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*Chapter 1*

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# **Conditions of Terrorism**

*Kent Hughes Butts*

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Since the end of the Cold War, the primary threat to United States' national security interests has been regional instability. In the absence of superpower influence and guidance, long suppressed religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, and territorial issues began to surface and threatened the continued governance and stability of regional states. At the same time, economic and military support from the superpowers was greatly reduced, as was the capacity of regional states to build and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their people. As they struggled to meet the demands placed on the political system, developing country governments became more vulnerable to criticism from dissident, separatist, and religious groups, and the rise of extremist ideology. Some states, Afghanistan for example, failed and were taken over by groups with extremist ideologies and a willingness to use violence to promote their views and attack their enemies. The United States (U.S.), its citizens and overseas interests, and its allies have been attacked by terrorists from these groups. Addressing this problem requires the coordinated application of diplomatic, development and defense resources and the renewed effort to promote regional stability.

The problem of regional stability and terrorism is complex; its solution will require the application of all of the elements of U.S. national power in support of a national combating terrorism strategy that is based upon clear and unambiguous policy guidance. In the United States it has proven easier, and more popular politically to undertake military operations to attack and disrupt obvious terrorist targets than to initiate multilateral diplomatic and developmental efforts to win the struggle of ideology and diminish the underlying issues that terrorists seek to exploit. The military of the United States is vastly superior to the armed elements of the terrorist organizations and with the support of intelligence, financial, and law enforcement agencies, it has successfully exercised its global reach to strike terrorist bases and those governments that support terrorists. However, both history and the current

effort have shown that is rarely, if ever possible to defeat terrorism using the military alone. Moreover, the military option often entails régime change that is both a lengthy and costly process, and makes the United States vulnerable to the strategic communication of its enemies, who successfully use military intervention to recruit new terrorists.

As attractive and valuable as the attack and disrupt option may be, it fails to address the issues of regional instability that provide justification for extremist ideology. Striking deep at terrorist targets and protecting the homeland are indispensable concepts for any strategy to address terrorism, yet they do not bring the full array of U.S. interagency or partner nation resources to bear upon the problems of regional instability and ideological persuasion. To be successful, the U.S. combating terrorism policy must include the synchronized use of defense, diplomacy, and development to address the multiple elements of a combating terrorism strategy, to include the underlying conditions that foster terrorism.

The importance of addressing regional instability and the underlying conditions of terrorism was recognized by the 9/11 Commission in their report, and by the U.S. Congress. As stated by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Richard G. Lugar,

“U.S. national security interests will be threatened by sustained instability. The war on terrorism necessitates that we not leave nations crumbling and ungoverned. Our tolerance for failed states has been reduced by a global war against terrorists. We have already seen how terrorists can exploit nations afflicted by lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out such places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and tap into a black market where all kinds of weapons are for sale.”<sup>1</sup>

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), written by the National Security Council (NSC), was the basis upon which all agencies were to frame their concepts on how to address the terrorist threat.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard G. Lugar, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, February 26, 2004.

The NSCT has four pillars: *defeat* terrorists and their organizations; *deny* sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; *diminish* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and *defend* U. S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.<sup>2</sup> Known colloquially as the Four Ds, these pillars are reflected in supporting documentation to include the National Military Strategy. Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld undertook a critical review of the NSCT and the results of the ongoing global war on terror, found it wanting, and directed the Joint Staff to prepare an alternative concept. A chief requirement was that the new concept clearly establish leadership for each of its elements.

The new Defense Department concept, called the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), has three pillars: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorists; and counter ideological support for terrorism.<sup>3</sup> The latter element, the wording of which is being modified, addresses the underlying conditions of terrorism, and clarifies why diminishing these conditions is essential to winning the global struggle against the extremist ideology of terrorism. The NMSP-WOT was briefed directly to the President, who approved it. Formally adopted by Secretary Rumsfeld in March 2005, and presented by the Secretary of State at the Principals Committee meeting in May, it now appears that a form of this new document will displace the NSCT. It is expected to underpin the U.S. combating terrorism efforts for the remainder of the Bush Administration. A much needed National Security Presidential Directive that clarifies responsibilities and authorities is expected soon and will reflect the NMSP-WOT.

The importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism is nowhere more compelling than at the regional level where instability threatens U.S. national security interests. Although leaders of many terrorist organizations are from the ranks of the educated, the foot soldiers of terrorism, and the people who overthrow weak governments are often drawn from the deprived masses of failed and failing states. While the United States

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<sup>2</sup> National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003: 11-12.

<sup>3</sup> Various interviews with DOD personnel, also "Plan of attack: The Pentagon has a secret new strategy for taking on terrorists," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 1, 2005.

may have been successful in its efforts to attack and disrupt key terrorist organizations, lack of development and resulting shortfalls in the legitimacy of governance continue to provide terrorist organizations a feeding ground of frustration and futility that is replenishing their numbers faster than the United States can diminish them. This point is examined in greater detail in Chapter 2, *Ideological Support: Attacking the Critical Linkage* by Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, recently retired Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, who said, “This war is a war of ideas, fought on a cultural frontier. Winning the hearts and minds of local populations is far more important than killing or capturing people.”<sup>4</sup>

If the new NMSP-WOT is to be successful in gaining the support of regional partner states then it must overcome barriers associated with the description of the enemy as the Islamic extremists. In the heavily Muslim region of South East Asia where terrorists have attacked western hotels and targeted U.S. embassies, the consistent point of contention between regional states and the United States remains the U.S. approach to combating terror. By its very phrasing, the global war on terror runs counter to the approach of the region’s governments and beliefs of their people. In the eyes of Southeast Asian states, the U.S. strategic communication concerning terrorism defines a war or “crusade,” of the largely Christian West against Islam. The constant use of the term “Islamic extremists” instead of “ideological extremists” to describe terrorists elicits emotional responses from well-educated military and civilian leaders, as well as the working-class populations of the region.<sup>5</sup>

The states of the region, both Muslim and Buddhist, do not perceive a significant Al Qaeda terrorist threat. They see a region of multiple separatist movements where violence has long been applied against state governments. While they acknowledge the presence of the Al Qaeda franchise Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and its well-known objective of a Muslim caliphate, they do not

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<sup>4</sup> Wallace C. Gregson, remarks delivered June 8, 2005 at the *Addressing the Conditions that Foster Terrorism Symposium*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

<sup>5</sup> Interviews by the author with senior military leaders and the faculty of the senior service colleges of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, June 13-25, 2005.

perceive JI as a significant threat to their governments, nor do they fear JI taking over the existing separatist organizations. The governments do not want to be publicly associated with the United States in a war on terror as they believe it will erode their popularity and enhance the appeal of JI and Al Qaeda. Moreover, they believe that the United States' heavy emphasis on the attack and disrupt element of combating terrorism creates more terrorists than it eliminates and reinforces the belief in the Muslim community that the U. S. is leading a war on Islam.<sup>6</sup>

Instead, military and civilian leaders of the region emphasize the need for the U.S. to lead an effort to diminish the underlying conditions of terrorism and win the ideological struggle. In June 2005, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said, "I believe that we can address the problem of extremism and terrorism by delivering better and more widespread development."<sup>7</sup> The moderate Abdullah pointed out that "Poverty and inequality prevails in many parts of the Muslim world with high illiteracy rates, lack of human development and poor infrastructure." In arguing that the fruits of development must be shared by all, Abdullah emphasized, "Economic success is a major factor in raising the dignity of the Muslim world and their voice at the global level."<sup>8</sup> While it is increasingly popular in the United States in discussions of combating terrorism to dismiss poverty, illiteracy and lack of economic development as causes of terrorism, making the assumption that terrorists are ideologically sophisticated, educated elites, like those who attacked the trade towers, Southeast Asian leaders disagree. Republic of the Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo makes the case for a balanced approach to terrorism that emphasizes the need to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism; "We have to fight poverty in the places where they can recruit their supporters."<sup>9</sup> This theme is reiterated in the Republic of the Philippines' plan for

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Speech at the United Malays National Organization Annual General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 20, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> William Green, "Family Comes Last," Interview with Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. *TIME Asia*, June 6, 2005: 27.

internal security and combating terrorism document.<sup>10</sup> This phenomenon is not limited to Southeast Asia. In the North Caucasus, where some republics have 80 percent unemployment and the per capita gross domestic product is half that of Russia, poverty and other socioeconomic issues are driving the populace into rebel organizations with ties to international Islamic terrorist groups. In the words of Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexi Malashenko, "Fundamentalist Islam is a form of social protest."<sup>11</sup> The importance of economic development to combating terrorism is made clear by Leif Rosenberger in Chapter 5, *Towards a Socio-Economic Struggle Against Violent Extremism*.

As human rights over-watch groups are quick to point out, none of the governments of Southeast Asia are reluctant to use direct military action against suspected terrorists. However, these countries recognize the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism to maintaining governmental legitimacy and denying terrorist ideology a fertile ground. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are veterans of successful campaigns against insurgency. These countries all have well-developed military programs to win the trust, confidence and respect of their people that focus on development and eradicating poverty. Malaysia, in particular, was most effective in this regard against the Communist insurgency.

Governments recognize that there is an Al Qaeda element to the terrorist organizations operating in the region. Nevertheless, they do not believe that the Al Qaeda/JI influence is as pervasive as the Western press and governments make it seem, and want to address it in their own, low-key way. The countries of the region are quite willing to work with the United States on either socioeconomic or military approaches to the terrorist threat. However, they are reluctant to accept U.S. assistance if it is to be provided in the well publicized context of a global war on terror. They will receive the assistance positively if it is packaged as part of an effort to address transna-

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<sup>10</sup> National Internal Security Plan (v4.0), Republic of the Philippines Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, Malacanang, Manila, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Neil Buckley, "Insurgency in North Caucasus Spreads Out from Chechnya: Poverty and Heavy-handed Security Forces are Boosting Support for Islamist Rebel Groups," *Financial Times*, 9 August 2005, p4

tional threats, such as illegal arms and drugs smuggling, trade in humans, and illegal logging.<sup>12</sup> A particularly compelling examination of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia and the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism with the resources of the U.S. interagency community is provided in Chapter 3, *The Regional Dimension of Combating Terrorism*, by the U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Burma, Shari Villarosa.

### **Benefits of Addressing the Underlying Conditions**

Most regions are threatened by some form of natural disaster that will require government planning and management, or the response of multiple governmental agencies, to include the military. Preparing for and properly managing these threats can build governmental and military legitimacy, win the hearts and minds of the people and deny terrorist support, resources and operating areas. The 26 December 2004 tsunami had a significant positive impact on the U.S. image and the politics of combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. No nation was harder hit than Indonesia, where the loss of human life is estimated at 131,000 with over 37,000 listed as missing. Over 450,000 remain homeless and 90,000 people are still living in refugee camps or tents.<sup>13</sup> In Banda Aceh, nearly 25 percent of the 300,000 population died in the tsunami.<sup>14</sup> Aceh Province had already suffered from years of violence associated with the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The ability of the United States and other donor countries and organizations to rapidly respond to the massive devastation and subsequently depart in a timely fashion built substantial goodwill and eroded support for the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiah. The spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir, said that as a result of the U.S. military relief effort, he was losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, JI's legitimacy was further eroded when his predictions that Western military forces would

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<sup>12</sup> Interviews by the author with senior military leaders and the faculty of the senior service colleges of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, June 13-25, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Tini Tran, "Road to Recovery," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 26, 2005: A6

<sup>14</sup> Harry Bhaskara, "Acehnese Bemoan the Slow Reconstruction," *The Jakarta Post*. June 21, 2005: 5.

<sup>15</sup> Mark Dodd, "Western Aid Winning Hearts," *News.com.au*, January 12, 2005.

use the tsunami as an excuse to establish permanent bases in the region were proven false. In polls taken in Indonesia subsequent to the relief effort, the popularity of Al Qaeda dropped 20 percent while the positive perception of the United States rose over 30 percent.<sup>16</sup>

The tsunami response demonstrated the value to combating terrorism of addressing the underlying conditions that undermine governmental legitimacy and promote the adoption of radical ideology. Governments have fallen due to their inability to respond effectively to the demands placed upon the political system by natural disasters. U.S. combatant command (COCOM) programs dedicated to building the capacity of host nation militaries to address disaster management and other underlying conditions make a major contribution to the objectives of combating terrorism. Because the threat is transnational in nature, it requires a unity of effort and dedication of interagency, international, and donor communities, which, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have substantial resources. The resulting lines of communication and coordination between the host nation and international and NGO organizations increases the effectiveness of the nation in addressing many other issues critical to its perceived legitimacy, builds multilateral cooperation, and decreases the potential for regional instability. Addressing these underlying conditions broadens the support to civilian authority by the military, enhancing the legitimacy of both the military and that of the newly democratic government, while promoting multinational cooperation between regional militaries. As coordinator of the capacity building effort, the U.S. combatant command gains invaluable access, influence, and the opportunity to enhance both interoperability and the capabilities of partner nation militaries.

Nowhere is the potential greater for strengthening the U.S. effort to diminish the underlying conditions of terrorism than in the area of development. Highlighted repeatedly in the U.S. National Security Strategy as a major weapon in the war on terror, the resource of development has yet to be fully integrated into the U.S. combating terrorism program. When Prime

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with Dr. Ermaya Suradinata, Governor, National Resilience Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia, June 21, 2005.

Minister Abdullah said that widespread development could address extremists and terrorism, he was not alone. The 9/11 Commission Report makes the same point, “Backward economic policies and repressive political régimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and national passions have no constructive outlet.”<sup>17</sup> Lack of development creates breeding grounds for terrorism, challenges the legitimacy of governments whose economies and education systems cannot keep pace with their rapid population growth, and creates internal instability that is easily exploited by antigovernment elements and ideological extremists. Addressing the developmental needs of fragile states, particularly those with large, illiterate Muslim populations, is an effective way for the United States to deny sanctuary, recruits, and financing to terrorist organizations. In Chapter 4, *The Role of Development in Combating Terror*, Elizabeth Kvitashvili clarifies the contributions that are being made by this powerful national security resource and highlights the potential for interagency collaboration between the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U. S. Defense Department (DoD) in regions vulnerable to extremist ideology.

### **Strategic Communication**

Perhaps the most powerful element of any effort to address the underlying conditions of terrorism is strategic communication. Correcting the perception that the United States does not value the interests of its partner countries and practices a unilateral foreign policy directed against the interests of the Muslim community will require more than action; it will require words of persuasion that reflect the regional interests of other states. The U.S. does not have a strategic communication strategy that skillfully manages its message to the world. The lead for strategic communication for the United States global war on terror has changed frequently. Numerous organizations and entities have recently been established within the U.S. government to coordinate, integrate and synchronize U.S. strategic themes and messages. Among these are the Office of Global Communication and several policy planning committees under the leadership of the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Unfortunately, and

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<sup>17</sup> 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004: 378.

for a variety of reasons, all of these have failed to implement a national strategic communication plan. In fact, a Defense Science Board study published in September 2004 states that U.S. strategic communication is “in crisis.”<sup>18</sup> There appears to be no strategy controlling what is being developed as the informational component of the War on Terrorism. What should the U.S. message be if it is to successfully use strategic communication to fight the War on Terror?

There should be two elements to the Combating Terrorism (CT) Strategic Communication Plan: domestic and international. Although the U.S. has done well in preventing another domestic terrorist attack since September 11, 2001, other attacks are inevitable. The government needs to prepare the American people for the eventuality of another terrorist attack in order to prevent citizens from overreacting and behaving in ways that promote panic or complicate the government’s ability to manage the crisis. In addition, the administration should endeavor to promote a clear understanding of why other countries and their interests matter to the security of the United States. Popular support for international development funding has been cyclical at best and foreign aid spending is often used against congressional incumbents running for reelection. It is time to educate the American people on the substantial return on investment gleaned from the relatively modest development assistance required to diminish underlying conditions and enhance regional stability. The resulting understanding will be essential if a long-term program to combat terrorism is to be sustained.

Far more important to the U.S. combating terrorism effort is the international message. The U.S. government has characterized the current war on terror in a way that identifies the threat as exclusively Islamic, attempting to define terrorists as Islamic extremists willing to use violence for political ends. This characterization suggests that religion is the basis of terror and greatly complicates the ability of the U.S. to reach out to moderate Muslims whom strategists view as the center of gravity in the War on Terror. This characterization limits the focus of terror to Islamic organizations

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<sup>18</sup> *Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington DC, December 2004: 71.

with a global reach while ignoring regional organizations that use terror as a weapon and the organized crime, drug, and illegal arms organizations whose lines of communication support Islamic terrorists.

In order to win the struggle of ideologies, the Strategic Communication Plan needs to fight the world's perception that the West is undertaking a war on Islam and which sees the U.S. as an avenger rather than a champion of human rights and democracy. Because the message is framed by U.S. strategic documents, language such as, "The United States and its partners will disrupt and degrade the ability of terrorists to act, and compel supporters of terrorism to cease and desist,"<sup>19</sup> should be avoided. Instead framers of the Strategic Communication Plan should be circumspect in how they communicate the message while seeking regional cultural perspectives and asking moderate Muslim leaders what form it must take and substance it must contain if it is to help them stand against the appeal of radical ideology. Currently, Egypt provides critical support to the U.S. mission of projecting power overseas; will Egypt be willing to execute this mission in a few years? The primary enablers for the international CT effort are the friends and allies of the United States. If U.S. policies and the Strategic Communication Plan are not maintaining those partnerships, there will be trouble ahead.

Because the Strategic Communication Plan must address the long, as well as the short term dimensions of the CT effort, its tenets should influence the development and execution of other CT activities. As with all political activities, it should: capture the moral high ground; be explained relentlessly; win critical allies to the U.S. side; and guide the planning of all elements of national power. If the United States executes a Strategic Communication Plan against terrorism with the priority, accountability, and thoroughness of the effort to reform social security, it will enjoy overwhelming success against extremist ideology.

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<sup>19</sup> National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003: 15.

## Interagency Process

There are several things that can be done to improve the interagency CT process. One could argue that the War on Terror is less about military actions and more about criminal activities with political purpose. U.S. National Security architecture was not organized for this purpose. An excellent summary of the need to modernize this architecture and facilitate the interagency process is provided by Clark Murdock and Michele Fluorney in Chapter 6, *Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus*. To be successful without a further, large scale reorganization of government, several elements must be in place. Any combating terrorism strategy must be based upon a clear and marketable vision. The supporting strategies should look into the future and identify proactive measures that will aggressively bring the vision to fruition using all of the elements of national power. Strong leadership must come from the highest level, naming a clear leader of the CT effort with the authority to hold the interagency community accountable for executing these proactive tenets. If this is not done, then the War on Terror will be reactive, unsuccessful and the generator of unintended economic, ideological and political consequences that will hurt other U.S. interests. Moreover, a reactive strategy results in failures that create intense public pressure for new organizations intended to correct the failures. All too often, these organizations complicate an already complex architecture, dilute the application of scarce resources and become another ineffective element of bureaucracy. Chapter 8, *Strengthening the Interagency and Maximizing its Effort in Combating Terrorism*, by Bert Tussing, examines the process for coordinating the U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism and identifies new ideas for maximizing cooperation within the interagency community.

Long term strategic planning in support of a national CT vision, requires that principal leaders focus on long-term threats to U.S. national security interests. The trend in recent years had been for the highest level leaders to spend a disproportionate amount of their time managing crises. This is due in part, to the “CNN effect”. The focus of the media on the crisis of the day, and the fact that many lawmakers run for office on a platform of domestic issues first, means that it is difficult to develop the political will and capital

to address long-term foreign policy issues, such as combating terrorism. This approach ensures a reactive effort that is doomed to failure. Success requires the use of the corporate model, wherein companies regularly hold-off sites to identify future threats and create strategic plans that array corporate resources to achieve the corporate vision and deal with these threats. Crisis management should be delegated down, freeing up top-level leader time to address long term threats and keep a crisis from occurring. The importance of strategic planning in the process for combating terrorism is articulated in Chapter 7, *Strategies for the War on Terrorism*. This chapter examines existing and evolving strategies for the war on terrorism and develops the recommendations to improve them.

With the current reorganization of the NSC, and the ongoing Principals' Committee meetings to address CT policy, the potential exists for the NSC to establish itself as the strong leader of the U.S. CT process. A reorganized and prioritized U.S. CT process will allow for a proactive approach and the effective use of all elements of national power. This is essential if the U.S. is to focus on other, salient emerging threats that are potentially much more significant to U.S. national security. The world is getting more complicated and organizing the proactive management of such emerging threats as China, South America, Taiwan and Africa will require a national security community focus that is not constantly distracted by the terrorist threat.

The success or failure of any efforts to improve the interagency process in dealing with CT will be determined at the regional level where the execution and impact of policy will be measured. Executing proactive CT measures at a regional level will require deftness and the authority to overcome a country-centric diplomatic structure. A regional ombudsman with significant political stature and close ties to the President may be required to overcome the state focus, provide the pull from the region necessary to overcome bureaucratic inertia in Washington, and ensure a transnational focus. This person would work closely with the regional bureaus but ultimately be responsible for crafting strategies that utilize a menu of interagency CT capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat as it is manifest within that unique region and multilateral in nature. Regardless of who leads, measures of effectiveness should be emplaced to identify elements of the strategies with

potential. How can the United States best design a regional strategy process and allocate the most appropriate elements of national power against the terrorist threat? In chapter 9, *A Process for Regional Cooperation*, Dennis Murphy and John Traylor provide broad recommendations to improve the regional CT process and overcome obstacles to translating interagency cooperation within the Beltway to cooperative efforts in the field.

## Summary

The Cold War was won with a balanced strategy that emphasized diplomacy, economic might, intelligence, strategic communication and development to win the ideological battle, as much as it was by military might. The early U.S. effort to defeat terrorism with military action sent a strong signal and partially decapitated the highest profile terrorist organizations. However, the limits to this approach are now widely recognized and a new strategy and interagency process are guiding the most informed efforts to enhance the U.S. CT process. The new strategy recognizes that the essential ideological struggle can only succeed if the United States addresses the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and wins the battle for trust, confidence and respect of the regional states. Such an emphasis will also create regional stability, preserve newly democratic states, and build legitimacy for those governments and the ideology of freedom and democracy. This volume reflects an effort to encourage informed discussions on the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism and how the U.S. interagency community could most effectively use the elements of national power to successfully combat terrorism. The Principals Committee is meeting to determine the policy and strategy of the second G.W. Bush administration's CT effort. These meetings are taking place at a time of change and recognition that the struggle against terrorism will require diplomatic and developmental programs as well as the indispensable military dimension, and the support of partner nations. New organizations such as the National Counterterrorism Center; the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State Department; and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation of USAID have been created to deal with elements of combating terrorism, and their most effi-

cient application is being discussed at the highest levels. Moreover, the new administration has evidenced a renewed interest in working with friends and allies to develop cooperative approaches to common national security threats. The authors of this volume hope that its findings will make a positive contribution to these processes.

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*Chapter 2*

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**Ideological Support:  
Attacking the Critical Linkage**

*Wallace C. Gregson*

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### **Ideological Support: Attacking the Critical Linkage**

**Wallace C. Gregson**

Clausewitz said that the most important task of the leader is to understand the enterprise, to understand its true nature.<sup>1</sup> This global war on terror has a popular label, a political label, but it is not accurate. Terrorism is a means of power projection, a weapon, a tool of war. This is no more a war on terrorism than World War II was a war on submarines. This is not merely semantics. Words have meaning, and these words are leading us to the wrong concept. United States (U.S.) strategists attempting to defeat the terrorist threat to the U.S. must first understand its nature. Refining the problem and using the appropriate elements of national power to address its center of gravity will bring measurable success and support from partner nations.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, tactically and operationally, we have never been better. Our junior leadership is able to adapt and innovate on the fly. Conventional units are doing tasks reserved for special operations years ago. Corporals integrate fire team fire and maneuver with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) in real time. We routinely move small cities of populations in and out of theater with complex relief in place operations under fire. We are winning battles, but what about the war? Is the enemy weaker, or are our actions missing the center of gravity of the enemy and bolstering its ideological strength?

#### **Understanding the Enemy**

The current threat is an insurgency, a popular movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence, subversion, propaganda, terrorism or other military action. But it is different from the nationalist insurgencies the United States has fought in the past. This one is global, and thoroughly

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<sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984, 88.

networked, as a result of modern technology. It is ideologically driven, fundamentalist and extremist. The key insurgent leaders are Muslim, but they do not speak for Islam. They threaten to hijack Islam for their purposes. All insurgencies have local or national aims and grievances. But a new class of regional and global actors has emerged and linked these movements in a global network. It's a network of ideology, financiers, document forgers, transportation experts, propagandists, family relationships, cultural groups, operations experts, logisticians, and others. It does include Al-Qa'eda, Jemaah Islamiah, and other affiliated "theater" movements. Their jihad is a confederation of movements exploited and linked by regional and global fundamentalist extremist insurgents. They "think globally and act locally."

The enemy has a powerful virtual component as the primary method of internal and external communication. Collectively, within the minds of its adherents, it functions as a "virtual caliphate," guided by an extremist ideology fueled with a unique strain of militant Islam. *The center of gravity, the decisive terrain of this war, is the vast majority of people not directly involved, but whose support, willing or coerced, is necessary to insurgent operations around the world.*

Terrorism is only one of the tools the insurgents are using, just as submarines and airplanes were tools of World War II. The "war on terrorism" label also sets a very high standard for success, and an infinite duration. Any successful terrorist attack means that we failed. The odds are pretty high against 100 percent success for the indefinite future. This war started well before we noticed it. Through the last 21 years of the twentieth century, the United States was attacked repeatedly and failed to react, or at least react effectively. I am speaking of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Beirut Marine Barracks attack, repeated aircraft hijackings, the destruction of U.S. embassies in east Africa, and the World Trade Center attack in 1993, an effort that was partially successful. But perhaps it was also an operational test.

It is important to pay attention to what the terrorist organizations say. In 1998 the World Islamic Front, popularly known as Al Qa'eda or "the base," issued a declaration of war against "Jews and crusaders." It said: "The

ruling to kill the Americans and their Allies—civilians and military— is an *individual* duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the holy mosque in Mecca from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.”<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after 9/11, Amion al-Zawahari, Al Qaeda’s operations officer, published a strategy paper that called for re-creation of the Muslim Caliphate that existed from the time of Mohammed until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. The Middle East was designated for phase one. They are fighting to regain complete and utter control over every aspect of life, and they will stop at nothing to achieve their goals, to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. To them, that is part of the price they must pay to achieve power on earth.

So who are these insurgents? The leadership comes from alienated, educated, moneyed elites, but their foot soldiers are drawn from the most troubled areas of the world. How do the dedicated leaders of this global insurgency generate recruits and resources? They have been preparing the battlefield for years. They have been operating in troubled areas of the world where the writ of liberal, representative government, or even effective autocratic or authoritative government, does not function. In failed or failing states, or failed parts of states, they have been the providers of education, medical care, and jobs. Through their education efforts, and their care for the population, they have been able to psychologically condition the people. *By providing what local governments have not, these insurgents have gained legitimacy, psychologically conditioned these populations, and created an area from which they can safely operate.*

Male children raised in cultures of violence are more likely to become delinquents or violent criminals. With indoctrination, these tendencies are valuable to the extremist. These troubled children are recruited from

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<sup>2</sup> Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement, 23 February 1998. <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

extremist religious seminaries where they are indoctrinated from an early age about the spiritual importance of donating their lives in a holy war. The insurgents also capitalize on dire economic situations. Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation make death and the reward of paradise appealing. They preached that “every good Muslim understands that it’s better to die fighting than to live without hope.”

The last time we fought so many people willing to die for their beliefs, who were thoroughly indoctrinated, it was called the Great Pacific War. Remember how tough that was. The habits of western military thought that value defeat over destruction, artful maneuver over slaughter, have a difficult time with an enemy that actively seeks death if it means killing us.

Once vulnerable individuals become part of these well-armed groups, they feel strong and powerful, perhaps for the first time in their lives. They are taught that their mission is holy, which destroys any moral ambiguities they might have. They are also taught that the United States is the epitome of what is wrong with the world. Globalization is another form of the colonial system; it is America’s attempt to dominate the rest of the world economically, culturally, and spiritually. The spread of consumer culture is seen as an assault on their dominant position in their society.

Jessica Stern, a Harvard professor, did a four-year study on terrorist organizations, living with them on occasion. Here are some of her conclusions:

- One of the biggest recruiting factors is the gap between the rich and the poor. They promise schooling, free membership in a sports club, transportation, scholarships, money and jobs for families. They are providing what the government has not.
- The failures of modern society also make these organizations very attractive to many Muslim families. These failures are like a disease and people everywhere begin to feel that the only way to protect their families is to go back to tradition, to religion. Families send their children to mosque, and there wait the recruiters.

- They recruit in the schools and sports clubs by promising the opportunity to not only kill infidels, but to provide economically for their families.
- They encourage suicide bombers in training to focus on the *ummah*, the Muslim community, not the demands of the “corrupt” Muslim rulers or the emotional loss their families will suffer. They promise these suicide bombers that their families will be taken care of. They win the hearts and minds of not only the suicide bombers, but their families as well.<sup>3</sup>

Let us understand the typical suicide bomber. He is young, often a teenager, and mentally immature. He is the second or third son, with no chance of inheriting anything from his family. There is intense pressure on him to find a job, which he can't. He can't work because he doesn't have any inside connections. He has no girlfriend or fiancée, and no money to pick up girls, even if that were possible. Marriage is not an option because of its expense—and without work, he can't support himself, much less a family. In short, life has no pleasure for him, only pain. He feels like he's lost everything.

Where does he go to deal with this problem? He goes to the local mosque. This is very different from here in the United States, where most people go to church on Sundays. At the mosque, prayer services are held five times daily, even at 4:00 AM, a service that all but the most devout usually skip. He begins attending every service. It is there that he comes to the attention of those watching, who see his anxiety, his worry, his depression. They talk to him, getting to know him and his situation—and his recruitment begins.

They talk to him of the paradise that awaits him if he should die in the jihad. They tell him that if he should volunteer for a suicide bombing, his family name will be held in the highest respect, and that he will be remembered as a *shaheed*, a martyr. They promise him that his family will receive money, food, clothing, things he has not been able to provide for them. But this all comes with a catch—he cannot tell anyone what he is doing. To ensure that

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<sup>3</sup> Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, Ecco, New York, 2003, Ch.10.

he does not change his mind or tell anyone, they take him away from his home for the last 48 hours before the operation. During this time, he will write his will and his last letters, making it difficult if not impossible to turn back.

What is noteworthy about the situation is that almost no one commits a suicide bombing as an individual—it is always done as an organization, and candidates are trained. Logistics and planning are provided for the recruit, who becomes a *living martyr*. After all this, the recruit sees his death as being more valuable than his life, both for his country and himself.

### **How do we fight them?**

How does the United States fight this network of global insurgency? How do we ensure that our success in the field is matched at the strategic level? We can begin by realizing some hard facts, and making a clear-eyed examination of our past successes and failures with insurgencies, and rigorously understanding what remains the same, and what has changed. One fact is that insurgencies have existed in many parts of the world for a long time. Indeed, many insurgencies that are now linked in some fashion to Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiah existed long before, due to valid, long-standing grievances. The various separatist movements in the southern Philippines are an example as are the Chechen and Uighur separatist movements. The linkages and mutual support among insurgencies from Algeria, to the Middle East, to Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and into Southeast Asia, are new. Ending all insurgencies is not a practical goal, however, a focused effort that addresses the underpinnings of terrorism can significantly reduce the threat. The requirements for a successful counter-insurgency, tightly integrated plans and actions across the wide range of governmental and societal functions, remains the same.

The United States is a nation that loves statistics. During Vietnam, we developed systems analysis, under Secretary of Defense McNamara's Whiz Kids, into high science. But we had it wrong in many ways because our traditional systems analysis could not measure a complex human enterprise. Our enemy did not react according to our western military and statistical

models. We did not understand the enterprise upon which we embarked, to paraphrase Clausewitz. We need a new tool to model and understand this new global phenomenon.

Complexity theory, on the other hand, argues that the dangerous aspect of this global insurgency is its enabling linkages.<sup>4</sup> If so, complexity theory offers a path to a new line of strategy and attack. *Attacking the linkages offers a way to gain support from many nations and international organizations that are reluctant to join our current campaign.* Under this model, it is not necessary to kill every insurgent and separatist from Algeria to Papua New Guinea to the Philippines to Chechnya to Central Asia and western China. We cannot hope to defeat all the local insurgencies, but we must break the links that allow them to network. We must make local insurgencies a local issue again.

Ideology is one such a link. This war is a war of ideas, fought on a cultural frontier. We need to provide people with a better vision, with better hopes and chances than the insurgents do. We need to give people a way to earn a living so they are not vulnerable to ideologists. *Winning the hearts and minds of local populations is far more important than killing or capturing people.* We had a small campaign against the Abu Syyaf Group (ASF) on Basilan Island in the Philippines. A major part of it was repairing roads. With the roads, the civilians had a way to get their crops to market without paying usurious taxes to the ASF. They turned away from them; the ASF leadership made a run for it and was apprehended at sea. There is now a prosperous Jollibee's, a more successful fast food franchise than McDonald's, on Basilan.

Finances and other resources are another such link. We must develop ways to track the movement of financial instruments, people, and materiel in a way that breaks the links, yet provides an appropriate degree of privacy and national sovereignty. All the links should be analyzed and interdicted in similar ways.

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<sup>4</sup> Larry Blakeley, "Observing Al Qaeda Through the Lens of Complexity Theory," Available from <[www.royblakeley.name/larry\\_blakeley/articles/monthly\\_articles/Michael\\_beech200407.htm](http://www.royblakeley.name/larry_blakeley/articles/monthly_articles/Michael_beech200407.htm)> Internet accessed September 1, 2005

## **What does the military need to do?**

We must continue and even accelerate our adaptation to the tactics of these fundamentalist extremist insurgents. Our military heritage prizes overwhelming force over subtlety, Jomini over Sun Tzu. We feel that operations, strategy, logistics and technology are war's dimensions. Our military history since the Civil War and our concentration on global conventional war shape our attitudes. Remember how fast we dropped the study of insurgency after 1973, as we returned back to "real" war? We must get back to this form of warfare not just as it was in those days, but as it is now. We must also look at the experience of our friends and partner nations. In recent years, Australia completed one very successful counterinsurgency in the Solomon Islands, and is now embarked on a similar, but different, effort in Papua New Guinea. Their use of a federalized police force alone is worth serious national study.<sup>5</sup>

Any successful military strategy and doctrinal effort must acknowledge fundamental future trends. The developing world is becoming more lethal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical arms, long-range missiles and other highly capable weapons. Threats to the United States will be unpredictable and situation-dependent. There is no precise model to optimize force structure, so our forces will have to be multi-mission, mobile, flexible and capable of precise and discriminate use of military force. We must place a premium on the training and maturity of the young men and women who wear our nation's military uniform.

The most important future trend is that a permanent, large U.S. armed forces presence in these troubled areas is obsolete. Third party nationals based ashore, particularly wealthy Americans, provide a convenient target, both physically and as symbols for enemy strategic communication. More importantly, the American forces based ashore invariably have an adverse cultural impact that is self defeating. Our presence skews the local economy and provides flashpoints for violence. The local government, its forces and economy lose viability and credibility. The natural resentment of the local

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<sup>5</sup> Government of Australia, Department of Defence Annual Report 2003-2004, pg. 84, references to "Operation Anode"

population defeats us. Joint sea-basing, national capability afloat combined with expeditionary presence ashore, is one way to effective influence and worldwide mobility, without extensive infrastructure. We need to look seriously at this option for areas traditionally and culturally unable to accommodate a large permanent U.S. or other western presence.

The local, duly constituted government must do more for the people than the opposition or the United States. The minute the U.S. takes the lead, it begins to lose. Through flexible sea-basing and tailoring of our forces, we can enhance the local government's successes and at the same time avoid making ourselves attractive, vulnerable targets. Further, we can instantaneously control our level of intervention based on the local government's degree of acceptable behavior. By doing so, we help the local government fight its own corrupted elements and set the stage for defeat of the insurgency.

Ultimately, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life. The end aim is the social, economic and political development of people subsequent to the defeat of the enemy insurgent. In these "small wars," respect, tolerance, sympathy and kindness should be the keynotes of our relationship with the mass of the population. We must provide military force, not as a broadsword, but as a scalpel. The solution lies in redefining the problem and our reaction to it.

The truly magnificent performance of our forces in the field has provided us the foundation. We need to take the lead as our government develops the strategy and the operational art for this new, global, long war. Attacking the linkages that bind terrorist organizations and winning the hearts and minds of the people whose countries are at risk, will bring the enhanced support of partner nations and success in the struggle. Those serving today deserve no less.

*Lieutenant General (Retired) Wallace C. "Chip" Gregson, is the former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific. He is now the Chief Operating Officer of the United States Olympic Committee.*

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*Chapter 3*

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**The Regional Dimension  
of Combating Terrorism**

*Shari Villarosa*

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Regional Dimension of Combating Terrorism**

**Shari Villarosa**

In order to develop a comprehensive regional strategy to successfully combat terrorism in Southeast Asia, we must take into account the unique local characteristics so we can more effectively address the complex mix of factors that have given rise to terrorism in the region. There is no “one size fits all” solution. A successful strategy needs to address civil society, education, and law enforcement—a “hearts and minds” strategy. This will deny terrorists the space to operate while building healthier economies and democracies, further reducing the appeal of terrorism. To do this, we will need to ensure that the various U.S. Government (USG) agencies coordinate as well in Washington as they do at our Embassies overseas.

#### **Factors To Keep In Mind**

The underlying factors that have contributed to increased terrorist threats in Southeast Asia vary widely from country to country, and even within local populations. Our personnel working in our various Embassies and Consulates are best able to describe what is happening in order to recommend the best course of action for advancing our objectives. I am not speaking of just State Department personnel, which comprise less than 50 percent of the personnel at most Embassies, but the entire staff—including representatives of other federal agencies at each post, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), and their contractors.

#### **No One Agency Has All The Expertise Needed**

This chapter will focus on the situation in three countries—Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines—seen as primary terrorist hotspots in Southeast Asia. I have lived in two of these countries and am currently the Director of

our policy towards the third. And while I will focus on these three countries, it is worth noting that Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia and Burma also have sizeable Muslim communities, including some individuals linked to terrorist organizations. I do not believe that all Muslims are terrorists; quite the contrary, the overwhelming majority reject terrorism. However, extremists have used religion to justify terror in the region and have been able to broaden their appeal by exploiting other factors. We must find ways to reduce that appeal by addressing those other factors.

First, understand the different environment in which Islam developed in Southeast Asia. Islam spread into what is now Southeast Asia via traders, not war. It existed side-by-side with other religions—Buddhism and Hinduism initially, and Christianity during the colonial period—by and large peacefully. Thus, Southeast Asian Islam developed an open and outward looking approach. A tradition of tolerance also developed strongly encouraged by governing authorities to build cohesion among diverse peoples. As democracy has developed in the region, elections required more inclusive appeals to voters of different faiths. Few Muslims in Southeast Asia today see any conflict between Islam and democracy.

## **Indonesia**

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim majority nation, its almost 200 million Muslims outnumber Muslims in the entire Middle East. The overwhelming majority of Indonesian Muslims do not hold extremist views—their primary concerns are economic and governance as Indonesia continues its recovery from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its dramatic democratic transition.

Based on the results of elections in 1955, 1999, and 2004, the Indonesian people prefer secularist parties over Islamist parties (60 percent, 86 percent, and 79 percent respectively). The multiplicity of Islamist political parties further demonstrates the diversity of opinion among Indonesians regarding religion and politics. The only Islamist party to gain votes between 2000 and 2004 was one that shifted its platform from advocating shariah law to good governance. Larger than any political party, the broad-based religious

organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, focus on providing social services.

Where do the terrorists originate? Historically a small number of Indonesian Muslims have advocated an Islamic state and rigid application of shariah law. Abu Bakar Bashir comes from this stream. Suharto for most of his 30-year rule kept religion under tight control, jailing Bashir and ultimately driving him to exile in Malaysia. Bashir only returned to Indonesia with the fall of Suharto. He then linked up with veterans from the Russian-Afghan war to form Jemaah Islamiah (JI). (I believe the reluctance of Indonesians to crack down on Bashir is due to the desire to permit broader expression of views as the country democratizes, as a way of distancing themselves from the repression of the past. Outsiders may question the balance, but I'm optimistic that Indonesians will get it right eventually.)

The JI leaders by and large are educated, but can take advantage of the large numbers of unemployed in their recruitment. Thus, assisting Indonesia to resume growth and create jobs will shrink the pools for terrorists to exploit. Our USAID programs do that. We promote the needed policy reforms to attract job-creating investment, as well as improve the quality of education to further enhance economic competitiveness. We have worked closely with NU and Muhammadiyah to promote active citizen involvement in this dynamic new democracy. The 80 percent plus turnout of Indonesians in three different elections last year shows the value Indonesians place in democracy.

## **Thailand**

Thailand has a small Muslim minority (7-8 million out of a population of 60 million) concentrated in the south, but Muslims can be found throughout Thailand. The Southern Muslims are closely related to Northern Malaysian Muslims—in the family sense. In 1909, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam agreed to divide the Sultanate of Pattani to demarcate the border between what is now Malaysia and Thailand. The people living there were not consulted, and it is not a coincidence that the people on both

sides of the border have little use for or loyalty to their respective central governments. Muslim separatists have periodically resorted to violence with their motivation more political than religious.

The Thai government, spearheaded by the military, waged a “hearts and minds” campaign beginning in the 1980s to reduce separatist sentiments by delivering better services to the people and improving the caliber of public servants in the south, including respecting Muslim sensitivities. Thai Prime Minister Taksin dismantled this and put the police in charge. The police have long been seen as the most corrupt Thai government officials. Police in the South have routinely singled Muslims out for payoffs. Muslim resentment was bound to grow, and it did. The fact that most Thais (i.e. non-Muslims) support Taksin’s measures against the Southern Muslims is no surprise since Southerners in general have historically been viewed as more violent and less “Thai.”

No one is sure whether outside terrorists have entered to take advantage of the deterioration in Thai government-Muslim relations in the South, but certainly the situation has become more fertile for terrorists to exploit. It should be remembered that the JI operative Hambali was captured in Thailand. To reverse the situation, the Thai government will have to reverse recent policies towards the Muslims in the South. It has models that have worked before.

## **The Philippines**

The Philippines also has a small Muslim minority (4.3 million out of a population of 80 million) also concentrated in the south, in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. Muslim resistance to inclusion in what is now the Philippines has continued on and off since colonial times. Where once Muslims controlled one-third of the territory that is now the Philippines, government policies encouraged Christian settlers to move to fertile, relatively under populated land in the south. This whittled down Muslim territory to a small fraction of what they once occupied. Mindanao is now 20 percent Muslim and 80 percent Christian.

Current insurgencies date from the 1970s after Marcos instituted martial law, in what Muslims believe was an attempt to move more Christian settlers from other islands into Mindanao. Today the Muslim and Christian communities are so interspersed that it is difficult to identify clearly Muslim or Christian areas. Historically, the central government has neglected the region, and during the Marcos era once-prosperous areas seriously deteriorated. Today the southern Philippines is the poorest part of a poor country. A legacy of the Philippines' Spanish colonial past has been the anti-Muslim attitude of the Catholic Church.

Clan rivalries among the Muslims further exacerbate tensions in the southern Philippines. This has resulted in multiple insurgencies with differing objectives, but a shared desire for peace and development. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), led by ethnic Tausugs and Maranaos, has a more secular orientation. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), led mainly by ethnic Maguindanaos, split from MNLF and advocated a more Islamic orientation.

Another MNLF splinter group, Abu Sayyaf (ASG), predominantly Tausugs, assumed more of a criminal reputation engaging in kidnapping for ransoms. Numerous other offshoots have contributed to the general lawless reputation of Mindanao, which served only to attract Jemaah Islamiah (JI) looking for space for training camps. MILF, which provided the initial refuge to JI in the 1990s, has recently distanced itself. Nevertheless, JI ties to some elements of MILF continue. JI now finds ASG, and other MNLF breakaway groups, more receptive to cooperating in actual terrorist operations. Unlike the MILF, ASG rejects negotiations with the government.

Few see the MNLF peace agreement of 1996 that resulted in the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a success; it certainly has not brought real peace to Mindanao. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) reneged on many of its commitments, most seriously with regard to financial power, leaving ARMM officials having to beg the Philippine congress for funding. The GRP has essentially selected the ARMM governor rather than allowing a fair election. Since they were not accountable to the people, the leaders proceeded to enrich

themselves rather than deliver better services to their people. MILF leaders have made it clear that they will not settle for MNLF terms. Instead they seek meaningful political and economic commitments from the GRP upfront, which the government has been loath to offer. Questions remain about whether the MILF can credibly negotiate for other parties, including the indigenous people, and the remaining ties with JI cause concern. Although a ceasefire has been in place for almost two years, we do not see the prospects for genuine peace as imminent. To promote peace in Mindanao, we have pursued various strategies. Few other countries offer U.S. personnel and programs such wide access. The United States is viewed more positively today in Mindanao than the central government. We have a large military intelligence sharing program to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in improving their capacity to fight the insurgents. [While making progress against the ASG (estimated at a few hundred), observers doubt the AFP can defeat the roughly 12,000 strong MILF militarily.]

The U.S. Government has increasingly focused our aid resources on Mindanao to provide tangible peace benefits—livelihoods, education, health services—to former MNLF combatants and others who renounce violence. In addition, we continue to urge the GRP to address in good faith the legitimate grievances of the people of Mindanao. MILF has indicated interest in our assistance programs, which have succeeded in reintegrating 28,000 former MNLF combatants. We have said that we would be prepared to support a viable peace agreement with MILF, if MILF breaks all ties with JI.

In the meantime, some far-sighted Muslims are moving to take control of their own future. A young Muslim businessman persuaded foreign investors to come to one of the most lawless parts of Mindanao and start a banana plantation. This project has thrived, promoted reconciliation between Christians and Muslims, and brought peace to a former war zone.

At the same time that multiple insurgencies are active in Mindanao, the Communist New People's Army, another designated terrorist organization, has increased its activities. Many officials in Manila see this as a more

immediate threat to the government, since it operates throughout the Philippines, especially in the provinces closer to Manila.

## **Malaysia**

The government of Malaysia has been aggressive in going after terrorists operating in Malaysia. Malaysia has a healthy economy and regular elections. Nevertheless, some of the most deadly terrorists today—Nuridin Top and Azahari Hussein—are Malaysians. They are from middle class families with university educations. They have been the beneficiaries of government affirmative action policies to advance Muslims. They did not lack opportunities, but obviously have other grievances against modern society.

## **So What To Do?**

Yes, terrorists are operating in Southeast Asia, but the numbers are relatively small. Military and security measures alone will not suffice. We must also narrow their space to operate and recruit. This means addressing the underlying social, political and economic factors while improving the effectiveness of the security forces.

These countries are all democracies now, and minorities should be able to express their views and make their own political and economic choices. The desire for stability is powerful. Decent jobs providing an income to support a family will lure many away from the insurgencies. The days of the military alone providing internal security passed with the rise of democracy. Law enforcement must shift from extortion to protecting the security of the community (and not the interests of the powerful).

If we want to encourage informed choices, then we must make sure accurate information is available. The Saudis have significantly increased their support for Muslim educational institutions, spending an estimated \$75 billion since 1975. We must engage in the competition for minds—through schools, libraries, books, and the internet. We have a plethora of assistance

programs, which have received significantly increased funding since 9/11. While the war against terrorism may have motivated increased funding, our development assistance also advances our long-term objectives of building democracy, growing economies, and ensuring peace in a region of geostrategic importance. The nature of our budget process requires annual appropriation justifications; addressing the underlying factors will require long-term engagement.

Our continued long-term engagement to strengthen democracy and promote economic growth in these countries will build stability internally and regionally and reduce the space for terrorists to operate. Our ability to stay engaged will be noted and build goodwill for the United States. They saw what we could do with tsunami relief and will keep watching.

So what are these programs? Our military assistance programs (Foreign Military Financing [FMF], and International Military Education and Training [IMET]) have built a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers who value close ties with the U.S. Civilian aid funds (Economic Support Fund [ESF], Development Assistance [DA], and Child Survival and Health [CSH]) build the institutions of good governance, deliver potable water, create jobs, and improve the quality of education. Other funds provide scholarships to the future leaders (Educational and Cultural Affairs [ECA]) and upgrade the skills of police officers to improve their effectiveness (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement [INL] and Diplomatic Security/Office of Antiterrorism Assistance [DS/ATA]).

In addition, we have numerous regional programs that will build relationships to handle common threats. We set up the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok in 1998 to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement officers. That undoubtedly served as a model for the Jakarta Combined Law Enforcement Center and the South East Asian Center for Counter Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, both of which we now support with training courses and expert advisors. We also work closely with the nations of the region to improve maritime security in a region through which half the world's oil and one-third of the world's trade passes.

## **Coordination Is Essential**

Different bureaucracies and congressional committees control the different funds, so interagency cooperation has also had to increase to ensure coordination. It may not be perfect, but it is happening in Washington and at our overseas missions. Most Embassies now have some sort of law enforcement working group; with military representatives participating in meetings regarding USAID education programs; and economic and law enforcement officers working together on terrorist finance. In addition, they work with other bilateral and multilateral donors at post. Working together, these interagency groups develop the Mission Program Plan prepared annually by every Embassy. Those plans in turn are reviewed by all the interested Washington agencies, so that the final product reflects coordination between Washington and our Embassies.

Different agencies and bureaus have the lead in requesting funding. Each has its own particular perspectives and priorities. Coordination again is essential to ensure that the programs complement each other and advance a common strategy. Thus, budget requests and justifications are circulated for interagency clearance in Washington. Perhaps those different pots of money controlled by different agencies ensure that we offer more comprehensive programs. While the interagency groups can make recommendations on the desirable mix of funding, the ultimate determinant of funding is Congress, which has its own multiple agendas. So even though the military may agree on the need for more funding to create jobs, funds at their disposal, such as FMF, cannot normally be used to do this. While most observers agree on the need for improved policing, both the military and USAID are prohibited from funding police programs. Again, coordination is essential to ensure we move forward in a comprehensive fashion.

In conclusion, I believe we are proceeding in an incremental fashion through a variety of agencies to build a web of cooperation in Southeast Asia that not only will reduce the threat of terrorism over time, but also build better societies—tolerant, democratic, just, with greater economic opportunity for all. This will require our long-term engagement and must be a team

effort. By appealing to peoples' desires for economic well-being, security, fairness, and decent education, we are providing a very attractive alternative to terrorism.

*Ms. Shari Villarosa is Charge d'Affaires, United States Embassy Rangoon, Burma. At the time of the symposium she was Director of Philippine, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore Affairs; East Asia and Pacific Bureau, Department of State.*

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*Chapter 4*

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**The Role of Development  
in Combating Terror**

*Elisabeth Kvitashvili*

## **Chapter 4**

### **The Role of Development in Combating Terror**

**Elisabeth Kvitashvili**

The President’s National Security Strategy identifies three pillars: defense, diplomacy, and development. To date, however, our response to one of our most critical foreign policy priorities—the Global War on Terror—has emphasized military options that disrupt terrorist networks and activities. As critical as these are, military options are not enough. A more comprehensive approach must recognize that instability, terrorism and extremism will continue to flourish as long as weak or predatory states fail to guarantee security for their citizens, provide access to basic services, and address issues such as corruption, political exclusion, and economic growth. For example, in the case of Iraq, an effective approach to reducing or eliminating the insurgency and stabilizing the country must not only ensure security for Iraqi citizens, but also address underlying conditions—such as inadequate social services, rampant corruption, political exclusion and joblessness—that insurgents exploit to undermine the regime.

These are themes where the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has significant expertise, and there is already recognition in academic and policy circles of the importance of development assistance in countering terrorism and extremism. For example, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies four “Ds”: defeat terrorist networks, deny groups access to support and sanctuary, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and defend the homeland.

USAID has been explicitly assigned the third “D” of diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. It is an area that some people are familiar with but I want to mention the many important tools that we in USAID bring to the table. However, I want to point out that development assistance also has a critical role to play in the second “D”, denying support and sanctuary to terrorist groups, and I’ll discuss the work my office is doing in this area.

## Diminishing Underlying Conditions

First, let's elaborate on the role development assistance can play in terms of addressing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, focusing on two themes that have received the most attention—democracy promotion and poverty reduction.

**Democracy Promotion:** In many parts of the developing world, government institutions lack legitimacy and citizens are blocked from meaningful political participation. Democratic institutions (above and beyond elections) that promote transparency, the rule of law, and political inclusion are critical to countering the appeals of extremists.

In a democracy, political inclusion and effective participation guarantee that groups with competing interests can engage in a political search for solutions. A healthy civil society and independent media can articulate priorities and monitor abuses of power. A strong and accountable security sector can guarantee territorial integrity and personal security. An equitable and impartial rule of law can provide protection for basic economic and political rights. Essentially, the institutions in well-established democracies are designed to address many of the underlying factors that lead to violence, whether or not they are always able to find solutions to these problems.

While I would never suggest that we not promote democracy—and in fact USAID is heavily invested in this area—I do want to highlight the fact that it is a misconception that political repression causes terrorism. Findings from empirical studies instead suggest that violence and terror are linked to regime type in an inverted U-shape curve, sometimes called the democracy curve. This means that in highly authoritarian states there is little to no violence or terrorism—think North Korea or the former Soviet Union, given that the regime has a tight hold on power and information, and is able to detect and destroy internal threats. Similarly, in well-established democracies, as discussed above, there are few internal challenges that need to be handled through violence or terror.

However, that path between democracy and authoritarianism is a rocky one. When institutions begin to shift or weaken, the risk of violence and terrorism increases dramatically, particularly when this occurs in authoritarian regimes where there are likely to be many sources of pent-up frustration. Fundamental political change is a highly contested process. It changes the existing distribution of power, opens up new channels for competition, draws in new actors, creates new threats, and often leads to the erosion of constraints governing the behavior of powerful actors. Previously accepted rules of the game no longer apply and in this fluid environment, elites will often attempt to mobilize violence to advance their own narrow political or economic agendas. Think of Serbia, Uzbekistan, Burma. Extremist groups have done extremely well in this type of environment, and in places like Algeria, Afghanistan, and Nepal have used weak democratic institutions to essentially subvert the democratic process by mobilizing a mass base of support.

The answer, clearly, is not to abandon democracy promotion. Rather, it is to develop a deeper understanding of how to adapt our democracy programs to high-risk environments in order to minimize opportunities for extremists to mobilize violence. One example of this type of modified democracy promotion program is in Haiti, where my office is supporting business leaders and youth associations who are pressuring political parties to stop using political violence in campaigns. These models can be transferred to places where religious extremism is making inroads, such as in parts of Indonesia, Nigeria, the Sahel, Yemen, and Morocco.

**Economic Growth:** Poverty reduction is another area that has received a great deal of attention in terms of underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. It is clear that economic growth is critical to stability in poor countries. The World Bank estimates that poor countries are 15 times more likely to have internal conflicts than countries that comprise the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, for example. Targeted poverty reduction and employment creation programs—particularly for young people and marginalized populations—have been successful in many parts of the world and these programs have a useful role to play in regions that are at risk for terrorism and violence.

However, as with democracy promotion, it is wrong to believe that poverty causes terrorism. In fact, the evidence suggests that individuals who become terrorists tend to come from relatively well-to-do families and tend to be relatively well educated. There is evidence that existing terrorist groups have recruited from the ranks of very poor and that they may be used as foot soldiers once terrorists are fully mobilized. However, poverty alone cannot explain the emergence of terrorism, nor are poverty reduction programs sufficient to eliminate terrorism. Poverty itself is not the cause of the problems faced in southern Thailand or Nepal, but economic disparities compound the problem. It is important not to subscribe to the overly simplistic notion that economic development by itself will reduce the potential for violence and extremism. It can help manage conflict if the costs and benefits of growth are relatively equally distributed. But if growth exacerbates pre-existing divisions, if benefits are unequally distributed across politically relevant fault lines, or if corruption siphons off most of the gains, then it may fuel conflict.

The discussion above is meant to highlight the point that reducing underlying conditions is an important role for development assistance, but it is not a straightforward one that simply suggests we do more democracy promotion or more poverty reduction without reflection.

### **Deny Sanctuary and Support**

While attention in inter-agency circles has tended to focus on the role development assistance can play in terms of long-term approaches that diminish underlying conditions, it can also make important contributions in terms of denying sanctuary, recruits, and financing. Ultimately, the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit exist everywhere while terrorism does not. We need to be strategic in our approach, and for that reason, we are also focusing much more closely on the contribution development assistance can make to denying support and sanctuary.

Recently, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID conducted a joint assessment with the United States European Command

(EUCOM) of extremism and terrorism in the Sahel. The goals of the assessment were to:

- Understand the potential for radical Islam to make significant inroads in the region
- Explore the role development assistance plays in combating extremism and terrorism
- Begin a discussion about how to better coordinate USAID and EUCOM assistance

The bottom line finding of the assessment is that, given limited resources and immediate term threats, development assistance needs to identify and engage high-risk populations and high-risk regions. Doing so here and elsewhere helps us deny sanctuary and support for groups seeking to destabilize countries/regions. High risk populations include groups who are particularly susceptible to the appeals of extremists working in the region, including alienated young people, business men in the ‘illicit’ or ‘shadow’ economy, and marginalized populations such as former insurgents in Niger and Chad and the former slave caste in Mauritania, which is starting to search for a new identity and is being targeted by radical forms of Islam. High-risk regions included remote northern areas, border regions where cross-border extremist groups are operating, such as the Chad-Sudanese border and the border between Nigeria and Niger, and urban centers where young, unemployed people are concentrated.

Let me provide some examples of the types of programs we are considering in the region and what I mean when I suggest development assistance can deny support and sanctuary.

**Sanctuary:** Because of past successes in rolling back state sponsorship of terror, terrorists increasingly seek out remote areas of the world where they can operate with impunity because the government is too weak to stop them. These areas have long been ignored by governments and donors. They are places where violence and insurgency is a way of life, and where it is easy to make the claim that no outside government is willing to help. It is important to increase visible U.S. foreign assistance to remote areas in

order to provide tangible evidence that the U.S. provides help, where others do not. It is equally important that we support local government's ability to show its face in these regions.

USAID is already in some of the world's most isolated areas, including the frontier provinces of Pakistan, tribal areas in north Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. But this is about far more than just getting more development resources out to remote areas. Of course we need to get more health clinics, or schools, or irrigation projects out to these areas. The difficulty is that we've been trying but it isn't working, because the difficulty is that in many of these places, like north Yemen or the northern reaches of the Sahel, violence is so pervasive that we can't just do development as usual. So we are also working to adapt our assistance models to high risk environments, so that they achieve both stabilization and development objectives. For example, we are using health assistance to broker cease-fires between tribes in north Yemen. In Mali, we support community engagement in local radio programming through training and the involvement of youth which is leading to the production of, among other things, messages of tolerance. The radio programming is also being used to promote a better relationship between the North and other regions of Mali.

**Recruits:** In terms of working with at-risk populations, we recognize that there will always be a 'hard core' of militants or insurgents who cannot be swayed by development in the form of jobs, or basic services such as education, or more open political participation. However, this hard core always exists in a broader population of at-risk groups that may be more or less supportive of extremists' goals and methods. The challenge for development assistance is to 'draw a line' between ordinary people who are driven by frustration from those who are driven by ideology. The clearer this line, the more militants, extremists, and terrorists are pushed into the world of criminality where they can be dealt with in terms of intelligence and law enforcement.

As I mentioned, one important at-risk group is young people. When young people—particularly young men—are uprooted, alienated, unemployed, and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a ready pool

of recruits for extremist groups. Think of Uzbekistan, the North Caucasus, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco.

Several categories of young people appear to be particularly at-risk, including unemployed university graduates, young people who have moved from rural to urban areas, and young people who have lived through internal conflict.

USAID is shifting attention to at-risk youth and is currently funding a broad range of training, employment, and political participation programs. For example, a project in the West Bank supports employment for Palestinian youth through information technology. Our interventions in Iraq have focused on various quick impact projects that generate employment as they help rebuild communities. In channeling the productive energies of at-risk young men, these programs also provide visible signs of hope that can counter the call of those who base their appeals on a sense of hopelessness. A sense of dignity and self-worth comes to individuals who are engaged in productive work that provides for the betterment of their families, communities and societies. Development initiatives that focus on such fundamental truths are part of the answer to the insurgents.

**Financing:** Drug trafficking, trafficking in humans, and the exploitation of valuable resources such as diamonds and timber, provides financing for terrorist activities. Many of these ‘shadow’ economies thrive in remote areas and gain support from disenfranchised populations who have few other economic options. The challenge is to distinguish ordinary people from criminal elements, so that interdiction efforts do not push people in more radical directions. USAID supports programs that provide people with alternatives to illicit economic activities. For example, a program in Sierra Leone worked with the government, businesses, and local miners to move diamonds into ‘clean’ channels. In Afghanistan, we fund a range of market and agricultural activities that support alternatives to poppy cultivation.

**Engagement with Islamic Associations:** Many Muslims believe the Global War on Terror is a war against Islam. Actions speak louder than

words. Direct U.S. support to moderate Islamic associations undercuts that view, particularly if they are working on issues that touch people's lives in a direct way, such as schools, clinics, and access to water. In places like Uzbekistan, Nigeria and Indonesia, USAID already supports programs run by Islamic associations on conflict management, democracy, human rights, and religious tolerance. These initiatives, particularly basic infrastructure projects, need to be dramatically expanded and publicly promoted throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

In all of the places where we are focusing on extremism, essentially we are proposing a different model for development assistance. This is not development as usual where we are pursuing traditional development goals. Rather, we are choosing to engage in difficult regions and with difficult populations in order to stabilize a potentially volatile situation. Our Mission in Yemen is quite explicit about the fact that it is pursuing a stabilization program in lawless northern areas, and it is doing so through its health assistance, through work with tribal groups on mediating disputes over access to natural resources, and by working to build stronger ties between tribal leaders and the central government.

In Nepal, our Mission is looking at ways to deliver basic services including health and education to populations held hostage in insecure environments that are dominated by the Maoists. We are also examining ways to fill the security gap, for example by working with the police and communities on community policing programs. Finally, we are exploring ways to keep young people out of the hands of Maoists through programs that provide them with constructive forms of political and economic engagement. All of the thinking around these programs has been done in close coordination with the Department of State and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),

### **Coordination between the U. S. Defense Department and USAID**

Because these are not traditional development programs, and because we are working in areas that are highly unstable, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID has also been actively exploring ways to coordinate

more effectively with the military. As I mentioned, the recent assessment in the Sahel was a joint USAID-EUCOM assessment, and there were a number of areas where we explored possibilities for closer collaboration. Let me touch briefly on these before I conclude.

First, both the Department of Defense and USAID are delivering ‘development’ assistance in many high-risk areas in the forms of schools, clinics, and other tangible projects. DoD can deliver the hardware – the building – very effectively. But for these projects to be truly successful, the software needs to be in place. I think we have all heard stories about schools that have been built but have stood empty for lack of teachers or because they were built in a nomadic area where the notion of settling down so children can attend school is problematic. USAID has the expertise to provide the software that complements DoD’s hardware so that U. S. Government assistance can be more effective in these areas.

Similarly, development assistance can be used to soften or blunt the impact of U.S. military interventions that have unintended negative consequences. Let me tell you what I mean.

One thing the joint assessment team found in Northern Niger, is that EUCOM’s military training and equipment program had been very successful in helping the government of Niger tighten control of borders and block illicit cross-border flows of people and goods. This is a success, clearly. But, in remote northern regions of the Sahel, for centuries people have earned their living through ‘cross-border’ trade or smuggling, not that borders really mean anything in the Sahara. By shutting down borders, many nomadic populations and traders in these areas have lost their livelihoods, and we have inadvertently created a group of people who may be more receptive to the appeals of anti-western extremists in the future. The point here is that if we know a military activity is planned, we can pre-position development assistance in a way to mitigate any potentially negative effects. But we can’t do this without much more effective coordination.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, USAID can play a key role in countering terrorism and insurgency throughout the world. Terrorism and insurgencies find their roots in countries where governments are unstable and ineffective, where citizens are poor and lack significant opportunities for change. USAID has for many years, and will continue for many years, to address the needs of the poor in many developing nations. USAID hopes to give people in these developing nations a sense of control over their lives. The most potent weapon against terrorism, however, will come not from external aid but from the internal development of such societies. USAID is using a wide variety of programs that address the economic isolation that is imposed on people by their history, multiple impediments to productive enterprise, and disenfranchisement, but ultimately the fight against the terrorists must be won by the local inhabitants themselves. That is why local empowerment, capacity building and jobs are so important—so people themselves can control their lives and destinies.

Although each situation and each country offer unique challenges and differing conditions, USAID is rapidly adapting its assistance programs to respond more strategically and to include an array of useful approaches to counter terrorists. In general, we must:

- Provide support to communities' post-conflict livelihood reconstitution efforts, through community infrastructure repair and development;
- Provide assistance that undercuts shadow economies that fuel conflict such as illegal natural resources extraction (e.g. trafficking in minerals, diamonds, small arms or drugs ) while supporting unemployed youth and former militia and facilitating the establishment of transparent processes designed to expose and manage transnational war economies;
- Provide assistance that addresses both the root causes or symptoms of conflict and the constraints to economic growth, such as issues over access to land, property, and natural resources;

- Create mechanisms that may prevent or minimize potential violence, and in a post-conflict context, that may help consolidate peace-building processes through leadership training and technical support to local or tribal leaders who enjoy legitimate popular support;
- Provide support to peace processes associated with ceasefires and peace arrangements, including assistance with the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance in conflict and war situations (e.g., immunization programs, food aid, reconstruction of essential infrastructure, preparation of return areas, etc.);
- Support security sector reform including demobilization, disarmament, reintegration programs for militia, and limited police training (rule of law, judicial procedure), and human rights education;
- Foster family livelihood support during conflict to promote reconciliation and local-level peace-building efforts, and reduce civilian vulnerability to livelihood failure as a result of conflict. This work will be conducted at the local level with communities directly affected by conflict and instability, as well as at regional and national levels in terms of influencing policy, strengthening service delivery systems, and promoting post-conflict recovery strategies that directly address the needs of affected civilians.

All of this we must do to prevent further extremism, instability and conflict. Our interventions must be about ensuring communities can rebuild lives and livelihoods and live with dignity, it's about ensuring human security, it's about ensuring people have a voice and authorities are responsive to their people and much much more. USAID is changing itself to be more strategic in its approach. Together with the State Department and you, our military colleagues, we can do a better job of undertaking joint stability operations in the future; to leverage our collective wisdom and capabilities to get the job done.

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*Chapter 5*

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**Towards a Socio-Economic  
Struggle Against Violent Extremism**

*Leif Rosenberger*

## **Chapter 5**

### **Towards a Socio-Economic Struggle Against Violent Extremism**

**Leif Rosenberger**

#### **Introduction**

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 caused the United States (U. S) to reprioritize its strategic interests in the world. Almost overnight the war on terrorism jumped to the top of the list. The 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call to defend the U.S. homeland. Beyond the homeland, the main front for this war on terrorism quickly became Southwest Asia. The United States attacked Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Prior to 9/11, the most important U.S. strategic interest in SE Asia was arguably America's shared prosperity with ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) states.<sup>1</sup> But since 9/11, U.S. leaders began to see the region in a different light. Admiral Thomas Fargo, the former PACOM Commander, refers to Southeast Asia as a "primary fault line" in the war on terrorism. Other observers in the U.S. see SE Asia as a "second front" in the war on terrorism. If so, what is the nature of this second front? In particular, what is the military dimension? The metaphor of a war against terrorism accurately describes the effort to capture or kill terrorists in Afghanistan. The language of war also helps to evoke a national mobilization. But the conflict in Afghanistan gives the false impression that the war against terrorism is a conventional war. In fact, Afghanistan was an exception.

What makes this terrorist threat so difficult to tackle is its multi-dimensional nature. After Afghanistan, the scope for conventional military action in places like SE Asia is quite limited. Admittedly, the military does play a role in the U.S. war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. But any success in reducing terrorism in Southeast Asia demands the use of all the elements of national power—diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy and homeland defense as well as military power. The

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<sup>1</sup> For more on these subjects see the following forthcoming publication: Leif Rosenberger, *Asia Pacific Economic Update 2005*, US Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii, USA.

U.S. government is well aware of the need for interagency cooperation. But in practice, U.S. interagency operations in the war on terrorism are difficult to implement.

### **Missing: Strategy**

Another crucial gap in American policy is absence of a comprehensive long-term strategy to counter terrorism, according to the bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report released in June 2004. The report says that what the U.S. needs first and foremost is a grand strategy. In fact, the bulk of the 9/11 recommendations call for a broad political and economic strategy. Of the 27 recommendations in chapter 12 on developing a global strategy, only one can be seen as advocating the use of military force: attacking terrorists and their sanctuaries. And even this one requires multilateral cooperation cited earlier.

Recently, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and other top officials from the Bush Administration have changed the way they talk about terrorism to be more consistent with the vision of the 9/11 Commission Report. They have shifted their strategic communication terminology from a narrow “war against terrorism” to “a struggle against violent extremism” (SAVE). The administration is making the change because the war on terrorism focused too much on terrorism as a tactic. In this regard, Philip Zelikow, special assistant to Secretary of State Rice, is leading the effort at the head of a 10-member U. S. committee that is expected to lead to a formal declaration of a new U. S. national strategy. How do we go from new semantics to a new strategy?

### **Crafting a Strategy**

Crafting a strategy requires three components: ends, ways and means. The ends or what is wanted (a reduction in violent extremism) is straightforward. The means (the financial resources needed) is conceptually straightforward once the ways are established. But what makes strategy formulation difficult is coming up with ways. How do we reduce violent extremism? What strategic concepts are needed? The answer to these questions is difficult because they require creative thinking. Creative thinking is prevalent in the

U. S. business sector. But the 9/11 report is critical of U.S. government analysts for their lack of imagination. Former Singapore Prime Minister Goh has criticized the people in Singapore for their rigid mindsets. In fact, he initiated a “remaking Singapore” program to instill more creativity and innovation in the people in Singapore.

Most analysts of violent extremism start with two reasonable assumptions: a) law enforcement plays a central role in combating violent extremism, and b) violent extremism must be treated as a crime. If so, how should SE Asian police forces reduce violent extremism? Interestingly enough, three members of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) are currently working with analysts at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore. What can the NYPD police teach IDSS analysts about violent extremism?

Back in the late 1980s, the crime rate in New York was among the highest in the country. Then in the 1990s, Rudi Giuliani became the mayor. Mayor Giuliani changed the philosophy of policing in New York. Before Giuliani New York City had reactive policing. A crime would take place. The dispatcher back in headquarters would call a police officer in his car. The police officer would drive to the scene of the crime. The people in the area would flee, always fearful that the police might arrest them if they were nearby. Police officers would be rewarded based on their number of arrests and convictions.

### **Protecting the People**

Giuliani changed all this. He took police officers out of their cars. He sharply increased the number of cops on the beat. By walking the beat, NYPD police bonded with the people. People in the neighborhood now viewed the police differently. The police were there to protect them from crime. The people would alert the police to any strange developments. That pro-active public awareness and two-way communications helped to prevent crimes from taking place.

As a result, the number of crimes taking place in New York City fell dramatically. It also reduced fear of crime. New York became one of the

safest cities in the United States. That boosted confidence and the people reclaimed their parks, playgrounds and streets. People started shopping again in Manhattan. The economy took off. This same creative approach to reducing crime could arguably be used to dramatically reduce violent extremism in places like southern Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.

### **Turning Enemies into Friends**

In strategy formulation, the U.S. also needs to differentiate between hard-core violent extremists and those individuals who would abandon the cause if given a viable alternative. During the 1980s, the U.S. did not have to capture or kill all the communists to “win” the Cold War. Instead President Ronald Reagan persuaded many communists that democracy and the free market were better than communism. The lesson learned in the Cold War ideological struggle is that people can and do change. President Ronald Reagan turned enemies (like Gorbachev) into friends. Similarly, the Chinese communists became capitalists in all but name.

President Bush says the U.S. will not bargain or negotiate with Al Qaeda. The U.S. position is that there is no common ground or basis for dialogue with Al Qaeda. But there is always a danger that the U.S. makes the mistake of coloring a moderate Moslem group that criticizes U. S. policy with the same brush that it uses to track down violent Moslem extremists. So the U.S. needs to sort out hard-core terrorists who should be captured and brought to justice from those it seeks to win over.

### **Defending U.S. Ideals**

The 9/11 Report also argues that the U.S. needs to defend its ideals vigorously, even when US friends or allies do not respect these ideals. Why? Another U.S. Cold War lesson is the following:

“Short term gains from cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks for America’s stature and interests.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report (henceforth 9/11 Report) Recommendation # 6, 376.

A good Cold War case study in this regard occurred in El Salvador. The U.S. kept sending guns to the military in El Salvador to kill Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) insurgents. Poorly trained right wing “Death Squads” would use these guns to kill innocent victims as well as communist terrorists. More and more innocent victims joined the FMLN insurgency and the number of violent extremists rose. After awhile a stalemate was reached. The one-dimensional U.S. military approach to violent extremism failed. The rigid U.S. mindset finally changed, which in turn led to progress in ending this bloody conflict in which both sides were guilty of terrorism and other atrocities. The U.S. learned that the FMLN insurgents had some just grievances. The U.S. changed its role from military sponsor to that of an honest broker with the United Nations (UN). The Death Squads and FMLN insurgents were brought together in the same room.

The ability to forgive and forget didn’t happen overnight. But step-by-step, the combatants gradually but steadily moved toward reconciliation. At first, there was anger and demands for revenge. Then, came a full accounting of the truth about atrocities on both sides. Next, came the punishment phase. Only after there was a sense of justice was it possible for the anger and demands for revenge to start to fade. The society then moved towards opportunity and hope. The final phase is reconciliation, as in Cambodia today.

### **Toward a Coalition Strategy**

Next, the U.S. strategy must be transformed into a coalition strategy.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. cannot fight terrorism alone. Practically every aspect of U.S. activities against violent extremism in SE Asia relies on international cooperation.<sup>4</sup> Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.

But a coalition doesn’t mean everyone has to “jump onboard” and do it the American way. Open policy debate on violent extremism should be fostered, not discouraged. The policy debate among U.S. friends and allies does not undermine U. S. ideals. It enhances them. One of the most important U.S. freedoms is freedom of speech. The 9/11 Commission’s Report lauds respect

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<sup>3</sup> See 9/11 Report, Recommendation # 10, 379.

<sup>4</sup> See 9/11 Report, 379.

for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences and tolerance for opposing points of view.”<sup>5</sup> In this regard, the Senate Intelligence Committee reviewed the Central Intelligence Agency’s pre-war intelligence failure on both weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi operational support for Al Qaeda. The committee blamed groupthink for creating false threats.<sup>6</sup>

## **Policy Differences**

Thankfully, groupthink was not a problem at the Shangri-La Dialogue of Defense Ministers in Singapore in June of 2004. Some Asian leaders at the Shangri-La meetings said that the U.S. was tackling the war on terrorism in the wrong way, radicalizing Asia’s Moslems and failing to appreciate the growing domestic opposition to the U. S. policies that are weighing on Asian allies.<sup>7</sup> A few days earlier Malaysia’s new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi—a former moderate Islamic teacher—blamed the Israeli-Palestinian problem and U.S. policies in Iraq for radicalizing even more people, breeding a new generation of violent extremists, refusing to recognize some root causes of terrorism and consciously and deliberately aggravating the problem.<sup>8</sup> Abdullah speaks from experience. He successfully used a subtle approach to defeat the Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS) in two states by addressing grievances (such as corruption in the ruling United Malays National Organization [UMNO]) and not inflaming passions. Armed terrorists were captured without deaths on either side. In so doing, Abdullah avoided the pitfalls of the right wing death squads in El Salvador who kept creating new violent extremists.

## **Policy Consequences**

The 9/11 Report says that America’s policy choices have consequences: “Rightly or wrongly, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding

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<sup>5</sup> 9/11 Report, 376.

<sup>6</sup> See US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Far Eastern Economic Review, (henceforth FEER), “Same Planet, Different World,” 17 June 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Moslem world.”<sup>9</sup>

Former Singapore Prime Minister Goh concurs and says that increasing numbers of moderate Muslims around the world are uncomfortable with America’s Middle East policies and therefore can’t justify joining the wider fight against violent extremism. Like Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah, Goh argues that a more balanced and nuanced U. S. approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must become a central pillar of the struggle against violent extremism.<sup>10</sup>

## Resentment

Notwithstanding the critique of ASEAN states, the United States is heavily engaged in the Middle East and the broader Moslem world and will be for years to come. The 9/11 Report persuasively argues that this U. S. engagement is resented.<sup>11</sup>

- Polls in 2002 found that among America’s friends, like Egypt—the recipient of more U.S. aid for the past 20 years than any other Moslem country—only 15% of the population had a favorable view of the United States.
- In Saudi Arabia the number was 12%. And two thirds of those surveyed in 2003 in countries from Indonesia to Turkey (a NATO ally) were very or somewhat fearful that the United States may attack them.”<sup>12</sup>

Since the U. S. invasion of Iraq, support for the United States has plummeted even outside the Middle East. Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people thought the United States was doing the right thing in its fight against violent extremism. Few people saw popular support for Al Qaeda. Half of those surveyed said that ordinary people had a favorable view of the United States. By 2003, polls showed that the bottom

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<sup>9</sup> 9/11 report, 376.

<sup>10</sup> FEER, 17 June 2004.

<sup>11</sup> See 9/11 Report, pp. 362 and 375.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

has fallen out of support for America in most of the Moslem world. Negative views of the United States among Moslems, which had been largely limited to countries in the Middle East, have spread.

- Since the summer of 2003 favorable ratings for the United States have fallen from 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% among Moslems in Nigeria.<sup>13</sup>

Which groups should the United States target in trying to win hearts and minds? For starters, the small number of Moslems who are fully committed to Usama Bin Laden's version of Islam are currently impervious to persuasion. But the United States could attract the large majority of Arabs with what Harvard's Joseph Nye calls a soft power message that encourages reform, freedom, democracy and opportunity. That said, as long as Americans are the carriers of this message, these messages are of limited effectiveness. The 9/11 Commission's Report persuasively argues that the United States can promote moderation but cannot ensure its ascendancy. Only Moslems can do this.

### **Toward Opportunity and Hope**

How can the United States be more effective in reducing anti-Americanism? Perhaps U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage puts it best: "Americans have been exporting our fears and our anger, not our vision of opportunity and hope."<sup>14</sup> The United States and its ASEAN partners need to foster economic opportunity and hope for a better life if the war on terrorism is to achieve anything but tactical successes.<sup>15</sup>

Educational opportunity is also essential to winning the struggle against violent extremism. The UN correctly equates literacy to freedom to develop one's potential. Education also teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs as a key element in any global strategy to eliminate Islamist terrorism.<sup>16</sup> President Bush talks about his about his education program, "No Child Left Behind" in the United

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> 9/11 Report, 377.

<sup>15</sup> See 9/11 Report, Recommendation # 9, 379.

States. This same philosophy should be spread globally to help reduce the root causes of violent extremism.

## **Breeding Ground**

Some people are quick to make the case that poverty and illiteracy do not cause violent extremism. They also say that lots of terrorists come from relatively well-off families. In addition, they point to parts of Africa where there is widespread poverty and no violent extremism. True enough. But it doesn't take much radical leadership and organization to exploit poverty and illiteracy, use the United States as an ideological scapegoat and ignite anti-U.S. violent extremism in the Middle East. After all, 40% of adult Arabs are illiterate. One third of the broader Middle East lives on less than two dollars a day. The same social and economic injustice that fans incendiary conditions for violent extremism in the Middle East can and does occur in ASEAN states. The 9/11 Commission's Report persuasively argues that "When people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created... Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive outlet."<sup>17</sup>

## **Underclass**

Meanwhile, the Asian underclass is not remaining passive in the face of poverty and illiteracy. Poor people are rising up and venting their frustration. The underclass was a key political driver when the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party was voted out in India. A similar political event happened in Mongolia. Despite strong economic growth in both places, the incumbent government was voted out. The good news is that this was all done peacefully.

But when there's no peaceful way to vent, the potential for terrorism to break out increases. Elections come and go but the needs of the underclass are ignored. As a result, terrorism breaks out in places like Nepal, Indonesia, southern Thailand and parts of the Philippines. Pervasive poverty in Laos

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> 9/11 Report, 378.

and Cambodia also create the potential for violent extremism unless the governments can provide a better way of life for the underclass.

### **Thailand's Southern Insurgency**

The outbreak of Islamist violence in Thailand's Moslem south is particularly disturbing since this separatist militancy has not been seen since the 1970s and 1980s. Thai authorities initially played down over 100 killings since January 2004. But they are not dismissing it anymore. Anxious Buddhists are buying guns and training for battle. In one sense the conflict is a religious struggle that pits Moslem insurgents against a Buddhist dominated government. The militant Moslems want to restore the independence of Pattani, a region that was annexed by the Buddhist kingdom of Siam a century ago.

But in another sense the previously dormant conflict has found fresh partisans among those religiously fervent Moslem youth that lack jobs, hope and opportunity. Moslem teachers tell them Buddhists are responsible for hopelessness and their only hope for a better life is a "Jihad for Pattani." Bangkok cannot change this mindset simply by killing Moslems. If Bangkok wants to persuade Moslem youth to rediscover their loyalty to Thailand, Thai authorities need to offer an attractive alternative. Bangkok needs to provide a viable economic development package and new jobs.

### **Conclusion**

Creating macroeconomic growth and prosperity for a privileged few is not enough. Prosperity is like a pile of horse manure. It must be spread around as fertilizer before things grow. In this regard, it's important to understand that strong economic growth is not an end in itself. Economic growth is a means to generate employment, banish poverty, hunger, and homelessness and improve the standard of living of all the people. To sum up, spreading prosperity, while not a silver bullet, does help in combating violent extremism. Conversely, poverty and illiteracy are easy prey for violent extremists to exploit.

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*Chapter 6*

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**Creating a More Integrated  
and Effective National Security  
Apparatus**

*Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy*

## **Chapter 6**

### **Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus<sup>1</sup>**

**Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy**

#### **Introduction**

For well over a decade, the United States (U. S) has faced a security environment far more complex than that of the Cold War. Today's challenges – such as winning the global war on terror and slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – require multifaceted security strategies that take advantage of capabilities from across the full spectrum of national security agencies.

Yet, while today's challenges are vastly different from those of the Cold War, the structures and mechanisms the United States uses to develop and implement national security policy remain largely unchanged. Cabinet agencies continue to be the principal organizational element of national security policy, and each agency has its own strategies, capabilities, budget, culture, and institutional prerogatives to emphasize and protect.

The United States has entered an era in which cooperation and coordination among Cabinet agencies can make the difference between success and failure. The national security agencies can bring a wealth of experience, vision, and tools to bear on security challenges, but more often than not, the mechanisms to integrate the various dimensions of U.S. national security policy and to translate that policy into integrated programs and actions are extremely weak, if they exist at all.

Experts constantly point out that America's adversaries operate on a strategic timeline of years, if not decades, while senior U.S. officials find it almost impossible to break the tyranny of the inbox and find time for

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted by Permission, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2005, Chapter 2.

strategic planning. Because the budget process remains largely focused at the Cabinet agency level, even policies that do result from strategic planning in one agency can founder because their objectives may not be reflected in critical resource decisions in another. Similarly, attempts to coordinate related activities across departments to maximize their effects can falter because agencies do not define geographic regions and functional issues the same way, and lack the time, resources, or inclination to work closely with interagency counterparts.

Even at the highest level, the executive branch does not take a holistic approach to the most pressing security problems. For example, two different Cabinet level councils—the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council—have responsibility for problems that are fundamentally inseparable.

Greater unity of effort in U.S. national security policy will not happen on its own. Senior officials in the White House, the Defense Department, the State Department, and other agencies need a stronger architecture for policy development, implementation, and oversight. This architecture should take a “cradle to grave” approach, enabling development of strategic policy objectives that are translated into executable policy initiatives resourced according to their strategic priority – and whose implementation is overseen with sufficient rigor to ensure they have a chance to succeed.

Building this architecture will require reshaping national security organizations to emphasize integration across agency boundaries and budgets and make a long-term investment in the career professionals who make up these agencies.

### **Institutionalizing Strategic Planning for National Security**

Every President, every National Security Adviser, and every Cabinet secretary faces a vexing challenge from the moment they take office until the moment they step down: how to keep the urgent from crowding out the important. In the national security arena, “the tyranny of the inbox” often becomes “the tyranny of managing today’s crises.” For reasons both practical

and political, the day's headlines, meetings with counterparts, actions about to occur on Capitol Hill, and crises at home and abroad often set the day to day agenda for senior leaders in government. This understandable focus on today, however, often precludes strategic thinking about tomorrow.

In a highly complex and uncertain international security environment, this near-term focus brings some substantial risks. Perhaps most importantly, it can force the United States into a predominantly reactive posture in which its options are, by definition, more limited. When the United States fails to anticipate crises or problems before they occur, it forfeits potential opportunities to prevent them or to minimize their consequences, and consequently incurs higher costs associated with responding to them after the fact. When U.S. leaders fail to look over the horizon, they also can miss opportunities to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and to hedge against developments detrimental to those interests. Finally, without a long-term perspective, policymakers lack the bigger picture they need to set the nation's priorities wisely and make tough choices about where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk.

The U.S. government currently lacks both the incentives and the capacity necessary to support strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena. As mentioned, it is extremely difficult to divert the attention of national security officials beyond the crises and demands of the day. In addition, while individuals on the National Security Council (NSC) staff may develop planning documents for their respective issues, the NSC staff lacks adequate capacity to conduct integrated long-range planning for the President.

While some capacity for strategic planning exists in the Department of Defense, no other department devotes substantial resources to planning for the long-term future. Although the State Department's policy planning office develops a "big picture" approach in specific policy areas, like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) enlargement or U.S. relations with China, it tends (with some exceptions) to focus on issues already on the policy agenda rather than challenges that might loom over the horizon. Nor

does it address the types of capabilities the United States should seek to develop to deal with future challenges.<sup>2</sup>

Recognizing this gap, Congress sought to force strategic planning on the executive branch by requiring in law that the President submit a National Security Strategy along with the annual budget request.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, this requirement has not always produced the intended strategic thinking on national security. Rather, each administration from President Reagan on has chosen to treat this statute primarily as a requirement to publicly explain and sell its policies rather than an opportunity to undertake a rigorous internal strategic planning process. The result has consistently been a glossy document that serves a public affairs function, but does little to guide U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Consequently, there is no national security analogue to DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review – no established process for delineating the nation's security strategy and the capabilities required to implement it.

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<sup>2</sup> Similarly, a number of agencies now develop "strategic plans" to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, but these plans tend not to have significant impact on the policy-making and program implementation of their respective Departments.

<sup>3</sup> Congress amended the 1947 National Security Act in 1986 as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act to require the President to transmit to Congress each year, with the submission of the budget, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. See Sec. 108 [50 U.S.C. 404a]. When a new President takes office, he or she must submit a national security strategy report within 150 days of taking office. Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States; (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States; (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1); (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy; (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning puts the United States at strategic disadvantage. If the United States wants to defeat global terrorism, keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the wrong hands, and deal with other threats to its vital interests, it needs to have a proactive national security policy that is sustainable over the long term. Achieving this requires building more capacity for long-range planning at the highest levels of the U.S. government and creating incentives for harried decisionmakers to participate in the process.

## Recommendations

A robust strategic planning process for national security should include the following elements:

- ***Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) to develop U.S. national security strategy and determine the capabilities required to implement the strategy.***

Every four years, at the outset of his or her term, the President should designate a senior national security official (most likely the National Security Adviser) to lead an interagency process to develop a U.S. national security strategy and identify the capabilities required—economic, diplomatic, military, informational, and so on—to implement the strategy. The review would engage all of the national security agencies in an effort to produce both the National Security Planning Guidance described below and the unclassified National Security Strategy already mandated by Congress.<sup>4</sup> The review would begin with an assessment of the future security environment and the development of national security objectives. The heart of the exercise would be devising a national security strategy for achieving these objectives, identifying the capabilities required to implement the strategy, and delineating agency roles and responsibilities. Such a process would provide every administration with an opportunity to conduct a strategic

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<sup>4</sup> The study team believes the Congressional requirement for the President to submit a National Security Strategy each year should be amended to require a Quadrennial National Security Review instead.

review of U.S. national security policies and capability requirements and to define a way forward for the future. The QNSR should logically precede and provide the conceptual basis for agency reviews like DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review.<sup>5</sup>

- ***Create a classified National Security Planning Guidance to be reviewed by the NSC, signed by the President in the first year of a new administration, and updated on a biannual basis.***

The President's National Security Planning Guidance would articulate his or her national security objectives and the strategy and capabilities required to achieve them. It would provide planning guidance, directing the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretaries to develop particular courses of action and undertake specific activities in support of the strategy, as well as capabilities guidance – developed in conjunction with OMB (Office of Management and Budget) – identifying baseline capability requirements in priority areas. This document would provide the conceptual basis for the unclassified National Security Strategy, the development of interagency concepts of operation, and the conduct of interagency mission area reviews as described below. It would also be the starting point for all of the national security departments to develop their own implementing strategies, such as DoD's defense strategy. To be effective, the development of this National Security Planning Guidance would have to be a top-down, rather than bottom-up, effort that would engage the President and the national security principals.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This would likely require delaying the start of the QDR and other agency reviews until the basic conclusions of the QNSR are known. Consequently, agency reviews would not likely be completed until the second year of a President's term.

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the best historical analogue for this process was President Eisenhower's Solarium Project as described in Nottberg, Tyler, "Once and Future Policy Planning: Solarium for Today," in Living History. The Eisenhower Institute. Available at <http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/livinghistory/solarium.htm>; and in Bowie, Robert. "President Eisenhower Establishes His National Security Process," in Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership, David Abshire, ed. Westport: Praeger, 2001, 152-154.

- ***Establish semi-annual “Over the Horizon” reviews for agency deputies to anticipate potential future crises and challenges, and to stimulate proactive policy development.***

In these meetings, the Director of National Intelligence would present the Deputies – representing NSC, OMB and all of the agencies involved in national security – with an “over the horizon look” at possible developments in the international security environment one year, five years, and ten years or more in the future. This material would be developed in concert with the broader intelligence community and would aim to highlight not only points of consensus but also areas of uncertainty and debate that should inform national decision-making. This review would increase the visibility of longer-term trends, plausible developments, and “wild cards” in order to stimulate more proactive consideration of ways the United States could shape the international environment.<sup>7</sup> This review process could also stimulate interagency planning efforts and provide scenarios for the exercise program described below.

- ***Establish an annual table-top exercise program for senior national security officials to practice managing future national security challenges and identify capability shortfalls that need to be addressed.***

This exercise program would serve several functions. First, it would allow senior national security officials an opportunity to experience managing a crisis or complex operation, without the costs and risks involved in a real-world situation. Second, each exercise would enable these officials to identify courses of action that might prevent or deter a crisis and responses the United States should explore and develop further.<sup>8</sup> Finally, these simulations would enable the participants to identify critical gaps in U.S. capabilities and task

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<sup>7</sup> Such reviews would build on but be broader in scope than the existing interagency reviews of the NIC watch list, which aims to identify countries on the brink of instability or failure.

<sup>8</sup> Identified courses of action could be more fully developed and explored in the wake of the exercise, possibly for presentation at the next such session.

development of action plans to address them. Progress in implementing these action plans could be reviewed in subsequent exercises or as part of the biannual National Security Planning Guidance process.

- ***Create an NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to strategic planning.***

In support of the above recommendations, the NSC requires a small but empowered staff devoted to strategic planning. The proposed Senior Director for Strategic Planning would be responsible for drafting and staffing the President's National Security Planning Guidance, working with the Director of National Intelligence to prepare the semi-annual "over the horizon" reviews, and overseeing the annual national security exercise program.<sup>9</sup>

### **Strengthening the Links Between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution**

In administration after administration, senior national security officials have lamented that policy decisions taken in Washington are not always reflected in the programs and activities of agencies in the field. Whether the challenge is implementing a complex program, like biodefense, across multiple departments of government or integrating the efforts of various U.S. agencies in a given region of the world, the gap between setting policy priorities and effectively executing them is one of the hardest and most frustrating perennials in our system of government.

This section examines three different aspects of this problem: the lack of an agreed interagency approach or "concept of operation" for a number of high priority mission areas; the inadequacy of current processes to ensure that agency budgets reflect the President's highest national security priorities; and the absence of adequate mechanisms to coordinate the policy implementation of diverse U.S. actors within various regions of the world. In

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<sup>9</sup> The recent reorganization of the NSC staff includes a new "Senior Adviser for Strategic Planning," but the responsibilities of this position do not appear to be as expansive as what is proposed here.

each case, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study Team team recommends specific measures to strengthen the link between stated policy priorities and their execution.

### *Interagency “Concepts of Operation”*

The U.S. government’s level of experience with and capabilities to execute important missions such as stability operations, homeland security, counterterrorism, and combating WMD vary widely. The study team’s analysis focused on these four mission areas, but these are only representative cases, and our recommendations could be applied to other mission areas as well.<sup>10</sup>

While the United States has conducted a wide range of stability operations in the last ten to fifteen years, it still tends to conduct each operation on a rather *ad hoc* basis. Past operations have suffered from poor interagency planning, slow response time, insufficient resources, and little unity of effort among agencies, as well as infighting and competition among organizations in the field. Because sufficient capacity to respond to complex contingencies does not exist elsewhere in government, the Department of Defense often finds itself with the lead role in stability operations – despite the fact that it has no comparative advantage in many of the tasks these operations require.

Fighting terrorism, while certainly an important mission over the last two decades, has become a mission of vital interest since the September 11 attacks, and the scale of counterterrorist operations has expanded dramatically as a result. In the past, U.S. policy toward terrorism tended to be relatively reactive; the United States sought generally to deter terrorism, and if it was attacked, tried to punish state sponsors and bring the terrorists themselves to

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<sup>10</sup> The BG-N (Beyond Goldwater-Nichols) study team focused on these four mission areas because each of them will likely play a prominent role in how the United States manages the challenges posed by the future security environment, yet to date they have generally been treated as lesser included cases of more traditional missions like warfighting. The study team did not view these four cases as the definitive set of important missions relevant to the future, but did feel they would present a potentially rich set of missions through which to explore the issue of unity of effort.

justice through the legal system, if possible. Since September 11, not only is the United States working much more aggressively to defeat terrorists and deny them sanctuary, it is also more focused on the need to address the societal conditions that provide fertile ground for terrorism. This broader approach to counterterrorism requires the application and integration of a much wider range of instruments of national power than has been used in the past.

As a mission, homeland security has come to the forefront since September 11, 2001. The mission of combating weapons of mass destruction has roots in previous nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts, but has grown to encompass new areas, such as proactively interdicting potential WMD shipments and identifying, securing and eliminating WMD. Of the four mission areas the study team examined, these two have the least developed intellectual framework to guide the policy development process.

Among the four mission areas, there is little agreement on how to define the challenges and major issues. Various Cabinet agencies define the missions differently and use different terms to discuss the critical issues. As a result, agency representatives, subject matter experts, and stakeholders outside the federal government, such as state and local governments or non-governmental organizations, frequently talk past each other.

The lack of common terminology for these four mission areas indicates the absence of comprehensive, integrated interagency approaches to them. For example, the complexity of securing the homeland and combating WMD in a resource-constrained environment virtually demands that policies be developed based on risk assessments, to ensure efficient use of limited resources. But to date there are no common risk assessments guiding policies in these areas.

Finally and tellingly, in most instances there are still considerable debates about which Cabinet agencies have lead responsibilities in what areas, what constitutes effective coordination, and what programs should reside in which Department budgets. For example, National Security Presidential Directive 17, signed on September 17, 2002, lays out a broad strategy for

combating weapons of mass destruction, but it does not include a significant discussion of roles and responsibilities within the federal government. The National Response Plan<sup>11</sup> outlines roles and responsibilities in the event of disaster or attack within the United States, but applies only to the response portion of the homeland security mission. The National Strategy for Homeland Security delineates roles and responsibilities to a degree, but is not sufficiently specific to resolve many important debates in this area. And in some areas, such as intelligence and information analysis, the roles and responsibilities outlined in this national security document have been overtaken by changes to the organizational landscape that have emerged from the intelligence reform effort.

## Recommendations

- ***Develop common terminologies for each interagency mission area, using NSC-led interagency working groups.***

These working groups should focus initially on developing common definitions of the mission in each of the four areas, and then identify and define key terms in each mission area. Over time, this effort should include all priority mission areas identified in the President's National Security Planning Guidance. Common terminology would enable interagency and other relevant stakeholders to discuss these mission areas in the same language, which would greatly facilitate efforts to build the intellectual framework for them. The goal of such an effort would not be a comprehensive dictionary of terms, but basic agreement on the key terms used to define a mission area and its critical tasks.

- ***Develop common interagency concepts of operation for each mission area, using NSC-led interagency working groups.***

Once a common terminology for each of the key mission areas exists, the working groups should focus on developing a basic interagency concept of

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<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2004).

operation for each mission area. In the context of these four mission areas, the NSC-led interagency working groups would develop an overall description or picture of how the U.S. federal government envisions accomplishing each mission. These concepts of operation would outline major assumptions about the challenges inherent in the mission areas, including risk assessments that would help prioritize efforts. They would also describe *how* the federal government will apply the full range of capabilities at its disposal to achieve its desired objectives or effects.

Put another way, if securing the homeland or combating WMD is the policy “end” and the range of capabilities resident in DHS, DoD, and other agencies are the “means,” the concept of operation for these missions articulates the “ways” capabilities will be applied to achieve the policy objectives.

In some instances, individual Cabinet agencies and sub-components have already developed CONOPS (Concept of Operations) outlining specific approaches to particular missions. While agencies should be encouraged to develop subordinate concepts describing how their specific capabilities could contribute to the overall concept of operations, this should not be seen as a substitute for developing the interagency concepts of operation that are so critical to achieving true unity of effort across the U.S. government.

When finished, the interagency CONOPS can become the basis for developing requirements in each mission area. Formal requirements will make it easier to determine whether existing U.S. capabilities are adequate, and where gaps in existing capabilities may exist. Each agency can use those requirements and assessments of necessary capabilities as essential inputs to its programming and budgeting process.

- ***Develop an agreed set of interagency roles and responsibilities for key mission areas using an NSC-led interagency working group; codify the roles and responsibilities in a series of National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD); and embody in legislation those roles and responsibilities in each mission area that are enduring.***

After developing concepts of operation for each key mission area, the interagency working groups could use them to help develop clear, agreed sets of roles and responsibilities for all relevant stakeholders.

In some areas, roles and responsibilities have already been defined. For example, NSPD-33 outlines the division of labor for biodefense in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But NSPD-33 was written in the absence of agreed, overarching concepts of operation for combating WMD or for homeland security, and focuses on only a portion of the broader mission area. As a result, it may need to be updated.

Similarly, several Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) outline aspects of the homeland security challenge, and discuss roles and responsibilities related to those specific elements, but no HSPD consolidates a discussion of roles and responsibilities into one document or is based on a comprehensive, agreed interagency approach to the mission.

Because these missions are evolving, it may be desirable to initially define roles and responsibilities through a series of presidential directives that would provide the President with the flexibility to adjust and adapt them to reflect significant changes in the strategic environment.

But limiting codification of roles and responsibilities to presidential directives would mean that with each new administration, progress in the area of interagency roles and responsibilities could be eroded or lost entirely. Turnover at senior levels can result in loss of institutional memory, and old bureaucratic battles being re-fought. New policy objectives might demand that old agreements be revisited. For the aspects of these missions that seem least prone to significant change in the next five to ten years, passing legislation to codify agreed roles and responsibilities is the best way to preserve hard-won advances in creating greater unity of effort across the interagency. Such legislation could also provide the basis for realigning agency authorities and resources to ensure that each agency has the capabilities it needs to execute its assigned tasks.

### *Ensuring Budgets Reflect National Security Priorities*

In addition to the challenge of creating integrated interagency approaches to critical mission areas, every administration grapples with the problem of translating its strategic priorities into actual programs and budgets. Funding is a critical tool for ensuring that policy decisions are carried out in programming decisions.

But today's budgeting processes are largely unchanged from the Cold War era. Agencies for the most part prepare their own budgets in "stovepipes." These budgets are keyed to OMB-issued top-line fiscal guidance and to individual agency priorities, but not always to common strategic priorities as they may be articulated at the national level across agencies. Furthermore, no consistent process exists for developing budgets across agencies against these policy priorities.<sup>12</sup> Without a set of articulated priorities against which agency budgets can be examined on an interagency basis, the government has little means of assuring that the hard choices on funding national security missions are being considered within the context of a particular mission and/or against the full range of the President's top goals and objectives.

Today, nearly all national security priorities have a multi-agency dimension in both policy development and execution. That is certainly the case for the 21<sup>st</sup> century mission areas discussed above—stability operations, counterterrorism, homeland security, and combating WMD. Homeland security has particularly complicated policymaking by adding a number of new players to the traditional State/Defense/CIA national security policy process. As noted in the section above, these mission areas lack comprehensive, integrated interagency approaches. Without common concepts of operation, it is not possible to comprehensively review the programs required to execute them.

Beyond that, *within* these mission areas, core programs are commonly interagency in nature. To cite one example in the homeland security area,

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<sup>12</sup> See also discussion in Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 366-367.

the national biodefense program requires cross-cutting functions such as information management and communications, research development and acquisition, and maintenance of biodefense infrastructure. Multiple cabinet agencies have responsibilities for implementing this program, including, among others, the Secretary of Homeland Security (domestic incident management), the Secretary of State (international terrorist incidents outside U.S. territory), and the Department of Defense (support for foreign consequence management operations).<sup>13</sup>

Yet, for the most part, the procedures for examining budget priorities have not kept pace with the way the government designs and implements policy priorities. Current processes for tying policies to budget priorities and looking at cross-agency trade-offs are far from systematic. At its core, the problem has been insufficient coordination between defense and non-defense budgets, and across non-defense budgets, during their development within the executive branch.

At the White House level, neither the National Security Council nor National Economic Council staffs have an institutionalized role in coordinating resources across national security agencies. Some individuals at senior levels within the NSC have taken a particular interest in budget matters and supported the OMB budget process, but that interest has tended to ebb and flow with personalities. More frequently, NSC offices with specific regional or functional responsibilities have worked closely with OMB to track or support specific initiatives. While this is useful, the process lacks a senior NSC policy official designated to look across national security priorities and work with OMB on budget trade-off decisions across those priorities and across agencies.

OMB – the main driver of the budget process – is viewed as a dependable, often un-biased, White House player with expertise about how programs work and how to pay for them. On the other hand, it is principally concerned with the fiscal dimension of the overall budget. This primary task of fiscal control means OMB does not have the tools to develop, evaluate, and endorse

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<sup>13</sup> Biodefense for the 21st Century; <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html>.

robust and resource-intensive policy options. While it is excellent at finding resources to support Presidential priorities, the OMB process alone does not necessarily result in a realignment of resources to reflect policy priorities – either within any budget function or across functions.

The budget cycle begins when OMB provides top-line fiscal guidance to agencies. Agencies then prepare budgets over the spring and summer (with varying degrees of OMB involvement), and submit them to OMB for review in the fall, prior to submission of the formal President’s Budget to Congress in early February of the following year. OMB considers the agencies’ budget requests and sets funding levels, meeting separately with agencies on specific program requests in “hearings” before final budget numbers are set.<sup>14</sup> The NSC staff is invited to participate in the OMB-led “hearings” on the national security portion of the budget in autumn, but with the exception of the DoD budget, the NSC is rarely involved prior to that time.

Examining the budget from a cross-cutting perspective should affect not only this deliberate annual budget planning, but also requirements that may emerge throughout the year, such as post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. The security environment is not static, and to be responsive to the changing environment, the process must be designed accordingly.

## **Recommendation**

- ***Conduct NSC/OMB mission area reviews for top national security priorities that require interagency implementation.***

Mission area reviews should help to more systematically identify gaps, duplication, or misalignment among agencies. Recognizing the challenges inherent in the budget process, the study team believes this strengthened

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<sup>14</sup> This section describing the current process draws heavily from an unpublished working paper developed for the BG-N project by Anne Richard, entitled “Interagency Resource Allocations: Understanding and Reforming How Resources Are Allocated,” November 2003.

review process – with NSC providing the policy focus and OMB the fiscal focus – should be confined to very specific mission areas that are among the most critical Presidential priorities and require implementation across multiple US Government agencies.

Specifically, these mission area reviews would include the following elements:

- First, the NSC Senior Director for Strategic Planning, in coordination with other NSC senior directors and key agencies, would develop capabilities guidance as part of the President’s National Security Planning Guidance described above. This guidance would articulate the baseline capabilities and programs in key mission areas and would be issued in the spring, prior to development of the agencies’ respective budgets.
- Second, once the President’s National Security Planning Guidance is issued, OMB should be the lead in tracking planned resource allocation against Presidentially-mandated priorities, before agencies submit their budgets to OMB.
- Third, OMB and the NSC should co-chair interagency mission area reviews before agency budgets are finalized. These would build on the “hearing” process in place today, but would be broader in scope and participation and would be held on a regular basis. They might be conducted in two phases: in the early summer, before agency submissions to OMB; and in the fall, as part of the process of finalizing the President’s budget submission to Congress. Extra reviews would be held as needed for crisis issues not foreseen in the budget.
- Finally, significant unresolved issues would be raised to the President for decision, as is the case today.

For specific high priority mission areas, budgets would be presented to Congress not only in the traditional form, but also as a cross-cut. Such a

presentation would enhance the executive branch ability to defend its submissions in these areas based on the rationale with which they were developed.<sup>15</sup>

The proposed process argues for not only strengthening OMB's partnership with the NSC but also raising the level of "budgetary literacy" among senior national security policy officials through targeted training and hands-on experience.<sup>16</sup>

### *Integrating Day to Day Policy Execution in Regions*

In any given region of the world, from East Asia to Latin America, U.S. national security policy is implemented daily by a multiplicity of actors: U.S. ambassadors, in-country representatives from agencies ranging from USAID to the FBI, regional and functional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and their subordinate military commanders, and so on.

Although regional COCOMs are charged with integrating the activities of the U.S. military in their areas of responsibility, there is no standing mechanism for integrating the activities of all U.S. government players in a given region. Moreover, each of the key national security departments defines the regions differently, creating sometimes troublesome seams and overlaps in the policy implementation process.<sup>17</sup> As a result, U.S. government

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<sup>15</sup> There is some precedent for this approach. In the 1990s, OMB developed budget "cross cuts" for several priority mission areas, such as combating terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-proliferation. More recently, it has developed cross-cuts for homeland security and combating terrorism. For another proposal to strengthen NSC and OMB planning and coordination to build capabilities to meet new threats, see John Deutch, Arnold Kantor, and Brent Scowcroft with Chris Hornbarger, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 265-284.

<sup>16</sup> This recommendation was suggested by Gordon Adams, former Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs at OMB.

<sup>17</sup> For example, the State Department divides the world into six regions: Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, Western Hemisphere, East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia. The Office of the Secretary of Defense divides the world into four regions: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Near East and South Asia, and Western Hemisphere. Within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, the world is divided into the following regions: Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa, Near East and South Asia, and Russia and Europe. The Unified Command Plan divides the world into

programs and actions in a region are often uncoordinated (as in the right hand not knowing what the left is doing) or entirely incoherent (as in one agency's actions contradicting or conflicting with another's). Strengthening the link between policy made in Washington and its execution in the field requires greater integration of U.S. government programs and activities on a regional basis.

## Recommendations

- ***Establish a common USG-wide framework for defining the regions of the world.***

The NSC should lead an interagency review of how various agencies divide the world into regions for the purposes of policy execution, with the aim of creating a common regional framework that could be used across the U.S. government. The resulting framework should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it adapts to changes in the international security environment.

- ***Conduct regular NSC-chaired interagency “summits” in each region.***

The NSC Senior Director for a given region should convene on a regular basis, on behalf of the National Security Adviser and the President, a “summit” of the senior USG officials with policy execution responsibilities in the region, including (but not limited to) the relevant ambassadors and COCOM. These summits would review current and planned activities in the region in light of the President's priorities, policies, and planning guidance. They should also identify ways to improve unity of effort and develop strategies by which the United States could shape the environment and possibly prevent crises. These summits might also provide useful bottom-up input into interagency processes for crisis action planning, as described in the next chapter.

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5 AoRs that differ from OSD(P) ISA's breakdown. NORTHCOM has the US, Canada and Mexico, SOUTHCOM has Central and South America, CENTCOM has the Middle East and the Newly Independent States of former USSR, EUCOM has Greenland, Europe, Russia and Africa, and PACOM has India, China, the rest of the Pacific, Australia and Antarctica.

In the longer term, the U.S. government should consider establishing standing Regional Security Councils, composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments, that would coordinate U.S. policy execution on a day-to-day basis and seek approaches to shape the regional environment in favorable ways.

- *Enhance opportunities and networks for information sharing and collaboration across agency lines and with coalition partners.*

Information flow among agencies of the U.S. government operating around the world remains remarkably constricted. The barriers to information sharing and collaboration on an interagency basis stem from a combination of policy constraints, cultural barriers, and technological inadequacies. Similar obstacles hamper information sharing with U.S. partners and allies. Achieving greater unity of effort in day to day policy execution requires improving how the U.S. government manages and shares information internally and with its partners.

Building on initiatives such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional Commands and proposals to make DoD's regional centers more interagency in character is a useful starting point. Beyond that, the NSC should establish an interagency working group to conduct a review of current national and agency policies on information sharing with the aim of removing counterproductive constraints. It should also seek to accelerate the efforts of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to build networked information technology architectures that would enhance information sharing and collaboration among the national security agencies of the U.S. government. Solutions identified for the U.S. government might also provide a basis for improving information sharing with key allies and partners.

### **Developing the Human Resources to Support a More Integrated National Security Approach**

Perhaps the most essential requirement to implement the above recommendations is a true national security career path across government

– one that produces an educated and trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate all the instruments of national power into effective national security policies, plans, and operations. Although there are many talented career professionals within government, such a workforce does not exist today.

Despite multiple and repeated calls for significant reform by a wide range of blue ribbon panels and commissions, little progress has been made across the U.S. government toward revitalizing the federal workforce.<sup>18</sup> Put simply, the national security agencies of the federal government lack the tools and resources to recruit and retain sufficient top-notch talent.<sup>19</sup>

Not only is the federal government poorly positioned to recruit and retain enough of the best and the brightest, the Cabinet agencies with significant responsibilities for national security<sup>20</sup> do not have career paths for their

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<sup>18</sup> A sample of the recent literature on civilian resource management includes the following: (i) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change*, Phase III Report (February 2001); (ii) Defense Science Board Task Force, *Human Resources Strategy* (February 2000); (iii) The National Commission on the Public Service, *Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century* (January 2003) (iv) GAO Report, *Senior Executive Service: Enhanced Agency Efforts Needed to Improve Diversity as the Senior Corps Turns Over* (October 2003); (v) GAO Report, *DoD Personnel: DoD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing Decisions* (March 2003); and (vi) GAO Report, *Human Capital: DoD's Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System* (May 2003).

<sup>19</sup> As noted in the Phase 1 Report of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project, “the problem stems from multiple sources: competition from private sector opportunities with often superior pay and fewer bureaucratic frustrations; complex and rigid hiring and security clearance procedures that can take months to complete; perceptions of government as a plodding bureaucracy where young talent lies increasingly fallow; and a changing labor market that increasingly views the notion of a single-employer career as undesirable and anachronistic.” (Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 1 Report, page 52.)

<sup>20</sup> While many federal agencies today have roles in national security, for the purposes of this section of the report, the BG-N study team focused on the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Justice Department and parts of the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and Energy.

civilian professionals that encourage them to develop the types of skills the government needs most. They are not encouraged to serve outside of their home agencies, nor are they provided significant interagency training or education. In fact, rotations outside of one's home agency can be very difficult to arrange, and often even damage prospects for promotion. While the strategic environment increasingly demands integrated approaches and interagency operations, very few professional development structures are in place to develop "jointness" at the interagency level.

## Recommendation

- *Working with Congress and the national security agencies, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should develop a national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training. Congress should approve a 10% personnel float for key civilian agencies to enable interagency education, training, and rotations.*

One of the most important changes made in the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the creation of the Joint Service Officer designation and associated incentives for officers to seek joint service as a way of advancing their careers. Once joint service became essentially a requirement for promotion to General or Flag Officer, the best talent in each of the Services began to seek out joint assignments.

Building on this model, OPM should work with Congress and the Cabinet agencies involved in national security to develop a national security career path for civilian professionals.<sup>21</sup> Like the Joint Service Officer model, this

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<sup>21</sup> This system is very similar in approach to the National Security Service Corps proposed in the Phase III report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (i.e. the Hart-Rudman Commission). See Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (February 15, 2001), 118. The Phase 1 Report of the Beyond-Goldwater Nichols project recommended creation of a Defense Professional Corps that would apply to DoD career civilians; in Phase 2, the BG-N study team realized that in order to build the needed capacity for interagency operations in the federal government, expansion of the Defense Professional Corps concept to the broader set of national security agencies would be essential.

system would create incentives for civilian national security professionals to rotate to assignments outside their home organizations, thereby broadening the experience of individual careerists and creating a pool of civilian professionals with experience in interagency policy development, programs, and operations.<sup>22</sup>

To develop and oversee implementation of a national security career path, the Office of Personnel Management should chair an interagency oversight board composed of representatives from each of the participating agencies. This board would identify the positions in the federal government that would be designated as “interagency duty assignments” (IDA) and determine the prerequisites for each. The board would also monitor the development of participating careerists to encourage home agencies to ensure that when individuals return from rotational assignments, they are placed in positions in their home agencies that leverage their joint experience.<sup>23</sup>

Creating a pool of interagency duty assignments across government is a central component of developing a national security career path, but equally important is linking these rotational assignments to increased upward mobility for those who participate. Making promotion to the Senior Foreign Service or Senior Executive Service (SES) for national security related positions contingent on completing a rotational assignment would radically alter the prevailing view in government that outside assignments virtually guarantee stepping off the promotion track.

Linking rotational assignments to accelerated promotion consideration for career civil servants at lower GS-levels (for example, those in Grades 13 and 14) would push the incentives further down into the career ranks and speed up the culture change needed to move from stove-piping to interagency

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<sup>22</sup> Members of the Foreign Service, while often perceived as different from individuals serving in GS positions, are also civil servants. The BG-N study team views the Foreign Service as an important component of the larger pool of career civil servants that would participate in this national security career path.

<sup>23</sup> If OPM and the agencies do not act in a timely fashion, Congress should step in to create the necessary legislation.

integration. Home agencies, not the OPM-chaired interagency oversight board, would retain control over the promotion process for their employees in this proposed system. All agencies participating in the system, however, would need to comply with the OPM mandated requirements that, to be eligible for SES, candidates must have completed an IDA rotation, and that GS-13s and GS-14s who complete an IDA will be immediately eligible for step increases and considered for promotion under accelerated timelines.

Interagency education and training also will be central to the creation of a national security career path that develops real interagency professionals. Just as national security career professionals who want to join the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign Service will be required to complete an IDA assignment, they also should be required to complete some amount of interagency education or training before being promoted. In addition to existing billets for civilians at the National War College and the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar, Congress should create a new Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would focus on training national security professionals in planning, managing, and overseeing complex contingencies and on preparing for deployments to specific operations. Should the Department of Homeland Security establish an educational center for its senior professionals, participation in that program might also fulfill the education and training requirements associated with the national security career path.

Critical to making a national security career path work is creating a “personnel float” for participating agencies that will enable rotations, education, and training as careerists move through the ranks. Congress allows the Military Services 10-15 percent additional end strength to create a float sufficient to ensure the joint service officer process can work. A similar approach is needed for national security agencies, beginning at the GS-13 level and above, to enable them to meet the professional development requirements of the national security career path.

Such a float would not be cost-free, but the return on investment in terms of the enhanced performance of government operations would be considerable.

Creating a pool of career professionals with significant experience in interagency policy development and operations could help to break down the cultural barriers between agencies that too often hamper effective U.S. government action. Over time, enhancing the number of career professionals with substantial interagency experience could establish the human foundation for greater jointness at the interagency level, and could also appreciably reduce the current burden on the U.S. military by providing the leadership element of the civilian capacity needed for complex operations in the field.

## **Conclusion**

Since the September 11 attacks, there has been much emphasis on the need for the federal government to “connect the dots.” Even in the best of circumstances – when multiple agencies are focused on the same threats, when efforts to address critical problems are well-resourced, when technology enables a wealth of information to be integrated and accessible to multiple actors – connecting the dots in today’s security environment is extremely challenging. And unfortunately, ideal circumstances are not the norm. The United States needs a new national security architecture, one that will make integration, shared focus, consistency of approach and unity of effort the defining characteristics of U.S. national security policy.

Process and organizational structures are not substitutes for good policy, but they can enable its formulation and execution. The United States needs a national security process built on interagency strategic planning, programming, and budgeting. A more integrated national security approach will not guarantee all the dots are connected every time, but it will greatly increase the chance that many of the dots are connected more often, and in so doing help us see and respond to the whole picture more quickly and clearly.

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*Chapter 7*

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**Strategies for Combating  
Terrorism**

*Kent Hughes Butts*

## Chapter 7 Strategies for Combating Terrorism

**Kent Hughes Butts**

In order to defeat terrorism, the United States (U. S.) must have an accepted, combating terrorism strategy upon which each agency and element of U.S. national power can base its own combating terror plans and objectives. This strategy should reflect the three pillars of the president’s National Security Strategy (NSS)—defense, diplomacy, and development—and support its vision. In the absence of a unifying combating terrorism strategy, the United States will undertake ad hoc efforts characterized by unsynchronized and variably efficient agency plans. This chapter identifies the elements desired in a complete strategy and discusses the importance of strategic planning to accomplish U.S. government objectives for combating terrorism. It reviews the elements of the two extent competing strategies for combating terrorism and identifies themes that should be reflected in any final U.S. combating terrorism strategy.

### **The Elements of Strategy**

If one reads many of the “strategies” developed by agencies of the U. S. government, one will find that they frequently are characterized by a lack of clarity concerning essential elements that most strategists would expect to find in a strategy. Conversely, in reading strategy documents from the private sector or those written by the military, one tends to find a consistency of framework that enables the reader to ascertain quickly the purpose, the plans for achieving that purpose, and those responsible for using the available resources to achieve success. These strategy documents will uniformly include the three essential elements of any strategy: the end state to be achieved; the ways or concepts to achieve that end state, and the resources available to implement those concepts. Known commonly as *ends, ways, and means*, they are the three pillars upon which, when properly aligned, rests the crown of victory.

The importance of strategy-based planning is exemplified by the highly effective presidential election strategies developed by the two major political parties. No political party campaign manager could hope to be successful without sending the chosen candidate into the fray with a clear and easily articulated vision. The end state of victory and the successful election to office of the chosen candidate is understood by all members of the campaign planning staff. So too, strategic themes and concepts of the campaign will be known to all supporters so that their daily actions may help achieve interim objectives and ensure unity of effort and a common focus. And of course, the clear end state and well defined strategic concepts will make it easy to identify the resources necessary to achieve victory, and thus, facilitate the effort to obtain those essential resources from stakeholders or donors. If the Republican and Democratic political party campaigns benefit from this quality strategic planning, so too should the efforts of the United States to combat what the President states is the primary threat to U.S. national security—terrorism.

The United States has a National Security Strategy that enhances its ability to function successfully in the dynamic global milieu. The strategy defines national interests, the objectives necessary to achieve those interests, and the means or resources with which they are to be pursued. This was not always the case. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require this strategy. Goldwater-Nichols requires the President to send to Congress a comprehensive annual report that defines the U. S. National Security Strategy, and the global interests, goals and objectives vital to U.S. security.<sup>1</sup>

The NSS outlines U.S. foreign policy, global commitments, and the defense capabilities necessary to implement the strategy. The NSS specifies the proposed short and long term uses of the various elements of national power necessary to protect, or further, U.S. interests and achieve stated objectives. The NSS also emphasizes the need to use diplomacy, development and defense in concert to achieve the stated security objectives and address the threat to those objectives posed by terrorism. The NSS document is

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986.

intended to be a clear articulation of the elements necessary to ensure the survival of vital U.S. interests, and a strategic vision that allows other nations to understand U.S. priorities. The NSS is written for a state-centric world of weak international organizations with questionable enforcement mechanisms, and multiple dynamic threats, with terrorism the chief among them. Thus, the NSS is a pragmatic document that articulates current and long-term U.S. national security interests and methods for protecting them.<sup>2</sup> Strategies to address combating terrorism should be rooted in the language and intent of the National Security Strategy.

### **Competing Strategies for Combat Terrorism**

The terrorist threat has changed markedly since the end of the Cold War. State sponsorship from the Soviet Union and others characterized much of that era's terrorist threat. Terrorist organizations were largely secular or nationalist in nature.<sup>3</sup> The end of the Cold War robbed many of the organizations of sponsorship and purpose, but also allowed long suppressed ethnic, socioeconomic and religious differences to surface. Radical ideologies have evolved that exploit these differences and use the new global systems of communication to broaden their reach and resource base. Adherents to these ideologies may be multi-national and cooperate with criminal groups and other, regional, terrorist groups. Fortunately, the elements essential to combat this new source of terrorism and create the single, clear, concise, unifying strategic framework to do so, can be found within the two existing CT strategies. The two documents' origins differ, as do their effect upon the U.S. national security leadership and the direction of the CT effort. They should be used to create a new combating terrorism strategy that will guide the application of U.S. resources and foreign policy.

The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (NSCT) was written by a team led by the National Security Council (NSC) in consultation with

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<sup>2</sup> David Jablonski, *Times Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change*, Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1995

<sup>3</sup> *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (NSCT), Feb. 2003, 7

the interagency community. Published in February 2003, it elaborates and complements the themes of the President's 2002 National Security Strategy. The vision that defines the end state of the NSCT is clear and compelling: a world in which "Americans and other civilized people...can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks."<sup>4</sup> The NSCT identifies the growing list of resources or means with which the strategy will be executed: "every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence and military."<sup>5</sup> Its strategic concepts or ways of achieving that end state are well reasoned and thorough, and underpin the alternative strategy written by the Defense Department.

In order to create a world free of terrorism, the NSCT identified four concepts that were to be synchronized and pursued simultaneously. The first is to *defeat* terrorist organizations with global reach. This entails targeting elements of leadership, financing, sanctuary, and command and control. The second concept is to *deny* terrorist groups sponsorship, support and sanctuary. This means encouraging other states to meet the terrorist threat, either by building their capacity or their will. These two have dominated the U. S. effort to combat terrorism. The third tenet is to *diminish* the underlying conditions exploited by terrorists. This tenet commits the United States to winning the war of ideas by promoting state and regional stability through political, social and economic development. The final concept is to *defend* the interests, citizens and territory of United States both domestically and in the international milieu.<sup>6</sup>

While the elements of this strategy were clear and the mission defined, the effort to enact the strategy was slow to evolve. This stemmed from the failure of the NSC to serve as a strong coordinator of the CT effort, the almost exclusive focus of the administration on the defeat and deny concepts, and the weakness of the strategy in identifying the agencies responsible for leading and synchronizing each of the four concepts. These weaknesses kept the NSCT from effectively altering the unbalanced U.S. approach to

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 1

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 11-12

combating terrorism and applying all effective resources toward defeating the threat. Although some agencies beyond DoD, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of the Treasury aggressively acted upon elements of the NSCT that were within their purview, the administration came under criticism in the late part of 2003 amid allegations that the United States was losing the war on terrorism. Responding to this criticism, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ordered a review of the U.S. approach to combating terrorism. As a result of this review, he ordered the Joint Staff to develop a National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). When Secretary Rumsfeld was satisfied with the NMSP-WOT, it was briefed to President Bush. The President approved the strategy and it was signed in 2005 by Secretary Rumsfeld.

Far from being simply a strategic plan for the military element of power, the NMSP-WOT addresses the full spectrum of CT concepts and is now recognized as the leading CT strategy. It is based upon the NSCT and combines most of its concepts into a new framework that has three ways: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorist networks; and counter ideological support for terrorism. The end state that it seeks is to achieve is a global environment inhospitable to terrorists in which terrorist extremists do not threaten free and open societies.<sup>7</sup> It identifies as its resources the same instruments of national power as the NSCT.

The NMSP-WOT was launched at the beginning of the second G. W. Bush administration and captures fresh thinking about the need for a more balanced approach to combating terrorism. This includes seeking to create an international partnership aimed at denying terrorist organizations the networks and resources they need to function and survive and diminishing the underlying conditions. It also comes at a time when the NSC has been reorganized and Ambassador John Negroponte takes over as the Director of National Intelligence and with the more sizable National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) available to draft strategic plans and hold the interagency

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<sup>7</sup> National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), unclassified briefing, J-5 Joint Staff, April 18, 2005.

community accountable. It thus captures the momentum of a new administration effort to build partnerships rather than approaching foreign affairs in a seemingly unilateral fashion. It also sets the stage for a genuine and long needed CT strategic communication program by dropping such harsh and easily misrepresented language as, “Where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter the threat they pose and, ultimately to compel them to cease supporting terrorism.” found in the NSCT.<sup>8</sup> The desire to create CT partnerships is genuine and interagency wide, and is reflected in the NMSP-WOT terminology. The center of gravity for this strategy is its focus on extremist ideology, an effort embraced by such administration leaders as Donald Rumsfeld and Steven Hadley. This allows the United States to move away from couching the threat as exclusively Islamic and leaving the United States vulnerable to terrorist strategic communication that has portrayed the war on terror as a Western war on Islam.

In the spring 2005 Principals’ Meetings, in which a review of the U.S. approach to combating terrorism was undertaken, Secretary Rice presented a slightly modified version of the NMSP-WOT as the accepted framework for discussions. Subsequent to these discussions however, elements of this strategy were made public by senior administration officials, who addressed the downside of using the term war on terror and surfaced some of the concepts articulated in the NMSP-WOT. Some conservatives immediately portrayed this suggested revision of terminology as being soft on terror<sup>9</sup> and the president quickly responded to this domestic criticism by backing away from the new approach and renewing his use of the term “war on terror.” Some argue that this calls into question the future direction of the U.S. combating terrorism program and the tenets of any proposed plans for implementing the CT strategy. However, it could be argued that, given the fact that the president had approved this strategic plan, it may be simply that some elements will need to be reworded before the NMSP-WOT will be adopted and put into practice. At this point then, the U.S. has a lame duck National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that has been replaced within the

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<sup>8</sup> NSCT, 12

<sup>9</sup> William Kristol, “Bush v. Rumsfeld,” *The Weekly Standard*, August 15, 2005.

interagency community by a new strategic concept that is itself in question. Nevertheless, the strategies provide a clear vision; similar, well-conceived strategic concepts; and encourage a broad array of U. S. elements of power to be synchronized and committed against the threat of terrorism. Almost certainly, the policy that emerges from the ongoing CT review process will be framed by these strategies and a modified NMS-PWOT will emerge as the new U. S. CT strategy.

### **Strategic Direction<sup>10</sup>**

The ongoing CT review process has demonstrated that the interagency community now agrees that the U.S. approach to combating terrorism requires a strategy. A strategy and the strategic planning process that implements its concepts provides three important functions: they chart a path through uncertainty; they relate the various agencies to the changing milieu; and they allow unity of effort by enabling lower echelons to alter their behavior to be in consonance with a clearly understood direction. Moreover, the strategy would: focus the government on a long range vision, helping senior leaders avoid the “tyranny of today’s crisis”; define the strategic concepts necessary to achieve that vision; and specify clearly the required resources and leadership. Signed and prioritized by the president, the strategy would define his expectations of how resources will be used by matching actions to achieve the end state. Such a strategy organizes the interagency toward collective objectives, aligns priorities through risk assessment, and defines roles and participants. It also serves to frame public discussions, which maintain the will of the people over the long haul, and advance U.S. strategic communication themes. Finally, the strategy would guide the U.S. government’s relationships with partner nations for managing transnational threats, and put combating terrorism in perspective within broader national security priorities.

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<sup>10</sup> Many of the following recommendations were developed during a workshop at the U. S. Army War College Symposium, Addressing the Underlying Conditions that Foster Terrorism, which took place at the U. S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership from 8 – 10 June 2005.

Implementing plans for the U.S. strategy that ultimately emerge from the ongoing review process and media driven debate should do two things. They should undermine the inclination by non-state actors to use violence for political objectives against non-combatants, and should foster tolerant civil societies that protect fundamental human rights<sup>11</sup>. While the national strategy should remain concerned about how the United States government would defeat the immediate threat of terrorism to U.S. citizens and interests, its necessary implementing international components should be concerned with building coalitions and leveraging the comparative advantage of both partner countries and the private sector. Tapping into these strengths, the strategy's implementing plans should first undermine and then prevent terrorism by encouraging and sustaining long term commitments to developing civil societies, and increasing opportunities in those societies. Similarly, the strategy should foster an understanding of the cultures from which it seeks support.

Although the Department of Defense drafted National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism is a good beginning to a broader approach to implementing the current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, it is not sufficient unto itself. Together the NSCT and the NMSP-WOT include many of the elements necessary for a balanced strategy to defeat terrorism. However, if the overall strategy is to be effective in addressing the United States' primary national security threat, creation of a full set of appropriate interagency implementing plans for the NSCT will have to have presidential priority and emphasis—no strategy will work unless the leader both grants authority and holds all involved principals accountable for its execution. Regardless of which agency is the “lead” agency, all agencies will need to develop their own supportive plans – fully aligned and coordinated not only with the overall strategy itself and with the lead agency's plan, but also with every other agencies' plan. Clearly all the agencies' plans need to also de-legitimize anti-American perceptions that feed terrorism, omitting inappropriate anti-Islamic rhetoric and instead treating terrorism as a transnational threat that all nations have in common. Both the NSCT as a

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<sup>11</sup> International Law already prohibits states and their military forces from deliberately employing violence against non-combatants.

whole, and the implementing plan set must be complemented by a strategic communication program supported by all cabinet members that projects a unifying message to the American public while it simultaneously promotes greater tolerance and cultural respect both at home and abroad. Similarly, as already noted above, the required set of agency implementing plans must reflect an understanding of the regional cultural differences and interests of partner nations; and the strategic communications effort must demonstrate that understanding. Finally, the various implementing plans must be carefully coordinated and integrated so as to affordably include resources to promote and sustain long-term commitments to develop good governance and civil societies, including education and economic opportunities in developing societies.

## Summary

The threat of terrorism is not waning. One could argue that the readily identified targets have been addressed by the *defeat* function, driving terrorist organizations into more isolated and difficult to identify cells. Thus, the next phase of combating terrorism will be more complex, requiring a long term effort that not only attacks and disrupts and protects the homeland, but counters the ideological support for terrorism by addressing the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit and helping partner nations win the hearts and minds of high risk populations. A fully coordinated, integrated set of interagency implementing plans for the combating terrorism strategy is essential to that mission. Effective strategy does not require each element to do the same things toward accomplishing the goals, but it does call for each element to do its things in a manner or at a time that assists the actions of the others rather than confounds them. DoD may have taken the first step by developing the NMSP-WOT, but unless the other agencies and involved parties put forth equal analytical and planning efforts—and unless everyone truly coordinates and integrates those efforts among all the agencies—neither the NSCT nor DoD’s NMSP-WOT will significantly enhance the nation’s security against terrorist activities.

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*Chapter 8*

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**Strengthening the Interagency  
and Maximizing its Effort in  
Combating Terrorism**

*Bert Tussing*

## **Chapter 8**

### **Strengthening the Interagency and Maximizing its Effort in Combating Terrorism<sup>1</sup>**

**Bert Tussing**

A host of concerns currently surrounds the interagency process and its ability to effectively and efficiently address the complex contingencies that surround the current War on Terrorism. A recurring charge against that process is that it lacks focus; that while there is a recognition of the need and importance of addressing the conditions which continue to provide a fertile feeding ground for terrorists to exploit, our country's efforts towards those ends are stove-piped among diverse components of the federal government. More-than-noteworthy efforts of organizations like USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, the State Department's new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the combatant commanders' Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) are attempting to address the problem. But there is a concern in that these efforts are not being coordinated through the interagency, allowing little to no chance for synergy, and leaving wide open the inability to bring a necessary prioritization to a pool of never-ending need. An accompanying concern is that personnel who actually populate and "work" the interagency are frequently laden with institutional obstacles which do nothing to ameliorate these conditions.

There will be no quick solutions to these "shortfalls," whether real or perceived. But before the ultimate answers can be derived, the correct questions have to be asked. The remainder of this chapter attempts to discern some of those questions; to provide observations surrounding the environment which raises the questions; and suggested solutions to the questions discerned.

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<sup>1</sup> The questions, observations and recommendations in this chapter were obtained from a workshop examining the efficacy of the current interagency process in addressing terrorism, its roots and its effects. The workshop was a part of the U.S. Army War College's symposium, Addressing the Underlying Conditions that Foster Terrorism, which took place at the U. S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership from 8-10 June 2005.

## **Who Should Lead in the Coordination of the Interagency Process in Combating Terrorism?**

This elemental question must serve as a starting point for any viable discussion. For whatever benefit, there is of course an elemental the answer: the President. But that answer, while perhaps correct, is in and of itself, far from satisfactory. Without meaning to overstate the obvious, the President is ultimately responsible for everything that does or does not occur in government during his administration. Accordingly, the Executive Branch is designed to assist in that administration, the Congress is designed to oversee that administration. Still, the question of how much of a direct role the Chief Executive plays in the day-to-day oversight of any issue is one that is finding frequent resonance in a number of authoritative circles.

For our purposes, it may be best to focus on the day-to-day aspect of the White House involvement in the War on Terrorism. Some have suggested that the President (as well as the Congress) has too frequently become victimized by the “tyranny of the in-box.” That in trying to remain responsive to immediate concerns and actions, President Bush is robbed of an ability to step back and take a more *strategic focus* on issues of great complexity, such as combating transnational terrorism. They further suggest that the Administration must, in fact, discipline itself to provide direction, to establish a reasonable infrastructure to respond to that direction, and then to allow the direction to take place.

This requirement, has occasionally been found wanting in the first term of the present administration. Many authorities have held that the logical entity to have *strategic oversight* of the interagency efforts in the War on Terrorism is the National Security Council (NSC). However, a pervading opinion is that the NSC had not been provided the direction to properly provide for the balance of issues that need to be addressed in combating terrorism, nor empowered to coordinate those issues across the Executive Branch. Accordingly, cooperation between powerful entities like the Department of State and the Department of Defense, is as likely a function of personality as process. The character and influence of the NSC and its

function has always been a reflection of the President's personality. The importance and complexity of the issues of dealing with transnational terrorism deserve more than the "ad hoc" response than that provided by the structure of the NSC during President Bush's first term.

In fairness, the evolving direction of the NSC in the Administration's second term may address some of these concerns. The reorganization, which includes a dedicated "Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism" placed notably along side deputies for "International Economics" and "Strategic Communications and Global Outreach," portends a more directed focus and steadier application of the elements of national power against terrorism, its power base, and the conditions which sustain it. But there are still what some hold to be blatant obstacles within the NSC structure that will serve to obfuscate and divert attentions which desperately need focus. Frequently cited among these is the continued existence of the Homeland Security Council (HSC). The Council, which was established in response to a greater terrorist threat, unnecessarily divides the government's concentration on a transnational issue into domestic, as opposed to international concerns, invariably fostering competitive attitudes while the potential for synergy lies dormant. The wisdom of husbanding issues of domestic security under the new and distinct banner of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an era that brings the threat against our populace to and through our doors is well founded. But an accompanying decentralization of thought within the Executive Office of the President is considered by many to be particularly ill-conceived.

Accordingly, the lead in coordination of the nation's *strategic* approach to addressing the total spectrum of terrorism should reside in a reconstituted National Security Council, folding the HSC back into that body. However, while this new leadership may provide for overarching authority, the operational and tactical implementation of policy coordinated by the NSC will also require sanctioned authority. In that light, an evolving position is that the new National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) may serve as the most appropriate conduit for *operational* implementation of national policy. Through the mechanism of the center's Strategic Operations Planning Department,

the NCTC appears postured to “integrate, coordinate and synchronize” interdepartmental efforts to apply the instruments of national power in combating terrorism.<sup>2</sup> These instruments will include diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, and law enforcement activities, applied at home and abroad in the various regions of strategic concern to our nation and its interests.

The domestic application of these activities will occur *tactically* through the established mechanisms of federal, state and local governments. There is not, however, a universally recognized *regional* mechanism for this same coordination across the international front. Many acknowledge USAID as the most appropriate medium for *localized* implementation of the developmental portion of a national “Defense- Diplomacy-Development” construct for addressing terrorism. But this still leaves open a required function to coordinate the three elements of that construct, and to prioritize them throughout a given region. Whether that coordination function should continue to take place through the Combatant Commanders, especially through an agency like the JIACG; or through a de-militarized entity under the Department of State that captures a regional focus to address transnational threats, is a question whose time has come.<sup>3</sup>

### **An Interagency Process Devoted to Combating Terrorism and its Causes, Which Authorities Are Necessary to Successfully Lead?**

Simply establishing an agency, or a function within an agency, and assigning responsibilities thereto does not equate to empowering that agency. Particularly given the demands of coordinating the diverse efforts associated with these concerns, even the restructuring of the NSC will not guarantee it the wherewithal to orchestrate the functions of the interagency toward these ends. Current concerns along these lines are highlighted against the backdrop of the real and perceived dominance of DOD in determining the direction of the country’s response to the terrorist threat. Real or not, the concerns were reinforced in the minds of many players within the interagency following

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<sup>2</sup> From “An Overview of the National Counterterrorism Center,” a presentation delivered at the symposium by Mr. Art Cummings, Interim Principal Deputy Director of the NCTC.

<sup>3</sup> Dennis Murphy and John Traylor provide a more detailed discussion of the regional dimension of combating terrorism in Ch 9.

the introduction of DoD's *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. While thoughtful and well-construed, the document was not vetted through any interagency process, but is nevertheless being portrayed in many circles as superseding the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Whichever strategy stands, the mechanics of this development drove home the notion that coordinating the actions of the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Treasury, et al., will require specific empowerment or the NSC will find itself cast as a peripheral player.

The only guaranteed means toward such empowerment throughout the President's cabinet will be through a National Security Presidential Directive. This directive will have to take up an early initiative of this President to supersede Presidential Decision Directive 56 of the Clinton Administration (*Managing Complex Contingency Operations*), but will have to move beyond that directive to focus more explicitly on combating terrorism, its causes and its effects. It must assign specific responsibilities to Executive Branch departments in fulfilling their agencies' functions in battling the terrorist threat, and specifically empower the NSC (presumably through the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism) with the integration and coordination of departmental efforts. In short, it must make clear that the NSC carries the President's mandate.

In addition to this mandate, however, some insist that resourcing and budgetary authority will be an essential component to executing a coherent strategy. Irrespective of which agency would exercise "lead" authority over the issues, some mechanism is necessary to ensure that "follower" agencies would, first, *have* sufficient resources to address the issues, and then *use* those resources towards those ends. In these regards, it is important to note current restrictions in the control of funding for developmental programs, such as those in the Economy Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, restrictions that will only be overcome by Congress which imposed them. A call has gone out for a "replenishable counterterrorism funding line," disbursed by direction of the President with "notwithstanding authority" and "no year" dollar expenditures to handle close in requirements to assist partner countries with urgent needs. Some have cited a need for a strategic approach to budgetary

considerations addressing the soft side of the War on Terrorism, but note that genuine long-term planning of the sort envisioned in these discussions is rare outside of DOD. Accordingly, a long-term planning process may be called for, but with it a long-term budgeting *authority*, rather than the supplemental authorities most often associated with these expenditures. Among other benefits, this shift from iterative supplemental funding to long-term budgeting may provide a more productive means of supporting the developmental line-of-action contained within the interagency terrorism programs.

From a cross-Cabinet perspective, the integration of issues in combating terrorism at its sources will cross many budget lines in multiple departments. As such, some authorities are calling for a partnership in coordinating and integrating anti-terrorism functions between the NSC, which would oversee policy considerations, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which would assist in budgetary oversight. This oversight could take form not only in deliberate annual budget planning, but likewise in providing for requirements which challenge anticipation, such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other potential pools for terrorist exploitation.<sup>4</sup>

### **How Do We Expand the Interagency Focus to Address Complex Contingencies in General, and the Challenge of Terrorism in Particular?**

Discussion over the cross-cutting, budgetary planning process that will be required to properly address the interagency effort against terrorism and its causes is indicative of a larger concern that exists over the structure of the interagency and its ability to adapt to a new threat in a new era. The current interagency process has been characterized as a relic of the Cold War era, ill-configured to handle the complex contingencies which are already

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<sup>4</sup> For a description of how this sort of policy-fiscal partnership could be constructed, see Chapter 6 of this volume, authored by Craig A. Murdock and Michele Fournoy, reprinted by permission, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase 2 Report*, CSIS, Washington, DC, July 2005, Chapter 2.

characterizing the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There is an increasing need to integrate all elements of national power to address issues such as terrorism, peacekeeping and stabilization, transnational organized crime, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, disaster response and other challenges. But the interagency process largely remains a collection of “stove-piped” functions, often pursuing separate but related agendas, with no real impetus towards pursuing or achieving synergy. The vision of the NSC as an “orchestration mechanism” for this diversity marks a proper beginning, but its success will be limited until institutional, (or perhaps better described as “cultural”) obstacles within the interagency are overcome.

To be sure, these obstacles aren’t intentional; in many cases they are born of ignorance. Simply put, far too few members of the interagency know what the rest of the interagency does. Without an understanding of how the separate components fit into a combined interagency effort (recognizing the capabilities, limitations and necessary constraints in each) it will be hard to develop and maintain a long-term strategic focus for addressing complex contingencies. From multiple sectors, a clear requirement seems to be emerging for a working familiarity between the components of the interagency. Some have suggested that, in the short term, this could begin with a sort of exchange program between the Departments, assigning personnel outside of their parent agencies for a period of time, automatically infusing a degree of shared awareness between the “detailees” and the agencies to which they are joined. It is perhaps interesting to note that the Strategic Operational Planning Department of the new National Counterterrorism Center is largely composed of this kind of detailee structure, a condition they intend to make permanent. Mr. Art Cummings, Interim Principle Deputy Director of the Center, extolled the virtues of this approach: “The strength of the NCTC is the fact that we have all those different cultures and people working at the same table, on the same mission.... We don’t approach problems the same way, and we don’t think the same way. That’s the good news.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Cummings, *op. cit.*

While this proposed exchange program may be viewed as beneficial, in the minds of many it fails to adequately — or perhaps more to the point, *permanently*—address the problem of interagency coordination. Observers contend that, in order to synergize the strength of the interagency process in addressing terrorism and the other complex issues of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the federal departments will have to undergo a “Goldwater-Nichols-like” conversion in systems designed for education, planning, and coordination.

Outside DOD, there is an appreciable lack of educational opportunities and requirements surrounding national security functions in the interagency. Exchange opportunities like the ones cited above are certainly educational, but the relative potential gains in insight and understanding gathered on the job (as opposed to in a dedicated learning environment) would be limited. Studies have recommended the introduction of sequenced educational opportunities over the course of an interagency career, preparing “national security professionals” for increased responsibilities while traversing their individual agencies’ career paths. The apex of this type of education would come in syllabi designed for “strategic-level leadership” close akin to the type of joint, strategic curricula offered at DOD’s top level schools.

Taking these recommendations a step further may call for planned assignments across interagency lines during the course of a career. Drawing again from examples within DoD, ascension to senior positions in government would be contingent upon having served outside of one’s “host agency,” perhaps on multiple occasions. Proponents of this institutionalized exchange program are convinced that neither a full appreciation of the combined strength of the interagency community, nor a sufficient awareness of its weakness can be gained without this kind of hands-on experience.

In order to accommodate this “cross-pollenization,” significant adjustments may have to be made in the government personnel system (or systems), for the purpose of establishing a common foundation for interagency assignments. People with experience in the arena have contended that a genuine interagency process will require a genuine interagency personnel system. An immediate requirement in the minds of many is the

development of a universal Federal Security Clearance system, allowing common access to items of common concern in problems demanding interagency solutions.

In addition to these recommendations, a call has gone out across the interagency for several “institutional enhancements” to strengthen the interagency process in combating terrorism. One of these is devoted to establishing a long-term, deliberate planning process incorporating representative stakeholders from across the governmental departments. The process would be devoted to identifying and addressing a desired “comprehensive end-state” for a country or region’s response to terrorism, its causes, and that which sustains it. The planners would attempt to frame this end-state, and the ways and means to reach it, from a national, regional, and global perspective. And the plan would place a high premium on building “partner” capacity to achieve the desired end in its own right, whether that partner is a nation, a region, or a transnational entity.

Developing plans, however, should not be viewed as an end in itself: *exercising* the plans (or plans deliberately similar to those plans) will also be a vital component of strengthening the interagency process. Such exercises (ranging perhaps from tabletop to command-posts and beyond, in deference to what is being assessed) reinforces the types of “familiarity” sought after in some of the previous recommendations, but also provides a practical mechanism to play out policy, demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of our doctrine, and identify gaps in our preparations. Familiar territory for DOD and DHS, the lessons learned from these types of exercises, especially viewed from the multiple perspectives that characterize interagency efforts, could prove invaluable in *solving* problems before they happen.

### **Additional Consideration: the Role of Strategic Communication**

Concurrent with the interagency question is the role Strategic Communication will play in the United States’ efforts to address terrorism and the underlying conditions which sustain it. Viewed simplistically as how we convey our message in these efforts, and how that message is received,

a significant number of critics hold that the country is suffering losses at home and abroad in “the war of ideas.”

One point of origin for our weakness in this arena is attributed to be the government’s failure to provide sustained leadership. Once again, the answer to the question of “Who should be in charge?” has proven to be elusive across the Executive Branch. Over time the nominal responsibility for carrying out the strategic communications campaign in the War on Terrorism has drifted from the NSC’s Directorate for Strategic Communications and Information, to the NSC’s World Muslim Outreach, to its new Strategic Communications and Global Outreach. New indications are that coordinating the overseas component of the Nation’s strategic communications effort will fall under the new Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Department of State. Wherever the responsibilities will ultimately reside, the presiding officials of the responsible organizations will have significant challenges to face, domestically, internationally, and within both the public and the private sectors.

The domestic side of our strategic communications efforts in addressing terrorism’s “underlying conditions” will have to deal with adverse perceptions surrounding resources and expenditures towards these ends. Frequently it has been noted that the American public and some members of Congress look upon efforts toward overseas development as “give-away programs”—nice to do, but easy to assign a lower priority viewed against constrained resources. It has been suggested that an education campaign is needed, particularly within the halls of Congress, to show a cost-benefit analysis behind empowering nations and peoples to stand alone, ending the cycle of deprivation and frustration that terrorist organizations have found so easy to exploit. Once again, building the capacities of our partners (nationally, sub-nationally, and supra-nationally) may well be the surest path to success; but unless Congress can be convinced, it will likely be the path not taken.

On the international front, the challenge for strategic communication will be in enlisting both governmental and non-governmental support. From

a governmental perspective, many would suggest that Washington can seldom expect a message emblazoned with “Made in the U.S.A.” stenciled across it to be warmly received by nations trying to establish/maintain credibility with their own people. In some cases, in fact, a government’s “moderate message” against fundamentalist extremism is either lost outright or obscured by charges that the purveyor of the message is a “puppet” of the Americans. It is the message and its moderating influence that should be important to us, not whether or not we receive credit for it.

If this is true of governments, it is all the more so with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is no secret that these organizations often enjoy greater access to the populace of a country or region than our diplomats could hope to obtain; but history has taught these organizations that openly associate with governmental entities could immediately result in doors closing. In some areas of the world this is particularly true of association with the government of the United States. Unfortunately, recent history would indicate that our country has occasionally made bad matters worse in rhetoric surrounding its developmental efforts. Many NGOs are quick to note that, no matter what the economic, educational, medicinal or other altruistic intent, trying to enlist their organizations in any effort labeled “The War on Terrorism” is predisposed to failure. Interestingly enough, the same type of obstacles could be expected in enlisting another non-governmental sector, international business. This sector could provide a significant venue for access, but its reticence to being associated with a poorly conceived global message would be equal to, or even surpass that of the NGOs.

## **Conclusion**

The direction the Administration is taking in the NSC, through the NCTC, the State Department’s Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy and other initiatives leaves an opening for new optimism surrounding the interagency process for addressing terrorism; but optimism is not enough. No effort by any organization will succeed without a clear mandate from the White House in the form of a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). That directive must empower a partnership between the NSC

overseeing policy and OMB overseeing the resourcing of that policy. The policy must lay out a clear delineation of agency responsibilities, including delineation of tiered leadership along a strategic, operational, and tactical focus. The importance of Strategic Communication must be sustained at each level, consistently presenting our nation's message in "the war of ideas" under the orchestration of a single agency charged with framing that message for both a domestic and international audience.

Even on the strength of an NSPD, the NSC will remain foremost a coordination and synchronization entity between the Departments of the Executive Branch. In order for it to perform its function most efficiently, those departments will have to approach their integrated efforts with a common understanding of the strengths and limitations of these essential stakeholders behind our national elements of power. This understanding will only come about through a new direction in education and exchange among those charged with our Nation's security. The bi-polar threat that fashioned the national security structure of the last generation has given way to an asymmetric threat that defies even national identity. And, the threat is evolving. Our new national security structure must be able to move as freely—across agencies and across institutional cultural boundaries.

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