This monograph analyzes a Heavy Brigade Combat Team’s (HBCT) preparedness to counter a hybrid threat. The analysis consists initially of developing broad understanding of hybrid warfare/ threat by reviewing numerous proposed definitions. With a general understanding of hybrid warfare/ threat determined, subsequent analysis identified six tenets of hybrid threat from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) approved definition. The author’s initial hypothesis is that an HBCT is prepared to confront a hybrid threat. Research supports this hypothesis. U.S. Army doctrine prescribing full spectrum operations is feasible. DOTMLPF analysis indicates that an HBCT is capable of countering an opponent that can simultaneously conduct major combat operations, irregular warfare and criminality, adapting to an HBCT’s actions, reactions and counter-reactions. This capability is however, limited by the scale of an HBCT’s size and capabilities. What is less clear is the validity of the theory of hybrid threat. As illustrated by the research in this monograph, an HBCT can adaptively and simultaneously counter major combat operations, irregular warfare, and criminal activity dependent on the scale of enemy activity. Theoretically, if an HBCT is constrained by scale it is logical that a hybrid threat is so limited.
Title of Monograph: Hybrid Threat: Is the HBCT Ready for Future Warfare

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Abstract

HYBRID THREAT: IS THE HBCT READY FOR FUTURE WARFARE? by Major Eric N. Lindsay, U.S. Army 44 pages.

This monograph analyzes the United States Army’s preparedness to counter a hybrid threat. The analysis consists initially with developing broad understanding of hybrid warfare/threat by reviewing numerous proposed definitions. With a general understanding of hybrid warfare/threat determined, subsequent analysis identified six tenets of hybrid threat from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) approved definition. These tenets are major combat operations, irregular warfare, criminality, terrorism, simultaneity and adaptability. Definitions of the hybrid threat tenets come principally from joint and U.S. Army doctrine. Subsequently an analysis of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis in accordance with the Joint Capabilities and Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is conducted of a heavy brigade combat team’s (HBCT) ability to counter the tenets of hybrid warfare/threat.

The author’s initial hypothesis is that an HBCT is prepared to confront a hybrid threat. Research supports this hypothesis. U.S. Army doctrine prescribing full spectrum operations is feasible. DOTMLPF analysis indicates that an HBCT is capable of countering an opponent that can simultaneously conduct major combat operations, irregular warfare and criminality, adapting to an HBCT’s actions, reactions and counter-reactions. This capability is however, limited by the scale of an HBCT’s size and capabilities. The review of doctrine relative to irregular warfare determined that the definitions of irregular warfare and terrorism are nearly synonymous. For the purposes of this monograph, terrorism is a tactic of irregular warfare, because doctrinally an HBCT does not conduct counterterrorism. This is problematic because if the concept of hybrid warfare/threat is feasible; U.S. forces must maintain the capability to counter all its tenets.

The HBCT’s capability to counter a hybrid threat is clear; full spectrum operations enable the heavy brigade combat team to respond to an antagonist employing hybrid warfare tactics. What is less clear is the validity of the theory of hybrid threat. Vast numbers of academics and military intellectuals have varying opinions each of which suggesting a hybrid threat can adaptively and simultaneously conduct major combat operations, irregular warfare and criminal activity. As illustrated by the research in this monograph, an HBCT can adaptively and simultaneously counter major combat operations, irregular warfare, and criminal activity dependent on the scale of enemy activity. Theoretically, if an HBCT is constrained by scale it is logical that a hybrid threat is so limited.
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Introduction

“We must train ourselves for the unexpected in place of training others for the cut and dried”.  

-Major General J.F.C. Fuller  
Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, a Study of the Personal Factor in Command

The United States Army has recently undergone transformational change. This change was a necessary and evolutionary development from a Cold War force oriented towards high intensity interstate warfare to a post-Cold War, full spectrum force. Was that change sufficient? In the absence of a peer or near-peer competitor, the United States Army has struggled to identify a threat on which to orient its doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). The ambiguous nature of the post Cold War international security environment has resulted in a glut of theoretical classifications including military operations other than war (MOOTW), Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), complex war fighting, peacekeeping/ peace enforcement/ nation building, insurgency, asymmetric warfare and most recently hybrid warfare. The outcome has been the development of doctrine that prescribes preparation for all threats in a full spectrum environment. This monograph will assess the capability of a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), across the domain of DOTMLPF to counter a hybrid threat. For the purposes of this monograph, hybrid warfare and hybrid threat are synonymous.

Field Manual 3.0 Operations defines full spectrum operations as, “Army forces combine offensive, defensive and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.

Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.”

An operative definition of hybrid warfare has been elusive until recently. In December of 2008, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) adopted the following definition: “Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and non-state actors.” This will be the definition of reference for this monograph. An expanded definition, not accepted by JFCOM is, “An adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of (1) political, military, economic, social and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/ criminal warfare methods. It may include a combination of state and non-state actors.” As its name suggests, hybrid warfare is a compilation of different forms of warfare. The JFCOM approved definition indicates that it is a synthesized form of warfare encompassing various different activities including irregular warfare. Irregular warfare, as a component of hybrid warfare is, “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. It favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

Compound warfare is a form of warfare that is outwardly similar to hybrid warfare. During the Vietnam War, analysts used the term “hybrid warfare” to define combat action that transcended guerilla combat and main force engagements. Following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the term

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4Glenn, 2.


disappeared. It is however still important to understand compound warfare and how it differs from hybrid warfare. Compound warfare is defined as, “…synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we anticipate at the operational and even tactical levels in war where one or both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the battle space.”

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the United States decisive victory over Iraq in operation Desert Storm in January-February 1991, the United States found itself in a strategically ambiguous situation. The failures of U.S. forces in Somalia, and ongoing conflicts in Chechnya led GEN Charles Krulak, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the prescient realization that future wars would not resemble the large set-piece maneuver engagements typified by Desert Storm; instead he predicted wars would be messy and incoherent struggles across a broader spectrum of conflict. GEN Krulak defined this future conflict as a “Three Block War” where, “In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day…all within three city blocks.”

At the turn of the millennium with a perpetual state of conflict existing in Israel, retired United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes postulated the theory of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) as a means of describing conflict in Israel. Mr. Hammes defined 4th Generation Warfare as, “…using all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived


benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.”9 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan validated some aspects of Mr. Hammes’ theory as necessary but insufficient in describing future conflict. The south Lebanon war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah illustrated some of the insufficiency of Mr. Hammes’ theory while also demonstrating its necessity. Central to Mr. Hammes’ 4GW theory was the suggestion that non-state actors, lacking the equivalent resources as those of states, would pursue victory through asymmetrical advantages such as insurgency, information campaigns, or terrorism.10 Hezbollah contradicted Mr. Hammes theory. The employment of conventional, major combat capabilities by Hezbollah, a non-state actor, exploited an asymmetric advantage in conventional warfare military capability; the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had largely focused on the conduct of COIN in the West Bank, and Gaza preceding the war in south Lebanon in 2006.11 The Israeli Army’s diminished skill in conducting major combat operations contributed to the perceptions of defeat at the hands of Hezbollah.12 Hezbollah validated Mr. Hammes theory by exploiting the information domain where it had an asymmetric advantage over the Israeli government, communicating perceptions of victory over the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) by leveraging the Internet and broadcast media to illustrate Israeli tactical failures and casualties.13

The 2006 war in southern Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel was the spark that ignited the debate on hybrid warfare. Since the conclusion of that conflict, the literature on hybrid conflict is proliferate. Leading the discussion has been retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, an analyst at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Mr. Hoffman in his monograph entitled, “Conflict


10Hammes, 2, 208.


in the 21st Century,” defines hybrid warfare as, “…incorporating a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” Mr. Hoffman suggests that adversaries employing hybrid tactics and strategies will pursue a favorable solution by integrating unconventional, asymmetric tactics with weaponry and activities of unprecedented violence to achieve an end state in accordance with their goals and strategies. He elaborates that hybrid warfare is not solely the purview of transnational, non-state actors. States are just as likely to employ traditional concepts of war in conjunction with hybrid tactics.

Mr. Hoffman’s monograph has become the seminal work for understanding hybrid warfare. He suggests that hybrid warfare, true to its title incorporates elements of 4th Generation Warfare and compound warfare. He postulates further that the hybrid warfare concept implicitly integrates elements of Chinese strategic philosophy as espoused in the book Unrestricted Warfare by PLA Colonels Liang and Xiangsui. Hoffman’s definition of hybrid warfare reflects Allied thought too, integrating the thinking of Australian defense intellectuals as postulated in the Australian Army’s concept paper Complex Warfighting.

16Ibid, 20.
17Frank G. Hoffman, Lieutenant Colonel (R) “Preparing for Hybrid Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, (2007): 58; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing, China: People’s Liberation Arts and Publishing House, 1999), 7. http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf (accessed 23 March 2009). This source provides some background information into understanding the global strategic environment that has spawned discourse on hybrid threat. Colonels Liang and Xiangsui suggest that, “the new principles of war are no longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will, but rather, using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” This excerpt captures the general themes illustrated by hybrid threat as well as those provided by Mr. Hammes in his work The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.

Another author whose opinions have gained traction is retired U.S. Army Colonel John McCuen. In an article entitled “Hybrid Wars” published in Military Review in 2008, Mr. McCuen defines hybrid wars as, “A combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously—and more decisively—attempt to achieve control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them through “stability operations.” Mr. McCuen elaborates on his definition by suggesting that hybrid conflicts are defined as, “Full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations and the support of the international community.” Mr. McCuen’s definition is strikingly similar to that of compound warfare, defined earlier as, “synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we anticipate at the operational and even tactical levels in war where one or both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the battle space.” When compared to Mr. Hoffman’s definition Mr. McCuen’s does not offer as dynamic or comprehensive an explanation of hybrid warfare.

2009). LTC Kilcullen defines complex war fighting as, “operations that demand the application of precise and discriminating force, in a whole of government framework, to influence and control populations and perceptions. This demands land forces that can conduct close combat in complex (probably littoral and urbanized) terrain, in small but capable teams with high lethality, mobility, protection and situational awareness. They must be able to perform an extremely wide range of operations and transition between them in an agile manner. Success does not depend upon the destruction (even precise destruction) of platforms and targets. Such destruction may still occur, but it is always a means to the end of controlling populations and perceptions. Military forces provide one element in a coordinated campaign applying all elements of national power.”


20McCuen, 108.

Another definition comes from Colonel Margaret Bond in a monograph prepared at the United States Army War College defining hybrid warfare as, “...war of the next century will comprise a kind of hybrid war, projecting all elements of national power along a continuum of activities from stability, security, and reconstruction operations to armed combat.” Colonel Bond offers an opinion on how the U.S. Army may need to be prepared to respond to an adversary utilizing hybrid tactics.

Numerous definitions exist relative to hybrid warfare, illustrating broad professional interest in the topic. As noted earlier, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has defined hybrid warfare as, “Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state actors.” Clearly there is no shortage of ideas about the topic of hybrid warfare, but is the concept so significant as to warrant the development of new doctrine?

The tenets of a hybrid threat are conventional combat, irregular warfare, terrorism, criminal activity simultaneity, and adaptability. As articulated in the JFCOM definition hybrid threats, “…simultaneously and adaptively employ a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means…” These tenets will serve as the basis for analysis in this monograph.

For this monograph, conventional combat operations and major combat operations are synonymous. Conventional combat operations are a sufficient and necessary aspect of hybrid warfare. Historically, conventional combat has been the exclusive domain of state actors, but within the hybrid

22Margaret S. Bond, “Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States.” (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 4. COL Bond suggests that to counter the anticipated hybrid nature of future threats, the U.S. government will have to develop a hybrid capability of its own embracing all of the elements of national power into a single strategic concept applicable for use in pre and post conflict environments and easily transferable to relevant civilian organizations as permissiveness of the strategic environment allows.


24Glenn, 2.
threat construct non-state actors engage in major combat operations as well. The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict provides an example of a non-state actor employing a conventional combat capability. Hezbollah employed conventional combat tactics to defeat Israeli Defense Forces conducting offensive operations into southern Lebanon. According to author Matt Matthews in Occasional Paper 26 We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, “Hezbollah had assembled a well-trained, well-armed, highly motivated and highly evolved war-fighting machine on Israel’s northern border.” Matthews elaborates on the nature of the Hezbollah fighters quoting Israeli leaders as saying, “Hezbollah was not a regular army but was not a guerilla…It was something in between.” Hezbollah employed weaponry commonly associated with traditional armies. It engaged an Israeli patrol boat with a surface-to-surface cruise missile, used anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) ambushes and conventional maneuver tactics to defeat armored columns and encircle Israeli units. Hezbollah fighters made extensive use of restricted, urban terrain to employ strong point defenses in Bint Jbeil and Maround Al-Ras fighting conventionally with the Israeli Defense Forces, something previously considered suicidal.

Irregular warfare is the most important tenet of hybrid warfare as it enables achievement of the political end-state by its executor. Hybrid threats use multiple irregular warfare tactics simultaneously or near simultaneously and in conjunction with other tenets to give hybrid warfare its uniqueness. The dominant irregular warfare tactic is insurgency. Referring again to the south Lebanon war of 2006, Hezbollah had been waging a relatively unsuccessful low intensity campaign against Israel until the

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26 Matthews, 21.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, 44.
29 Ibid, 44; Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2001), Glossary 25. “Strongpoint: A heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain.”
summer of 2006. A hybrid threat uses humanitarian operations to win the support of the population. Historically, humanitarian operations have been separate and distinct from warfare, but the concept of hybrid threat suggests its employment as a tactic of irregular warfare. Encompassing humanitarian operations as well as conventional operations and a critical component of insurgency is the use of information operations. A hybrid threat will employ terrorism as a tactic of irregular warfare to undermine public support for host nation military operations, by targeting the civilian population with violence. By demoralizing the people and instilling a perception of danger and inability of the government to protect the civilian population, the hybrid threat progresses towards achieving its political objectives. A final aspect of irregular warfare is the use of cyber attack. Employed in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, cyber attack promises to be much more prominent in future conflicts, especially against technologically dependent western armies.

The inclusion of criminal activity as a tenet of hybrid warfare significantly differentiates it from the other forms of warfare mentioned earlier. Criminal activity as a tenet of hybrid warfare is intended to, “Destabilize local government and abet the insurgent or irregular warrior by providing resources or by undermining the host state and its legitimacy.” Criminal activity can take multiple forms including cyber attack as seen in the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, and may include activities such as smuggling, narcotics and human trafficking. The incorporation of criminal activity provides means for funding

34 Senate Select Committee, Annual Threat Assessment, 39.
hybrid threats that transcend the spectrum of warfare challenging a state’s ability to coordinate its efforts against a hybrid threat across the various arms of government.35

Terrorism is a tactic used by a hybrid threat, as a part of irregular warfare to capitalize on military and political asymmetry. Doctrinally, an HBCT conducts offensive operations to combat terrorism.36 A grand strategic approach to countering terrorism is dependent on the application of the broader instruments of national power across the diplomatic, informational, military and economic realms. To combat terrorism an HBCT may conduct offensive operations as part of a broader counterterrorism campaign or operations. Counterterrorism is not synonymous with antiterrorism, which encompasses an array of activities and measures taken, “to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to included limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.”37

Simultaneity broadly defined is a combination of operations that overwhelm an adversary by requiring them to respond to more activities than they are capable.38 The Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006 provides a contemporary example of the employment of simultaneity by a hybrid threat. During the battle of Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah was able to near simultaneously wage an urban strong point defense and aggressive information operations communicating a perception of Hezbollah’s defeat of the Israeli Defense Force.39 Hezbollah leveraged the Internet and the omnipresent news networks to develop

perceptions around the world of a Hezbollah victory.\(^{40}\) This simultaneity blurred the distinction between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war; through routine tactical actions, and a timely information campaign, strategic effects occurred. David Kilcullen, noted author and expert on counter insurgency, effectively summarizes the tenet of simultaneity in hybrid warfare by suggesting, “Combat has diffused across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war so that actions at one level have a direct effect on another.”\(^{41}\)

Adaptability is another tenet of hybrid warfare that is necessary and sufficient to differentiate hybrid threat from other forms of conflict. Adaptability occurs through activities undertaken by a combatant to counter an antagonist’s actions. Drawing again from the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, guerillas utilized small, independent and distinct teams to assemble, emplace, arm, and fire rockets into Israel while separate teams deployed to defend rocket sites.\(^{42}\) This was an operational and tactical adaptation to mitigate the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) air superiority and employment of precision air power. The inability to identify the rocket teams because of their dispersion by a cellular force structure prevented the Israelis from eliminating the rocket threat. Hezbollah illustrated this adaptability by launching 250 rockets into Israel on the last day of the war, after a sustained but ineffective IAF air campaign.\(^{43}\) Hezbollah, understanding the supremacy of Israeli airpower and their reliance on it, effectively adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures to mitigate the Israeli advantage.

Hybrid threats will operate within the contemporary operating environment or “operating environment.” Field Manual 1-02 *Operational Terms and Graphics* defines the operating environment


as, “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander. While they include all enemy, adversary, friendly and neutral systems across the spectrum of conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources and the culture of the local population.”

Military theorists suggest hybrid threats are the most likely antagonist the U.S. Army will confront in the early part of the twenty-first century. Contemporary doctrine prescribes the U.S. Army as being capable of waging warfare across the full spectrum of operations from stable peace to general war. Full spectrum operations are adequate and necessary for a heavy brigade combat team to counter a hybrid threat. This monograph will qualitatively demonstrate that an HBCT is capable of conducting full spectrum operations and can counter a hybrid threat.

**DOTMLPF Analysis**

The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis is a tool used by joint forces to determine capabilities. The DOTMLPF analysis is the analytical tool of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS), which implements an integrated and collaborative process to guide development of new capabilities. A DOTMLPF analysis of a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) will provide insight into the preparedness of the war fighting army to counter a hybrid threat. Research will consist of a DOTMLPF analysis, in

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47 Chairman, "Joint Capabilities," 2.
accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSM 3170.01c), of a U.S. Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). This analysis will include a review of the relevant doctrine, Field Manuals (FM) 3.0, Operations, 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team and 3-06 Tactics. Analysis of organization and material will review modified tables of organization and equipment (M/TOE) for the HBCT. Analysis of training will be through FM 7.0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations. A review of FM 6-22, Leadership, will provide the basis for reviewing leadership and education development within an HBCT. Generally, the personnel and facilities components of the DOTMLPF were inapplicable to this analysis. A brigade receives personnel based on end-strength calculations made by Human Resources Command and does not have the ability to determine specific skill requirements or capabilities. While it can request specific skill sets, it is limited in its receipt of these personnel based on the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and its MTOE allocations. The HBCT will get what it needs when it needs it. The exception to the irrelevance of a personnel analysis is the criticality of different skill sets in conducting COIN a nuance explained during the analysis of irregular warfare. The facilities portion of the analysis is irrelevant except for training. The Army’s combat training centers (CTC) have developed capabilities and capacities for training BCT’s on full spectrum operations. An in depth review of training at the CTCs is a topic for further research and beyond the scope of this monograph. Every Army post that hosts BCT’s has improved and enhanced its deployment infrastructure since September 11th to a point that deployment is now simply a mathematical exercise of rote methodology.

Major Combat Operations and Irregular Warfare

“In short, Army leaders in this century need to be pentathletes, multi-skilled leaders who can thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments…innovative and adaptive leaders who are expert in the
Major Combat Operations

The first tenet of hybrid threat analyzed through DOTMLPF is major combat operations. The United States Army is the premier land warfare fighting force in the world. The best equipped and best trained, it is unrivaled in capability and capacity for destroying or defeating a conventional adversary. An analysis of an HBCT’s ability to counter conventional combat across the DOTMLPF spectrum provides qualitative proof of the U.S. Army’s competitive advantage in waging conventional combat and/or major combat operations.

The conduct of major combat operations is part of full-spectrum operations. Commanders use the spectrum of conflict to describe the level of violence in terms of an ascending scale marked by graduated steps. U.S. Army forces operate anywhere along the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime military engagement to major operations during general war. Field Manual 3.0, Operations defines major operations as, “A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander.” According to FM 3-90.6

The Brigade Combat Team offensive operations consist of movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate  

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attack, exploitation, the pursuit, raid, counterattack, and the cordon and search. Defensive operations include area or mobile defenses and retrograde operations.\(^{52}\)

The HBCT is the U.S. Army’s core formation for conducting major combat operations (MCO). The HBCT is organized and resourced to wage warfare across the spectrum but is equipped with materiel such as tanks, artillery, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored reconnaissance vehicles to conduct major combat operations. The greatest challenge to an HBCT’s ability to conduct MCO is competing requirements to train on other tasks such as COIN/stability operations.

Organizationally, the HBCT is capable of major combat operations against a peer or near-peer competitor of similar size, scope and scale. It consists of two combined arms battalions. Each is equipped with two companies of tanks, totaling twenty-nine M1A2 main battle tanks, two companies of infantry fighting vehicles totaling twenty-nine M2A3 infantry fighting vehicles and twenty-four rifle squads. The organic Fires Battalion is equipped with two firing batteries of self-propelled howitzers totaling sixteen M109A6 155 mm self-propelled Howitzers. The reconnaissance squadron is equipped with two troops of cavalry fighting vehicles totaling 29 M3A3 cavalry fighting vehicles and a troop of up-armored high mobility, multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVS).\(^{53}\)

Staffing the HBCT occurs in accordance with the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The core formations are the combined arms battalions comprised of infantrymen and tankers. Artillerymen and cavalrymen constitute the fires battalion and reconnaissance squadron, respectively. Initial entry and subsequent training of these soldiers focuses on developing and sustaining the core competencies of their branch.

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Leadership of an HBCT occurs regardless of the type of operation conducted. An HBCT’s senior leadership, across the field grade and senior non-commissioned officer levels, has been a product of institutional education, auto-didacticism, and experience.\textsuperscript{54} Even junior field grade leaders have commanded at the company level, while senior NCO’s have led squads or possibly platoons. These experiences have developed, for both categories of leaders, over the span of a decade. Leaders in an HBCT, whether conducting major combat operations or stability operations are expected to embrace the eight core competencies of; leading others, extending influence beyond the chain of command, leading by example, communicating, creating a positive environment, preparing self, developing leaders and getting results.\textsuperscript{55}

A U.S. Army heavy brigade combat team is well prepared to conduct major combat operations. Its organization, equipment, training, and leadership are oriented on the conduct of warfare. Operations in Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001-2002 illustrate the army’s ability to conduct major combat operations in a dominant manner. Contemporary and potential adversaries have taken note of the U.S. Army’s unmatched capabilities in war fighting and have begun to adapt their tactics and strategies as a result; the advent of hybrid warfare reflects this adaptation.

Irregular Warfare

The second tenet of hybrid threat analyzed in this monograph is irregular warfare. The use of irregular warfare (IW), when conducted simultaneously and adaptively with the other tenets of a hybrid threat, challenges an HBCT’s capabilities, but through the conduct of stability operations a heavy brigade combat team can counter irregular warfare. A conflict exists between the hybrid threat tenet of irregular warfare and the activity of terrorism, a principle of hybrid threat according to the JFCOM approved


\textsuperscript{55} Headquarters, \textit{Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile}. 2-7.
definition. Field manual 3.0 defines irregular warfare as, “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.” Field manual 3.0 does not define terrorism, however FM 3-90.6 defines it as, “the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear and to coerce or intimidate governments or societies.” The two definitions are nearly synonymous. Field manual 3-90.6 does not define irregular warfare. Field manual 3.0 implies that irregular warfare is an operational level of war approach to achieving strategic ends. Tacitly included in irregular warfare are different tactics such as insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Field manual 3-24 does not define irregular warfare either but does define stability operations as, “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside of the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept version 1.0 defines irregular warfare with more detail than FM 3.0 defining IW as, “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” A comparison of the definitions of irregular warfare and stability operations suggests the U.S. Army conducts stability operations to counter an adversary conducting irregular warfare. This analysis will consider terrorism as a tactic of irregular warfare and not a separate tenet of a hybrid threat.


Irregular warfare is fundamentally different from conventional warfare. While major combat operations generally occur between peer competitors; the 2006 Israeli – Hezbollah war being the counter example, and represent a direct approach towards the achievement of policy and strategic ends, an adversary using irregular warfare is seeking to accomplish their goals through an indirect approach, avoiding a direct military confrontation.60 An HBCT counters irregular warfare by developing proficiency in stability operations.61 By addressing the needs of the population proactively, before conflict can begin, insurgency and conflict are preventable. Conventional forces, conducting stability operations, may assume a supporting role to special operations forces in supporting insurgency. The exception to the supporting role is when special operations forces cannot defeat irregular or unconventional threats.62

Field manual 3-90.6 does not define irregular warfare but does address stability operations, which encompasses irregular warfare.63 Proficiency in stability operations represents a potential advantage for U.S. forces in countering irregular warfare by enabling US and host nation (HN) forces to address population needs before conflict arises.64 Friendly aspects of irregular warfare are foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare.65 Irregular warfare also includes capabilities that the enemy will exploit such as insurgency, information warfare, cyber attack, or a humanitarian crisis. Nested within the broader concept of stability operations


63Headquarters, Field Manual 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, 10-2.

64Headquarters, Field manual 3-07 Stability Operations, 1-3.

65Headquarters, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, 2-10.
are security assistance which involves training, advising, assisting allied and friendly armed forces.  

Another sub-category of stability operations is humanitarian and civic assistance, which is the provision of assistance to the host nation populace in conjunction with military operations and exercises.

Counterinsurgency is a critical component of stability operations and fundamental to countering a hybrid threat. Most counterinsurgency operations occur at the lowest levels with military activity conducted in a decentralized manner by platoons and companies. It is at these levels that the greatest amount of interaction between the counterinsurgent and the populace occurs. Larger organizations such as battalions, brigades, and divisions are coordination nodes and resource providers. Counterinsurgency comprises offensive and defensive military operations in conjunction with various other elements of national power as part of a comprehensive approach to defeat an insurgency.

Also included in stability operations are counter drug operations. Counter drug operations include the ability to counter criminality and require the support of one or more governmental agencies or the host nation. Counter drug operations may be required to eliminate the financial means and support infrastructure insurgents use to support financially their operations. The conduct of counter narcotic operations, under the concept of stability operations, enables an HBCT to counter criminality.

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation of US civilian and military agencies, utilizing a whole of government approach, to support activities taken by another government, to protect the host nation population from subversion, lawlessness, and intimidation by insurgent forces. Helping the host nation establish and maintain the institutions and facilities responsible to the people’s needs through the

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67 Headquarters, *Field Manual 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team*, 10-5.


conduct of stability operations provides U.S. forces with an asymmetrical advantage over an insurgent or guerilla foe.\textsuperscript{70}

Organizationally, the structure of contemporary HBCTs for irregular warfare is no different from its organization for major combat operations.\textsuperscript{71} The HBCT, developed with a modular framework, enables capabilities that provide the organization an advantage in countering irregular warfare. The creation of modular BCTs, facilitating greater interagency integration and improved deployability, enables greater flexibility in the types of missions a BCT can perform. Modular brigades give Combatant Commanders formations that can be packaged to address the operational requirements of the joint operating environment.\textsuperscript{72}

Within the leadership and training domains, HBCTs have greater interoperability with other governmental agencies to ensure a more efficient whole of government approach to the complex security challenges of the contemporary operating environment. The development of new counterinsurgency doctrine has generated a groundswell of interest among the Army’s leadership in the conduct of COIN. New organizations such as the Joint Center for Security Force Assistance (JCSFA) and online collaboration communities supporting the exchange of ideas and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are all recent developments demonstrating the emergence of COIN as a core competency of the U.S. Army.

The development of modular heavy brigade combat teams has coincided with a change in training doctrine. Training for the conduct of irregular warfare is markedly different from training for major combat operations. The divergence in tasks associated with major combat operations and irregular warfare has facilitated the creation of new training paradigms. Under this evolved framework, units


develop and train core mission essential task lists (CMETL) prior to notification of a pending mission. Defined in FM 7.0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations, a CMETL is, “a list of a unit’s corps capability mission-essential tasks and general mission-essential tasks.” Upon receipt of a specific mission, the HBCT commander, in conjunction with the next higher commander, develops a directed mission essential task list (DMETL). Doctrinally a DMETL is, “a list of the mission-essential tasks a unit must perform to accomplish a directed mission.” The distinction in mission essential task lists provides an HBCT tools to focus training and preparation for major combat operations and stability operations.

As an example, a unit selected to conduct counterinsurgency would develop a DMETL that included developing cultural awareness, a critical activity associated with counterinsurgency. Dissecting the DMETL into individual and collect tasks would include developing task proficiency in language training, cultural history, and religious awareness. Because counterinsurgency is also about developing host nation capacity such as critical social services, governance, and economic development, training these tasks as DMETL is fundamental to success. An illustration of the implementation of DMETL training is provided in the article, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations” where creative approaches such as partnerships with city and state government helped develop understanding and stimulate thinking among the leadership of the 1st Cavalry Division toward solving what were traditionally non-military tasks. This training includes the development of additional, non-traditional and unique skill sets for army personnel and provides an opportunity for integrating with various other governmental agencies.


34 Headquarters, Field Manual 7.0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 4-10.


36 MG Peter W. Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations” Military Review (July-August 2005): 10. This article provides an example of an integrated and creative approach towards interagency training for stability operations. The 1st Cavalry Division trained in
Personnel requirements for the conduct of irregular warfare are unique. Large numbers of troops are required for counterinsurgency operations in order to provide security for the people. However, the need for soldiers with specialized skills both diminishes and increases. To meet the intensive manpower requirements, soldiers with specialized skills in employing armored fighting vehicles may need to be re-tasked for traditional infantry-centric missions such as patrolling, cordon and search or check point operations. Conversely, soldiers with specialized skills in civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, civil engineering, social services, or governance are critical enablers to effectively influencing the population. Equally important is the role and inclusion of interagency personnel. These human resources are force multipliers. Assets such as Enhanced Provisional Reconstruction Teams (EPRT) or Human Terrain Teams (HTT) can greatly assist the HBCT in developing local, cultural and societal awareness. These resources assist in establishing the soft instruments of power such governance councils, local and regional political infrastructure. Economic development teams can assist the HBCT in beginning economic revitalization that provides jobs and reduces the pool of unemployed citizens and corresponding number of potential insurgents / guerillas. Fortunately, doctrine prescribes the attachment of additional forces to assist BCT’s in conducting missions. This includes formations maintaining collective and individual skill sets that can assist the HBCT in conducting stability operations in response to irregular warfare. Facilities are inapplicable to the analysis of an HBCT’s ability to counter irregular warfare.

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cooperation with the city of Austin, TX, the University of Baghdad, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to organize the provision of essential services in a large urban environment. This was an unprecedented approach towards training for and developing proficiency in stability operations through interagency coordination and collaboration.


Conducted simultaneously, irregular warfare, major combat operations and criminality challenge, but do not defy, an HBCT’s efforts to counter a hybrid threat. The broad array of activities within irregular warfare employed simultaneously with major combat operations and criminality challenge the personnel resources of an HBCT and highlight the organization’s orientation towards major combat operations. The challenge to the HBCT in conducting stability operations simultaneously with major combat operations and law enforcement is the scale of operations that the brigade conducts.

**Criminality and Terrorism**

“Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.”79

-Sun Tzu: *The Art of War*

**Criminality**

The third tenet of hybrid threat analyzed in this monograph is criminality. Because an HBCT is conceptually capable of full-spectrum operations, the capability to counter criminality, a relatively new phenomenon that Army forces are required to confront is essential. Hybrid threats use criminal activity such as drug trafficking to finance their operations. An HBCT counters criminality broadly through stability operations, which includes security force assistance (SFA) where the HBCT works by, with and through host nation security/ law enforcement organizations to train and develop host nation capacity and capability. Doctrine prescribes the conduct of Security Force Assistance in a permissive environment, implying a diminished threat.80 Hybrid threats capitalize on the conduct of multiple, simultaneous operations to create a non-permissive environment, disrupting the Security Force Assistance activities and

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challenging the HBCT’s ability to counter criminality. According to FM 3-90.6 in stability operations, “The Army assists the law enforcement personnel of a foreign country by providing equipment, training, and expert advice. The presence of Army personnel helps maintain law and order through military power until the foreign country’s police force is able to do the job.”

The HBCT possesses a single military police (MP) platoon that doctrine specifies is for the establishment of observation posts (OPs), check points (CPs), and route reconnaissance. Augmentation of the HBCT with additional MP formations from a higher headquarters is in accordance with doctrine, illustrated in FM 3-90.6 (see figure 11-2 below).

![Figure 11-2. CS units in the HBCT](image)

Doctrinally, the HBCT’s organic MP platoon conducts the five military police functions of, “maneuver and mobility support operations, area security, law and order, internment and resettlement operations and police intelligence operations.” An HBCT, dependent on mission, enemy, time, terrain, troops available, and civilians (METT-TC) could receive augmentation of an MP battalion. Augmentation enables the

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82 Headquarters, *Field Manual 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team*, 10-2

83 Ibid, 11-2.

84 Ibid, 11-20.
brigade to improve force protection, staff enemy prisoner of war collection points, provide static check points or roaming security patrols, conduct criminal investigations and establish relationships with host nation law enforcement agencies.85

The Army’s doctrine for the conduct of stability operations, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, elaborates on the role of an HBCT in countering the hybrid threat tenet of criminality by suggesting that the permissiveness of the environment determines the level of military involvement in Security Sector Reform (SSR).86 As host nation law enforcement capacity improves and the environment becomes more permissive comprehensive security force assistance, inclusive of joint and interagency partners will replace military forces. Security Sector Reform is the process underneath SFA that an HBCT undertakes to counter criminality and is inherently an interagency process. Military forces may help to develop justice and law enforcement capacity but strive to transfer these functions to civilian agencies.87 An HBCT may be required to counter criminality by conducting operations to eradicate sources of criminal activity such as destroying narcotics’ precursor crops (poppy, coca) through offensive operations. It may be required to use the RSTA squadron to conduct surveillance of criminal actors such as financiers or couriers. If required to assume a passive law enforcement role in conjunction with host-nation security forces, the HBCT is constrained by the comparative scope of criminal activity.

As discussed earlier, Field Manual 7.0 “Training for Full Spectrum Operations” provides the framework for the conduct of training across the U.S. Army. Doctrinally, the HBCT’s MP platoon prioritizes its training initially in accordance with the CMETL, and subsequently the DMETL to conform to the BCT commander’s intent. Nested within the commander’s intent, the MP platoon’s training is guided by the five core military police battlefield functions outlined in FM 3-90.06 and FM 3-07. These


87 Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, 6-2, 6-5.
functions are, “maneuver and mobility support operations, area security, law and order, internment and resettlement operations and police intelligence operations.” The specified task of law and order provides the doctrinal framework for helping the HBCT counter criminality. Law and order operations are, “Those measures needed to enforce laws, directives and punitive regulations; conduct military police investigations (MPI); and to control populations and resources to ensure the existence of a lawful and orderly environment for the commander.”

The DOTMLPF analysis revealed no specific leader development or educational programs that specifically assist the HBCT in countering criminality. Leaders, understanding doctrine, recognize that the HBCT may be reliant on augmentation from higher echelons, the non-traditional use of organic formations such as the RSTA, and collaborating with host nation law enforcement and security forces.

An HBCT’s law enforcement resource, the MP platoon, can counter criminality on a limited scale, if conducted simultaneously with irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Other HBCT assets such as the RSTA and CABs are proficient in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and offensive operations, respectively, which are necessary for interdicting some criminal activity on a finite scale. The HBCT’s reconnaissance, maneuver, fires and effects battalions can collaborate with host nation law enforcement to interdict criminal activity.

Terrorism

Terrorism is the next tenet analyzed in this monograph. As discussed earlier, an analysis of an HBCT’s ability to counter terrorism across the DOTMLPF spectrum is inappropriate if considered a technique in the conduct of irregular warfare. FM 3-90.6 defines terrorism as, “the calculated use of
unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear and to coerce or intimidate governments or societies."\textsuperscript{90} Terrorism is a tactic used by a hybrid threat, as a part of irregular warfare to capitalize on military and political asymmetry. Doctrinally, an HBCT conducts counterterrorism (CT) through offensive operations. \textsuperscript{91} Counterterrorism may be a specified mission for special operations forces working directly for the National Command Authority.\textsuperscript{92} The deployment of HBCTs is in support of requests from combatant commanders for specific or general capabilities, as part of larger command structures. In the inventory of U.S. military capabilities, there are U.S. forces that are specialized for CT and are more suited to combating terrorist. The concept of antiterrorism encompasses an array of activities and measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to included limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. It is inherently a defensive, protection task.\textsuperscript{93}

Terrorists target civilians to instill fear while guerillas attack military personnel and/ or facilities to leverage capability asymmetries. An HBCT conducts lethal offensive and defensive operations against terrorists in conjunction with some aspect of stability operations. Organizationally, there is no significant change of the structure of the HBCT to conduct offensive operations against terrorists. Training for CT operations takes advantage of nested efficiencies with offensive operations training. An HBCT will conduct anti-terrorism training as a force protection measure qualifying it as a leadership, materiel, and facilities task.


\textsuperscript{91}Ibid, 10-6.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid, 10-8.

As discussed previously CT may be a specified task for special operations forces. Counterterrorism, as an independent activity or as a tactic of stability operations, is a doctrinal mission a HBCT will conduct, through offensive operations. Offensive operations against terrorists will always consist of operations, engagements, or battles as part of larger campaigns. Because terrorists engage in activities targeting civilians to undermine governments it is difficult for an HBCT to fight terrorists. As mentioned previously an HBCT will conduct antiterrorism training to minimize vulnerability by U.S. forces to terrorist or guerilla attack.

**Simultaneity and Adaptability**

“Leaders at the lowest echelons, in constant contact with the enemy and local population are especially critical to success in land conflict, as these leaders can often see and act on immediate opportunities and threats more rapidly than their superiors.”

General George Casey, Chief of Staff U.S. Army

*Army Magazine Oct. 2008*

**Simultaneity**

The second to last tenet of hybrid threat analyzed in the monograph is simultaneity. Simultaneity is a tenet of hybrid warfare that differentiates the concept from previous theoretical constructs of warfare. The ability of an adversary to be able to conduct major combat operations while simultaneously employing irregular warfare tactics and/or criminal activity is unprecedented. As a tenet of hybrid warfare, simultaneity introduces an element of complexity in the contemporary operating environment that is unprecedented. To counter simultaneity as a tenet of hybrid warfare, an HBCT has to conduct the full spectrum of operations against an opponent simultaneously conducting major combat operations,

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irregular warfare and criminality. These capabilities require redundant formations, wide spread use of information systems (INFOSYS), external resources to augment the brigade’s organic means, and a robust staff to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize activities across the HBCT.

The development of an expeditionary, full-spectrum capable Brigade centric Army implies the ability to confront simultaneous threats simultaneously on a hybrid battlefield. Field Manual 3.0, *Operations*, defines full spectrum operations as, “Army forces combining offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” The capability to conduct multiple types of operations simultaneously, in accordance with the definition of full spectrum operations, suggests that an HBCT is prepared to counter simultaneity as a tenet of hybrid warfare. The FM describes simultaneity in full spectrum operations as, “synchronization; the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place.” The second doctrinal source for assessing an HBCT’s preparedness to counter simultaneous operations by a hybrid threat is FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*. Field manual 3-90.06 states that BCTs can conduct full spectrum operations, simultaneous operations, information operations, A2C2 and select units can conduct forced entry operations.

Organizationally, an HBCT staff of unprecedented size and imbued with capabilities previously retained at the division level, in conjunction with a reconnaissance squadron, two combined arms maneuver battalions, and a fires battalion enables the heavy brigade combat team to conduct simultaneous operations with caveats. A key tool in enabling simultaneous operations within the HBCT is a robust, cross-functional staff encompassing all of the war fighting functions. Prior to transformation, the


maintenance of these capabilities was at the division level. The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) allots the HBCT with four battalions including two combined arms battalions (CAB) a reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and acquisition (RSTA) squadron and a fires battalion each capable of conducting full spectrum operations enabling the brigade to conduct limited simultaneous operations within its battle space.\(^98\) Conceptually, in a full-spectrum environment the CABs would occupy terrain and conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Simultaneously the RSTA squadron executes reconnaissance and surveillance missions or occupies limited battle space. Utilization of the fires battalion mirrors that of the RSTA squadron given its personnel and equipment constraints. The transformation of the Army to a modular force enhances interoperability. Through modularity, the HBCT can better integrate military police, engineers, civil affairs, chemical units or interagency personnel to assist the brigade in conducting full spectrum operations.\(^99\)

While the core principle of Army training doctrine is preparation for full spectrum operations, constraints on time and resources force commanders to make difficult decisions about what tasks units train in preparation for the contemporary operating environment. Mitigating these difficult decisions is the CMETL and DMETL training management doctrine. The simultaneous nature of hybrid warfare challenges commanders by requiring them to train for major combat operations, stability operations, counterterrorism, and law enforcement at the same time; skill sets demanding very eclectic training methodologies and resources, but enabled through CMETL and DMETL. The HBCT, in preparing for the contemporary operating environment must prioritize using METT-TC, mission analysis because it cannot train everything, “Nor can it afford to view operations dominated by the offense and defense and


those dominated by stability as either/or propositions. Both usually occur simultaneously.\textsuperscript{100} FM 7.0 \textit{Training for Full Spectrum Operations} illustrates in Figure 1.1 the spectrum of conflict generally where hybrid warfare occurs.\textsuperscript{101}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{spectrum_of_conflict.png}
\caption{Aim point for Army training and leader development}
\end{figure}

The MTOE provides the framework for the provision of equipment and personnel to the HBCT that supports the conduct of limited simultaneous operations. An HBCT seeks to counter the threat’s ability to conduct operations simultaneously through automated battle command systems (ABCS),


\textsuperscript{101}Headquarters, \textit{Field Manual 7.0 Training for Full Spectrum Operations}, 1-7.
unmanned aerial systems (UAS); advanced electronic signals intercept systems, and other information systems (INFOSYS). These networked systems assist commanders and staff in developing situational awareness through shared information to facilitate progression towards situational understanding (reference) through information superiority.102 Previously mentioned under organizational aspects of countering simultaneous hybrid threat operations, the HBCT maintains two CABs, a RSTA squadron, and a fires battalion.103 These formations provide an HBCT the ability to counter a hybrid threat simultaneously conducting major combat operations, irregular warfare and criminal activity.

Leadership & education is important to countering the use of simultaneity by a hybrid threat. Since hybrid warfare blurs the distinction between strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, through the conduct of different types of operations simultaneously, leaders have to be more adaptive and able to confront a tactical threat with strategic ramifications.104 A hybrid threat exhibits creative and adaptive thinking at the lowest possible levels. The Army’s doctrinal manual on leadership, FM 6-22 Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile suggests that, “since missions for larger organization are more complex and involve many parallel efforts, leaders at higher levels must encourage subordinate initiative.”105

As described earlier, HBCTs are constrained in the personnel they receive by the MTOE, so the impact of personnel on an HBCT’s ability to address simultaneity is minimal. Requirements for low-
density military occupational specialties (MOS) such as linguists will always exist and remain under resourced. At a macro level, the BCT staff is more robust and augmented with capabilities previously found at the division that enable the BCT to conduct simultaneous operations of a limited scale and scope. During the course of the research, it was determined that facilities play an insignificant role in an HBCT’s ability to counter a hybrid threat, so it is not included in this analysis.

An HBCT’s success in countering a hybrid threat simultaneously conducting major combat operations, irregular warfare, and criminality is dependent on the scope and scale of the enemy’s operations. Organizationally, the HBCT is well equipped and trained for major combat operations. The HBCT, through development of CMETL & DMETL, and modularity can conduct scaled, simultaneous, stability operations, major combat operations as well as law enforcement against an adaptive hybrid threat.

Adaptability

The last tenet of hybrid threat analyzed in this monograph is adaptability. Adaptability as a tenet of hybrid warfare presents a challenge. The definition of adaptability in FM 6-22 is, “an effective change in behavior in response to an altered situation.”106 Conceptually, U.S. forces avoid the strengths of their antagonists by adapting more rapidly than their opponent adapts, exploiting the adversary’s vulnerabilities. If adaptability is insufficient, U.S. forces pursue asymmetric alternatives changing the environment of the conflict to force the threat to adapt, reactively. Conceivably, countering a hybrid threat’s adaptability occurs by adapting more rapidly than the hybrid threat. Doctrinally the concept of battle command is the means for an HBCT to adapt more effectively and quickly than a hybrid threat. Greater adaptability in response to an adaptive hybrid threat develops in an HBCT through doctrinal and materiel tools. Brigadier General Michael Krause of the Australian Army and author of Square Pegs for

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Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt suggests that, “Armies need first to challenge themselves to train and equip for the most likely and adapt to the unlikely.”107 Greater adaptability represents an opportunity to develop and exploit asymmetries between friendly and threat forces.

The organizational structure of the HBCT has no impact on adaptability. Training can facilitate greater adaptability by using creative techniques such as partnerships with local cities to develop an understanding of essential services, or the workings of local governance.108 Adaptability is a cognitive endeavor. A more adaptive HBCT leverages situational awareness and understanding to adapt more effectively and quickly to the hybrid threat’s adaptation resulting in the hybrid threat’s adaptation being insufficient. The HBCT possesses proliferate INFOSYS that facilitate more rapid sharing of information to enable shared understanding. Through shared understanding, leaders seek to make better decisions more rapidly, demonstrating better adaptability. Within an HBCT, situational awareness occurs through the proliferation of information passed through these systems, intelligence assets and the RSTA. Tools such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT), Command Post of the Future (CPOF), Maneuver Control System (MCS) and a host of other automated Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) network the HBCT to enhance information flow and enable greater flexibility and adaptability in response to enemy adaptation and ideally seizing the initiative forcing the enemy into reactive adaptation.109

Leadership represents the most effective tool for countering an adaptive hybrid threat. FM 6-22 discusses the aspects of adaptability needed in Army leaders. These include mental agility enabling a

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leader to see the second and third order effects of his decisions. Adaptive leaders must be open-minded, consider multiple perspectives, resist jumping to conclusions, take risks, and be resilient to setbacks. Maintaining adaptability requires challenging previously held ideas and assumptions and getting outside personal comfort zones. Thinking and acting creatively in response to new environments and being comfortable in those unfamiliar environments is another quality of adaptive leaders. Adaptive leaders seek challenges and view change as an opportunity instead of a liability, allowing them to be comfortable with ambiguity, flexibility, and innovation. Seeking diversity in relationships and situations, an adaptive leader seeks to change his own personal practices and those of the unit in which he/she serves working to capitalize on strengths and minimizing weaknesses. The School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) provides an example of an educational tool that builds adaptive, creative and critical thinking leaders prepared to deal with a hybrid threat. The school’s mission according to Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 3 August 2007, "The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) provides advanced education in military arts and science for selected ILE graduates. The school emphasizes planning and executing campaigns at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The AMSP prepares officers to plan and conduct future operations across the wide range of military operations." Successfully countering the hybrid threat tenet of adaptability comes down to leadership. An HBCT instilling adaptability, innovativeness, creativity and critical thinking in its leadership is equipped with the cognitive tools to counter a hybrid threat.


111 Headquarters, FM 6-22 Army Leadership, 10-9.

112 Ibid.


114 Ibid, 10-8, 10-9.
An HBCT counters an adaptive hybrid threat through leadership. Leaders in an HBCT, from a rifle squad leader to the brigade commander, must constantly be thinking, analyzing, questioning, adapting and making timely decisions. Institutions such as the School for Advanced Military Studies are illustrative of the intellectual development essential for an HBCT leadership to counter an adaptive hybrid threat. Leaders in the HBCT leverage the experience of subordinate leaders, their education and U.S. Army leadership doctrine to counter tomorrow’s hybrid threat.

**Conclusion**

“*We will tailor our units under modularity to transition and transform the force from a divisional-based Army to a brigade-based Army. We are literally pushing down assets to make brigades more autonomous.*”¹¹⁵

-Major General J.D. Thurman, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division

The professional discourse on hybrid warfare suggests that future adversaries will adaptively conduct major combat operations, irregular warfare and criminal activity simultaneously. This monograph, through a DOTMLPF analysis qualitatively illustrates that a U.S. Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team is prepared to confront a hybrid threat. Full spectrum operations doctrine is a feasible tool for the HBCT to use to defeat a hybrid foe. Constraints on personnel, resources, and time challenge an HBCT’s conduct of conventional combat, stability operations and law enforcement, simultaneously and adaptively but do not prevent it from countering a hybrid threat of relative scale.

**Feasibility**

Brigadier General Michael Krause of the Australian Army suggests in his monograph, *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt,* efforts to maintain

military forces that are full spectrum capable will inevitably lead to escalating costs transcending all
dimensions of military spending including, but not limited to, personnel, equipment and education.116 BG Krause’s comments, oriented towards modern military forces, provide insight into the feasibility of a state, or non-state actor seeking to develop a hybrid threat capability. If preparation for full spectrum operations leads to ascending, unsustainable costs for a developed nation, a non-state actor’s capacity to provide adequate personnel, fiscal and materiel resources is even more challenged. Given the wide variety of tenets associated with hybrid warfare, and its employment as an asymmetric response to military dominance, how could a state or non-state actor resource the materiel, personnel and training requirements without external patronage or donation?

It is unproven that hybrid threats pose a “silver bullet” danger to an HBCT. The HBCT is well resourced, but challenged to conduct multiple types of operations simultaneously because of constraints on time, resources, and personnel. A state or non-state actor seeking to develop a hybrid threat capability faces the same challenges of resources, especially non-state actors. Human resources, money, and training are constraints for all antagonists regardless of their operational approach to warfare.

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