intent to handover termination to either the United Nations or the local government. This expectation was rooted in the US foreign policy and reflected United States reluctance to the US military and for nation building. The senior military and civilian leaders were focused on combat operations against terrorist cells. Ultimately, the United States was forced to create organizations

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 91.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 70.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 153.

to provide for nation building. Additionally, despite foreign policy rhetoric, US military forces were forced to conduct nation-building operations out of necessity.

Conclusion

A review of US military interventions aimed at regime change since 1989 reveals that foreign policy decisions prevented clear definition for termination. Consequently, because senior US military leaders disliked nation building, they used this unclear termination guidance as justification to avoid their obligation to properly plan for termination.

The foreign policies of Presidents George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush promoted global democracy. However, President George W. Bush insisted that the military would not conduct nation building. President Bush's aversion to nation building presumed that the US would quickly transfer the responsibility for nation building to some other entity once a government was overthrown. As a result, senior US military leaders used President Bush's foreign decision as reason to neglect termination and instead focus on combat operations. Senior military leaders neglect for termination planning is in direct conflict with Joint Doctrine. The senior military leader ought not neglect the responsibility to plan for termination because of transient political reasons. He has a duty to the President and the Secretary of Defense to inform the national leadership when a decision to terminate runs counter to the United States' interests. Likewise, the senior military leader has a duty to inform the president concerning the affect of legal obligations on termination. An effective discussion about termination between the senior military leaders and the President and the Secretary of defense is predicated on good civil-military relations.

Planning for conflict termination and achieving termination will continue to challenge the senior leaders of the United States in the coming years. This challenge will not get any easier particularly in the complex present day world. The September 11, 2001 attacks upon the US forever changed the world's dynamics and complicated termination planning.

Termination operations will not be easy, as evidenced by the review of the United States involvement in Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Historically, a national impatience to get things done quickly is one of the most formidable forces affecting termination planning as David Halberstam details in *War and a Time of Peace*. The lessons learned from these operations provide valuable insight into the challenges of termination planning and execution.

Because termination is ultimately a political decision, it is possible in the future that the US will repeat the same mistakes as cited in the case studies. However, it is incumbent upon the military planner to develop viable termination criteria. Joint doctrine and US Army are both a valuable source of information to assist with planning termination. The planner must make honest effort to ensure the military endstate is nested with the strategic endstate for an operation. The planning team must avoid basing termination solely on a timetable. A prudent planner should consider an exit strategy tied to realistic benchmarks instead of a time based approach.

Lastly, the planning team must avoid assuming that someone else will take care of termination. Military planners must presume the worst-case scenario, one in which the US is responsible for nation building. The planning headquarters must realize that nation building is not easy and requires a significant commitment of troops and capital for an extended period. Because nation building is complex, the planning effort must involve a whole of government approach. Even in a best-case situation where another entity accepts responsibility for termination, the US has a responsibility to set the conditions for the transfer of authority. Regardless, the US has an obligation to monitor termination progress and must be prepared to intervene to ensure US goals endure.

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