

# **Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## Abstract

TRAINING BALANCE: FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS FOR 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY CHALLENGES by COL Jerome K Hawkins, U.S. ARMY, 50 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate training balance in the United States Army at the brigade combat team level in order to determine if our current training strategy is properly balanced. The work began by examining the National Security Strategy and supporting primary source documents to determine if the Army's training strategy was adequately preparing it for all of the potential requirements. Second this study examined the doctrine of full spectrum operations in order to fully understand it as a lens to measure training balance. Third this paper examined the current and projected Army force levels to determine the impact on the ability to balance training. Finally, this study examined the Army's training strategy focusing primarily on post 9-11 operations at the National Training Center to determine if it adequately trained full spectrum operations.

The monograph provides a synthesis of multiple types of references in order to accurately analyze training balance in the Army. Government sources include the major security strategies of the United States to include the *2006 National Security Strategy*, *2004 National Military Strategy*, and *2005 National Defense Strategy*. Additionally this study incorporated relevant data from the Army's *2007 Posture Statement*, and *2007 Army Modernization Plan*. The work relied heavily on articles written by senior leaders in military journals. These articles provided key insights from the Army senior leader perspective on the status and future of training at the BCT level. An interview with a former senior observer controller from the National Training Center was conducted to receive insight from an experienced senior leader recently assigned to the NTC.

This paper concludes that the Army's training strategy is not balanced. Deployment cycles for brigade combat teams (BCTs) coupled with current force structure shortages caused an imbalance in Army training. Brigade combat teams are forced to weight training heavily in favor of stability and reconstruction operations. The BCTs weight training in favor of stability and reconstruction operations because these are the missions they are required to execute in Iraq and Afghanistan. The NTC focuses primarily on stability and reconstruction missions in order to prepare BCTs for the rigor of stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This weighting at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict comes at the cost of training in the traditional areas of offensive and defensive operations. Without being fully trained in offensive and defensive missions BCT training is unbalanced.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....	1
Methodology.....	2
Strategic Guidance .....	4
National Security Strategy 2002.....	6
National Military Strategy 2004.....	7
National Defense Strategy 2005 .....	8
National Security Strategy of 2006 .....	10
Full Spectrum Operations.....	13
Force Structure .....	18
Brigade Combat Teams .....	20
Army Forces Generation .....	22
National Training Center.....	25
History .....	25
Post September 11th.....	26
2 <sup>nd</sup> Revolution in Training.....	28
Conclusion.....	36
Summary .....	36
Recommendations .....	39
Areas Which Require Additional Study .....	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	44

## Introduction

The Chief of Staff of the Army, recently reported “Today’s Army is out of balance. We are consumed with meeting demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other contingencies.”<sup>1</sup> The current conflicts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are characterized primarily by counter-insurgency operations using techniques and principals from the recently published *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* manual. Military and national security specialists have many predictions for the future type of warfare with which the United States can become involved. Unfortunately, a crystal ball predicting the exact nature of our next war does not exist. The United States Army is therefore not only faced with the challenge of fighting war in Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously ensuring that training is relevant for today’s conflicts, but also must prepare Army forces for the next conflict. Over the past six years the United States Army has not been successful in this endeavor of balancing training across the full spectrum of war.

Many military leaders question whether the Army’s training strategy is properly balanced for the Army to be successful in any future conflict. The Chief of Staff of the Army has determined the Army is out of balance and this examination of training strategy focused primarily at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, concludes that the current preparation and training of our brigade combat teams is also out of balance.

This study evaluates the Army’s training strategy for preparing brigade level forces for full spectrum operations in joint campaigns overseas. Full spectrum operations became doctrine with the publication of *FM 3-0 Operations* in 2001.<sup>2</sup> The Army’s current training strategy

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<sup>1</sup> George W. Casey, Jr., “The Strength of the Nation,” *Army Magazine* 57, no.10 (October 2007), 21.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001), 1-17.

designed to prepare brigade level forces for simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability and reconstruction missions falls short in the area of offensive and defensive missions. Current training strategy is weighted heavily in favor of stability and reconstruction operations due to the nature of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has therefore focused its training effort heavily in favor of stability and reconstruction operations, focusing primarily on the current fight, at the cost of neglecting traditional offensive and defensive missions.

## **Methodology**

Section two (Strategic Guidance) examines the security guidance the Army was issued in the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, and the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*. These three primary source documents for U.S. security strategy assist in the evaluation of potential adversaries and future 21st century challenges. More importantly, these documents provided insight on the potential role the Army is expected to play in the global security environment. The Army must structure its training strategy in a manner which contributes to successful preparation for the 21st century environment. These documents contribute to this study by validating the concept of full spectrum operations as a core imperative of Army doctrine.

Section three (Full Spectrum Operations) examines the doctrine of full spectrum operations. Training balance can be defined in a number of ways; this monograph evaluates it through the lens of full spectrum operations. Army doctrine defines full spectrum operations as the ability to simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations in joint campaigns overseas; and to conduct offensive, defensive, and civil support missions within the continental United States in support of the homeland security mission.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008), 3-1.

Although critical to the Army doctrine of full spectrum operations this examination will not address the homeland security aspect of full spectrum operations because of monograph length limitations. Specifically, this study will focus only on full spectrum operations for joint campaigns overseas.

Section four (Force Structure) examines the impact of the Army's current size, force structure, and transformation efforts. Therefore, training balance has not been achieved in the U.S. Army. The Army has changed its posture from a forward deployed force, to a CONUS based expeditionary force. The expeditionary force is built around modular brigade combat teams. Because of recent deployment cycles, Army brigade combat teams do not have the time to focus on training for missions other than stability and reconstruction operations. Given the goal of one year deployed for every year spent at home station, there is currently no time to adequately prepare for offensive and defensive operations.<sup>4</sup> The *2007 Army Modernization Plan* indicated that the Army is "severely under-manned, lacks strategic depth, and has key capability shortfalls," this was the genesis behind a 74,200 increase in authorized force structure.<sup>5</sup>

Section five (National Training Center) examines training focus at the National Training Center. Any comprehensive evaluation of brigade level full spectrum operations training must include the combat training centers. The National Training Center has been instrumental for U.S. Army mechanized and armored forces to maintain proficiency in the core traditional offensive and defensive missions since it began training battalions and brigades in the mid 1980s as part of AirLand Battle. The NTC was selected over the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) because it focuses on brigade and battalion operations vice the BCTP focus of division, corps and

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<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2007), <http://www.army.mil/institution/leaders/modplan/2007/high-res/Army%20Mod%20Plan%202007.pdf>, (accessed December 12, 2007) 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

Army Service Component level training.<sup>6</sup> The NTC was selected over the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) because the Army is re-deploying forces back to the continental United States in order to create a CONUS based force rather than a forward deployed force. The CONUS based strategy will result in more brigade combat teams conducting training at the NTC than at the JMRC. The NTC was selected over the Joint Readiness Training Center because the geography at JRTC cannot support brigade level high intensity conflict training in open terrain. NTC is larger and more effectively able to accommodate heavy brigade level, full spectrum operations. Historically JRTC has specialized in dismounted, Air Assault or Airborne training.

Section six (Conclusion) provides a summary of the major points of this monograph. This work draws several conclusions on the Army's preparation of brigade combat teams for full spectrum operations. Additionally, this paper will offer some recommendations to get the Army's training back in balance. Finally, this monograph will identify areas which require additional study in the evaluation of U.S. Army training balance.

## **Strategic Guidance**

*FM 1 The Army*, one of the Army's two capstone manuals, identifies four challenges in the future security environment: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive and directs the Army to prepare to simultaneously address these four challenges.<sup>7</sup> These four 21st century challenges are also found in the *2006 National Security Strategy*, *2005 National Defense Strategy*, *2004 National Military Strategy*, and the *2006 Quadrennial Review*.<sup>8</sup> The *2005 National Defense Strategy* clearly defines the challenge of the 21st century security environment,

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *AR 350-50, Combat Training Center Program*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 3.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2005), 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed 12 December 2007), 44; U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2005*, (Washington, DC: Department of

“Traditional challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict. Irregular challenges come from those employing unconventional methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects. Disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.”<sup>9</sup>

These four 21st century challenges validate the Army’s doctrine of full spectrum operations. The Army must be trained in order to respond to any or all of the four 21st century challenges identified in the *2006 National Security Strategy* and all of its primary supporting documents. The current and future security environments demand that training and preparation of Army forces are balanced and agile enough to address the four challenges identified in the future security environment.

In order to fully evaluate the Army’s training balance, it is important to first assess the impact of strategic guidance. The military services, to include the U.S. Army, receive focus for contingency requirements from civil authorities.<sup>10</sup> The Army must ensure that its overarching training focus is consistent with the comprehensive United States strategy. The formal mechanism to issue strategic security guidance to the military services is derived from three primary source documents: the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, and the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*.<sup>11</sup> As a major part of this examination of Army training balance, this work will use these primary source documents to assist in our understanding of the current national security environment. These source documents provide strategic training

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Defense, March 2005) 2; U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 6 February 2006. <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2007), 19; U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*, (accessed December 12, 2007), 4.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy 2005*, 2.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, 2-1 through 2-7. Also derived by statute and regulation (the Constitution; the Congress, in Title 10, United States Code; and the Department of Defense, in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1).

focus, and indicate that the U.S. Army must be prepared to respond to a number of diverse threats from both State and non-State actors.

## **National Security Strategy 2002**

The *NSS* is designed to summarize the major national security threats of the United States and to broadly define how the administration intends to address them with all the instruments of national power. The *NSS* is not only applicable to the Department of Defense (DOD), but all the departments of the United States Government (USG). Two recently published *NSSs* have assisted in creating some training imbalance in the Army, as it adjusts to the President's strategy changes.

The September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, was heavily influenced by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. President George W. Bush stated: "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology."<sup>12</sup> In order to effectively thwart this new threat the Bush administration created a new policy. The 2002 edition of the *NSS* introduced the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive attack.<sup>13</sup> This new doctrine, coupled with the events of 9/11 transformed the assumptions on training and 21st century warfare in two significant ways. First, the pre-emptive attack doctrine created a focus on traditional warfare, specifically focusing on States that sponsored terrorists. The concept of rogue nation-states (North Korea, and Iraq) were designed to put states which supported or harbored terrorist on notice.<sup>14</sup> The 2002 *NSS* indicated that the Army must be prepared for a first strike offensive action against either North Korea or Iraq. Pre-emptive attacks on rogue States that harbored

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 2-1 through 2-7.

<sup>12</sup> White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>, (first accessed December 12, 200), Introduction.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 14. The President of the United States introduced the term Axis of Evil in the January 2002 State of the Union address which included North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.

terrorists were designed to be an integral part of conducting the War on Terrorism. The United States would pre-emptively attack the States that harbored and supported terrorist in addition to attacking the terrorist networks in order to maintain homeland defense. Second, the events of September 11th created a requirement for the U.S. Army to simultaneously focus on conventional and unconventional warfare. Operation Enduring Freedom was primarily characterized by unconventional warfare against Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist organizations previously operating with impunity in a failed nation state.

### **National Military Strategy 2004**

The *2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* is the most current NMS and is designed for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to give strategic direction and guidance to the Joint Force.<sup>15</sup> The NMS is nested within the NDS. The *2004 NMS* focused DOD on the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while acknowledging that there are future challenges which the United States must be prepared to face. It “described the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.”<sup>16</sup> Of all the primary source security source documents, the *2004 NMS* provides the clearest articulation for the requirement to maintain a balanced capability to deal with the entire spectrum of 21st century threats.

The *2004 NMS* is the first strategic document to refer to the concept of full spectrum. The document introduced the concept of Full Spectrum Dominance (FSD). FSD is defined by “the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military

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<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*, 1.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

operations.”<sup>17</sup> The Army’s concept of full spectrum operations is closely aligned with the CJCS’s vision of FSD for the joint force. Both concepts acknowledge the requirement for forces to operate in the full spectrum of conflict.

The *2004 NMS* established three military objectives: “to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”<sup>18</sup> In order to link these objectives to specific tasks, guide plan development, and provide guidance to the execution of operations, four Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) were developed. The JOCs are “Homeland Security, Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations.”<sup>19</sup> The Army’s doctrine of full spectrum operations are clearly nested with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s JOCs. Major combat operations translate to offensive and defensive operations.

## **National Defense Strategy 2005**

Nested within the *NSS* is the National *Defense Strategy (NDS)* which describes DODs strategy to execute the *NSS*. The most current *National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America* is dated March 2005. The *2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, similar to the *2006 NSS*, also validated the Army’s concept of full spectrum operations. This document, published by the Secretary of Defense in order to provide defense strategy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that “our most recent experience indicates that the most dangerous circumstances arise when we face complex challenges. For example, our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan presented both traditional and irregular challenges.”<sup>20</sup> It states further that “in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive capacity with

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

traditional, irregular, or catastrophic forms of warfare.”<sup>21</sup> The net affect of this statement is that the Department of Defense and the United States Army were directed to prepare for war throughout the full spectrum of conflict. The *2005 National Defense Strategy*, updated as part of the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, required the Armed Forces to be able to “conduct joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict. The spectrum ranges from the low end - emphasizing stability and civil support operations - to the high end – emphasizing major combat operations.”<sup>22</sup>

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* provides additional strategic direction for the military. The *QDR* is produced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in conjunction with the services and the Joint Staff. The *QDR* “reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense.”<sup>23</sup> The *2006 QDR* directs services to shift from current to future capabilities. This shift in focus from traditional challenges to catastrophic and irregular challenges indicates that the Secretary of Defense acknowledges an imbalance in Army readiness posture. Figure 2-1 illustrates the shift in assets and focus from traditional challenges to irregular and catastrophic challenges.<sup>24</sup> “The goal is full spectrum dominance (FSD)-the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”<sup>25</sup>

Unlike the Cold War era however, when the United States had a known enemy, 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict is characterized by uncertain challenges. While conventional warfare has not become subordinate to irregular warfare, there is an increased recognition of the importance of

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy 2005*, 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, 10.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, vi.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

irregular warfare. In addition to conventional and unconventional warfare, the U.S. Army is also required to conduct stability and reconstruction operations abroad in joint campaigns overseas. These three operations required a more balanced training strategy than that of the Cold War era whereby the Army focused almost exclusively on high intensity conventional offensive and defensive tasks.

Two points indicate the *2005 NDS* may have caused some of the training imbalance experienced by the U.S. Army. First, the *2005 NDS* indicated that “we will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military capability.”<sup>26</sup> While this assertion may be true at the time of this monograph, it neither negates the Army’s responsibility to maintain the advantage in traditional warfare, nor the requirement for commanders at all levels to train to the doctrinal standard of full spectrum operations. Ongoing operations in support of the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan further strain the U.S. Army’s ability to maintain this edge in the traditional realm. Second, the *2005 NDS* states further that our transformation involves refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges, not those we are already most prepared to meet.”<sup>27</sup> This indicates that the U.S. Army has shifted training away from the traditional offensive and defensive missions, in favor of irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats (see figure 2-1).

## **National Security Strategy of 2006**

The March *2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, is the most recent *NSS* issued by the executive branch. The *2006 NSS* takes a more conventional approach to national security. In contrast to the *2002 NSS*, the 2006 version establishes that “the proliferation

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 13.

of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security.”<sup>28</sup> The *2006 NSS* focused on two pillars. The first pillar focused on “freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny” and the second pillar focused on “confronting challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.”<sup>29</sup>

Additionally, the *2006 NSS* required the Department of Defense to continue to adapt and build to meet new challenges and states: “We are pursuing a future force that will provide tailored deterrence of both state and non-state threats (including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression) while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.”<sup>30</sup> In order to create deterrence, the Department of Defense, and all of the security institutions were directed to “transform.”<sup>31</sup>

Significantly for this study the *2006 NSS* requires the Department of Defense to be prepared to operate throughout the full spectrum of conflict. The *2006 NSS* states: “Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force.”<sup>32</sup> It also requires “military involvement to stop a bloody conflict, because peace and stability will last only if follow on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful.”<sup>33</sup> The preceding two quotes from the *National Security Strategy of 2006* validate the Army’s concept of full spectrum operations. To highlight the importance of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction; the “administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction

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<sup>28</sup> White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006*, 44.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Introduction.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.


<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

efforts.”<sup>34</sup> The new office was designed to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all agencies of the United States Government to include the Department of Defense.

In summary, the strategic guidance across the board validated the U.S. Army’s concept of full spectrum operations. Given the current security environment, the U.S. Army can be called upon to simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations. During current and potential future 21st century conflicts, stability and reconstruction operations will play an important role in U.S. Army operations. The Army must continue to train stability and reconstruction tasks, but must not lose focus on preparing for offensive and defensive missions. The Army’s full spectrum operations doctrine is sound given the current security guidance. An Army properly trained in full spectrum operations naturally adapts to the changing global security environment.



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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 16.

Figure 2-1<sup>35</sup>

## Full Spectrum Operations

The Army's fundamental operational concept to address the four 21st century challenges is referred to as full spectrum operations. The February 2008 edition of FM 3-0 Operations defines full spectrum operations as:

“Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.”<sup>36</sup>

The challenge for the Army is to achieve the proper training balance between the four sub elements (offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, or civil support) of full spectrum operations which will enable it to deal with 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and challenges. In a recent article in *Military Review* General William S. Wallace, commander of Army Training Doctrine Command stressed the importance of stability and reconstruction operations. “The ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations is paramount in the Army's ability to win the peace.”<sup>37</sup> Offense, defense, and stability and reconstruction are now co-equal missions within full spectrum operations.

The Army has placed significant doctrinal emphasis on full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations, combined arms, joint interdependence, and mission command comprise the Army's four fundamentals of its operational concept.<sup>38</sup> The operational concept is essential to the

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<sup>35</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 19.

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations 2008*, 3-1.

<sup>37</sup> William S. Wallace, “FM 3-0 Operations, The Army's Blueprint,” *Military Review* 88, no. 2 (March-April 2008), 4.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, 3-3. Definitions: *Combined arms* involve the complementary application of the different Army branches. *Joint interdependence* describes the

Army's contribution to national security. The operational concept represents the core statement of Army doctrine and provides vision and guidance on how the Army will fight 21st century adversaries.<sup>39</sup> The ability to conduct full spectrum operations across the entire spectrum of conflict requires a balanced approach to training.

Full spectrum operations require the Army to be prepared to respond to threats at home and abroad. In order to successfully conduct full spectrum operations, U.S. Army training strategy must be balanced across the missions of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction. *FM I* divides full spectrum operations into two major components: joint campaigns (overseas), and homeland security missions within the United States. See figure 3-1 . The two components are divided further into four operations: offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support operations. *FM I* defines the operations as follows:

Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. Defensive operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. Civil support operations address the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. Army forces do not conduct stability and reconstruction operations within the United States; under U.S law, the federal and state governments are responsible for those tasks.<sup>40</sup>

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complementary use of Army forces with those of other Services as part of the joint force. *Full spectrum operations* combine offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support operations. *Mission command* is the Army's preferred method for commanding and controlling forces. These fundamentals define the way the Army executes operations.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 3-6.

These doctrinal definitions provide training focus for the Army's BCTs and are indicative of the diverse training challenge for the Army.

*FM I* defines full spectrum operations during the conduct of joint campaigns overseas as follows: "During joint campaigns overseas, Army forces execute a simultaneous and continuous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational teams."<sup>41</sup> Joint overseas campaigns are not necessarily independent of homeland security missions. *FM I* is clear the Army must also prepare and train brigade combat teams to also conduct operations in the continental United States. "Concurrently with overseas campaigns, Army forces within the United States and its territories combine offensive, defensive, and civil support operations to support homeland security."<sup>42</sup> In fact, the security strategy places the requirement to simultaneously conduct joint overseas campaigns and simultaneously execute homeland security missions. "Strategically, the ability to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations in overseas campaigns while supporting homeland security domestically is central to full spectrum operations."<sup>43</sup> The requirement to conduct full spectrum operations in overseas campaigns and in support of the homeland security mission complicates the training challenge for brigade combat teams.


The Army concept of full spectrum operations acknowledges that missions of offense and defense are still critical but must be executed simultaneously with stability and reconstruction missions in joint campaigns and with civil support operations during homeland security missions within the United States. LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, responsible for development of the Army's doctrinal

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 3-6.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 3-6.

manuals, recently announced the publication of *FM 3-0 Operations* and stated that: “This blueprint for the future will look beyond the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan; the implication of full spectrum operations still includes the requirement to remain fully capable to fight major combat operations in the future.”<sup>44</sup> Caldwell’s comments highlight the requirement for a balanced approach to training. He clearly acknowledged that *FM 3-0 Operations* must be applicable to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is also relevant to potential future conflicts which may include traditional offensive and defensive operations.



(Figure 3-1)<sup>45</sup>

The Army is currently executing full spectrum operations in OIF. Following redeployment from OIF as Commanding General 1st Cavalry Division and subsequently Commander Multi National Division- Baghdad (MND-B), Task Force Baghdad Major General Peter W. Chiarelli co-authored an article for *Military Review* entitled *The Requirement for Full-*

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 3-6.

<sup>44</sup> William B. Caldwell IV, “Evolution vs Revolution: FM 3-0,” *Small Wars Journal* (February 15, 2008), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/evolution-vs-revolution-fm-30/> (accessed February 16, 2008), 1.

Spectrum Operations. In this work MG Chiarelli described Task Force Baghdad's approach to and methodology in implementing full spectrum operations.<sup>46</sup> MG Chiarelli wrote that the Army trained and prepared him well over the last thirty years to win the Nations wars "on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that point of penetration"<sup>47</sup> MG Chiarelli found the realities of OIF much different. "But in Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace."<sup>48</sup> MG Chiarelli is clear that during his career the Army's training methodology did not prepare him for full spectrum operations in Iraq.

MG Chiarelli advocates full spectrum operations. He writes that traditional offensive and defensive operations alone will not bring success on the battlefield in Iraq, but must be coupled with stability operations. MG Chiarelli adopted five lines of operation for Task Force Baghdad. The lines of operation were: Combat Operations, Train and Employ Iraqi Security Forces, Restoration/Improvement of Essential Services, Promote Governance, and Economic Pluralism.<sup>49</sup> Two points from MG Chiarelli's article must be emphasized here. First, full spectrum operations cannot be sequential or phased, but must occur simultaneously. "The outcome of a sequential plan allowed insurgent leaders to gain a competitive advantage through solidifying the psychological and structural support of the populace."<sup>50</sup> Second, that amongst the lines of

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<sup>45</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, 3-26.

<sup>46</sup> Peter W. Chiarelli, and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85, No. 4 (July-August 2005), 4.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

operation, the efforts may not be weighted equally, but the situation will dictate which line of operation is the main effort for the organization, and that the weighting of these lines of operation are dynamic and will change as the situation warrants. Full spectrum operations are therefore able to address a wide number of challenges the United States may encounter in the 21st century. As such, full spectrum operations will remain one of the Army's tenets for the foreseeable future. MG Chiarelli suggests "we should consider paraphrasing Clausewitz: full-spectrum operations are the continuation of major combat operations by another means."<sup>51</sup>

In summary, the necessity to conduct full spectrum operations is a post 9-11 requirement for the U.S. Army. The Army previously focused its efforts on traditional attack and defend missions at the expense of stability and reconstruction operations. Today the training focus is on stability and reconstruction. The preponderance of missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are stability and reconstruction missions. Tomorrow's war may require offensive and defensive intensive missions. 1st Cavalry Division was forced to adopt full spectrum operations in stride in Iraq. The U.S. Army must train its forces so they are prepared for all 21<sup>st</sup> century threats and not forced to conduct warfare they are untrained for. The challenges of the 21st century will require the Army to balance its training strategy and fully embrace full spectrum operations.

## **Force Structure**

The Army is faced with a dilemma concerning how best to train for 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges. One option is to identify specific forces within the Army to address specific challenges. Another option is to prepare all of our forces to address the full spectrum of 21st century challenges. The Army has elected to adopt the latter option. *FM I* states that "because the nation cannot afford two armies, the Army is meeting this requirement by increasing the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 16.

versatility and agility of the same forces that conduct conventional operations.”<sup>52</sup> The 21st century challenges and budgetary limitations on force structure and size validate the necessity for full spectrum operations doctrine. However, there are several challenges to fully embracing this doctrine.

Two significant factors hinder the Army’s ability to train for full spectrum operations. First, insufficient force size and structure limit the Army’s ability to train brigades for full spectrum operations. Second, the requirement to prepare brigade combat teams to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, have degraded the Army’s ability to balance its training strategy. Brigade combat teams are focused on the current war rather than future contingencies.

The current Army force structure inhibits the Army’s ability to reach training balance. The Army is too small to properly accomplish its current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and simultaneously prepare for emerging threats. The demands of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom consume a significant portion of the Army. Approximately 154,000 soldiers are deployed in support of OIF and approximately 26,000 Soldiers are deployed in support of OEF at any one time.<sup>53</sup> To meet the personnel requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan and future contingency operations, the Army must grow the force. The *2007 Army Modernization Plan* is published annually by the Army G8 to provide an update on Army modernization. The 2007 plan states, “The Army will grow 74.2 k by FY 2013 across all three components (active, reserve, and national guard). The active Component will be increased to 547.4k, a 65k increase from the currently programmed 482.4k.”<sup>54</sup> This increase in force structure acknowledges the United

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<sup>52</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1, The Army*, 4-2.

<sup>53</sup> Staff, “The Army as of Feb. 14,” *Army Times*, Springfield, VA: Army Times Publishing Group Volume 68, No.32 (February 25, 2008), 7.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, 24.

States is in a long war and the ground forces will play an integral part in the conflict for the foreseeable future.

## **Brigade Combat Teams**

As part of Army Transformation the Army is reorganizing itself to an expeditionary force rather than a forward deployed force.<sup>55</sup> This expeditionary force will be built around brigade combat teams. Army Transformation has made the brigade combat team the lynch pin of its force structure. According to the 2007 Army Modernization Plan 18 to 20 BCTs are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>56</sup> The BCT is a more capable organization than its predecessor the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) brigade. BCTs are modular, defined by the ability to deploy independently of its parent divisional organization. Once deployed the BCT, can accomplish missions assigned as part of a joint force. The BCT is a combined arms teams; each BCT has its own enablers: combat support, reconnaissance, maneuver, field artillery, and logistical support assets, organic to its TOE. The combined arms nature of the BCT assists with continuity. Under the brigade construct, the organization was enhanced with enablers only for training or deployment. This created a “forming” phenomenon which occurred with every exercise or deployment. The BCT eliminates this forming phenomena, it is singularly responsible for training, deploying, and employing its organic support assets.<sup>57</sup>

The Army has three BCT variants: the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT).<sup>58</sup> The

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<sup>55</sup> George W. Casey Jr., The Brookings Institution Maintaining Quality in the Force: A Briefing by General George W. Casey: Transformation is a holistic effort to adapt how we fight, train, modernize, develop leaders, station, and support our Soldiers, Families and Civilians. Transformation is a journey – not a destination. Transformation is also a multi-faceted process.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 26.

Army's transformation efforts rely heavily on the success of this new organization. The three variants give the joint force commander a wide range of options to request forces tailored to the threat and the environment. Figure 4-1 from the *2007 Army Modernization Plan* illustrates the capabilities unique to each variant of the BCT.




Figure 4-1<sup>59</sup>

In order to ensure success of full spectrum operations, BCTs must be trained to simultaneously accomplish offensive, defensive and stability and support missions. The current deployment cycle however precludes adequate training in offense and defense and requires a focus on stability and support missions. The surge has therefore created significant strain on the

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 26.

Army's brigade combat team structure. According to the *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, "The Active Component brigades are deploying at a rate of one year deployed for each year at home instead of the Army's deployment planning objective of one year deployed to two years training at home station under surge conditions."<sup>60</sup>

A significant number of brigade combat teams are deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. According to the *Army Times*, which provides a weekly report of deployed BCTs, seventeen of the Army's active BCTs (to include 3rd ACR), are deployed in support of OIF, and three National Guard brigades are also deployed in the Iraqi theater of Operations.<sup>61</sup> Two active component BCTs and one reserve component brigade are deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.<sup>62</sup> To mitigate the demands, the *2007 Army Modernization Plan* states, "The Army has developed plans to grow to include 76 BCTs (48 AC BCTs and 28 RC BCTs) and approximately 225 support brigades."<sup>63</sup> The 76 BCTs will be cycled into three pools as part of Army Force Generation.

## **Army Forces Generation**

In July of 2006 the Army began a 15 month rotation for BCTs vice the previous 12 month rotation as part of the "surge." This has created a scenario in which the majority of the brigade combat teams are either deployed, preparing for deployment, or recently returned from supporting the War on Terror. This is consistent with the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) concept of the reset and train pool, ready pool, and the available pool; however full ARFORGEN will not be fully implemented until 2013.<sup>64</sup> According to the *2007 Army*

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>61</sup> Staff, "The Army as of Feb. 14," *Army Times*, 7.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>63</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, 24.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 4.

*Modernization Plan*, “ARFORGEN is an Army initiative to divide the force into three separate pools (reset/train, ready, and available). In the reset/train pool the Soldiers will redeploy from operations, receive and stabilize personnel, reset equipment, and conduct training which culminates in a brigade level training event. Units in the ready pool continue mission specific collective training in accordance with the BCTs Mission Essential Task List (METL), and are eligible if necessary to meet joint requirements. Units in the available force pool are in their planned deployment windows and are fully trained, equipped and resourced to meet operational requirements.”<sup>65</sup> The Army envisions the ARFORGEN cycle will assist BCTs in training full spectrum operations. However, the *2007 Army Modernization Plan* may contradict this vision.

The *2007 Army Modernization Plan* declares that

“When the full three-year (Active) and six-year (Reserve) deployment cycles are realized, ARFORGEN will enable a unit to focus on its core mission of offensive and defensive operations) in reset/train and focus on its directed mission (stability operations) in the ready force pool. This way, ARFORGEN enables units to be fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations.”<sup>66</sup>

This statement directly contradicts the 2008 edition of *FM 3-0 Operations*, which identifies stability and reconstruction operations as a core Army mission equal to offensive and defensive missions. It reflects an institutional bias to train the Army for traditional missions and limit Army involvement in stability and reconstruction operations. Documents like the *2007 Army Modernization Plan* create an institutionally caused imbalance in training when they refer to offensive and defensive operations as core Army missions. Historically, unit training to conduct stability and reconstruction missions has been secondary to preparation for the traditional missions of offense and defense. In his seminal work *The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005* as part of the Army’s Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper series,

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 5.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates asserts that the Army hesitancy to conduct non traditional operations is not new.

Traditionally, the US military has not regarded stability operations as a 'core' mission with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations. The American military has traditionally focused on conventional warfighting as its most important mission, and while few officers have challenged the Clausewitzian axiom that wars are the 'continuation of policy by other means,' a pervasive belief maintains that, once an enemy's conventional forces have been defeated, the responsibility of the military for helping the policy makers achieve the broader objectives for which the hostilities were conducted has been largely fulfilled... In other words, it's the military's responsibility to win the war, not win the peace.<sup>67</sup>

Throughout its history, the Army has been called upon to conduct operations outside its traditional missions of attack and defend. When the Army has conducted these non traditional missions it has been frequently accompanied by internal institutional debate which focused on the appropriateness of these non traditional missions.

In summary, the Army premier war fighting organization will be the brigade combat team. As part of Army Forces Generation, the Army plans to cycle BCTs into one of three pools: reset/train, ready, and available with a projected fully operational date of 2013. The Army projects it will have 76 BCTs (48 AC BCTs and 28 RC BCTs) at endstate. The current deployment cycle makes it extremely difficult to focus on any mission other than the stability and reconstruction missions they can expect to see in Iraq or Afghanistan. At the current rate of deployment 60 of the projected 76 BCTs will be either training for deployment to OIF or OEF, deployed, or recently returned from deployment. The *2007 Army Modernization Plan* lack of situational awareness on the Army's full spectrum operations doctrine creates a situation that exacerbates the imbalance of training in the Army when it states that BCTs will be able to focus on the core mission of offensive and defensive missions when in the reset/retrain pool. Assuming that the Army reaches full implementation in 2013 with no delays; the question becomes what is

the Army's training strategy for the 4 year interim period? The National Training Center provides insight on current and future full spectrum operations training.

## **National Training Center**

Training brigade combat teams for missions in the area of stability and support has superseded training for the traditional attack and defend missions at the National Training Center and during home station training. Offensive and defensive training were previously considered to be core Army missions. Because the Army is neglecting training for the traditional missions of offense and defense, it is therefore not properly preparing brigade combat teams in accordance with prescribed doctrine for full spectrum operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, which is essential to meeting the security challenges of the 21st century.

### **History**

The National Training Center has a distinguished history of preparing forces for high intensity conflict. The NTC filled a void in the U.S. Army training strategy following Vietnam. According to the National Training Center and Fort Irwin Land Expansion homepage,

“In the late-1970s, the Army, during the post-Viet Nam period of a drawdown of forces and austere budgets, pioneered a training concept designed to teach and sharpen the skills of its units, leaders and soldiers. The concept was simple, expanded from proven Navy and Air Force programs, "Top Gun" and "Red Flag" respectively, which honed the combat skills of pilots and aircrews to prepare them for the "first ten missions of the next war."<sup>68</sup>

The Army therefore required a similar system but to train mechanized forces in high intensity mounted maneuver. The result was the National Training Center (NTC). The National Training Center has a rich and storied history of preparing mechanized infantry and armored forces for

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<sup>67</sup> Lawrence A. Yates, “The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-200”, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press, 2006), 21.

<sup>68</sup> National Training Center Homepage,” The National training Center and Fort Irwin Land Expansion” December 2007, <http://www.fortirwinlandexpansion.com/PDFs/NTC%20Land%20Expansion%20Article.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2007), 1.

high intensity mounted maneuver. The NTCs initial charter was battalion level training in an offensive and defensive environment with force on force simulated engagements coupled with an extensive battalion level live fire.<sup>69</sup>

The NTC Homepage also states, numerous locations were considered for the new and innovative training site. “In 1979, Fort Irwin, California was selected, from among 11 candidates, for its size, high desert terrain, and remote location, to become the "National Training Center (NTC).”<sup>70</sup> The NTC was designed to be a one of a kind training experience structured to give heavy U.S. forces the edge in mounted warfare.

“At first structured to conduct training to defeat Cold War threats, the first training "rotation" occurred with a battalion-sized force (about 800 soldiers) in 1982, and progressively grew to brigade size by 1986. The proof of principle for the NTC training concept came during the Gulf War in 1991, when an Army trained with NTC rigor and high standards, with its joint partners, took 100 hours to defeat the Iraqi Army in ground combat in Southwest Asia.”<sup>71</sup>

The NTC was designed and uniquely resourced to prepare forces for Cold War type threats. It proved to be the ideal environment to prepare armored and mechanized formations for mobile offensive and defensive operations. The NTC was thus able to give battalions and brigades confidence in their abilities to defeat the Soviet threat in high intensity conflict utilizing the Airland Battle doctrine.

## **Post September 11th**

The noted Vietnam commander and former commandant at the United States Army War College Major General (retired) Robert H. Scales authored an article in the January-February 2006 *Military Review* entitled “*The Second Learning Revolution*,” in which he asserts that the “Army’s first post-Vietnam training revolution began in earnest with the creation of force-on-

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 1.

force free-play exercises.”<sup>72</sup> Scales states that “The Army’s laboratory for creating the revolution was the National Training Center (NTC) in the California desert. By the time the Army and Marine Corps moved into Kuwait in 1991 both services had embedded the spirit of the combat training centers into their cultures.”<sup>73</sup> NTC not only served to prepare battalions and brigades for high intensity conflict at the tactical level, but it also validated the Army’s doctrine of Airland Battle. The Coalition and United States ground forces received an Iraqi capitulation in less than 120 hours of introducing high intensity ground warfare.

Prior to September 11, 2001 the NTC was accepted as the location of choice for training in high intensity conflict environment for Continental United States (CONUS) based forces. The NTC was uniquely situated, organized, and equipped to prepare brigades and battalions for the offensive and defensive realms of full spectrum operations. The focus changed however, after September 11th, to preparing units for the rigors of conflict in the entire spectrum of conflict, with more focus on stability and reconstruction operations. Thus U.S. forces were only being prepared for the rigors of war in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>74</sup> General William S. Wallace, Commander United States Army Training and Doctrine Command drives home this point in a piece he authored in the U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection by stating “We must increasingly and consistently adapt to how we handle the challenges of full

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<sup>72</sup> Robert H. Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (January-February 2006), 37.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>74</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training For The World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus, <http://www.irwin.army.mil/channels> (first accessed 12 December 2007) 4. National Training Center Mission: Provide tough, realistic joint and combined arms training. Focus at the brigade and battalion task force. Assist commanders in developing trained, competent leaders and soldiers. Identify unit training deficiencies, provide feedback to improve the force and prepare for success on the future joint battlefield. Provide a venue for transformation. Take care of soldiers, civilians, and family members.

spectrum operations in a protracted conflict.”<sup>75</sup> The National Training Center has transformed itself into an organization that focuses exclusively on the protracted conflict of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Given the maneuver space, cadre of Observer Controllers (O/Cs), support staff, dedicated thinking Opposing Force (OPFOR), and instrumented After Action Review (AAR) capability the National Training Center is still the ideal location to train brigades and battalions in offensive and defensive operations.<sup>76</sup> The salient question becomes if rigorous offensive and defensive operations are not trained at the NTC, then where will our brigade combat teams receive this training? The Army suffered its most visible aspect of training imbalance when the NTC shifted its focus from offensive and defensive mounted maneuver to stability and reconstruction operations, singularly focused on the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> Revolution in Training**

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Scales concludes “The U.S. had gotten it exactly right.”<sup>77</sup> He further states “large Army and Marine Armored formations, supported by massive aerial strike forces, were able to execute a truly joint operational takedown thanks mostly to the skills learned by Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen in the California deserts.”<sup>78</sup> Scales is not the only one to acknowledge the impact of the NTC in OIF. For instance *On Point*, the U.S. Army’s official account of Operation Iraqi Freedom, attributes the following to a brigade commander involved in OIF I:

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<sup>75</sup> William S. Wallace, “Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet the Needs of the Army,” *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006), 59.

<sup>76</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training for the World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus, 3-10.

<sup>77</sup> Robert H. Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” 37.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

After the conclusion of major combat operations, Colonel Will Grimsley wrote to the commanding general of the National Training Center to thank him and his key leaders for the work they did in preparing Grimsley's 1st Brigade, 3rd ID. According to Grimsley, "I told them I could draw a straight line correlation from how we fought in OIF successfully directly back to my National Training Center rotation."<sup>79</sup>

However, now Scales asserts that "the challenge today is to create a second training and educational revolution—that prepares military leaders to fight in this new age of warfare."<sup>80</sup>

Scales advocates that the requirement for warfare in the future will be centered on much smaller units than the 20<sup>th</sup> century massed divisions and corps. This 21st century warfare is "focused on creating extraordinarily proficient small units."<sup>81</sup> This new focus must concentrate on platoons and companies, vice battalions and brigades. Scales advocates the Army focuses on urban warfare vice open warfare. The NTC has embraced these changes. This is a radical shift in training for the National Training Center given one of the reasons it was selected as the premier Army training site was its open terrain.

Brigadier General Robert W. Cone commanded the National Training Center from September of 2004 until July of 2007. Cone acknowledges the NTC's contribution to the first revolution in training, "the NTC was a driving force in the Army's first revolution in training, and the demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have required a fundamental reassessment of the character and nature of training at the NTC."<sup>82</sup> Cone recently authored an article for the *U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection*. In this piece, he outlines changes in the infrastructure and training focus at the NTC. "Changes at the NTC have focused on a number of

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<sup>79</sup> Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 392.

<sup>80</sup> Robert H. Scales, "The Second Learning Revolution," 37.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>82</sup> Robert W. Cone, "The Changing National Training Center," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006), 1.

key features associated with GWOT and its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.”<sup>83</sup> He offers further insights on the training balance when he writes, “training at the NTC now places more emphasis on full-spectrum combat operations, especially counterinsurgency (COIN) training involving both kinetic and non-kinetic means.”<sup>84</sup> Cone echoes the sentiments of MG Scales when he declares “with the growing significance of small unit-actions, the NTC has redoubled efforts to increase the rigor and fidelity of training at the small-unit level.”<sup>85</sup>

During Fiscal Year 2006 the NTC was used exclusively for Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) rotations in order to prepare brigades for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. This is a shift from pre 9-11 rotations when brigade combat teams were cycled through the NTC in order to prepare them for the rigors of mounted maneuver. Typically, a commander received one Combat Training Center rotation during his tenure in command.<sup>86</sup> Of the twenty brigade combat team rotations all were MRXs in order to prepare forces for eventual deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>87</sup> Because of the requirement to prepare forces for Iraq and Afghanistan the post 9-11 rotations are exclusively focused on the War on Terror. The 2003 edition of AR 350-50 states: “The CTC Program does not fund mission rehearsal exercises and they are not a substitute for a CTC rotation.”<sup>88</sup> The 2003 edition of AR 350-50 states further that: “CTCs should not be used to validate or train to specific war plans or actual mission sets.”<sup>89</sup> The NTC has focused primarily on MRXs concentrating on stability and reconstruction operations. The MRXs have

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>86</sup> William S. Wallace, “Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet the Needs of the Army,” 59.

<sup>87</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training for the World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus”, 3-10.

<sup>88</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *AR 350-50, Combat Training Center Program*, 2.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 11.

created a training imbalance for BCTs. The premier training venue to conduct traditional offensive and defensive missions was now focused primarily on stability and reconstruction operations. In an article for the *American Forces Press Service* entitled *Cutting Edge Combat Training Prepares Soldiers for Future Fights* COL (P) Robert Abrahams Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS declared“ This is not your fathers NTC.”<sup>90</sup> This statement highlights a shift in focus at the NTC from a conventional offensive defensive scenario to a stability and reconstruction intensive training experience.

In an article for *Chemical Review* entitled *National Training Center Offers New Training Opportunities*, Major Brant Hoskins, a former Observer Controller at the NTC, described the number of urban training sites increased from four to twelve, varying from a few buildings to elaborate towns with markets, mosques, businesses, and houses. No longer are the rotations focused on a battalion movement to contact in the central corridor, but in these newly constructed villages.<sup>91</sup> BG Cone acknowledges that the “NTC is ideally suited to prepare units for combat in a desert environment, however increased emphasis on operations in urban and complex terrain has been essential in preparing units for combat in GWOT.”<sup>92</sup>

The NTC was once known for its ability to conduct rigorous realistic high intensity, offensive and defensive oriented training. A fourteen day rotation would include seven days of force-on-force training followed by seven days of live fire exercises.<sup>93</sup> Brigadier General Cone

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<sup>90</sup> David, Mays, “Cutting-Edge Combat Training Prepares Soldiers for Future Fights,” *American Forces Press Services news Articles* (November 5, 2007), <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48055> (accessed 12 December 2007) 1.

<sup>91</sup> Brant, Hoskins, “National Training Center Offers New Training Opportunities” *Army Chemical Review* (July-December 2005), <http://www.wood.army.mil/chmdsd/pdfs/Jul-Dec%202005/Hoskins3.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2007) 22.

<sup>92</sup> Robert W. Cone, “The Changing National Training Center,” *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006), 1.

<sup>93</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training for the World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus, 10.

writes that the primary focus at the NTC used to be kinetic operations.<sup>94</sup> Given the realities of the War on Terror, this may no longer be an appropriate venue for BCTs conducting an MRX at the NTC as opposed to a training rotation. Cone goes on further to contrast pre-September 11th live fire training with the focus of today's kinetic operations when he states: "Most kinetic operations are designed to exercise the skills that are most likely to be needed in theater: cordon and search, raids on high value targets, operations with Special Operations Forces (SOF), combat patrolling, and convoy security."<sup>95</sup>

A Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the National Training Center has little in common with the 30-day rotations conducted there through until 2004. Even the terrain has changed, as the NTC has constructed over a dozen mock Iraqi villages, mountain strongholds, and a network of caves and tunnels in the desert. The O/C teams have changed their focus from evaluation to mentorship and support, and there is no longer a sterile one-week Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) period followed by two weeks of force-on-force and another week of administrative turn-in of equipment.<sup>96</sup>

Units now receive classroom training on basic kinetic and non-kinetic COIN tasks immediately upon arrival at Fort Irwin during RSOI week. These classes include negotiation skills, language, and cultural understanding. The classes are taught by the same O/Cs that will accompany the units into the field for the two-week training period. Units pull security in the rear assembly area while they are building combat power. During this period they have to deal with demonstrations, occasional random indirect fire, and relief-in-place coordination with a "mock"

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<sup>94</sup> Robert W. Cone, "The Changing National Training Center," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May-June 2006), 7.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>96</sup> LTC (P) Franklin L. Wenzel, USA, former senior logistics Observer Controller at the National Training Center, interviewed by author 01 May 2008.

unit whose leadership makes occasional trips back to the assembly area to coordinate the battle hand-over.<sup>97</sup>

Prior to the BCT departing for their area of operations, approximately 1600 role players occupy the Iraqi villages. Following a week in the rear assembly area, the BCT deploys to the training area and occupies 4-5 Combat Operating Bases (COBs) and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) that were left by the departing unit (the departing unit was ordered to pull out a day prior to the rotational BCT's occupation). The movement to the FOBs is not an administrative move it is a tactical movement. The BCT may encounter Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), protests, civilian casualties, and other situations they can expect to encounter once deployed to Iraq.<sup>98</sup>

The training scenarios are flexible in order to meet the BCT and Division Commander's requirements, and the NTC constantly updates the scenarios in response to classified, unclassified, and O/C theater visits for lessons learned from theater. The rotations are challenging, as Soldiers and units learn best when pushed to the brink of failure. Since 2004 all of the scenarios have been singularly focused on preparation for missions in Iraq or Afghanistan.<sup>99</sup>

The NTC has begun to place greater emphases on role players vice OPFOR. AR 350-50 Combat Training Center Program describes role players as an integral part of the OPFOR.

“To support full-spectrum operations, the CTC environment must include elements of future conflict not associated with past OPFORs. These elements include things such as: media play, non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organization (nongovernmental organization/ private voluntary organization), displaced civilians, terrorists, urban operations, guerilla warfare, weapons of mass destruction, information operations, and so forth.”<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 01 May 2008.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 01 May 2008.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 01 May 2008.

<sup>100</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *AR 350-50, Combat Training Center Program*, 3.

Hoskins states further that the villages are occupied by Arabic speaking role players. These role players have taken a crucial role in the training at NTC. In fact, two squadrons and the engineer company from the 11th ACR which has traditionally served as the OPFOR were deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from January 2005 until 17 March 2006.<sup>101</sup> While deployed the “1/221 Cavalry, Nevada ARNG, was activated and deployed to Fort Irwin in the fall of 2004, formed the core of NTC’s premier Opposing Force.”<sup>102</sup> Prior to the stresses placed upon the force due to the War on Terrorism, this would be unimaginable. However, it does in fact highlight the fact that the role of the once well respected opposing force has changed from the primary traditional threat training tool, to a subordinate role in support of the role players.

Senior leaders are satisfied with the changes at the NTC as they relate to preparation for stability and reconstruction tasks. These changes however, reflect only the requirements for current ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and not future contingencies. Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr., General Casey indicates that soon after assuming duties at CSA he was “suspect” in the way our combat training Centers were preparing the force for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>103</sup> However, following visits to the combat training centers, he indicates he was “very pleased with what he saw.”<sup>104</sup> General Casey concluded that the NTC is accomplishing its mission to prepare brigade combat teams for current operations

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<sup>101</sup> On 4 July 2004, the Regiment received deployment orders for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Previously, in June 58<sup>th</sup> Combat Engineers, Red Devils, was the first to deploy attached to 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division in Baghdad, Iraq. 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron deployed in December 2004 to Babil Province, to conduct support and stability operations with the 155<sup>th</sup> Mississippi National Guard. 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron deployed in January 2005 to Baghdad, Iraq. Over the course of the year they were attached to four different Brigade Combat Teams conducting full spectrum operations in the Baghdad area of operations. The Regimental Headquarters deployed to Mosul Iraq that same month and assumed duty as the division headquarters for Multi National Force North-West.

<sup>102</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training for the World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus,” 10.

<sup>103</sup> George W. Casey Jr., The Brookings Institution Maintaining Quality in the Force: A Briefing by General George W. Casey, Jr. <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2007/12/04/7139-army-chief-of-staff-remarks-at-brookings-institution-dec-4th-2007/> (December, 4th 2007).

which is consistent with Mission Rehearsal Exercises. “Our ability to replicate the environments that they’re going to face is great, but our soldiers and leaders need to know that there’s not going to be any scrimping on giving them the tools they need to succeed.”<sup>105</sup> The NTC is satisfying the requirements to train stability operations in the current fight; however, this has come at the cost of preparing units for future conflicts. These future conflicts may require high intensity offensive and defensive operations conducted either prior to or simultaneously with the stability operations now trained at the NTC as the main effort.

In summary, the National Training Center was created to train brigade and battalion heavy forces in high intensity offensive and defensive operations. The NTC is often credited with the overwhelming success of Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Iraqi Freedom I. However, the NTC has undergone a revolution in training to prepare forces for the rigors of stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and now focuses exclusively on Mission Rehearsal Exercises. This has created a significant training imbalance for heavy brigade and below level forces. The NTC once known for its ability to replicate high intensity conflict in the traditional offensive and defensive warfare is now relegated to a stability and reconstruction focus. If brigade combat teams do not receive offensive and defensive training at the NTC then the salient question becomes, where will they receive this training? Offensive and defensive operations are just as much a part of full spectrum operations as stability and reconstruction operations. The challenge for the U. S. Army will be to balance its training strategy which will allow brigade level forces to be equally adept in all three operations required by full spectrum operations in joint campaigns overseas.

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., speech.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., speech.

# Conclusion

## Summary

This monograph examined the Army's training balance defined by its ability to prepare brigade combat teams to execute the doctrine of full spectrum operations. Conventional wisdom indicates that of the three missions of full spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction); the Army is less capable of conducting operations in stability and reconstruction. However, two facts suggest that the Army is better prepared to operate in the irregular realm, to including stability and reconstruction operations, rather than in the traditional realm of attack and defend. First, the training focus of the Combat Training Centers is weighted heavily towards stability and reconstruction. Second, the most recent combat experiences of our Soldiers have been on the irregular warfare end of the spectrum of conflict conducting stability operations. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 "provides policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct support stability operations"<sup>106</sup> This policy mandated "U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so."<sup>107</sup> This high standard indicated that the Army was not prepared for stability and reconstruction operations. However, recent combat experiences of the Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, recent National Security Strategy and associated supporting documents, and the current force size and structure coupled with the Army's emerging concept of Army Forces Generation, all suggest that the U.S. Army has created a disproportionate training strategy which favors stability and reconstruction missions over traditional offensive and defensive missions.

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<sup>106</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, (November 28, 2005), 1.

The strategic guidance validates the U.S. Army's concept of full spectrum operations. Given the current security environment, the U.S. Army can be called upon to simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations. Given the current and potential future 21st century challenges, stability and reconstruction operations will continue to play an important role in U.S. Army operations; the National Strategies however, mandate the Army to maintain a capability to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The Army has accepted risk focusing almost exclusively on traditional threats, at the expense of preparing for threats on the irregular end of the spectrum such as stability and reconstruction operations. During the conflict in the Balkans for example, the Army recognized the importance of stability and reconstruction operations and began to place greater emphasis on these areas of training. However, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have caused the Army to focus almost exclusively on stability and reconstruction training at the combat training centers and during home station training. The *Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05* published in 2005 contributes to the focus on stability and reconstruction operations directing:

“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”<sup>108</sup>

This recent focus of training on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict in stability and reconstruction operations has come at the cost of training preparation for more traditional threats, and the Army's ability to attack and defend. Neglecting training for conflict on the higher end of the spectrum of conflict degrades the Army's ability to conduct full spectrum operations.

Following a recent deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which his command

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 2.

was heavily involved in stability and reconstruction operations, a division commander responded “no” when asked if his division was prepared to conduct traditional missions. He emphasized that his brigade combat teams would require a significant reset and retrain period in order to successfully conduct high intensity conflict.<sup>109</sup> ARFORGEN is designed to provide this reset and retrain period but will not be fully operational until 2013. There will be a five year gap until ARFORGEN is fully functioning.

The NTC was an ideal choice to evaluate the Army’s training balance in terms of the ability to adequately prepare for full spectrum operations given its long history brigade and battalion level training, and the fact that the NTC is now exclusively conducting Mission Rehearsal Exercises for brigades prior to deployment.<sup>110</sup> This significantly detracts from their historic role as the pinnacle training event for CONUS based heavy forces. The NTC is currently adopting a Second Revolution in training which has focused training away from the Army’s missions of offense and defense, creating a training strategy which does not support the emerging full spectrum operations doctrine.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) recently experienced the painful consequences of a training imbalance. The IDF’s heavy focus on irregular warfare and counterinsurgency missions created an inability to conduct high intensity conflict operations in the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Noted military strategy author Gian Gentile recently wrote a piece entitled *Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities*. In this work Gentile offers the following: “The Israeli experience in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 should warn Americans against having an Army that has become so focused on irregular and counterinsurgency warfare

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<sup>109</sup> This comment was made by a division commander recently redeployed from Iraq in response to a question during a School of Advanced Military Studies seminar.

<sup>110</sup> National Training Center Homepage, “World Class Training for the World’s Best Army Part-1: Current Focus, 10.

that it can no longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy.”<sup>111</sup> This sentiment is shared amongst many senior civilian leaders and General Officers in Israel. During a recent visit to Israel senior leaders indicated they felt that years of policing actions by the Israeli Army hindered their ability to conduct conventional operations during the Second Lebanon War.<sup>112</sup> Israel’s experience in 2006 highlights the critical importance of maintaining a balanced training strategy.

## **Recommendations**

As a result of this study on Army training balance, four primary recommendations are offered. All of the recommendations are within the Army’s span of control. The Army can adopt these recommendations under its own authority. All four of the recommendations have an important impact on training balance.

First, to alleviate some of the training imbalance in the Army created post September 11<sup>th</sup>, brigade combat teams should focus their training strategies on those tasks that train the missions of offensive and defensive operations and simultaneously train for requirements in stability and reconstruction operations. For example patrolling operations are appropriate missions to train for offensive and defensive missions and for stability and reconstruction missions. By adopting this technique, brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to conduct full spectrum operations.

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<sup>111</sup> Gian, P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” *World Politics Review* (March 04, 2008), <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715> (accessed 07 March 2008),1.

<sup>112</sup> During an April 2008 trip to Israel as part of the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship the theme of lack of preparation for conventional war was suggested numerous times by senior civilian members of the government, and senior military leaders of the Israeli Defense Force. This theme focused on lack of preparation to fight the Second Lebanon War and was attributed to the IDF’s focus on threats on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict such as the Palestinians conducting COIN and policing actions.

Second, the Army should examine the role of the National Training Center with respect to conducting singularly focused Mission Rehearsal Exercises. The NTC should revert back to its role of training battalions and brigades for future combat operations which include traditional missions in high intensity conflict. In an article published in the *Armed Forces Journal*, co authors Lieutenant Colonels John Nagl and Paul Yingling remind us that “Maintaining our MCO (major combat operations) capability limits our enemies’ options to escalate conflicts while preserving our own ability to do so. Even in COIN environments there are requirements to conduct major combat operations.”<sup>113</sup> Recently many strategists have opined on the consequences of losing the struggle for the peace and stability in Iraq. Curiously, few if any of these strategists have considered a loss to a country like Iran in traditional offensive and defensive style warfare. The consequences of losing a conventional war to an enemy of the United States are potentially catastrophic. The Army must reestablish the NTC as the premier high intensity conflict training venue.

Third, the United States Army must explore the feasibility of creating a new Combat Training Center separate from the current National Training Center which focuses Brigade and battalions on stability and reconstruction operations. This newly created CTC would also train limited traditional missions but would be the Army’s premier center for stability and reconstruction operations. Although most experts predict long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both wars will eventually end. The United States Army needs a dedicated CTC to maintain the lessons learned in stability and reconstruction missions to ensure the Army does not slip back into focusing solely on offensive and defensive missions. Institutionally the Army is more comfortable fighting wars than winning the peace. As previously mentioned in Section three (Force Structure), the 2007 Army Modernization plan already indicates that in the reset/retrain

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<sup>113</sup> John A. Nagl and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” *Armed Forces Journal*, (October 2006), <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425> (accessed 12 December 2007), 2.

pool of Army Forces Generation that BCTs will focus on core offensive and defensive missions.<sup>114</sup> This contradicts the Army's full spectrum operations doctrine and *DOD 3000.05* which clearly mandate that stability and reconstruction are core Army missions.

Finally, the Army must ensure that approved increases in force structure and the completion of Army Forces Generation concept remains on schedule. This study finds that the current deployment operational tempo (OPTEMPO) precludes forces from training for full spectrum operations. The United States Army is currently stretched to its limits. Following six years of persistent conflict the CSA recently stated, "Today's Army is out of balance."<sup>115</sup> In order to ensure it is put back into balance the 74,000 Soldier increase in personnel end strength and the full maturity of the Army Forces Generation concept in 2013 must stay on schedule. The Army cannot continue to surge forces in Iraq and simultaneously prepare for future challenges without these initiatives.

### **Areas Which Require Additional Study**

This work focused broadly on training balance in the United States Army. The work was focused on training balance in brigade combat team operations during joint campaigns overseas. A significant portion of this monograph examined the current training strategy at the National Training Center with respect to full spectrum operations. During the course of study, three additional areas which impact training balance but which are outside the scope of this monograph were identified, but not examined in detail: training in the institutional base, training balance at echelons other than brigade level, and finally, training balance with respect to the homeland security portion of full spectrum operations.

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<sup>114</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan*, 5.

<sup>115</sup> George W. Casey, Jr., "The Strength of the Nation," 21.

In their article *New Rules for New Enemies*, co-authors Nagl and Yingling identified an increased level of training balance in the institutional training base. The article states, “Somewhat belatedly, institutional training within the Army began to shift from MCO to COIN. By 2006, most branches redesigned their officer and non commissioned officer training courses to include more COIN scenarios.”<sup>116</sup> A focused examination of all Army professional military education would add value to the subject. The Army’s institutional training base is essential to preparing Soldiers for 21st century warfare. This study would offer a better understanding of the extent to which our leaders are receiving a balanced training experience in Army schools.

This study focused on brigade combat team level operations because of the Army’s emphasis on the BCTs as the centerpiece formation. Currently the Army is deploying divisions and corps in support of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army corps are operating as joint headquarters and the divisions are C2 elements for the deployed BCTs. In July of 2006, when the surge was announced the Army increased the number of BCTs deployed to Iraq. At the same time, it announced the deployment of an additional division-level headquarters. Deploying an additional division headquarters for command and control illustrates the importance of divisions in full spectrum operations. In order to ensure a more complete picture on the ability of Army formations to conduct full spectrum operations, a study of the training balance in division and corps headquarters is also required.

This monograph focused on full spectrum operations for joint campaigns overseas. The doctrine of full spectrum operations requires that the Army can also simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, and civil support missions in support of Homeland Security missions within the continental United States. The Army will not be fully balanced until it can also conduct full spectrum operations in support of homeland security missions. Given current and projected force levels, the Army will be challenged to simultaneously conduct full spectrum operations both

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<sup>116</sup> John A. Nagl and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” 2.

overseas and in the United States. Therefore, a major piece of this study should address methods of training for full spectrum operations in both joint campaigns overseas and also in support of Homeland Security missions within the United States.

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