

CHAPTER - I

THE PROLOGUE

Pak Belligerence over Kashmir since 1947:

The Indian National Congress had fought the British for the establishment of a secular democratic polity. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had demanded a division of India on the basis of religion and the two nation theory. The communal game played by Muslim League finally brought about the partition of India. A theocratic state called Pakistan was born on 14 August 1947. This new state continued to play the communal card even after partition. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, thought that his Islamic idealism would be incomplete as long as 'Muslim' Kashmir remained separated from Pakistan. Within a month of Pakistan's creation, Jinnah was discussing with Lord Ismay, his military Chief of Staff, the possibility of military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, and stating that there was no alternative but to fight it out.* An immediate military expedition against Jammu and Kashmir at that time was not considered practicable, as Pakistani forces required some time for re-organisation and consolidation. The fear of adverse international repercussions and annoyance of the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir also discouraged Pakistan. However, these factors, it was thought, could be taken care of if a covert attempt was made in Kashmir.

The Indian Independence Act itself had laid down that the princely states of the Indian subcontinent would be free to join either of the two Dominions after the lapse of the British paramountcy. The question whether these states could remain independent was left unanswered in the Act. The Government of India took the stand that it considered the states free to join either India or Pakistan, taking into account the factors of geographical contiguity, and historical, political, economic, social and other ties. Nehru held that the people of these states had the democratic de facto right to decide to join either of the two Dominions and in this the ruling prince had to go by the wishes of the people. Jinnah, on the other hand, stated that the ruling princes alone had the right to decide on the accession, and if desired, they could also opt for independence.

The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, whose boundary was co-terminus with India, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, laboured hard to maintain independence, or vacillated and

* Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, p.54.

did not yield to advice and pressure to join either India or Pakistan.

Pakistan, which had set her eyes on Jammu and Kashmir supported the right of the rulers of the Indian states to remain independent. The intention was to create complications for India as the overwhelming number of princely states existed within her territory. It was also intended to encourage the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir with a view to prevent the State's accession to India. Pakistan entered into a Standstill Agreement with Jammu and Kashmir and, under its provisions obtained the right to supply her with food-grains, petrol, salt, etc., and also to control the post and telegraph system in the State.

This suited well with Pak plan to start a war in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of frontier tribesmen supported by its armed forces in disguise. Her strategy was to fan communal trouble in Jammu and Kashmir, incite the Muslim personnel of the state army to revolt and thus cause a total breakdown of the authority. This was to pave the way for the Pak armed forces to march on to Srinagar in disguise. The whole exercise was to be played up as an uprising of the people.

This clever plan nearly succeeded(1). Communal clashes erupted in the State, and the tribal raiders, controlled and directed by Pakistan, began to attack the State territory from 3 September 1947. The intensity of the attacks increased with each passing day. With the desertions of the Muslim troops of the state army, the collapse of the state authority became a real possibility. The raiders, with full Pak support rapidly advanced towards Srinagar. Simultaneously, it effected economic blockade of the state and withheld the supply of essential commodities such as food-grains, salt, petrol, and kerosene. The shortage of petrol completely crippled the transport system in Jammu and Kashmir. With depleted ranks, disrupted supply system and almost dead communication system, the state forces could not stem the tide of the raiders, led by Pak army personnel in mufti. On the south-western border of the State, "raiders" overran several small towns like Kotli and Mirpur.

This deteriorating situation compelled the Maharaja to appeal to India for help. After the State had formally joined the Indian Union on 26 October 1947, Indian troops were sent in by air and by road. Rajauri and Jhangar were rescued from the raiders. Poonch, surrounded by the enemy from all sides, was supplied and maintained by the IAF (then known as RIAF) for nearly a whole year, till a link-up was

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effected. The raiders advancing along the Jhelum valley road reached the outskirts of Srinagar in early November but were driven back. In Kishenganga valley, Tithwal and Gurais were recaptured by the Indian troops. In the north, the raiders seized Gilgit by a coup, occupied Skardu after a long siege, and took Kargil and Dras by a surprise attack. Leh was also threatened. From the early months of 1948, regular units of the Pakistan Army were seen fighting against the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian troops, however, broke through the Zoji La by using tanks and reoccupied Dras and Kargil in November 1948.

The hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir ended with a Cease-fire at midnight on 1/2 January 1949. Cease Fire Line left the towns of Mirpur, Kotli and Muzaffarabad under the control of Pakistan, through the so-called "Azad Kashmir Government". The Haji Pir Pass connecting Uri with Poonch also remained with her. On the northern front, the enemy not only retained Gilgit and Skardu, but also some vital positions which dominated the Indian line of communication near Kargil. This left about 13,000 sq km of the State under Pak occupation.

During the Jammu and Kashmir operations the Indian Army suffered 4,255 casualties (1,103 killed and 3,152 wounded). In addition, 32 IAF personnel were killed. State forces lost about 1,990 men killed or missing. Against this, 6,000 Pakistanis were killed and some 14,000 wounded(2).

The UN Resolution, accepted by India and Pakistan, envisaged the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the entire Jammu and Kashmir State. A plebiscite was to follow to determine whether the people of the State wanted to join Pakistan or India. But Pakistan never withdrew its forces and the UN-supervised plebiscite could not be held. Consequently, the Cease Fire Line (CFL) became, an international border. Hereafter the occupation of the Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir became the driving obsession with Pakistan.

The CFL, as fixed by the United Nations, did not solve India's problem. The threat to her Jammu and Kashmir border from Pakistani infiltration did not recede. Although negotiations at the UN were going on for a year, the Indian military officers in the field did not get sufficient advance notice that the Government of India intends to accept a Cease-fire. A longer period of warning would have enabled the Indian troops to occupy tactically important positions before the Cease-fire took effect. The sudden declaration of Cease-fire put Pakistanis in an advantageous position.

They stealthily occupied a few vantage points after the Ceasefire. There were no Pakistani troops south of the Burzil Pass on 1 January 1949, but after the snow had melted, they came across the Pass and occupied the ground up to a few kilometres from Gurais. Similarly, they occupied the hill tops, overlooking Kargil town and Kargil-Leh road after the Cease-fire. If the Indian officers had received sufficient advance notice on the date and time of Cease-fire they could have prevented such encroachments.

The Cease-fire alignment left some strategically vital areas along the Cease Fire Line in enemy hand. These included the strategic Haji Pir Pass, the Kargil heights, and some positions near Chhamb. These Pak positions greatly bothered the Indian defenders in subsequent hostilities.

Cultivating USA

After the cease-fire India was all set to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. Nehru made several attempts to initiate the process, but these were nullified by Pakistan's refusal to withdraw its forces from 'Azad Kashmir', a pre-condition for the plebiscite laid down in UN Resolution. Pakistan had thus made up its mind to grab the valley by the force of arms. To this end it concluded a military alliance with USA, and joined South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organisation for the alleged containment of communism. It also agreed to the establishment of American bases in Pakistan and in return received American military aid(3). The motive behind Pak policy was to win American diplomatic and military support against India, and not the containment of communism as made out by it. India on the other hand followed a policy of non-alignment.

India interpreted these moves as a direct threat to its security. On 9 December 1953, Nehru wrote to the Pak Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali: "I do not know what the present position is in regard to the military pact of assistance between Pakistan and the USA. But responsible newspapers state that large-scale military assistance and equipment, arms and training will be given to Pakistan by the US. It is even stated (The New York Times had said so) that an army of a million men may be so trained in Pakistan..... But it is obvious that such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources, with the help of the United States of America, can only be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger...."(4). India's objections to the pact were spelled out in subsequent correspondence as well.

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President Eisenhower of USA stated that the pact was not directed against India. In a message to Nehru on 24 February 1954, he added "if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression.... If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration"(5).

India, however, maintained that American military aid to Pakistan had changed the whole complex of the Kashmir issue. Nehru declared that India must "retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in Kashmir as we may consider necessary in view of this new threat to us". But the US went on supplying weapons to Pak army.

In 1954, Washington agreed to arm Pakistan's five and a half divisions with modern weapons. It also agreed to provide squadrons of PAF with modern aircraft(6). By September 1965, Pakistan is estimated to have received from USA 100 F-86 Sabre jets, 18 F-104 Starfighters, 30 B-57 bombers, 4 C-130 transport planes and 200 Patton tanks in addition to other arms and ammunition(7).

China Factor

The ever growing threat from Pakistan forced India to concentrate her limited military resources on Indo-Pak border. Consequently, India's northern frontier with China could not receive adequate attention. Quite naturally when the Chinese launched a massive attack on 20 October 1962, on Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), the Indian army found itself unprepared to meet the challenge.

USA and UK were quick to appreciate this grave threat to India's security and ordered emergency shipment of some infantry weapons for her immediate need(8). Attempts were also made to soften Pak opposition to US military aid to India by persuading the latter to make concessions in Jammu and Kashmir. But America did not pressurise India considering that she might feel 'that the Chinese are retreating in NEFA while we are trying to take Kashmir for the Pakistanis in the West, and that Kashmir is more valuable than NEFA(9). Strong disapproval of the US coupled with the Indian military preparedness in Jammu

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and Kashmir and the limited nature of Chinese operations appear to have deterred Pak from any military adventure against India just then.

However, Pakistan put pressure on US and UK to force India to make concessions in Jammu and Kashmir in return for Pak assurance not to attack India during this crisis. On persistent US and British attempts India and Pakistan agreed to talk on "Kashmir and related matters"(10). Six meetings took place between 17 December 1962 and 16 May 1963. But the Pak claim on 220,150 sq km of the Jammu and Kashmir territory alongwith the valley, and surrender of some 6475 sq km of occupied territory to Peking as result of a provisional Sino-Pak border agreement, rendered further negotiations futile.

America and England rendered emergency military assistance worth £120 million to India during this national crisis. This included transport aircraft, spare parts, light infantry weapons, ammunition, communication, engineering, medical equipment, etc. India was permitted to purchase American equipment for modernisation and expansion of defence production facilities(11). The US also promised to establish a factory in India for the production of ammunition for small arms.

American assistance between October 1962 and September 1965 totalled about \$47 million. This was much less than what they had pledged(12). But these arms were not sufficient to cater to the defence needs of India to meet the twin threat from China and Pakistan. A five-year re-armament programme was drawn up in 1963 and the defence budget was increased by 12%. It was intended to double the Indian army in the next few years, modernise its air force and establish six new Ordnance factories.

India badly needed supersonic aircraft, but the US and UK could not be of much help in this. The Soviet Union however, agreed to give India "ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles and fulfilled its MiG delivery commitments"(13). Subsequently, under a major military agreement concluded in September 1964, the Soviet Union agreed to provide India with MiG fighters, transport aircraft, light tanks, and naval equipment on deferred payment basis. In 1964 itself, India purchased eight AN-12 Soviet transport planes for use in Ladakh area. The Soviet Union had already agreed to build a factory in India for the manufacture of supersonic MiG jets in May 1962. This was completed according to schedule.

Courting the Communists

Side by side with arms build-up, Pakistan launched a diplomatic offensive against India. The military alliances enabled her to get massive arms aid ostensibly against Communist Russia and China, but in reality against India. It also tried to establish firm relations with China and USSR and East European countries to isolate India. Attempts were also made by Pakistan to enlist the support of the Muslim countries. President Ayub even tried to wean away Nepal from India. These Pak efforts had begun much before the Chinese attack on India in 1962.

For support over the Kashmir issue, Pakistan placed great reliance on China. From 1954 to 1961, Pakistan always voted against China's entry into the UN. But privately Pak leaders assured Chou En-Lai that their country was not against China. In Bandung, in April 1955, Chou En-Lai revealed that "the Prime Minister of Pakistan told me that although Pakistan was party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China" and that "as a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties"(14). To this end Pak also entered into commercial and cultural agreements with Peking. Two Vice-Premiers of China visited Pakistan in 1956. The same year Pak Prime Minister went to China and Chou En-Lai paid a return visit to Pakistan.

Pakistan began a reappraisal of its foreign policy in 1960. While maintaining military alliance with the US, it started voting in favour of China's entry into UNO, thus demonstrating that it would not compromise its relationship with China for the sake of its alliance with the West. China appreciated this shift. Both the countries concluded a border agreement on 2 March 1963, and Pakistan gave away to China some 6,475 km of Kashmir territory in Hunza, south of the Mintaka Pass. It was believed that this border agreement contained secret military clauses also.

In February 1964, during his visit to Pakistan Chou En-Lai assured full support to Pak stand on the Kashmir issue(15). China and Pakistan came closer during the years 1964 and 1965. Their foreign ministers and high level delegations exchanged visits more frequently. It was during one of these exchanges that the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshall Ch'en Yi hinted at the Chinese military support for Pakistan without pledging it.

Pakistan also made repeated attempts to establish close relations with the USSR and other East

European countries. Relations between Pakistan and Russia grew closer, and on 4 April 1965, President Ayub and Bhutto undertook a six-day state visit to Moscow. In the final analysis, though Pakistan succeeded in establishing close relations with USSR temporarily, it could not turn Moscow against India.

Pak Military Build-up

Having set her heart on war Pakistan concentrated on the expansion and modernisation of her armed forces. America had already agreed to modernise five and a half divisions of its army with modern weapons(16). The US military aid to Pakistan from 1954 to 1962 amounted to \$100,000,000. In addition to this, Pakistan also set apart a substantial amount of its budget for the military build-up. Its defence budget which was \$207,750,000 in 1961-62 increased to \$210,000,000 in 1962-63 to \$240,000,000 in 1963-64, to \$269,000,000 in 1964-65 and to \$289,000,000 in 1965-66(17).

Similarly, there was a massive increase in her armed forces. In the year 1961, it was estimated to be 182,700, out of which the Army accounted for 160,000, Navy 7,700 and Air Force 15,000. In October 1962, there was a quantum jump in the strength of the Pak army from 160,000 to 230,000, while no significant expansion of the Navy and the Air Force appears to have taken place. The Pak army was organised in 8 Divisions on triangular basis and was equipped with Patton tanks. In addition, there were 250,000 lightly armed militia and about 30,000 'Azad Kashmir' troops. The following years were devoted to provide the army with the latest sophisticated weapons and equipment to increase its striking power manifold.

In October 1964, there was a big increase in the strength of the Pak Air Force. The number of personnel went up from 15,000 to 17,000-25,000 and aircraft to about 200. The aircraft included 30 B-57 Canberras in two squadrons, - one F-104A Starfighter squadron (a second was to be formed) and four F-86 F Sabre squadrons. No role was envisaged for the navy in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, and as such its strength remained at 7,700 even in 1964. The Pak navy had 1 Light cruiser (Cadet training ship), 5 destroyers, 2 ASW frigates, 8 Minesweepers and 10 other ships. An examination of the ratio of Pakistan's male labour force in its armed forces reveals that it increased from 7% in 1961 to 10% in 1964, an increase of slightly less than 50%(18). In other words, one out of every hundred male population in the age group 15-64 was in the armed forces. This excluded lightly armed militia, 'Azad Kashmir' troops, etc., whose number exceeded the regular armed forces of Pakistan. The same trend is evident in her defence

expenditure. In the years 1963 and 1964, Pakistan spent 3.2% and 3.1% respectively of her GNP on defence, but in the year 1965, it was doubled to 6% of the GNP.

India's expenditure on defence always remained low. Even after the 1962 Chinese attack the Indian defence allocation was not sufficiently raised to make up for the lost years. It amounted to 3.7%, 3.5% and 3.7% of the GNP in the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 respectively. During the same period, Burma spent 6.5%, 6.6% and 6.7% and China 7.3%, 7.8% and 7.5% of her GNP on defence(19). The urgent need for economic development forced India to cut on defence expenditure.

Fishing in Troubled waters

After the Chinese attack on India in 1962, USA and Britain extended some arms aid to India. This was vehemently opposed by Pakistan. On 8 July 1963, Ayub told the Western nations that their policy of building the armed strength of India "will force smaller Asian nations to seek refuge from India under Chinese shelter"(20). President Ayub, during his visit to China in March 1965, emphasised in several speeches 'friendship' and 'peaceful' aspirations of China. These Pak outbursts against the US and UK were the result of her failure to force them to link the arms assistance to the solution of Kashmir problem, indeed, to the satisfaction of Pakistan. Pakistan viewed Chinese attack on India as a great opportunity to get concessions(21).

Thus Pakistan had waged a political and diplomatic war of nerves against India, and with its inflammable initiative "generally maintained the offensive, seeking to exert pressure on India by every means"(22). On 11 January 1965, Pak Communication Minister, Khan A. Sabur declared that the government would soon "find out all possible avenues to liberate the Muslims of 'occupied Kashmir'". On the same day a tribal leader Malik Spain Gul boasted that he would lead 25,00,000 tribesmen trained in guerilla warfare to Kashmir to "liberate the state from Indian occupation". On 7 March 1965, POK President Abdul Hamid Khan threatened to 'liberate the Indian held territory' of Kashmir. Between 25 March and 31 March 1965, 64 violations were committed by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.

India expressed concern over the massive arms supply to Pakistan, especially the heavy armour and supersonic aircraft. The arrival of even relatively slow F-86 Sabre jet fighters in Pakistan had disturbed India. Subsequently, when more advanced F-104A star fighters were supplied to Pakistan the threat became more formidable. These developments forced India to take counter measures. The Soviet arms assistance and

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offer to build a factory to produce MiG fighters was gratefully accepted. India also tapped its own resources to re-organise and modernise its armed forces and to manufacture arms and ammunition within the country. Expansion of the armed forces was also undertaken to meet the dual threat from Pakistan and China.

As a result of rearmament programmes the Comparative Military Strength(Approximate) of India and Pakistan on 1 September 1965 was as follows:

	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>India</u>
A. Population	98,570,000*	470,000,000*
B. <u>Defence Budget</u> (1964-65)	\$269,000,000*	\$970,000,000*
C. Army Strength	260,000 (including 30,000 "Azad Kashmir" troops manning one Infantry Division)	700,000 (excluding civilians, non- combatants, Nursing personnel & boys(23)

Infantry

7 Inf Divisions. Also 250,000 lightly armed militia.

9 Inf Divisions(of these 4 were on a reduced establishment) and 11 Mtn Divisions (most of them newly raised and some of them understrength and not fully equipped).

Armour

Two Armd Divisions (one of them was allegedly 1/3 of normal strength) manned out of the following:-

9 Regts - Patton
5 Regts - Sherman
3 Regts - Chaffee

Total No. of Tanks = 765

One Armd Div(with only one Armd Bde), one Indep Armd Bde and 5 Indep Armd Sqns(24), comprising the following(25):-

4 Regts - Centurion
8 Regts - Sherman
2 Regts - AMX-13
2 Regts - PT-76

Total No. of Tanks=720

* The Military Balance, 1964-65, IISS, London. The figures pertain to October 1964. Population of Pakistan was 101,000,000 in November 1965.

Artillery(26)

4 Fd Regts (SP)-25 pdr guns (SP) 105 mm How (SP)	25 Mtn Regts - 3.7" How/ 76 mm guns
25 Fd Regts-25 pdr/105 mm guns/ 105 mm How	41 Fd Regts } 25 pdr
10 Med Regts-5.5" guns/155 mm How	2 Para Fd" } 100 mm guns
1 Hy Regt - 155 mm guns/8" How	10 Med Regts - 5.5"/130 mm guns
8 Mor Regts - 120 mm Mors(27)	1 Hy Regt - 7.2" guns
3 LAA Regts(SP) - 32x40 mm Single guns 32x.50" guns in Quads	19 Lt Regts - 120 mm Nitars
	21 AD Regts - L 60 (towed) Bofor guns. A few L 70 guns also(28).

Naval Strength

	<u>Pakistan(29)</u>
Naval Personnel	- 8,000
Submarine	- 1
Light Cruiser	- 1
Destroyers	- 5
ASW Frigates	- 2
Minesweepers	- 8
Other Ships	- 12
Coast Guard Force	- 1,500
Naval aircraft included Albatross and some UH-19 helicopters.	

Naval Strength

	<u>India(30)</u>
Naval Personnel	- 17,000
Aircraft Carrier	- 1
Cruisers	- 2
Destroyers	- 6
ASW Frigates	- 5
AA Frigates	- 3
Minesweepers	- 6
Other Ships	- 25
Coast Guard	- Nil
Naval aircraft included 24 Sea Hawk strike interceptors and 15 Alize ASW aircraft.	

Air Force Strength

	<u>Pakistan</u>		<u>India</u>
Personnel	- 25,000	Personnel	- 63,000
Aircraft	- 260	Aircraft	- about 700
2 Bomber Sqns - B-57		4 Bomber Sqns	- Canberra
9 Fighter Sqns - one F-104 Starfighter Sqn and eight F-86 Sabre Sqns.		26 Fighter Sqns:	
1 Recce Sqn of high flying RB-57		Gnat - 5 Sqns	
2 Training/Tactical recce sqns		MiG-21 - 7 aircraft only	
1 Maritime recce and sea air rescue sqn of helicopters and amphibian SA-16 planes		Hunter - 6 Sqns	
2 Transport Sqns - one C-130 Hercules Sqn and one Bristol Sqn		Mystere - 5 Sqns	
		Vampire - 6 Sqns	
		Ouragon - 3 Sqns	
		13 Transport Sqns:	
		Dakota - 3 Sqns	
		Packet - 3 Sqns	
		AN-12 - 2 Sqns	
		Caribou - 1 Sqn	
		IL-14 - 1 Sqn	
		Otter - 2 Sqns	
		Super Constallation - 1 Sqn	
		5 Helicopter Sqns:	
		Mi-4 - 4 Units	
		Alouette - 1 Unit	

The comparative chart shows that Pakistan had a definite edge over India in terms of number and quality of tanks and their equipment, especially in medium tanks. Although the Patton and Centurion each weighed about 45 tons, the American Patton tank was faster and better equipped. The Patton tank had almost a "two-to-one range of gunfire, more manoeuvrability and a capacity, through infra red equipment, to operate at night, which Indian tanks lacked(31). Considered highly suitable for offensive operations, Pattons were much better than the Centurions of older vintage. By 1965, the Indian Sherman and Stuart tanks of World War II vintage had become even more outdated than the Centurions. Of the other tanks held by the Indians, the PT-76 and AMX-13 were light, and hence ineffective in offensive operations against Pattons or Shermans.

While Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division had 3 "combat commands", containing a mix of tank regiments and mechanised battalions, carried in modern tracked amphibious APCs, the lone Indian armoured division had only one armoured brigade and an infantry brigade carried in 3 Ton lorries. Again, while Pakistan had 17 armoured regiments, India had only 16 tank regiments, out of which only 14 were used during the operations in 1965. One was under conversion. Each Pakistani medium armoured regiment carried 44 tanks, and each Reconnaissance Troop 6 RCL guns. Each Pakistani Light Armoured Regiment carried 32 Light Tanks and 28 ACPS (M-113), which served as command vehicles and also as carriers for rifle troops.

India had only 4 regiments of Centurions against 9 regiments of Pak Pattons. Other Indian tanks - Sherman, AMX-13 and PT-76 were much inferior to Pak tanks. While 5 regiments of Sherman, held by India, were too old and mechanically unreliable, one of the two Indian PT-76 regiments was not yet trained on the new equipment, and hence the Indian generals were cautious in using them during 1965 Operations. The Indian armour relied on an out-dated communication system. Whereas Pak side carried an advanced type (ANGRC series) or radio equipment, which enhanced the Pakistani command and control capability. Pak mechanised infantry carried in amphibious M-113 APCs, closely followed their armour in battle and gave close support with the additional fire-power from a 50" machine-gun fitted on each APC(32). Moreover, unlike the Pakistani armoured formations, the Indian Armoured Division had no medium self-propelled artillery or advanced type of anti-aircraft guns, and hence lacked flexibility and adequate hitting power.

Although, India had more artillery pieces, Pakistani artillery was equipped with the latest American weapons, and its anti-tank fire-power was double than that of India. While there was one Medium artillery regiment, mounted on modern self-propelled armoured mountings, in each Pak armoured division, there was none in the lone Indian armoured division. Again, the Indian LAA regiment was towed, but its counterpart in the Pak Army was self-propelled, providing for more mobility and flexibility. The Indian field, medium, heavy and LAA regiments were respectively equipped with 25 pounder, 5.5", 7.2", and 40 mm guns of World War II vintage, whereas the Pak artillery was equipped with much superior and modern American guns - 105 mm guns for field regiments and 155mm howitzers for medium regiments.

Although in numerical strength, the Indian infantry appeared to be larger than Pakistan's,

in effective strength both were more or less equal. While most of the Indian Mountain Divisions were positioned along the northern borders with China on the Pak side, only one of her seven Infantry Divisions was located in East Pakistan. Thus Pak Army strength of 6 infantry divisions and two armoured divisions on West Pakistan border was not inferior to that of India, which had 9 Infantry Divisions (4 under-strength) and about 3 armoured brigades there.

Pak Air Force was smaller in size as compared to that of India. But it was more modern. Moreover, Pakistan had US-built NATO-standard modern air bases, as also a micro-wave communication network linking these bases. Early warning radar sets covering the Indo-Pak border had been installed at Peshawar, Multan, Sargodha and Badin. Pak Starfighters, equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, were more powerful than newly acquired Indian MiG 21s. All these factors neutralised the numerical superiority of the Indian Air Force.

Both India and Pakistan had limited naval strength. In September 1965 conflict, except an inconsequential Pak bombardment of Dwarka, no naval activity took place.

Thus in several crucial items, Pakistan enjoyed qualitative superiority over India. In numerical strength, the two sides were roughly equal.

It would appear that by joining SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had acquired superior arms from the USA. She had simultaneously made friends with her former "Communist enemies". Pak rulers always talked that Kashmir would have to be taken by force of arms. India was left weak after the Chinese attack, and its rearmament programme was in an incomplete state. For Pakistan the fateful hour seemed to have arrived.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The full story is related in the official History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-48.
2. History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-48, p.379.
3. Lamb, Alastair, p.84.
4. Ibid., p.86.
5. Brines, pp.128-129.
6. Hussain, S.S., and Qureshi, Sqn Ldr, M.T., pp.99-103.
7. Lamb, Alastair, p.124 (Footnote).
8. Brines, p.264.
9. Ibid., p.514. A less charitable but may be more honest, view is that, Pakistan's friends tried to take the opportunity to coerce India to give Kashmir to Pakistan but a gravely weakened India and a victorious China was not conducive to US security in 1962.
10. Galbraith, John Kenneth, pp.501.
11. Ibid., p.581.
12. Brines, p.265.
13. Mohan, Ram, p.154.
14. Strategic Digest, July 1987, published by IDSA, New Delhi, p.1296.
15. Brines, p. 212.
16. Ibid., p.277.
17. The Military Balance 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, pp.21,22,25 & 26 respectively.
18. The Military Balance, 1961-62, p.21 and 1964-65, p.26.
19. Raju, p.5. These figures pertain to the calendar years.
20. Asian Recorder, 1963, p.53,61.
21. Galbraith, John Kenneth, p.475.
22. Brines, p.252.
23. From Official Records.
24. Singh, B., p.22.
25. From Official Records.
26. One Arty Regiment = 18 guns generally.
27. Singh, B., p.28; Gen Musa, pp.15-16.
28. While there were 64 guns in each Pak LAA regiment, an Indian LAA regiment had only 32 guns. Singh, B., p.28.
29. The Military Balance, IISS, London, 1964-65 and 1965-66.
30. Compiled from Official Records.

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