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**EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE:
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MALAYA AND INDIA**

by

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December 2010

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**EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE:
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MALAYA AND INDIA**

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ABSTRACT

The Maoist insurgency in India, also called Naxalism, has become a threat to internal security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces and civilians. With the increased numbers of cadres, improved weaponry, and guerilla tactics, the Maoists' challenge to the state stretches across 16 of India's 28 states, affecting its economic growth. Despite efforts by India's state and central governments, counterinsurgency against Naxalism has failed in majority of affected areas. With an aim of finding a model that could lead to success in countering the Maoist insurgency, this thesis seeks to explain counterinsurgency success and failure, using cross-national and sub-national comparisons. At the national level, the successful Malayan counterinsurgency approach by the British is juxtaposed against the largely failed attempts by the Indian central authorities to control Naxalism. The thesis finds that success is explained by a combination of enemy-centric and population-centric approaches whereas failure is explained by lack of balance between the two. At the state level within India, a comparison between the successful case of Andhra Pradesh and the failed case of Chhattisgarh reveals a similar pattern. Specifically, enemy-centric measures based on reliable intelligence, a capable force, and a unified command followed by population-centric aspects of winning hearts and minds, lead to success in countering insurgencies.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AICCCR	-	All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries
BSF	-	Border Security Force
CCS	-	Cabinet Committee on Security
CoBRA	-	Companies of Commando Battalion for Resolute Action
COIN	-	Counterinsurgency
CPI(M)	-	Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPI(ML)	-	Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
CPN	-	Communist Party of Nepal
CRPF	-	Central Reserve Police force
IED	-	Improvised Explosive Device
INC	-	Indian National Congress
ITBP	-	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
J&K	-	Jammu and Kashmir
MCC	-	Maoist Communist Centre (in state of Bihar)
MCP	-	Malayan Communist Party
MHA	-	Ministry of Home Affairs
MISA	-	Maintenance of Internal Security Act
MLA	-	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	-	Madhya Pradesh (State in India)
MPAJA	-	Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army
MRLA	-	Malayan Races Liberation Army
NALCO	-	National Aluminium Company
NMD	-	Naxal Management Division
NMDC	-	National Mineral Development Corporation
PCPA	-	People's Committee against Police Atrocities
PESA	-	Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Area
PLGA	-	Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army
PWG	-	Peoples War Group

SAG	-	Special Action Group
SEZ	-	Special Economic Zone
TDP	-	Telugu Desam Party (political party in AP)
UPA	-	United Progressive Alliance
WB	-	West Bengal (State in India)

LIST OF TERMINOLOGY USED

<i>Adivasi</i>	The term Adivasi literally means a tribal or a jungle dweller. These people have for centuries lived in the forests by living off the land.
<i>Bal Mandal</i>	Children's organization of the Maoists
<i>Chetna Natya Mandal</i>	Motivation through Drama and dance Organization of the Maoists
<i>Dalam</i>	The term refers to the armed outfits of the Maoists who train and indulge in armed activities including bomb blasts
<i>Dalit</i>	Dalit is a term used for a lowest caste people in India who generally remain outside the traditional society and regarded as unsuitable for making personal relationships
<i>Deshbrati</i>	Country's movement in Bengali
<i>Jan Adalat</i>	Peoples Court.
<i>Jan Jagran Abhiyan</i>	Peoples Awakening Campaign
<i>Janata Sarkar</i>	People's Government
<i>Jotedar</i>	Rich farmers under <i>Zamindars</i> who rent land for cultivation.
<i>Lokyudh</i>	Peoples War
<i>Mahila Mandal</i>	Women's organization of Maoists for inspiring women to join
<i>Maoist</i>	The generic term Maoist will refer to Indian Maoist insurgents and may be used interchangeably with the term Naxalite.
<i>Naxalism</i>	Maoist rebellion in India is also called Naxalism because of its origins in village of Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal in 1967.
<i>Panchayat</i>	A village court
<i>Sadbhavna</i>	Good will
<i>Salwa Judam</i>	Vigilante groups from amongst the local villagers who function with the support of the Chhattisgarh state government agencies.
<i>Sangham</i>	Hard core over ground cadres of the Maoists primarily tribal people.
<i>Tehsil</i>	District
<i>Zamindar</i>	Landlord

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Why do some counterinsurgency efforts succeed, whereas others fail? This thesis seeks to answer this question through a comparative analysis of the Indian and Malayan counterinsurgencies, drawing comparisons across time, across country, and, within, India, across states. The thesis seeks to understand two specific approaches: the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches and finds that a combination of enemy-centric aspects which are based on reliable intelligence and working through a unified command followed by the population-centric winning of hearts and minds may be the best strategy.

India's Maoist movement, which started in 1967 in the village of Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal as a peasant uprising against social and economic grievances, was crushed by the state in early 1970s. However, the movement emerged again in the 1980s and has grown since.¹ In the present decade, this Maoist movement also referred to as the Naxalite movement has taken a sinister form: the left-wing extremists have organized with poor peasants and tribal communities living in isolated pockets in rural areas and forests to form a violent insurgency.² Currently, the Maoist insurgency reaches a large geographical area in the southern and eastern parts of the country, affecting over 16 of 28 Indian states to different degrees. In states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, and Orissa, insurgents exercise high levels of violence and control significant territory.³ In

¹ Debal Singharoy, *Peasant Movement in Post colonial India: Dynamics of mobilization and Identity* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 232.

² Tribals also locally called as Adivasi is an umbrella term for a heterogeneous set of ethnic and tribal groups believed to be the aboriginal population of India. They comprise a substantial indigenous minority of the population of India. Adivasi societies are particularly present in the Indian states of Kerala, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Mizoram, other north-eastern states, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

³ Alpa Shah, "Markets of Protection: The Terrorist Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India," *Critique of Anthropology* 26, no. 3 (September 2006): 297.

2009, Maoist sympathizers started operating in many major urban areas of the country, for instance in cities like Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Goa.⁴

Since 2000, the Indian national and state governments have devoted sizable resources to countering the Maoists by financing socio-economic development and employing large reserve police forces to restore law and order in the Maoist areas. In 2009, the Indian government further intensified its anti-Maoist operations. Despite these efforts, the problem of the Maoist insurgency has grown in membership and in terms of frequency of attacks. India's counterinsurgency strategy looks particularly ineffective when compared with the case of Malaya in the 1950s, in which the British successfully eliminated a Maoist insurgency. Interestingly, the Indian ineffectiveness is comparable to the British government's failure to contain that same Maoist insurgency in the initial period from 1948 to 1950.

In addition to this cross national and across-time variation of the Indian and Malayan cases, we also observe an interesting across-state variation within India. While the state of Andhra Pradesh in the southeastern part of India has seen success in fighting the insurgency, the neighboring Chhattisgarh has failed similar objectives. This research therefore seeks to answer the following questions: Why have Indian counterinsurgency efforts failed overall, whereas the British efforts in Malaya succeeded? Why did the British efforts during 1950s succeed whereas prior efforts had failed? Within India, what explains the success of the counterinsurgency in Andhra Pradesh? The thesis findings have implications for how Indian policymakers should proceed in its counterinsurgency strategy.

⁴ Pranab Dhal Samantha, "Maoists feel the heat, seek new hideouts in urban jungles," *Indian Express*, March 8, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/maoists-feel-the-heat-seek-new-hideouts-in/588141>.

B. IMPORTANCE OF A COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS

The significance of dealing with the violent Maoist insurgency in India cannot be overemphasized. The insurgency has grown sharply since 2004 when the Maoist Communist Party of India, CPI (Maoist), an extremist outfit, was formed. In order to effectively address the Maoist challenge, it is critical to identify the factors that explain these failures.

Over the years, the Maoists have enhanced their lethal capabilities by improvising their weaponry and tactics.⁵ Some experts believe that the Naxalite groups maintain links with left-wing foreign insurgent groups such as the Maoist extremists from Nepal and members of the erstwhile Liberation Tigers for Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, especially for arms training and procuring of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).⁶ To widen the insurgency's arc of influence and to systematically centralize control, a number of splinter groups combined to form the CPI (Maoist) in 2004.⁷ The increase of violence since 2004 caused the Indian government to ban the CPI (Maoist) in 2009 labeling it a terrorist organization.⁸

There is evidence that the Maoist insurgency has grown sufficiently powerful and is even challenging the legitimacy of the Indian state.⁹ By some estimates, the Maoists reach about 40 percent of the geographical area of India, and in 2006, the Indian Prime Minister; Mr. Manmohan Singh called the Maoist insurgency "the single biggest internal security threat facing the country."¹⁰ In some insurgency areas, such as some parts of

⁵ P.V. Ramana, "The Maoist Movement in India," *Defense and Security Analysis* 22, no. 4 (December 2006): 435.

⁶ Pratul Ahuja and Rajat Ganguly, "The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18, no. 2 (June 2007): 250.

⁷ P.V. Ramana, *The Naxal Challenge* (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley Private Limited Press, 2008), 164.

⁸ Vinay Kumar, "Centre Bans CPI (Maoist)," *The Hindu*, June 23, 2009, <http://www.hindu.com/2009/06/23/stories/2009062358320100.htm> (accessed November 23, 2010).

⁹ Ahuja and Ganguly, "The Fire Within," 249.

¹⁰ Text of Speech by Indian Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh for the second Meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers about Naxalism on April 13, 2006, on the Government of India Press Information Bureau, http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128 (accessed April 10, 2010).

Chhattisgarh, the Maoists have replaced the state government by running a parallel government of their own.¹¹ These illegal governments further alienated the locals from the state agencies.

Furthermore, the Maoist violence interferes with the government's limited development efforts in India's poorest, least developed regions. The state's slow efforts in fact, have created an environment in which the Maoists are able to convince people of their ideology. Most of the Maoist-affected areas are in difficult terrain like forests and rural villages with hardly any road connectivity.¹² Some of these areas are inhabited mainly by the tribal communities and poor peasants. In addition, health challenges are also present, due to lack of hospitals and primary health services. Such areas are the breeding grounds for epidemics and diseases like malaria and cholera, especially during the rainy season.¹³

In this setting, Maoist violence interferes with state projects such as construction of schools and hospitals, building roads, and special economic zones for promoting trade.¹⁴ At present, the Maoists control much of the existing minimal infrastructure in the affected areas, in cases such as Chhattisgarh.¹⁵ In contrast to the Maoists' general success in maintaining an ongoing presence and power in Chhattisgarh, in Andhra Pradesh,

¹¹ Maoists have organized parallel governments in the insurgent zones and their activities include taxing the population for protection from landlords and the security forces and giving judicial verdicts to resolve pending cases.

¹² Maoists primarily occupy the geographical regions of eastern and southeastern part of India, which have a large area under forest cover. In these areas, the tribal people live in forests while the rural peasants live mostly in the adjoining remote villages.

¹³ Kristin Elisabeth Solberg, "Health Crisis amid the Maoist Insurgency in India," *The Lancet* 371, no. 9621 (April 2008): 1323.

¹⁴ A Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is a geographical region that has economic laws that are more liberal than a country's typical economic laws. The category 'SEZ' covers a broad range of more specific zone types, including Free Trade Zones (FTZ), Export Processing Zones (EPZ), Free Zones (FZ), Industrial Estates (IE), Free Ports, Urban Enterprise Zones and others. Usually the goal of a structure is to increase foreign direct investment by foreign investors, typically an international business or a multinational corporation (MNC).

¹⁵ John Lancaster, "India's Ragtag Band of Maoists Takes Root among Rural Poor," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 2006, A 1; For examples of disrupted schooling see, Human Rights Watch Report, Sheppard Bede, "Sabotaged schooling : Naxalite attacks and police occupation of Schools in India's Bihar and Jharkhand states," December 2009.

Maoists find it difficult to pursue their objectives. The state has not only pushed out the insurgents, but it also provided basic amenities to the villages that were earlier under Maoist control.¹⁶

The Maoist insurgency interferes with the expansion of state services to India's poor regions, but as these regions are also rich in mineral resources, violence has interfered with India's major mineral export industry.¹⁷ Industrial investments in these mineral belts have slowed due to lack of security, affecting access to rich supplies of coal, bauxite, and iron. For example, Chhattisgarh's mining business is deteriorating due to extortion and fear as is the case across most of the mineral belt. More broadly, the mining companies are reluctant to enter the region until security conditions improve. A number of Maoist training camps are known to be operating in the forests of Chhattisgarh, while in Andhra Pradesh the Maoist strongholds have been successfully cleared by the state, and business conditions are better.¹⁸

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature relevant for this project includes scholarly work on the Maoist insurgency in India, theories of counterinsurgency, Indian strategic community viewpoints, Indian government's strategy, British government's strategy in Malaya, and the strategies followed by Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

Some works on Naxalism are written by the movement's sympathizers or even the Maoist revolutionaries themselves.¹⁹ The literature covers the left-wing communist ideology of Maoism, which supports a popular revolution from bottom up, through armed

¹⁶ Saroj Giri, "The Maoist Problem and the Democratic Left in India," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 39, no. 3 (August 2009): 463.

¹⁷ Ajit Kumar Singh, "India: Maoists Targeting Economy," *Eurasia Review News and Analysis*, June 28, 2010, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/4011>(accessed November 24, 2010).

¹⁸ Sujeet Kumar, "Troops closing in on Maoist training zone: Chhattisgarh minister," *Indo-Asian News Service*, December 02, 2006, <http://www.india-forums.com/news/naxal/11616-.htm>(accessed November 24, 2010).

¹⁹ For examples of literature by Maoist sympathizers see illustrations in: Biplab Dasgupta, *The Naxalite Movement* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974); Sumanta Banerjee, *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising* (London: Zed Books, 1984).

rebellion.²⁰ The literature brings out the basic grievances as social, economic, and political issues.²¹ These grievances include social exploitation, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of economic gain, lack of representation, lack of judicial reforms, lack of land reforms and the caste related grievances from a minority that has felt oppressed.²² According to George Kunnath, the lack of social and economic development coupled with the lack of governance in the rural and tribal regions over a period of four decades has allowed the revolutionary communists to take advantage and grow the Maoist insurgency in India.²³

Research on the counterinsurgency against the Maoists is extensive but does not fully explain the variations in outcomes of counterinsurgency in Malaya across time, between overall India's failure and Malaya's success and between Andhra Pradesh's success and failure of Chhattisgarh. This is because, the studies have primarily focused on factors explaining success part of counterinsurgency and have applied these models to failed insurgencies without analyzing the causes of failure. For instance, the population-centric, control approach by isolating the population was undertaken in Chhattisgarh, following largely from the British successful model of population control and isolation in Malaya, however in Chhattisgarh, it was a complete failure.²⁴ Hence, this study has focused on to those variables, whose presence explains success, and their absence explains the failure.

In the literature on counterinsurgency, there are two main types of theories for explaining success and failure. Population-centric theories focus on recovering and maintaining the support of the population. According to this approach, limited military action in the form of combat operations would be required but it is not the main focus.

²⁰ Rabindra Ray, *The Naxalite and Their Ideology* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 137.

²¹ Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Insurgency," *American Political Science Review*. 81, no. 2 (June 1987): 425–452.

²² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.

²³ George J Kunnath, "Becoming a Naxalite in Rural Bihar: Class struggle and its Contradictions," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 2006): 89.

²⁴ Praveen Swami, "For a Review of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *The Hindu*, April 13, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article395529.ece>(accessed December 02, 2010).

Instead, this approach focuses on improving the government's relationship with and support among the population. In particular, it emphasizes protecting the population and carrying out activities, such as building roads and schools to win the hearts and minds of the people, thereby strengthening the government's legitimacy. This theory can be summarized as "first protect and support the population, and all else will follow."²⁵

There are many proponents of the population-centric approach. French military officer, David Galula, a renowned counterinsurgency (COIN) strategist, is a scholar who points out the importance of this type of strategy. According to Galula, the government must work with the population and play to its strengths in terms of ability to progress projects that will win hearts. He observes that while the population is static and relatively easy to access in their homes or villages, the insurgents are more difficult to find and identify when they merge with the population.²⁶ Therefore, it is better to focus on the population. Galula gained these insights based on his own experiences in fighting insurgency in Algeria and also on his extensive studies of insurgencies in China and Indochina. Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson, a British military officer and COIN expert with experience in Burma, Malaya, and Vietnam wrote about the utility of population-centric COIN.²⁷

In the Indian strategic thinking community, there are two groups, the "development" group and the "law and order" group.²⁸ The development group, having a more population-centric approach, views Naxalism as fundamentally the result of poverty and political disenfranchisement, which is causing an armed rebellion. The development group views lack of basic amenities and development as the reasons for the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy. Represented by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and the

²⁵ U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt> (accessed May 23, 2010).

²⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International Press, 2006), 58.

²⁷ Vance Klosinski, "Population and Resource Control Measures: A Conceptual framework for understanding and Implementation," (Master's thesis in Defense Analysis Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 3-4.

²⁸ Joint Workshop by IDSA and PRIO, "Frameworks of Conflict Management," January 7-11, 2008, <http://www.idsa.in/node/475>(accessed November 23, 2010).

Asian Center for Human Rights, and think tanks such as the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, this camp takes a far more holistic attitude toward the most desirable means of combating Naxal violence.²⁹ Stressing the need for poverty reduction, land reform, and better local governance, adherents to this line of reasoning reject government-sponsored violence as a solution to the Naxalite problem except in the most extreme circumstances, when armed confrontation is inevitable. According to a noted strategist P. V. Ramana, “If the military option were effective, then the problem should not have resurfaced after the initial Naxalbari uprising was suppressed.”³⁰ Indeed, this group views overly aggressive action on the part of security forces as one of the contributing causes of further radicalization in the countryside.

In contrast to the population-centric group of counterinsurgency theories, the enemy-centric theory focuses primarily on combating the insurgents and seeking to eliminate their organizations. The theory emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities, such as “winning hearts and minds,” as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach.³¹ The approach is about targeting the enemy’s fighting capability and can be summarized as “first defeat the enemy and all else will follow.”³²

Particularly in political circles, there are fewer proponents for the enemy-centric approach, as compared to the population-centric approach primarily because the former involves use of military force which may at times lead to the deaths of many civilians. Though academics have not supported the enemy-centric approach, active-duty and retired military officers have written extensively on how the approach might prove successful. For instance, Colonel C.E. Callwell, a veteran of many of the insurgencies,

²⁹ For examples, see: Special Report by Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “Left Extremism in India: Naxal Movement in Chhattisgarh & Orissa,” June 25, 2006, <http://pdftohtml.ganjalinux.org/pdf> (accessed May 12, 2010).

³⁰ P.V. Ramana, “Naxalism and Internal Security in India,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Seminar, August 4, 2007, <http://www.ipcs.org/newIpcsSeminars> (accessed April 25, 2010).

³¹ Variants include soft versus hard, direct versus indirect, violent versus non-violent, outside-in versus inside-out and decapitation versus marginalization.

³² Text material from U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt/> (accessed May 23, 2010).

has prescribed an enemy-centric approach for defeating insurgencies. He has argued that the best way to wage war against the “irregulars” is by conducting a “counterstrokes” strategy, executed by highly mobile columns of soldiers that endeavor to hunt down and kill or wound the insurgents. His successful examples include the French in Algeria in 1841, the U.S. struggle against the western Indian tribes, and the British in South Africa during the Second Boer War.³³

In the Indian strategic thinking community, we see the enemy-centric approach among the “law and order” group, which considers the Naxalite problem as primarily a policing and security issue and prefers a limited enemy-centric approach, using strict policing measures by the state police forces and additional central police forces if necessary. The main proponents of this point of view are security analysts and researchers like K.P.S. Gill, the police inspector general who successfully led the fight against the Punjab insurgency in early 1990s.³⁴ Other proponents include Ajay Sahni, a noted security analyst and others associated with India-based think tanks like the Institute for Conflict Management.³⁵ While acknowledging socio-economic marginalization as a factor, these experts view the lack of effective state and municipal policing and poor coordination between municipal, state, and national police forces as being the main reasons for the failure of counterinsurgency strategy. Citing numerous failed efforts at peace talks with the Maoists, this group advocates strongly for the active suppression of Naxalism.

However, neither the population-centric nor enemy-centric approaches can alone fully explain counterinsurgency success or failure as I will show here. Instead, the cases suggest that depending on the type and capability of the insurgency, it is a combination of the two approaches that succeeds. The population-centric approach has proven effective in fighting insurgencies that are based on population grievances and are in their early

³³ C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices* (Lincoln; University of Nebraska press, 1986), 128–137.

³⁴ K.P.S. Gill, “Imperatives of Justice,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, April 30, 2005, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/governance/> (accessed April 17, 2010).

³⁵ Ajai Sahni, “The Angry Men of Mao,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, February 4, 2006, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/dailynews&analysis> (accessed April 22, 2010).

stages of insurgency when the insurgent resource networks are not well-established. However, this approach falls short of dealing successfully with a full-blown insurgency, which has predominantly taken to violence and terror as its tactics and has wide spread resource networks.

According to “U.S. Counterinsurgency Guide 2009,” an enemy-centric approach may work where the insurgents are well-organized and have established networks to sustain themselves.³⁶ In such cases, the insurgents generally develop the capability to fight security forces. For instance, one successful case was the Tamil Eelam insurgency in Sri Lanka, which was successfully eliminated by the Sri Lankan military using primarily an enemy-centric approach.³⁷ In short, as suggested in the following descriptions of the Indian, Malayan, Andhra Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh cases, success depends on a primary approach with elements of the other approach to complement it.

The Indian government’s approach of countering the Maoist insurgency since 2000 has been a two-pronged approach. First, to gain the support of the local population using socio-economic developmental projects at the state level Second, to simultaneously use police forces in large numbers to recapture territory from the insurgents and enforce policing measures. Since 2004, the violence by the Maoists has substantially increased. Since 2009, the Indian central government is providing additional reserve police forces and funds to tackle the insurgency. The analysis of literature highlights the lack of intelligence, capability and training of the police forces in fighting the entrenched Maoists in the jungles, which has resulted in large number of casualties. There are also issues of lack of coordination among the state and central agencies especially in the field of intelligence. The strategy so far is unsuccessful.³⁸

³⁶ U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, “Counterinsurgency Guide,” January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt> (accessed December 3, 2010).

³⁷ Bernard Finel, “A Substitute for Victory: Adopting a New Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 08, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66189> (accessed November 25, 2010).

³⁸ Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s anti-Maoist strategy under fire,” *Asia Times*, May 26, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/Indias-anti-Maoist-strategy-under-fire.html (accessed October 22, 2010).

The successful British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya in the 1950s are used as a guide in formulating counterinsurgency doctrine against the Maoist-type of insurgency in India as per Praveen Swami, a noted analyst.³⁹ The nomenclature of population-centric and enemy-centric approaches was not yet coined when this insurgency was fought in Malaya, but if we apply the two concepts, then we can conclude that the British government pursued a combination of the two approaches which led to the overall success of the counterinsurgency operations. Initially, the British used an enemy-centric approach without a unified command and reliable intelligence which failed. Then a modified enemy-centric approach led by intelligence under a unified command coupled with a population-centric, resource and population control approach was used which eventually succeeded in Malaya.

Within the affected states in India, the state of Andhra Pradesh presents a considerable success case in dealing with the Maoist insurgency. The state had primarily used the enemy-centric approach followed by population related development efforts. The counterinsurgency operations in the state, which lasted for over ten years, were largely successful, leading to a number of Maoists being killed or surrendering. These efforts consequently led to reduction in the violence.⁴⁰ The large numbers of social and economic developmental projects initiated by the state government have further changed the perception of the tribal community and rural population.

Chhattisgarh, which followed the classic population-centric approach, was unsuccessful and the state's efforts have not yielded any worthwhile results. Chhattisgarh is one of the poorest states in India with a lack of basic facilities and infrastructures. It has a large tribal population and is a top stronghold area of the Maoists. The strategy followed by the state was one of massing large numbers of state and central police battalions, treating the Maoist insurgency as a case of law and order problem. The police sought to control the population by moving the tribal population into relief camps. The

³⁹ Praveen Swami, "For a Review of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *The Hindu*, April 13, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article395529.ece>(accessed November 27, 2010).

⁴⁰ Violence includes attacks on security forces, civilians, government and private infrastructure employing guerilla tactics by using crude bombs, landmines, Improvised Explosive Devices, and small arms.

state also has encouraged the formation of armed village vigilante groups called “*Salwa Judum*,” which means Purification Hunt. This led to a lot of violence in the state between the Maoists and the vigilante groups. The death toll included large numbers of civilian casualties. Developmental activities by the state in the form of building schools, roads, and economic zones are stalled by violence and destruction. Since the implementation of this strategy, the state has seen large numbers of police and civilian casualties.

Based on the four cases, we observe that neither the population-centric approach nor the enemy-centric approach by itself, but rather a combination of the two approaches, can help us explain counterinsurgency success or failure. More precisely, it seems that the balance should be more heavily in favor of the enemy-centric approach initially: in both the Malaya and Andhra cases, a combination of both approaches with a bias for the enemy-centric approach in the initial phase was used to achieve success. In contrast, in the case of India at the national level and Chhattisgarh, there was failure in a similar combined approach when the balance was more population-centric. It seems that we must look further into the enemy-centric and population-centric aspects of the approach to explain counterinsurgency successes and failures among cases. The following discussion therefore proposes that we look at the factors in the four cases in terms of the elements of the enemy-centric and population-centric strategies pursued by the governments.

When observed at both the national level and the sub-national level, there are some factors that stand out explaining variation in the outcomes of the four cases. The first is the factor of reliable intelligence, which was critical in both Malaya and in Andhra Pradesh. The second factor is the resource control by isolating the sources that are essential for the insurgents and thereby forcing the insurgents to venture out of their hideouts to either reclaim the supplies or to fight with the security forces. The third factor that emerges from the literature is the capability of the security forces specifically in terms of their training, tactics and equipment capability to operate in the forests and to tackle the guerrilla tactics of the insurgents. The fourth factor is the measures to win the hearts and minds of the population. The last factor is the unified command, which was

present in both of the successful cases and was not evident in the two failed cases. Unified command allows for better coordination among the various agencies that are involved in a counterinsurgency operation.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will use the comparative case study method to analyze and explain success in counterinsurgency, and specifically, why overall at the national level the Indian government strategy is failing, in contrast to the Malayan case. At the sub-national level, it seeks to explain the variation between the two states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

At the national level, the thesis will compare the Indian government's strategy from 2000 to 2009 with the British government's counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya during the 1950s. The Malayan case is selected primarily because it was a successful case of fighting insurgency. Also the Malayan case involved a Maoist insurgency that had similar guerrilla tactics and ideology as those of the Indian Maoists. Moreover, like the Indian case, Malaya was also a domestic insurgency without any direct cross-border influence. Because of these similarities, the broader lessons that can be learned from the Malayan counterinsurgency would in many ways be applicable to countering the Indian Maoists as well. Though the British were colonial rulers in Malaya and India is a domestic power, as far as the counterinsurgency strategy is concerned, the type of government in control was not the issue for the Maoists, as for them it was a struggle for power against imperialism. Moreover, the strategy of the insurgents has not changed over the years. Consequently, the British example is used by many countries to form their counterinsurgency doctrines. In addition, the British had access to additional forces from other colonies; India too had access and flexibility in terms of importing from other states and central police forces or from the army if required. Hence, the two cases are comparable on several counts.

At the state level, the research aims to compare the state of Andhra Pradesh, a case of counterinsurgency success with the state of Chhattisgarh, a case of failure by comparing their strategies primarily from 2000 to 2009. The two states are comparable on

several counts. First, both states are ranked as key Maoist strongholds. Furthermore, in both states the Maoists enjoyed considerable support in the form of extortion of money and resources from the villagers and tribal people. Another similarity is that in both states the insurgents operated in similar forested terrain, which provided them considerable protection to conduct training and presented significant challenges to the security forces seeking to conduct operations in such terrain.

When we look at the variables, the dependant variable, outcome of counterinsurgency, is defined by the degree of success in eliminating the armed insurgent threat.⁴¹ There are three conditions, which indicate this outcome. First, the degree to which the government is seen by the local people as legitimate and effective in controlling social, political, economic, and security institutions that meet the population's needs including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fuelled support of the insurgency. Second, in a successful outcome, the insurgent movements and their leaders would generally be co-opted into the government mechanisms and society, or marginalized, or separated from the population. Third, the extent to which armed insurgent forces is, demobilized, and/or reintegrated into political, economic, and social structures of the country.⁴² Degrees of success and failure over the three conditions translate into measurement of displacement and rehabilitation of populations, violent incidents, economic growth, individual freedoms, improvement of infrastructure, the successful functioning of schools and hospitals, and the restoration of urban facilities.⁴³

The research had identified five independent variables that potentially explain the success or failure of a counterinsurgency operation. The first one is intelligence, which would mean a reliable and timely intelligence capability that can lead to successful targeting. A second independent variable is resource control measures achieved through

⁴¹ U.S. government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "Counterinsurgency Guide," January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt> (accessed May 23, 2010).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, "Rethinking Counterinsurgency," vol. 5, RAND Counterinsurgency study (RAND Corporation, 2008), 61.

disruption and targeting of insurgent resource networks.⁴⁴ A third independent variable is unified command, which means that the various agencies involved in the COIN operations function under one centralized command for better coordination, control, and decision making, and for optimization of effort. The fourth independent variable is the capability of security forces, in terms of specialized training, tactics and equipment of forces to deal with the insurgents using guerilla tactics in forest terrain. The fifth independent variable is winning hearts and minds which would involve both the coercive measures including propaganda against the insurgent sympathizers and the developmental activities for the population. The thesis finds that a combined enemy-centric and population-centric strategy succeeds with the driving variables being intelligence and unified command for the enemy-centric part and winning hearts and minds for the population-centric part.

For the research, I relied mainly on peer-reviewed, academic journal articles and books. I also drew on other publications like the *Indian Defense Review*, other theses, and NGO reports. Analysis works by think tanks like Indian Defense and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the Institute of Conflict Management Studies, and other security analysts provided material for the research. Reputable news media like *The Economist* (Indian monthly), *Frontline* (Indian weekly); *New York Times*, *The Statesman*, *The Washington Post* and *Times of India* were used along with a number of government reports from India such as the Ministry of Home Affairs annual reports. The detailed list of sources is placed in the bibliography.

⁴⁴ Maoist resource networks include funding mechanisms, manpower recruitment and weapons procurement. Maoist funding mechanisms are varied and include extortion from locals, looting of banks and private property, collection of money from sympathizers, taking protection money from mineral and ore industries, local contractors, and dealings in drugs and timber business. The manpower recruitments have depended on ideological conversions; forced kidnapping and induction, induction based on lure for money. Maoist weapon sources include purchases from black markets, foreign dealers and from the ambushes on police stations and other security outposts.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The thesis is organized into five chapters. After the introduction and methodology, Chapter II provides a background on Naxalism including its underlying factors sustaining insurgency, the history of Maoist insurgency in India and the present state of affairs including the Maoist organization, strategy and tactics employed. The thesis then provides comparative analysis using national and state level cases. The five independent variables explain variation across the cases will be discussed here. I will show that, the variables are not stand alone but interdependent. While intelligence comes out as the key variable, it does so in conjunction with the unified command which improves intelligence sharing and optimizes the use of force capability in targeting the insurgents similarly, the resource control measures depend on both intelligence and the capability of force. Measures for winning hearts and minds, especially developmental measures are effective after the insurgent fighting capability are reduced.

Chapter III focuses on the Malayan and Indian insurgencies at the national level, highlighting the factors explaining the success of the British government against the Malayan insurgency and the failure of the Indian strategy leading to resurgence and growth of the Maoist insurgency in India. The thesis will then systematically assess the influence or lack thereof of each of the five independent variables introduced above on counterinsurgency success or failure in the two countries. It would also show how the variables interact with each other.

In a similar manner to the country comparison, Chapter IV will compare the outcomes of counterinsurgency strategies at the state level looking at the cases of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh in India. Andhra Pradesh will represent a successful case; and Chhattisgarh a problematic one. Finally, a concluding chapter will bring out a causal model for success in counterinsurgency. Then it would analyze briefly the Indian government's latest strategy since 2009 to identify why it is problematic in some areas and successful in others. On that foundation, the chapter then makes recommendations for modifying the existing strategy to achieve success in the counterinsurgency efforts against the Maoists in India.

II. UNDERSTANDING NAXALITE INSURGENCY IN INDIA

In order to explain the Indian government's failed counterinsurgency effort, it is critical to first understand the core issues that led to the insurgency's emergence and growth. This chapter covers the ebb and flow of Maoist insurgency in India from 1967 to 2009. The Naxalite movement originated in 1967 as a peasant uprising in a small village called Naxalbari in West Bengal against feudal landlords. This incident followed an uprising led by the members of CPI (Marxist) in late 1960s and early 1970s which was weak and not organized and was crushed by the state. The insurgency surfaced again in 1980s, but was splintered and grew in isolated pockets over the next two decades. The underlying factors were not resolved from the 1960s. In the economic growth period, these areas are left out at the margins and have not progressed at all creating more grievances. It was only in the current decade, especially in the wake of the terrorist attack on Indian parliament in 2001 and in the aftermath of 9/11 actions against terrorist and insurgent groups, that the state is taking firm action against Naxalite insurgency. Also the creation of a new state in the insurgency prone areas in 2000 with weak administration, contributed to the growth of Naxalite insurgency which today stands as the single largest internal security threat to India.

A. BIRTH AND GROWTH OF THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY

Starting as a small rebellion in a remote village in India, the Naxalite insurgency has grown overtime in strength and capability. After the Indian state security forces crushed the original movement in early 1970s, it was dormant but now, it has morphed over two decades and emerged as a violent armed insurgency leading to hundreds of deaths annually and impeding economic growth in its area of operation, which also overlaps India's rich mineral belts.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ For annual deaths by Naxalite violence in the current decade, see Table 1 (based on GOI, MHA Annual Report 2008–09).

The Maoist radical movement first emerged among the landless farm laborers in West Bengal. Until the early 1950s, the *zamindars* (landlords) paid tax directly to the government under the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793.⁴⁶ The land reforms of 1950s abolished the *zamindari* system, redistributing land from previous renters, who became the new class of *jotedars*.⁴⁷ The jotedars had their farms cultivated by sharecroppers and hired farm laborers. The rightful share of the sharecroppers and the laborers remained insecure as most of the contracts were unrecorded. The share of cultivated crop often violated the legal stipulations however, the threat of eviction kept the sharecroppers from reacting against the jotedar keeping the feudal system intact. By mid-1960s, the prospects of farm employment became difficult and many laborers migrated to the forests.⁴⁸ As the plight of the sharecroppers and the landless laborers worsened, they shifted their tactics towards radicalism. Some rebelled against the jotedars to claim their share of produce by forcefully trying to take over the land. It was in this context that the Naxalite uprising took place.

Specifically, Naxalism gets its name from the May 1967 peasant uprising in the village of Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, where Maoists had a following. On May 24, 1967, three sharecroppers, along with 150 Communist Party of India (Marxist) workers armed with sticks, bows and arrows looted 300 mounds of paddy from the granary of a jotedar. The mob also attempted to take over land documents from

⁴⁶ Ranajit Guha, *A Rule Of Property For Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (Hyderabad, India: Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltd, 1982), 96.

⁴⁷ Jotedars were the erstwhile renters from the landlords. After the zamindari system was abolished, the amount of land holding by an individual was substantially reduced to allow the upliftment of the poor peasants.

⁴⁸ Ranjit kumar Gupta, *The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror* (New Delhi: Wordsmiths Press, 2004), 93.

the Jotedar.⁴⁹ Consequently, a state enforcement inspector raided the houses of these share croppers leading to the death of the inspector. In retaliation, the Assam frontier rifles next day killed eleven of the sharecroppers' family members who were protesting against the jotedar at Naxalbari bazaar. The massacre by the state agency was the key which started the Naxalite uprising by hundreds of tribals and peasants. The movement last for 52 days before the state responded with unprecedented suppressive measures such as torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings to crush the rebellion, in all killing 20 more radicals.⁵⁰

The incident of uprising against the security forces and jotedars in Naxalbari echoed throughout India and produced widespread support in peasant areas. In the late 1960s, the Naxalite chief ideologue Charu Mazumdar, and his associates Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal shouted slogans like "power flows through the barrel of the gun" and "China's chairman Mao is our chairman."⁵¹ Their extremist rhetoric inspired many to subscribe to Maoism. With the Chinese communist newspaper, *People's Daily*, eulogizing the movement as "spring thunder" over India, the movement spread to new areas in other states.⁵²

Naxalism soon assumed larger dimension and state level offices of CPI (Marxist) in Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and some party offices in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh joined the movement. Between July and November of 1967, revolutionary communist organs such as *Liberation* and *Deshbrai*' (Bengali for country's movement) besides *Lokyudh* (Hindi for people's war) were started. On November 12, 1967, comrades from Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,

⁴⁹ Asian Center for Human Rights Report, "The Adivasis of Chattisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite movement and Salwa Judum Campaign," March 17, 2006, 12.

⁵⁰ Hindustan Times, "History of Naxalism," May 9, 2003, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/nm2/225549/Article1-6545.aspx> (accessed November 12, 2010).

⁵¹ Amarnath K Menon, "Red Corridor," *India Today*, Cover story, December 20, 2007, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/2726/Cover%20Story/Red+corridor.html>. (accessed October 27, 2010)

⁵² Ibid.

Karnataka, Orissa, and West Bengal met and created the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR).⁵³

The police's sustained, aggressive crack-down involving large-scale arrests kept the movement under check in West Bengal after the initial uprising. However, during the state elections in 1969, owing to the popular support among the masses, CPI (Marxist) came to power in West Bengal for the first time.⁵⁴ By the order of the CPI (Marxist), the police released the imprisoned Naxalite leaders the same year, and the movement regained momentum once again.⁵⁵

After the crackdown, Naxalite leaders debated whether or not to advance the Naxalite ideology through violent means as opposed to the use of legal political channels. After significant debate, some Naxalite leaders decided to pursue the revolution through armed struggle which splintered the organization. Consequently, on May Day in 1969, the birth of CPI (Marxist-Leninist) was announced by Kanu Sanyal who organized some members to pursue an armed struggle against the state while CPI (Marxist) followed a political path.⁵⁶ This mobilization led to the growth of insurgency among the masses over the next two years. It is pertinent to note that the CPI (ML) party guidelines, adopted in 1970, focused on armed guerrilla warfare. The Maoist revolutionaries in the early stages were typically upper caste Hindu youth who had school and college level education.⁵⁷

With the insurgency growing rapidly in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the government responded with enemy-centric measures. In 1971, the government launched Operation Steeplechase to control the growing uprising. A corps of the Indian Army with about 45,000 troops was deployed from July 1 to August 15, 1971, in the Midnapore, Purulia, Burdwan and Birbhum districts of Bengal; in the Singhbhum, Dhanbad, Santhal Parganas districts of Bihar (now Jharkhand); and in Mayurbhanj district of Orissa. The

⁵³ *Hindustan Times*, "History of Naxalism," May 9, 2003.

⁵⁴ Roy Chaudhary, "From Naxalbari to Nalgonda," *The Hindu*, December 4, 2005, <http://www.hindu.com/mag/2004/12/05/stories/2004120500470400.htm>.(accessed September 29, 2010)

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Hindustan Times*, "History of Naxalism," May 9, 2003.

⁵⁷ Ranjit kumar Gupta, *The Crimson Agenda: Maoist Protest and Terror* (New Delhi: Wordsmiths Press, 2004), 98.

army formed the outer ring of a cordon spread across the districts on the borders of the three states while central and state police forces carried out searches and sweeps through the villages in the forests. The operation was successful and many of the Naxalite leaders were arrested.⁵⁸ The state's success against the armed uprising coupled with the death of Charu Mazumdar in police custody in July 1972, destroyed Naxalism in West Bengal for the time being. Meanwhile, Kanu Sanyal, the mastermind behind the armed insurgency fled to Andhra Pradesh with the aim of expanding the movement's population support base.

In the mid-1970s, there were large scale disturbances in India over the ruling Congress party's alleged involvement in large scale corruption, electoral fraud and misuse of state power to personal advantage. Consequently, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared a nationwide Emergency from 1975 to 1977.⁵⁹ By 1980, in the aftermath of states repressive measures, over 30 Naxalite groups had surfaced, including for example, pro-Lin Piao and anti-Lin Piao factions and the People's War Group (PWG) which operated in rural regions of eastern India.⁶⁰ The cadre profiles also began to change from that of Hindu upper caste youth to members of the rural masses, even as the leadership remained high-caste Hindus. For instance, the PWG was formed in the impoverished and underdeveloped Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. Its key objectives were to punish and kill class enemies, and police informants. The PWG also set up people's courts to sentence its enemies.⁶¹ The state government of Andhra Pradesh reacted with harsh measures to suppress the PWG movement especially in north-western Andhra.⁶²

⁵⁸ Sujan Datta, "Clamour to let army fight Maoists rises-Bengal, only state with military experience, adds voice to chorus," *The Telegraph*, September 27, 2009, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090927/jsp/nation/story_11546415.jsp (accessed September 28, 2010).

⁵⁹ ND Palmer, "India in 1975: Democracy in Eclipse," *Asian Survey* 16, no 2 (February 1976): 95.

⁶⁰ Amarnath K Menon, "Red Corridor," *India Today*, Cover story, December 20, 2007, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/2726/Cover%20Story/Red+corridor.html> (accessed November 16, 2010).

⁶¹ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 12, <http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/Chattis0106.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2010).

⁶² Armed Conflicts Report, "India - Maoist Insurgency (1980—first combat deaths)," February, 2010, <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndiaAP.html> (accessed November 13, 2010).

The Naxalite PWG spread from Andhra Pradesh to neighboring states of Madhya Pradesh (MP), Orissa, Jharkhand and Maharashtra to the tribal regions. Although the deprived and dispossessed *adivasis* (tribals) did not share the overall political objectives of the Naxalites, they supported the movement as they were victims of caste and class related feudalism, especially in those parts of Madhya Pradesh that now make up the state of Chhattisgarh. In addition to the PWG, the other major Naxalite group that emerged in 1980 was the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar. During the 1990s, the state governments did not devote significant resources to combating the armed threat and therefore the MCC grew.⁶³

Tribal unrest in Madhya Pradesh did lead to a population-centric response when in 2000, the central government created Chhattisgarh, a predominantly tribal area within Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, the central government created Jharkhand out of the Bihar state, also in order to allow for tribal populations to express themselves politically. However, creation of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand did not improve the social conditions of the *adivasis*. Instead, these new states under weak administrations and dominated by impoverished tribal populations merely became fertile ground for the Maoist recruitment.⁶⁴ By the early 2000, the Naxalites had strengthened their bases in a number of states. Consequently, the state government administration through the *Panchayat* (village court, a village level judicial system), Public Works Department (PWD), and Agriculture and Irrigation department came to a virtual halt in many regions. With their growing control, the Naxalites imposed taxes on the movement of raw material, including iron ore and bauxite in order to finance themselves. In 2004, the two violent factions, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) which had influence in Bihar and the People's War Group active in Andhra Pradesh joined to form the CPI (Maoist).⁶⁵ After 2004, Naxalism

⁶³ Suba Chandran and Alok Kumar Gupta, "India, Caste Violence and Class in Bihar: The Ranvir Sena," Searching for peace in South Asia, Survey Report 2002, <http://www.conflict-prevention.net/page.php> (accessed November 15, 2010).

⁶⁴ Anuj Chopra, "Delhi Prepares to Crush Rural Rebel Naxalite Army," Spearhead Research Organization, <http://www.spearheadresearch.org/phpbb2/viewtopic.php> (accessed October 11, 2010).

⁶⁵ *The Times of India*, "MCC, PWG merge, form new party," October 14, 2004, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/MCC-PWG-merge-form-new-party/articleshow/885191.cms>(accessed October 23, 2010).

spread at a fast pace and the violence increased in the Maoist dominated areas leading to frequent confrontations between the Maoists and their collaborators on the one hand and the security forces on the other.⁶⁶

The Naxalite *insurgency* has emerged as a dangerous threat mainly due to the movement's geographical spread, growing support base in tribal and underdeveloped areas and its cadres' enhanced fighting capabilities. The government of India mainly views the insurgency as a problem of lack of law enforcement and of economic development and has responded with more population-centric measures by way of funds for development along with increasing police forces to the affected states.⁶⁷ (Details of the Indian strategy are indicated in Chapter III). After years of fighting the insurgency, there is growing consensus among the Indian strategic think tanks that a 'law and order' approach i.e., one that mainly relies on policing efforts is unlikely to produce a lasting solution to the problem, since it does not effectively the armed capability of Maoists or redress the grievances felt by a majority of *India's* rural poor for decades.⁶⁸ The answer remains unclear in a democratic setting.

B. UNDERLYING FACTORS OF NAXALISM

The Naxalite *insurgency* in *India* is the latest manifestation of peasant struggles caused by poverty, exploitation and inequality that have prevailed in rural areas for decades. It has re-emerged due to the shifts in the economic conditions due to new economic politics that continue to favor the elite. The social conditions in rural areas have changed little and the policies followed by the Indian state have generally failed to mitigate rural problems. These unresolved factors have reproduced the insurgency by pushing the affected populations to embrace Naxalism. Thriving illegal markets of protection, deforestation, land acquisition in tribal areas, illegal natural resources

⁶⁶ For details of increased deaths in confrontations, see Table 3.

⁶⁷ Indian Express, "Both development, law enforcement needed to fight Naxalism: PM," September 26, 2009, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mr./521921> (accessed November 22, 2010). As brought out by Prime minister of India, Mr. Manmohan Singh on September 26, 2009.

⁶⁸ Pratul Ahuja and Rajat Ganguly, "Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18, no. 2 (June 2007): 249.

markets, nexus between Maoists and politicians add to the problem. The Maoists have made the tribal people feel more alienated from the state and have created distrust in the political process and solutions.

The declining feudal order also causes the landlords to take extreme measures that include violence over peasants. At the same time the upper strata of the lower castes, wealthier section of the peasantry, are aspiring to replace the upper caste as the political elite class. In the process, this class is also employing oppressive tactics against the poor peasant who are numerically larger and also the lowest caste.⁶⁹ The competition between the upper and lower caste elite combined with the oppression of the poor is creating an unstable system leading to a vacuum for revolutionary ideas.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, historically the state has done little for the plight of the peasants while the higher castes have access to the parliament. For instance, in Bihar sharecroppers and agricultural laborers constitute 39.27 percent of the total labor force of the state many of whom have been victims of atrocities and deprivation by landlords and are ready recruits for the Maoists.⁷¹

Also, badly implemented developmental projects by the state leading to large-scale displacement of tribals from forestland for mining and other commercial purposes, non-settlement of their rights and non-provision of timely and suitable compensation for their land has created distance towards development and the state, giving birth to extremism. For instance, in a case relating to acquisition of tribal land by Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. in Sundergarh district of Orissa, which is a Maoist hotbed, it was found

⁶⁹ Krishna Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26, no. 46 (November 16, 1991): 2612, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4398299> (accessed August 29, 2010).

⁷⁰ Mamoon Ali Kazmi, "Naxals The Poorest People of India," *Current Affairs*, October 17, 2009, <http://thecurrentaffairs.com/naxals-the-poorest-people-of-india.html> (accessed October 29, 2010).

⁷¹ Mammen Matthew, "Troubled land of Bihar," *Hindustan Times*, May 10, 2010, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/Troubled-land-of-Bihar/Article1-541880.aspx>.(accessed August 5, 2010).

Also for the shift from caste based to a class based struggle see; George J Kunnath, "Becoming a Naxalite in rural Bihar: Class struggle and its contradictions," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 33, no. 1(January 2006):89.

that those who lost their land were not paid compensation for 23 years.⁷² Lack of economic alternatives or proper compensation has made the peasants increasingly discontent. With the skewed pattern of land distribution, tribals and *Dalits* (the lowest in the caste structure) became dependant on the land owners reinforcing the feudal structure.

Illiteracy and associated unemployment is also adding to the problem. Illiteracy among the tribal population is rampant. The state has not managed to deliver the region from illiteracy and unemployment and this reality is further exploited by the Maoists who have moved to bring the government funded schools under their control. They also undermine functional schools on some pretext in order to disrupt the public goods that are being delivered. Naxalism to these tribals and farmers comes as a form of respite for survival and sustaining livelihood. In Chhattisgarh, which is a Maoist stronghold, the literacy rate among tribals is less than one-third the national average. Just 30 percent for men and 13 percent for women are literate. Of its 1220 villages, 214 don't even have a primary school. In Bijapur tehsil of Bastar district, only 52 villages have 25 percent literacy; 35 villages have no literate people at all.⁷³

Lack of representation both at local and state level political institutions adds to the tribal's inability to get access to the state resources. Due to the existing social structures, the landlords, rich farmers, forest contractors and corporate leaders dominate policy making on land reform, minimum agricultural wages, and control over forest and its produce. While the reforms are promised, they do not get implemented because of entrenched interests. Depending on the ruling political party in the state, the policy towards dalits and tribals has changed. Policies towards the tribal communities can vary from being pro-reform to anti-Naxalism. For instance, in Chhattisgarh, the policy towards tribals was more socio-economic reforms such as land reforms under the congress government.⁷⁴ However, under the BJP government came to power the anti Naxal stance

⁷² Dhananjay Mahapatra, "Skewed growth to blame for rise of Naxals: Supreme Court," *The Times of India*, July 21, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6193052.cms> (accessed October 29, 2010).

⁷³ Praful Bidwai, "Dealing with Naxalism in Chhattisgarh," Transnational Institute, October 2007, <http://www.tni.org/article/dealing-naxalism-chhattisgarh> (accessed November 7, 2010).

⁷⁴ Smita Gupta, "Out Of Vanvas?" *Outlookindia*, December 20, 2009, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?226043> (accessed October 23, 2010).

was taken using the vigilante groups.⁷⁵ In addition, at some places the security forces that are deployed provide security in the vicinity of the elite villages away from dalit villages. The Maoists aspire to initiate reforms promised by the successive elected governments.

The landlord armies and their atrocities are another cause for discontent among the peasants and tribals. These atrocities have led many to join with Maoists for their protection. For instance, in states such as Bihar, rural poor organized by Maoists took to arms to defend themselves against the landlord militia armies like the Ranvir Sena and the Green Brigade.⁷⁶ The Ranvir Sena is reportedly involved in 33 massacre cases claiming over 280 dalit lives.⁷⁷ While a more effective law and order approach and a real effort at delivering development are certainly worthwhile, the important need is to create a political environment that allows political expression for tribal concerns and gives tribal communities the power of self-government so that they can fight these local mafias through the state mechanisms.⁷⁸

With the economy growing at about 10 percent GDP per annum, the cost of basic commodities has also increased producing a wide economic chasm between the haves and the have-nots. It is hardly surprising that Naxal influence is strongest in tribal parts of India. The tribals, more than any other oppressed category, have yet to gain from India's liberalization policy. In fact, Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in their areas leaves them out.⁷⁹ The promised rights and benefits never reach marginalized citizens fuelling extreme discontent and giving birth to militancy.

⁷⁵ The Times of India, "Salwa Judum is answer to Naxal menace: Raman Singh," January 10, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/3958157.cms> (accessed September 22, 2010).

⁷⁶ Gautam Navlakha, "Treating Unlikely as Likely," *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 38 (September 18-24, 2004): 4235-4239, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415557> (accessed August 29, 2010).

⁷⁷ ACHR Report, "The private armies and the politics of ban," *Naxal Conflict Monitor*, 2006, <http://www.achrweb.org/ncm/ranvir-sena.htm> (accessed August 17, 2010).

⁷⁸ Nitin Desai, "Naxalism: It's time to redeem the promise," *Rediffnews.com*, June 17, 2010, <http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/17/naxalism-its-time-to-redeem-the-promise.htm> (accessed October 29, 2010).

⁷⁹ Sreelatha Menon, "Government Appointed Panel calls for Comprehensive land reforms," *Business Standard*, November 25, 2009, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/govt-appointed-panel-calls-for-comprehensive-land-reforms/377571> (accessed October 30, 2010).

Maoists have also added to the socio-economic conditions by creating markets of protection in the affected regions. For instance in Jharkhand, MCC gained grassroots support by gaining control over locals through coercion and simultaneous offers of protection against the landlord associated militias.⁸⁰ In return for the protection, the Maoists gained support and protection money from local contractors and tribals. Former Intelligence Bureau director, Ajit Doval takes the argument a little further when he says the Maoists can extort money only when there are surplus funds and illegitimate money is available like in the case of mine owners who dig up 100 truckloads a day more than they are authorized to do would happily pay protection money to the Maoists, which may amount to the cost of two truckloads. Meanwhile, protection is used as a dual edged commodity. Unveiling this market of protection demonstrates the contested boundaries between the state and the Maoists.⁸¹

Meanwhile, the deforestation of large areas, both legal and illegal is taking away the livelihood for the tribals. As a consequence, many oppose the state government policies for utilizing forest resources like timber and other produce for industrial and commercial purposes thereby providing the Maoists with platform. Another sore point is the acquisition of forest land for mining or other commercial purposes by the state. Again, this provided the Maoists with the tool for mobilization and has pushed the disgruntled tribals and farmers towards the Maoists. For instance, the economy livelihood of the people of Koraput district, Orissa, is primarily based on forest and agriculture. Their multifarious needs, with almost all parts of their dwellings and substantial dietary requirements are accessed from the forests. Apart from sustaining livelihood, forests provide them with potential cash income from sale of forest produce. However, the gradual degradation of forest cover and land diversification for the developmental projects in the district is hurting the tribals. It is estimated that the area of demarcated protected forests is 4316.77 sq kilometers and the undemarcated protected forests

⁸⁰ Alpa Shah, "Markets of Protection: The 'Terrorist' Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India," *Critique of Anthropology* 26, no. 3 (September 2006): 297.

⁸¹ Shah, "Markets of Protection," 297.

comprise 5050.09 Square kilometers. Presently both areas are devoid of forest cover owing to large and medium development projects leading to large scale deforestation.⁸²

Most regions under the Maoist control are rich in mineral ores and therefore impact the larger economy of the nation. Some 85 percent of India's coal reserves come from the five states most affected by Naxalism. Since India is still heavily reliant on coal, Naxalism puts almost half of India's total energy supply at serious risk according to a report by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.⁸³ The region is a mining hub for Iron ore and Bauxite. However, under the Maoist control, the region flourishes in illegal mining. The systemic corruption that allows such illegal activities has led to confrontations between the security forces and Maoists. The resulting violence affects the tribals and poor villagers who work at these mines for their livelihood and are often accused of being informants. For instance, in Chhattisgarh, where the Maoists control large swathes of mineral-rich forests and mountains, the attacks on government buildings and security forces are widespread. In another instance in mineral-rich Orissa, where bauxite production at state-run National Aluminum Company (NALCO) fell 20 percent after a Maoist attack on the mines in April 2010. After the attack, the company reduced the storage of explosives at its mines, fearing further attacks from the rebels.⁸⁴ Similarly, in a state wide strike by Maoists in east and central India in 2010, against police action in Lalgarh district of West Bengal, affected supplies of iron ore and coal. Exports have also been hit due to supply cuts and at least three steel plants in the region were affected.⁸⁵ This further hurts the economy of the region.

In some states there is a politician-Maoist nexus for mutual benefits. Some politicians including some former Chief Ministers of states like Jharkhand, who

⁸² Manoj Kumar Das, "Development of Tribals and Deforestation," Merinews, March 26, 2008, <http://www.merineews.com/article/development-of-tribals-and-deforestation/131308.shtml> (accessed November 26, 2010).

⁸³ Mark Sappenfield, "In heart of India, a little-known civil war," The Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0501/p06s02-wosc.html> (accessed August 30, 2010).

⁸⁴ Ajit Kumar Singh, "Maoists target Economy," South Asia Intelligence Review 8, no. 51(Weekly assessment reports), June 28, 2010, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair8/8_51.htm(accessed September 25, 2010).

⁸⁵ Bappa Majumdar, "Maoist insurgency can hurt industry in India" Reuter Analysis, June 23, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40536320090623> (accessed August 30, 2010).

apparently had connections with the Maoists. In these areas, Maoist leaders support politicians who patronize them for their political ends including vote bank. According to media reports, the former Jharkhand Chief Minister, Madhu Koda was associated with the Maoists and benefitted by the connection in a mining scam.⁸⁶ The mining scam in Jharkhand and the large-scale loot of the natural resources amount to about Rs. 4,300 Crore (US \$ 900 MN).⁸⁷

Corrupt officials and Maoists join the contractors in stealing the development funds. Out of all the money sanctioned for development over the years, some estimates put 30 to 40 percent of it has gone to the Maoists and the rest to the corrupt officials. Adding, more money for development also means more money to the Maoists.⁸⁸ For instance, the Jharkhand Chief Minister Koda's aide admitted that the political establishment received Rs 10 Lakh per acre for licensing for mining (total area extends to over hundreds of acres) while the Naxalites got 20–30 percent on each truck of resources taken out of such a mine. The bureaucrats who provide the oversight received 10–15 percent of the share of the minerals and the rest went to the businessmen.⁸⁹

Differing political approaches by the state governments in dealing with the Maoists also have led to confusion of strategy. For instance, between neighboring states of West Bengal and Bihar, the West Bengal government has for long engaged Maoists in the hope of creating a meaningful dialogue, while in Bihar; the ruling party is focused on hunting down top Maoist leaders. This difference in approach across state boundaries gives the Maoists the freedom of shifting to a state where the actions are not offensive. Also within a state the responses vary with the change in ruling political party which

⁸⁶ Pradeep Thakur, "Maoists got 30% cut in Koda's Jharkhand plunder," *The Times of India*, November 15, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5230928.cms> (accessed September 5, 2010).

⁸⁷ S. D. Naik, "Skewed policy on mining," *The Hindu Business Line*, August 10, 2010, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/08/11/stories/2010081150210900.htm> (accessed November 26, 2010).

⁸⁸ Prassana Mohanty, "Maoists' financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows" *Governance Now*, April 07, 2010, <http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/maoists-financing-blood-flows-long-cash-flows> (accessed August 27, 2010).

⁸⁹ Pradeep Thakur, "Maoists got 30% cut in Koda's Jharkhand plunder," *The Times of India*, November 15, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5230928.cms> (accessed September 5, 2010).

again allows the insurgency to grow. For instance, in Chhattisgarh, under the congress rule of chief minister Ajit Jogi until 2003, the approach was to have land and social reforms such as operation Barga for land reforms.⁹⁰ However, once the BJP government under Raman Singh came to power the approach was more security centric with vigilante groups like Salwa Judum that have continued ever since.⁹¹ While senior officials acknowledge that a comprehensive response would require district-by-district political programs for affected area, rather than a centrally imposed solution, the varying approaches within and between states allow the insurgency to continue and create problems for the locals who face the brunt of the Maoists.⁹² Also, in most Maoist affected areas, the ratio of police to civilians is much below the national average. The number of policemen in these states is half (current vacancies stand at over 300,000) of the national average of 120 policemen for a population of 100,000.⁹³

According to the Home Secretary, Gopal Pillai, “Our real success will be in restoring civil administration in this area including Public Distribution System, mobile medical vans, and police stations with stronger capability, and schools.” This statement at the highest level of the government indicates the lack of civil administration in the Naxal affected areas which are allowing the Maoists to accumulate support from the tribals.⁹⁴

C. PRESENT STATUS OF MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA

Naxalism presents itself as a well-established insurgency. The Maoists have been carrying out state functions in many places, and their support in the urban areas of the country has been increasing as have their violent activities. This section covers the

⁹⁰ Smita Gupta, “Out Of Vanvas,” Outlookindia, December 20, 2009, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?226043> (accessed September 22, 2010)

⁹¹ The Times of India, “Salwa Judum is answer to Naxal menace: Raman Singh,” January 10, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/3958157.cms> (accessed October 19, 2010).

⁹² Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, “India: Major rethink is needed on Naxalism,” April 29, 2010, <http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=ES159587> (accessed August 27, 2010).

⁹³ Prassana Mohanty, “Maoists’ financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows” Governance Now, April 7, 2010, <http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/maoists-financing-blood-flows-long-cash-flows> (accessed 27 Aug 2010).

functioning, organization, and capability of the Maoists, then it shows the well-established resource networks and finally the state of violence and Naxalite incidents in India.

1. Functioning, Organization and Capability

The Naxalites have taken over the tasks of the government in certain areas and carry out state functions as a parallel government called *Janatana Sarkar*, literally meaning people's government. Through their zonal committees the Maoist along with the tribal cadres run independent government in the dense forests of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa.⁹⁵ They distribute land records to the villagers, with documents having seal of the local commander. The Maoists collect taxes, dispense justice through their courts, settle land disputes and if their verdicts are violated, the accused are punished harshly and at times, executed to illustrate quick justice. The Maoist courts also known as Kangaroo courts are unofficially run courts which are draconian and are in fact usurped powers by the Maoists running parallel governments in India.⁹⁶ For instance, in the southern districts of Baster, Dantewada and Bijapur of Chhattisgarh, Maoists are running their governments with impunity.⁹⁷ The Naxalites also provide social services such as schools and health care centers in areas where the state has failed.⁹⁸ With such activities, it was not difficult for the Adivasis to relate to the Naxalites, when the state law enforcement and public good distribution had failed for them. According to some tribal people, they were being harassed by the government officials, forest officials and traders because of their land disputes, claim to forest

⁹⁴ Shoma Chaudhury, "Weapons Of Mass Desperation," *Teheka Magazine* 6, no. 39 (October 03, 2009), http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne031009coverstory.asp (accessed November 17, 2010).

⁹⁵ Robert M Cutler, "Naxalites drill away at India's wealth," *Asia Times*, May 20, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE20Df02.html (accessed October 27, 2010).

⁹⁶ Sarma Venkateswara Vemuri, "Is Democracy a Farce in India – Part 1: Kangaroo Courts Roost The Rule," *American Chronicle*, September 03, 2009, <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/117282> (accessed December 4, 2010).

⁹⁷ *Deccan Herald*, "Half of Chhattisgarh's diamond belt in Maoist strongholds," August 02, 2010, <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/85593/half-chhattisgarhs-diamond-belt-maoist.html> (accessed December 3, 2010).

⁹⁸ ACHR Report, "The adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 14.

produce and caste related grievances. However, after the Maoists took over such interference by the officials reduced considerably.⁹⁹ For instance, in Chhattisgarh the support for Maoists has continued to grow due to corruption within the government and lack of civil administration to address the grievances of people.¹⁰⁰

Working from the grassroots, the Maoists in India have evolved into an organized force with its own political agenda and effective leadership. Under the political leadership is the Central Military Commission (CMC). All major Maoist insurgent operations are planned by the CMC.¹⁰¹ All members of the CMC are concurrently members of the politburo, which reports to the all-powerful Central Committee (CC). Below the CC are state/special zone committees. These oversee the functioning of sub-zone committees, which in turn are responsible for the functioning of district/division committees, below which are village/town cells. The CPI-Maoist therefore has a well-defined organizational hierarchy. All policy decisions are made by the CC and it is left to individual field-level commanders to find ways to implement them.¹⁰² The leaders in the organization are Maoist ideologues who dominate the zonal activities and their functioning. Some prominent members include Koteswar Rao alias Kishenji who heads the politburo and Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad, considered second in CPI-Maoist hierarchy was recently killed by the Andhra Pradesh police in July 2010.¹⁰³

The Maoist armed wing is called the Peoples Liberation Guerilla Army (PGLA). The PLGA consists of a primary force (military and protection platoons) called *Dalams*, that spearheads the attack, a secondary force (guerrilla squads) called *Sanghams* and the base force (the people's militia). Unlike the guerrillas, people's militia members are villagers and tribals. As the size of the base force increases, the Maoists hope to convert

⁹⁹ Vanaja C, "Parallel Government in Dandakaranya," *Andhra Jyoti*, April 10, 2005.

¹⁰⁰ Tehelka archives, "It's outright war and both sides are choosing their weapons," *Tehelka.com*, March 31, 2007, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main28.asp(accessed December 4, 2010).

¹⁰¹ Janes information group, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," *Jane's Intelligence Review, Terrorism and Insurgency* section, May 15, 2008, <http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/2008/jir10397.htm>(accessed December 5, 2010)

¹⁰² Janes information group, "Red storm rising."

¹⁰³ Zeenews, "Top Maoist leader Azad gunned down in Andhra Pradesh," July 03, 2010, <http://www.zeenews.com/news638075.html>(accessed December 5, 2010).

the PLGA into a People’s Liberation Army.¹⁰⁴For better coordination and functioning, the Naxalite areas are divided into regions or zones as shown in Figure 1. Each zone has a Zonal Commander who controls all operations and administration within the zone.




Figure 1. Organizational Regional Bureaus of CPI (Maoist) (From the Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism portal, <http://www.satp.org>).

The fighting capability of the Maoists is quite evolved in terms of strength, training and tactics. Maoists have evolved into a combat force with squads patterned on lines of Army platoons. The rebels, estimated 22,000 fighters, operate in large parts of the eastern, central and southern countryside, and officials say they are now spreading to cities and bigger towns.¹⁰⁵ For instance, the Maoists are expanding their base in

¹⁰⁴ Janes information group, “Red storm rising - India’s intractable Maoist insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Terrorism and Insurgency section, May 15, 2008.

¹⁰⁵ Bappa Majumdar, “Maoist insurgency can hurt industry in India” Reuter Analysis, June 23, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40536320090623> (accessed August 30, 2010).

prominent Uttar Pradesh cities including, Lucknow, Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi and Meerut.¹⁰⁶ They have active influence in over 220 of the 626 districts of India spread over 16 of the 28 states.

Maoists undergo organized training similar to that of military and security personnel, which is evident from their tactics such as ambush and planned attacks on police stations. One of the Naxal training CDs seized by security forces in Andhra Pradesh gives an insight into the training modules, which is similar to organized military training. The Naxals also hit upon an innovative way to store their ammunition by hiding it in branded plastic water tanks placed in the ground and covered with mud and stones.¹⁰⁷ The training pattern of the Naxalites indicates their preparation for a long combat with security forces. Their activities include setting off landmines, leading jailbreaks, assassinating politicians in and out of power and resorting to other extreme forms of lawlessness and violence.

The Maoists have evolved in the art of ambush using large groups to bring about startling results. For instance, in Chhattisgarh, in February of 2006, four trucks carrying between 60 to 70 Salwa Judum activists each were attacked. One of the trucks was blown to pieces killing eight of the occupants instantly and injuring others. After the explosion, approximately 150-200 Naxalites came out of the forests from both sides of the road armed with guns, choppers, spears and bows and arrows and clubbed or stabbed to death 17 of the injured.¹⁰⁸ With the Maoist radicals developing military capabilities, the security and economic risks posed by the insurgency.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Deepak Gidwani, "Maoists shifting base to urban areas of Uttar Pradesh," *Daily News and Analysis, India*, April 21, 2010, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report/1373732> (accessed December 4, 2010).

¹⁰⁷ *Expressindia*, "Naxals setting up arms factories, developing electronic IEDs," June 14, 2009, <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Naxals-setting-up-arms-factories-developing-electronic-IEDs/476239/Agencies> (accessed August 30, 2010).

¹⁰⁸ All information in the paragraph from ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite movement and Salwa Judum Campaign," March 17, 2006, 24-25.

¹⁰⁹ *Janes information group*, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," *Jane's Intelligence Review, Terrorism and Insurgency section*, May 15, 2008, <http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/2008/jir10397.htm> (accessed December 5, 2010).

2. Maoist Resources for Sustenance

The Maoists have developed networks for sustaining their operations and have found new and innovative methods to meet the resource requirements. Their key resources include the finances, manpower, and weapons which form the backbone of Maoist operations and sustenance. The Maoists have significant financial resources from collection of protection money, extortion, looting and drug running. In the areas under their control, including district towns, Maoists levy a tax on small enterprises, such as spinning mills, *Beedi* (local cigarette) units, rice and flour mills, grocery, clinics, cigarette and liquor shops. The Maoists also secure large revenue from taxing iron and coal mining contractors. The coercive methods for enforcing taxation include abductions and killings. Another major source of funding for the Maoists is drug running and opium cultivation.¹¹⁰ In addition, the Maoists also make money by utilizing the forest resources by targeting the forest workers and tribals for products like *Tendu patta* (leaves for making local cigarettes), bamboo and wood. The Maoists make deals with poachers, smugglers, liquor and timber runners for operating in the forests by paying ransom amounts.¹¹¹

The extortion racket of the Maoists is extensive. Funds are collected from industrialists, businessmen, contractors, mine operators, tribals and even government officials and establishments. For instance, the head of a Maoist sympathizing group, People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA), confessed to the police that PCPA imposed a one-time 'levy' on people in Lalgarh area of West Bengal. His rate card was, Rs 200 (US\$ 5) for primary school teachers and workers, Rs 700 (\$17) for bank managers, up to Rs 5,000 (US\$ 100) for businessmen and Rs 12,000 (US\$ 300) for High school teachers. Every village family was forced to pay Rs 10 and give one kilogram of rice. PCPA also collected up to Rs 17,000 (US\$ 425) from Forest Beat Offices and Rs

¹¹⁰ Ajit Kumar Singh and Sachin Bansidhar Diwan, "Red Money - Tracing India's Maoist Money Trail," Eurasia Review News and Analysis, April 05, 2010, <http://www.EurasiaReview/RedMoney-TracingIndia'sMaoistMoneyTrail.mht> (accessed August 29, 2010).

¹¹¹ Daily News and Analysis, "Maoists hike their levies too," April 14, 2008, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_maoists-hike-their-levies-too_1159688 (accessed November 25, 2010).

20,000 (US\$ 500) from Forest Range Office. Some PCPA members run regular collection from vehicles plying through the area with collection up to Rs 300(US\$ 7) per vehicle.¹¹² Extrapolating these figures to over 220 districts under Maoist control in different states makes this extortion into an extensive racket. For instance, according to Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Raman Singh, the Maoist extortion racket is worth about Rs 400 Crore (US\$ 100 MN) in his state.¹¹³

Maoists also sustain their insurgency through extensive manpower. The recruitments have primarily depended on ideological conversions, forced induction, lure of money. The recruitments are highest in the tribal belts where the Naxals have managed to gain the support and sympathy of the local population. The intelligence bureau sources indicate that the recruitment process is constant across the red corridor, and is not limited to one particular area.¹¹⁴ The most common method for recruitment is forced enrollment especially from the tribals and rural farmers. The Naxalites forcibly recruit one person from each family which essentially involves males however females are forced to join if there are no male members in the family. Many recruits join the armed insurgency while some become member of organizations such as *Chetna Natya Mandal* (motivational dance group), *Mahila Mandal* (women's group), and *Bal Mandal* (Children's group). These organizations help propagate the Naxalite ideology among the tribals and peasants. For instance, Mahila Mandals recruit women into Naxalite activities, and the Bal Mandal groom children to become future Maoists by indoctrination and training. Meanwhile, the Chetna Natya Mandal motivates the population to join by way of drama and songs.¹¹⁵

The Maoists in the past have relied on localized weapons, therefore not requiring extensive sources. Earlier, they relied on country made small arms, bows and arrows and

¹¹² All information in this paragraph drawn from: Prassana Mohanty, "Maoists' financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows" Governance Now, April 07, 2010, <http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/maoists-financing-blood-flows-long-cash-flows> (accessed August 27, 2010).

¹¹³ Mohanty, "Maoists' financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows."

¹¹⁴ The Red Corridor is a term used to describe an impoverished region in the east of India that experiences considerable Naxalite communist militant activity. These are also areas that suffer from the greatest illiteracy, poverty and overpopulation in modern India, and span parts of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal states.

¹¹⁵ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 26.

other country made weapons including clubs, sickle and knives. However, more recently, some of the advanced weapons like bombs, IEDs and modern rifles are procured by purchases from black markets supply from foreign dealers and from the ambushes on police stations and other security outposts. With the growing affiliation between the Naxalites and Maoists from Nepal and erstwhile LTTE cadres, other sources are fast emerging. The landmine technology, for instance, was taught by the LTTE and the MCC of Bihar is known to have links with the Maoists of Nepal for procuring weapons.¹¹⁶ The Maoists have also hijacked and looted trucks carrying chemicals such as ammonium nitrate which are used for making explosives, on a regular basis to meet the requirement of operations. The Maoists have started making their own explosives at factories in remote forests.

The Maoists are also known to be operating with latest weapons including Kalashnikovs and plastic explosives and using mobile communication for better networking and targeting.¹¹⁷ They have also used rocket launchers during the Lok Sabha elections of 2009 and have set up four units to manufacture weapons and ammunition. The Naxals, who were targeting security forces with manual improvised explosive devices, are developing remote-controlled IEDs.¹¹⁸ Central security agencies and local police sources say the Maoists have started two weapon factories each in the dense forests and hills of both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

The Naxals have improved their firepower recently by creating the deadly 'Claymore Mines', or what are often called 'directional IEDs'. Unlike in the past, when IEDs use to be buried beneath the road in a small can, the Claymore Mines, which come with a thick aluminum plate, can be fitted to a tree. The Naxalites also make their own guns besides those snatched from policemen and procured from outside. Their locally-made guns called 'pahar' can be used to severely injure a person if not kill him. The

¹¹⁶ Venkatesvarulu Piratala, *Maoists: a threat to internal security* (Hyderabad: Krishna Kishore publications, 2005), 133. (Original article in Deccan Chronicle, February 15, 2005, compiled in the book).

¹¹⁷ Piratala, "Maoists: a threat to internal security," 137.

¹¹⁸ Expressindia, "Naxals setting up arms factories, developing electronic IEDs" June 14, 2009, <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Naxals-setting-up-arms-factories-developing-electronic-IEDs/476239/Agencies> (accessed August 30, 2010).

pellets break into pieces on impact and hence are deadly. The left-wing extremists also use the gelatin sticks in their explosives apparently sourced from mining areas.¹¹⁹

The Maoist networks for sustaining their operations have evolved over a period of decades. The networks of finance, manpower and weapons provide them with the ingredients for continuing their operations. The growth of violence by Naxalism can be largely attributed to the establishing of a well-organized Maoist resource networks.

3. Incidents and Violence

With an aim of ‘annihilating class enemies’, the Maoists use violence as a means to reach that goal. Increase in violence and attacks against the security forces and the tribals are seen in the regions under Maoist control. The Maoists, control about one-fifth of the total forested area of India.¹²⁰ Most violence takes place in and around these forested areas. The total incidents of Maoist violence and deaths in India are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Total Naxalite Incidents in India in the Current Decade (After Government of India, MHA Affairs Annual Reports, 2008-09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Incidents	1208	1465	1590	1533	1594	1509	1565	1591	2258
(Deaths)	(564)	(482)	(513)	(566)	(669)	(950)	(835)	(721)	(908)

As many as 455 people (255 civilians and 200 security personnel) were killed in Naxal violence in the first half of 2009 alone as revealed by the Home Ministry. CPI (Maoist) were banned by the government of India in June 2009 for its anti-national activities under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. The Naxal-dominated

¹¹⁹ All information in this paragraph drawn from article in Expressindia, “Naxals setting up arms factories, developing electronic IEDs” June 14, 2009,

<http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Naxals-setting-up-arms-factories-developing-electronic-IEDs/476239/Agencies> (accessed August 30, 2010).

¹²⁰ Jason Motlagh, “The Maoists in the forest: tracking India’s separatist rebels,” *The Virginia Quarterly Review*. 84, no. 3(Summer 2008): 102.

States of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the total deaths in the country in this period. The figures also reveal that Chhattisgarh is the State worst-hit by Naxal violence. The Dantewada massacre in April 2010 in Chhattisgarh speaks volumes about the status of affairs in the state. In the incidence, 76 CRPF personnel on patrol were killed in an ambush by a large group of Naxalites.¹²¹

Apart from attacking the tribal people and security personnel, the Maoist attacks have included targeting of economic infrastructure both private and government. The increasing frequency, with which the Naxals have been hitting economic targets, is also alarming.¹²² For instance, in May 2007, the Maoists blew up three 132 KVA high-tension electricity transmission towers in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. As a result, six districts in Bastar plunged into darkness for a week and normal power distribution in the area was restored only after 12 days. The blackout not only affected the functioning of hospitals and rail traffic but also the mining activity in Bailadila mines of the state-owned National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) and the privately owned Essar Steel came to a grinding halt. The NMDC suffered a loss of Rs 1.6 Billion (US \$ 38 MN), Essar Rs 250 million (US \$ 5.9 MN), and the railways Rs 200 Million (US \$ 4.75 MN). Overall in India, the destruction by Maoists is estimated to have produced total economic losses of Rs 20 billion (US \$ 475 MN).¹²³ The attacks on the railways have also increased lately. For instance, incidents of Naxal attacks on railway property nearly doubled in 2009 and the Indian Railways lost over Rs 500 Crore(US\$ 120 MN) due to disruptions by Maoists.¹²⁴

¹²¹ The Hindu, "Last Respects Paid to Jawans killed in Maoist attack," April 7, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article390226.ece> (accessed December 5, 2010).

¹²² GovenIndia, "Naxalite movement," August 31, 2009, http://www.governindia.org/wiki/Naxalite_Movement (accessed August 29, 2010).

¹²³ Janes Information Group, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," Jane's Intelligence Review Terrorism and Insurgency section, May 15, 2008.

¹²⁴ Economic Times, "Naxal attacks double in 2009, Rlys lose Rs 500 cr: Mamata," April 23, 2010, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Naxal-attacks> (accessed August 28, 2010).

The Maoists protect their territories and interests by carrying out violent attacks on government functionaries and whoever else they think is inimical to their interests.¹²⁵ For instance, Maoists blew up Essar Steel's 267-km iron slurry pipeline, which passes through a Maoist-held terrain and transports iron ore from Bailadila mines in Dantewada to the Visakhapatnam pellet plant, at several places in May and June 2009.¹²⁶ The repair team's vehicles were stopped and burnt by the Maoists for starting repair work without the consent of their leadership.

D. SUMMARY

Naxalite insurgency in India which started as a peasant uprising has grown to become the single largest internal threat to the nation. It has engulfed over one third of the districts in India and is spreading its tentacles into the urban sectors. The core factors of deprivation, marginalization and oppression in the absence of effective reforms have collectively added to the discontent among the tribals and rural villagers who have taken to the ideology of the Maoists which provides some form of governance where there is none.

The present status of Maoists India is that the Maoists are running parallel government of their own in many affected areas and their support among the most deprived is growing. Moreover, the incidents of violence and other attacks have increased especially since the unification of the splinter groups in 2004. The people who have faced the brunt of both the Maoists and the security forces are the innocent tribals who have been victimized by both and also by the vigilante groups like the *Salwa Judum*. They have improvised on their tactics and strategies over time to fight the security forces and have continued to cause considerable damage to infrastructure.

Reports of Maoists illustrate a refined organization and a stable hierarchy to sustain power. The Maoist resources for sustenance have included the financial networks

¹²⁵ Prassana Mohanty, "Maoists' financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows" *Governance Now*, April 7, 2010.

¹²⁶ Freny Manecksha, "Dantewada diary: Notes from Ground Zero," *The Times of India*, April 10, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Dantewada-diary-Notes-from-Ground-Zero/articleshow/5781349.cms#ixzz17BrxWirS> (accessed December 2, 2010).

of extortion and illegal taxation of industries, contractors and the tribals in the name of protection of their assets or by means of threats of destruction for non-compliance. Their manpower relies on recruits from the deprived that the state has not been able to provide for. The Maoists have developed reliable means for sustaining their operations.

In sum, Naxalism is a full blown insurgency having its self sustaining mechanisms. The failure of counterinsurgency in the majority of India's affected states is a matter of serious concern. Considering, the potential of the Maoists, with their support bases ranging from India's landless peasants, to the majority of India's tribal population, to the cities in states traditionally not affected by their insurgency, now is a critical time to analyze and correct India's defective counterinsurgency strategy. The next chapter compares the Indian and Malayan insurgencies and brings out the major drawbacks and lessons for the Indian government for better addressing of the insurgency.

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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACHES BY COUNTRIES

This chapter compares the Malayan case with the Indian central government's strategy, the main objective being to explain success and failure in countering insurgencies. The chapter will highlight the changes in counterinsurgency strategies that were followed in the Malayan case and then explain that success by analyzing the strategies across the following five independent variables: intelligence, unified command, resource control measures, capability of forces, and measures to win hearts and minds. This chapter then moves on to the Indian case, contrasting this case of failed counterinsurgency with that of the Malayan success, again focusing on these five variables.

The Malayan and Indian cases exhibit important similarities. First, both insurgencies exhibit Maoist ideological roots. Second, both operate in difficult forest terrain, in regions hard for the state to reach.¹²⁷ Third, in both cases, the insurgents rely on income from natural resource sectors. Specifically, the Malayan insurgency controlled rubber plantations, tin mines, and the timber market.¹²⁸ In India, the insurgency thrives on illegal mining and extortion of money from contractors and workers of functional mineral extraction companies.¹²⁹ Fourth, in terms of state counterinsurgency efforts, both countries made serious efforts to eliminate the insurgent groups. Both states initially used intensive police force.

Despite the similarities, the outcomes are different. While Malaya is a case of successful counterinsurgency, the Indian approach to Naxalite insurgency continues being largely unsuccessful. A large number of police forces continue to battle with the insurgents. India has unsuccessfully fought the insurgency since its resurgence in the

¹²⁷ For difficulty of forest terrain in the regions see following articles: Thomas M. Ladd, "The Malayan Communist Insurgency," *Asian Affairs* 4, no. 5 (May–Jun, 1977): 309-311; Sandeep Unnithan., "The Naxal antidote - A critical deficit in training and a crippling absence of specialized jungle warfare schools is the biggest stumbling block in the fight against Naxalism," *India Today*, April 26, 2010.

¹²⁸ Thomas M. Ladd, "The Malayan Communist Insurgency," *Asian Affairs* 4, no. 5 (May -Jun., 1977): 308.

¹²⁹ Sudha Ramachandran, "India digs deep to outflank Maoists," *Asia Times*, August 4, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH04Df04.html (accessed December 3, 2010).

1980s when organizations like the Peoples War Group were formed. The insurgency has further intensified since 2004 when CPI (Maoist) was created.¹³⁰ The Indian government's failure is all the more surprising given that the strategy undertaken in India is by some accounts based on the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign by the British.¹³¹

A. MALAYA: SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY BY THE BRITISH

In the 1950s, the British followed a combination of two strategies discussed, the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches. However, what was critical was the timing since the enemy-centric approach along with the isolation of population was applied first, followed by winning the hearts and mind strategy (the latter a population-centric approach). First, the “draining the swamp” strategy isolated the local population through forced resettlement into hamlets, denying any contact with the guerillas and thereby disrupting the resources of the Maoists including their supplies like food, weapons and manpower. Consequently, the state deprived the Maoists of access to and control of their support bases, forcing direct confrontation with British security forces.¹³² The British also used enemy-centric targeting of the insurgents in the jungles by using trained forces in small units. After achieving the locals' confidence, the British pursued socio-economic development projects, such as the construction of roads and primary health centers in the villages. In this setting, the British were able to gather intelligence from the locals that correlated with the intelligence gathered from captured insurgents

¹³⁰ Rajat Kujur, “Naxal Movement in India: A Profile,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Research Paper No. 15, September, 2008, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/848082154RP15-Kujur-Naxal.pdf (accessed December 4, 2010).

¹³¹ Ajay Sahani, “India's Maoists and the dreamscape of solutions,” South Asia Terrorism Portal Occasional Writings, march 25, 2010, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/10AS-3Seminar.htm> (accessed December 3, 2010).

¹³² John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002), 52.

and informants.¹³³ The harnessed intelligence was used to further target the Maoist insurgents and their hideouts. The communist guerilla forces sustained 3,791 casualties during the campaign.¹³⁴

The British success in Malaya despite the initial setback can be attributed to their development of a unified command structure and their use of intelligence-based small-unit operations rather than large-unit search and attack patrols in jungles. In addition, the resource control measures specifically, isolating the population in camps and thereby cutting off insurgents' access to finances, weapons, equipment and manpower and positioning trained troops, experienced in counterinsurgency, helped the British to defeat the insurgency. Furthermore, socio-economic developments along with propaganda helped capture the hearts and minds of the locals. This section covers the background and the three phases of counterinsurgency that bring out the initial failure followed by mid-course corrections in 1950 which ultimately led to success.

1. Background of the Malay Insurgency

The insurgency in Malaya, called the “emergency,” by the British lasted from 1948 to 1960 and was one of the bloodiest insurgencies fought by the British Commonwealth forces after World War II. (Figure 2 shows Malaya during the emergency).¹³⁵ The insurgency was born out of the post World War II disorder coupled with the rise of modern nationalism. The conflict also had a major ethnic dimension as the insurgent strength was centered primarily in the Chinese ethnic minority which constituted 42 percent of the population of the six Malayan federated states and Singapore. Ethnic Malays made up about 40 percent of the population and the rest were Indian immigrants and aboriginal people.¹³⁶ The largest ethnic group, the Chinese was

¹³³ Human intelligence is the intelligence primarily gathered from informers, or through trained agents who collect data from the local population.

¹³⁴ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 58.

¹³⁵ *Malayan Emergency Map, 1948-60* taken from Newzealand History website, <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/malayan-emergency-map>. (accessed September 14, 2010)

¹³⁶ Lucian Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956) 12–13.

mostly excluded from any proportional political power or influence under the Malayan federation system, which ensured that all the federated states were controlled by ethnic Malays. For instance, the Chinese were excluded from citizenship and from the status of British protected persons.¹³⁷ These policies coupled with communist organization and propaganda, set the stage for general unrest among Chinese population in Malay.



Figure 2. Malayan Emergency Map, 1948 to 1960 (From Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History [2000], <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz>)

During World War II, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was dominated by ethnic Chinese, expanded and organized its cadres. The Japanese occupation authorities singled out the Chinese community, and thousands of Chinese fled to the jungle and rural areas in response to the exceptionally harsh treatment.¹³⁸ In hiding, they became willing recruits for the MCP cadres resisting the Japanese, who also

¹³⁷ F. G. Carnell, "Malayan Citizenship Legislation," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (October, 1952): 511–517.

¹³⁸ Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (September, 1970): 61–89.

sought refuge in the jungle.¹³⁹ The MCP organized thousands of guerilla fighters who received arms and training from the British army to fight the Japanese under the name of Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).¹⁴⁰ After World War II ended in 1945, the communists were well-armed and organized and saw the opportunity to drive the British out of Malaya through a peoples' war reminiscent of Mao's teachings. Consequently, the colonial government forces and infrastructure, as well as the valuable British business interests such as tin mines and rubber plantations were targeted in a terrorist and guerilla war campaign.¹⁴¹ Members of the MPAJA then became the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), composed primarily of the communist Chinese population.¹⁴²

In the early stages of the insurgency, the insurgents were able to easily target the rural Malayan police. While the urban police forces were fairly well-trained and supervised by experienced officers, the rural police generally were organized into small, vulnerable detachments under command of Malayan non-commissioned officers as a mere symbol of government presence. The rural police were complacent and often corrupt, augmenting their salaries with small bribes extorted from the rural residents. Such a police force was incapable of mounting any action against a guerilla threat. Under attack from small insurgent bands, many such detachments surrendered their weapons without a fight.¹⁴³

The British forces counterinsurgency response between 1948 and 1960 is divided into three phases based on changing strategies. In the first phase, the state confronted the insurgency directly using large numbers of reinforcements, to flush out the terrorists from

¹³⁹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1966), 24.

¹⁴⁰ Anthony James Joes, *Guerilla Warfare, A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), 84.

¹⁴¹ Karl Hack, "Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 30, no. 1, (March 1999): 99–101.

¹⁴² Joes, *Guerilla Warfare*, 24.

¹⁴³ All information in this paragraph drawn from: James S Corum, "Training indigenous forces in counterinsurgency: a tale of two Insurgencies," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, March 2006, 7.

vast tracts of rubber and primary rainforests. This proved counterproductive as most forces were ill trained and some home guard forces indulged in extortion leading to increase in incidents of violence.¹⁴⁴ They were saved from this degrading situation that was rapidly approaching its tipping point by an experienced caucus of colonial civil servants and military officers. This cadre revised the strategy and addressed the Chinese population and their inclination to support the insurgency. The plan initially addressed the population rather than the insurgents.¹⁴⁵ Second, the state sought to defeat the insurgency from the outside-in, draining the swamp strategy which included harsh enemy-centric measures against the insurgents along with population control which involved isolating the Chinese population into hamlets away from the jungles to deny any contact with the insurgents outside the camps. These measures further helped in gaining intelligence to target the insurgents in the jungles. These control measures stabilized the situation. The third phase from 1952 to 1960 was characterized by a greatly weakened insurgency and continued application of force by security forces against the MCP. Offensive actions systematically cleared the remaining MCP holdouts.¹⁴⁶ This phase also saw population-centric measures to win hearts and minds, such as social and political reforms for the Chinese population which eventually defeated the insurgency.

2. The Initial Failed Effort (1948–1950)

In the late 1940s, the MCP launched a campaign of terror against foreign businessmen, workers in the tin and rubber industries, and state officials. These severe attacks culminated in the assassination of two high-level British subjects working in the rubber industry. Under these conditions, a state of emergency was declared in June 1948 under pressure from political leaders back in Great Britain. Under emergency rule, people could be detained for up to two years without trial and receive the death penalty for illegal weapon possession or for assisting guerrilla and, most importantly, all people over

¹⁴⁴ Hack, “Iron Claws on Malaya,” 102.

¹⁴⁵ Wade Markel, “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control,” *The Parameters* (Spring 2006): 37.

¹⁴⁶ Robert W Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (California: RAND, 1972), 17–22.

the age of 12 were issued mandatory identification cards.¹⁴⁷ The British had experience in countering insurgencies in other colonies prior to the crisis in Malaya.¹⁴⁸ Based on these experiences, they initially employed an enemy-centric approach, specifically attacking the insurgency directly through the use of conventional operations. The first step to deal with the insurgency was to expand the British forces' manpower special units to operate against the insurgents.

The separate British security forces were assigned different tasks. The police units along with the home guard vigilante groups were tasked with population control, military units were tasked to combat the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in the jungle, and auxiliary units like private security forces were tasked with protection of infrastructure. However, as the command and control of the counter-insurgency effort was not unified, each civil and military commander was responsible for his own actions and planning which proved to be detrimental in the initial years.

The police force was primarily responsible for controlling and protecting the population. However drastic expansion and training of additional police and security forces was needed before this goal could be realistically met. The British brought in W. N. Gray as commissioner of police based on his experience in Palestine.¹⁴⁹ The police capability was lacking in terms of numbers and training to deal with the MCP. The Malayan police force was expanded to 20,000 in 1949 men and to 50,000 personnel by 1951. The new police personnel were given only short basic training.¹⁵⁰ To protect the population of Malaya, the federation had only 9,000 police officers most of whom lacked an understanding of local language and culture.¹⁵¹ Moreover, owing to the shortage of police, the government authorized the establishment of village home guards, who were

¹⁴⁷ Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963* (Bristol, England: Western Printing Services Limited, 1973), 35–40.

¹⁴⁸ Riley Sunderland, *Army Operations in Malaya, 1947–1960* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1964a), 30.

¹⁴⁹ Riley Sunderland, *Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya, 1947–1960* (Santa Monica, California, :RAND Corporation, 1964d), 22.

¹⁵⁰ Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 5.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

not regular police trained in routine law enforcement and apprehension of criminals, but whose sole purpose was to aid police in carrying out population control.¹⁵² These home guards did not have uniforms and had few weapons. They served as a local vigilante force to guard the villages at night, essentially to stand shifts at the village gate or in watchtowers. By 1951, an estimated 100,000 Malaysians belonged to the home guards. Except for serving a sense of security, these home guards had minimal operational or tactical value.¹⁵³

Major General Boucher, who was in command of the military in Malaya during this time, underestimated the time and effort it would take to defeat the MCP.¹⁵⁴ To meet the armed combat requirements, the state dispatched additional Gurkha and British military units to Malaya, making it to ten battalions in all which could field 4,000 riflemen for the operations against 4,000 guerillas in the jungle.¹⁵⁵ Most units were short of key personnel, equipment and even ammunition. Most battalions lacked basic training in jungle and guerilla warfare. The state planned to conduct large-scale offensive operations as such tactics had proven successful during operations conducted in Burma. The intent was to destroy large MRLA formations in the field and prevent the guerrillas from being able to mobilize against targets of opportunity. Military battalions were deployed to areas where the guerillas were particularly entrenched to conduct search and attack operations in order to reduce MRLA activities.¹⁵⁶

Additionally, in order to provide the basic security for tin mines and rubber plantations, the mine and plantation owners raised their own private security forces to

¹⁵² Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 5.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10–12.

¹⁵⁴ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 17.

¹⁵⁵ John A Nagl, *Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 65.

¹⁵⁶ All information in this paragraph drawn from; Sunderland, *Army Operations in Malaya, 1947–1960*, 126.

guard the corporate assets, to protect their business community against insurgent extortions and attacks. The families of the British business community were specifically targeted in insurgent terrorist attacks.¹⁵⁷

The initial approach showed the futility of using sheer numbers without proper training and capability in dealing with insurgency. Also the lack of a unified command and reliable intelligence were identified as drawbacks that allowed the MRLA to have continued availability of resources from the supportive Chinese population. This realization led to the Briggs Plan from 1950 onward.

3. The Turning Point: The Briggs Plan (1950–1952)

In April 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, a successful counter-insurgency commander in Burma, was appointed as director of operations for Malaya, a new position under the high commissioner in charge of Malaya. The director of operations was granted operational control over all civil and military forces in Malaya. The Briggs plan continued the enemy-centric approach but veered from the prior strategy in that it created a unified command structure and used small unit intelligence-led operations. In addition, Briggs used a population-centric approach for population control in order to control the resources of the MRLA. Briggs attempted to defeat the insurgency from the outside-in through a series of programs that came to be known as the Briggs Plan. Several counter-insurgency experts credit as Briggs' principles used in Malaya necessary for defeating a Maoist insurgency.¹⁵⁸

Importantly, underlying Briggs' success were some additional factors, as well. British officials both civil and military including Briggs and his successor Templer had considerable experience working in Malay, through which they gained general knowledge of the country and culture, language, and geography.¹⁵⁹ In addition, one of the important innovations, and a key element of the British success in Malaya, was the

¹⁵⁷ Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 6.

¹⁵⁸ John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency* (RAND Corporation, 2008), *RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, vol. 5, 9–12.

¹⁵⁹ Markel, "Draining the Swamp," 37.

establishment of a jungle warfare training school at Kota Tinaggi in 1948 under Colonel Walter Walker.¹⁶⁰ The training focused on the terrain. The trainees were taught to employ small, jungle-savvy, light infantry patrols that could play the insurgents' game of raid and ambush on the insurgents' home ground.¹⁶¹ By 1951, 21 companies of 180 men each were trained.¹⁶² This training further improved the capacity of the forces.

The four principles of the Briggs Plan were as follows: first, to separate the insurgents from the population; second, to unify the state effort; third, to produce quality intelligence; and fourth, to launch small unit operations.¹⁶³ More importantly, Briggs realized the insurgency was based on the insurgents' link with local population.¹⁶⁴ Briggs' principles targeted each part of the insurgency and at the same time offered the population security and incentives not to support the insurgents.

Briggs established an important degree of unity of command by creating multiagency security committees that met on a daily or weekly basis at different levels of the government's unified administrative structure. At the district level, for example, the district officer led the executive committee and was therefore able to directly maintain the long-term political objectives of military operations. Each committee comprised representatives from key sectors of the government, including the police, finance ministry, civil administration such as health ministry, special intelligence, and the British army commander as well as community leaders.¹⁶⁵ With regard to the shift toward small unit operations, the state dispersed forces throughout Malay at the state and district levels by the end of 1951.¹⁶⁶

The state's capacity to collect useful intelligence also increased under Briggs' leadership. Prior to 1950, there was a serious shortage of trained intelligence officers and

¹⁶⁰ Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 8.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 9–10.

¹⁶³ Michael A Bottiglieri, "How to defeat Insurgencies: Searching for a Counterinsurgency Strategy" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 52.

¹⁶⁴ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 48–49.

¹⁶⁵ Mackinlay et al., *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 10–11.

¹⁶⁶ Sunderland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya 1947–1960*, 38.

Chinese speaking officers in Malay. After General Briggs took over the military command in 1950, he instituted a committee system of military and police cooperation from the strategic to the tactical level. The Special Branch Training School was established where all Special Branch personnel and senior police officers took courses in intelligence operations and analysis. In July 1951, the state initiated language training and intelligence reforms leading to cooperation between the intelligence agencies especially between the police and the army.¹⁶⁷

Briggs' focus on the population consisted of coercive control of the population and was critical to his success.¹⁶⁸ Briggs resettled Chinese squatter populations to locations away from the jungle.¹⁶⁹ The new villages were enclosed compounds guarded by police and military forces.¹⁷⁰ The Briggs plan limited civil rights of the villagers, including for instance freedom of movement. Further evidence of poor conditions in the villages is that roughly between a third to a quarter of the villagers died in the camps because of and despair.¹⁷¹

These population control efforts proved highly successful. By placing security forces among the population, the insurgents were forced back into the jungle.¹⁷² However, because the insurgents relied on the population for food and supplies, the guerillas were forced to return to the population when their resources ran out. As a consequence, the army's work was made easier. It no longer had to pursue the insurgents; rather the insurgents came to the army to fight and take their resources.¹⁷³ The strategy ultimately closed down the transfer of food, logistical support, and information between the insurgents and their prior support base.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁷ All information in the paragraph from: Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 10-12.

¹⁶⁸ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 48-49.

¹⁶⁹ Sunderland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1947-1960*, 35-36.

¹⁷⁰ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 50.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁷² Sunderland, *Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya 1947-1960*, 38.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

In sum, the Briggs strategy was the turning point in the counterinsurgency operations. It effectively isolated the people from insurgents, unified the overall effort and used intelligence-based targeting that proved to be successful and eventually broke the back of insurgency in Malaya.

4. Elimination of the Insurgency: Templer and Bourne Plans (1952–1960)

During this final stage of the British counterinsurgency effort, state security forces eliminated the few remaining strongholds of the insurgents. During this phase, General Templar, the high commissioner and director of operations pursued a population-centric, specifically, continuing to isolate the population and using additional hearts and minds measures. The enemy-centric part of the strategy was Templer's continued offensive operations against the insurgents that approached the villages for resource and information support. Bourne essentially continued the Templer's strategy.

With the MRLA kept in check due to the resettlement and food control programs under the Briggs Plan, Templer could afford to focus efforts on eliminating the MCP party structure through offensive actions.¹⁷⁵ He continued Briggs' effort to combine police and military intelligence efforts by placing both the military and police intelligence structures under the police service's special branch. The newly centralized intelligence organization conducted profiles and pattern analysis on the MCP leaders and units, which enabled it to map the underground networks linking the communists with the people.¹⁷⁶ This intelligence enabled the military forces that had previously limited their operations to intercepting insurgents near the villages to direct operations against the identified jungle camps.¹⁷⁷

Arguably, Templer's greatest contribution to the counterinsurgency effort was establishing "white" areas, designated or cluster of districts where state efforts were

¹⁷⁵ Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945–1963*, 86.

¹⁷⁶ Riley Sunderland, *Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1947–1960* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1964b), 19–25.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

believed to have successfully eliminated the MCP political and military presence and influence.¹⁷⁸ If the MCP activity resumed in a white area, full emergency regulations would go back into effect, in the now “black” area. The policy served as an effective deterrent for populations that might otherwise have returned to supporting the MCP after initial state efforts eliminated MCP influence. Throughout the insurgency no area that had been declared white returned to the status of black illustrating the success of the strategy.¹⁷⁹

General Bourne, second in command under Templer, was appointed director of operations in the summer of 1954. Bourne built on his predecessor’s outside-in strategy. He improved the efficiency of operations by redirecting the White Area Program to attack the insurgents’ weak areas first and then move, with momentum toward the difficult areas. Additionally, psychological operations encouraged the surrender of insurgents and reinforced the optimism of government supporters through social reforms.¹⁸⁰

5. Explaining the Success in Counterinsurgency

Having seen the counterinsurgency effort by the British against the Malayan insurgency, this section analyzes how the specific independent variables interact across the overall strategy to identify the driving variables that explain success.

The British used a combination of enemy-centric and population-centric strategies to fight the Malayan Communist Party. Initially, the enemy-centric strategy was a direct approach to confront the insurgents using large numbers of forces as in a classic military offensive. This approach proved ineffective. In contrast, General Briggs’ subsequent outside-in, indirect population-centric approach successfully separated the population from the insurgents, ultimately leading to their defeat. In order for this strategy to work, the government first needed to stop the expansion of the insurgency through these population-centric measures and then systematically destroy it through an enemy-centric

¹⁷⁸ Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution In Singapore and Malaya 1945–1963*, 194.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 21.

approach that focused on military combat against the insurgents as well as identifying and eliminating their organizational networks used for supplying the insurgency. The disruption of the Maoists' supplies of food and manpower was undertaken by the forced isolation into camps and hamlets of the Chinese population and the miners who were both found to be sympathizers with the Maoists, using overwhelming force. Based on reliable intelligence inputs, the targeting of insurgents was done using military and police forces that had been trained in jungle warfare. This approach of resettlement was the measure that had essentially taken away the initiative from the Maoists and broken the back of insurgency in Malaya.¹⁸¹

General Templer and General Bourne's plans enacted in 1952 were more biased toward a population-centric approach based on the population protection measures and activities to win hearts and minds. These plans, which continued until 1960, provided better governance and involved the state administrative agencies and police alongside the military. Their activities included local elections, provision of electricity, and other developmental projects that won the hearts and minds of the population and gradually turned them towards the government. The population-centric aspects further included social reforms such as employment and merging the Chinese squatter population into the political mainstream, thereby improving relations with the affected population.

When we analyze the specific independent variables within the broad approaches we find that unified command and intelligence were the key drivers for success of the enemy-centric approach and measures for winning hearts and minds were driving the success of population-centric part of the strategy.

The unified command provided a command and control structure at the highest level to allow better coordination and synergy between various agencies involved including intelligence, police, paramilitary forces, and the politicians to effectively deal with the insurgency. In Malaya, the centralized command under the director of operations formed the unified command. This enabled the enforcement of policies and avoided duplication of effort; it also enabled and better coordination between agencies especially

¹⁸¹ Gian P Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters* (Autumn 2009), 9–11.

in the field of intelligence. Briggs utilized the unified command to implement the reorganization of government machinery. A small Federal War Council was established to plan and coordinate the campaign at the national level, and war executive committees were utilized at the state and district levels to carry out policy. Templar unified the offices of high commissioner and director of operations, which gave him additional unified authority and he made decisive use of it. Under him, the police and the military continued to exploit the strategic advantage that resettlement had given them. The strategic framework that Briggs had established with police stations and outposts and their supporting army units was further developed.

Intelligence formed the backbone of the counterinsurgency operations in Malaya. After the initial setbacks owing to lack of specific intelligence, the British reorganized the intelligence organization.¹⁸² General Briggs had instituted the committee system of coordination at every level between the army and the police. The focus was also on generating reliable intelligence from informants and captured insurgents. The reorganization of the intelligence system led to the establishment of a special branch in August 1950 with responsibility for all emergency-related intelligence gathering. The information and psychological warfare services were strengthened by bringing in Hugh Carlton Greene, who later became the Director General of the BBC, as head of Emergency Information Services.¹⁸³ Templar gave the highest priority to intelligence; this is evident in his statement to one newspaper that emergency “will be won by our intelligence system.” Under Templer, the special branch was built up and played the decisive part in breaking the Min Yuen communist organization. While the patrols and ambushes were important, the growing network of special branch intelligence informers and agents made it possible for the successful hunting down of the elusive guerillas.

The capability of forces included the training level of the forces and the quality of their equipment. In Malaya, a new training school was established to improve the quality of training. Also many police personnel were sent to Britain which improved capability. The capability of the forces was further improved by Templar’s better tactics and

¹⁸² Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 50–51.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 51.

increased training. Large-scale sweeps were abandoned for more productive small-scale patrols and ambushes. The Jungle Warfare School in Kota Tinnagi, Jahore, established in 1948 was upgraded in 1953 to meet the guerilla requirements of the security forces.¹⁸⁴ In addition, the officer training collage was established in 1953 for the army at Port Dickson.¹⁸⁵ In a major change of tactics from the Briggs plan of systematically rolling the communists up from the South, Templar instead resolved to provide resources for intensive operations wherever the MCP appeared to be vulnerable and successful results were achieved, effectively clearing the areas where they were weakest first and then working outwards and declaring the cleared areas as “white.”

The resource control measures such as population control were about disrupting resource networks including finances, weapons, equipment and manpower. The resettlement program launched in June 1950 to disrupt the supporting networks was carried out with remarkable speed and urgency and by the beginning of 1952 over 400,000 people had been resettled in some 400 new villages. As resettlement was an emergency measure, it was carried out with the use of overwhelming force to prevent any escape or resistance. Also as a security measure, regrouping of the estate and mine labors who were sympathetic towards the guerillas was undertaken affecting about 650,000 people. Like the resettlements, the workers were concentrated in barbed wire enclosed compounds that were effectively controlled and policed. Based on the intelligence generated, the British were able to target the supporting networks. The resettlement of local Chinese population into government-run camps denied the insurgents their primary source of food and other supplies, which forced them to venture out of their jungle hideouts to procure essential resources.¹⁸⁶

In Malaya, after the fighting potential of the MCP was largely destroyed, the emphasis was on population-centric, measures to win hearts and minds, such as employment, construction of roads, representation of minorities in state affairs and integrating the Chinese populations into mainstream. From 1952 onward, the government

¹⁸⁴ Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 8.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸⁶ All information in the paragraph drawn from Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 50–51.

gradually gained the upper hand as the shift from a predominantly “search and destroy” approach to a new “hearts and minds” strategy began to take effect.¹⁸⁷ Another aspect of this variable was perception management. Toward this end, huge quantities of leaflets were dropped on the jungle and voice aircraft were used to broadcast to the guerillas, sometimes referring to them individually and urging them to surrender; this had an inevitable effect once it became clear that the MRLA was on the retreat. In 1953 alone the RAF dropped 54 million leaflets on the jungle.¹⁸⁸ Also, the surrender policy was made attractive, which encouraged many to lay down arms and surrender. These methods proved to be effective for the British campaign. The social and political reforms undertaken resulted in the reduction of unemployment and a rise in living standards which inevitably undermined the revolutionary politics appeal. In addition, as Karl Hack argues, the British used coercion of the population to manage perceptions during the early phase, along with the enemy-centric approach, and later used the hearts and minds approach after the insurgency was controlled.¹⁸⁹

When we view the success of the counterinsurgency in Malaya, Briggs halted the insurgency, Templer broke its spirit, and Bourne eliminated it. When seen from the basic strategy point of view, it was a combined strategy of enemy-centric and population-centric approaches that succeeded. More specifically, the independent variables, unified command and intelligence, stand out as the driving variables explaining success in the Malayan insurgency especially for the enemy-centric aspects of the strategy and measures for winning hearts and minds in the population-centric part of the strategy.

¹⁸⁷ Paul Dixon, “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 368.

¹⁸⁸ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 52–55.

¹⁸⁹ Karl Hack, *Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and Ethnicity*, in *Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism*, ed. H. Antlov and S. Tonnesson (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1995), 95.

B. NAXALISM IN INDIA: A COUNTERINSURGENCY STRUGGLE IN PROGRESS

Maoist insurgency or Naxalism started in India in 1967 in the state of West Bengal. The initial insurgency was suppressed by government forces using harsh measures by the early 1970s. However, the insurgency resurfaced in the 1980s, with groups such as the PWG of Andhra Pradesh and the MCC of Bihar. The 1990s were a consolidation period for the insurgents, during which they increased their number of combatants, their violence and their number of supporters across the country. In the current decade, especially since the 2004 merger of the two major groups (PWG and MCC) to form CPI (Maoist), the violence has substantially increased in spite of ongoing government counterinsurgency efforts since 2000 (see Figure 3 and Table 2).¹⁹⁰




Figure 3. Areas Affected by Maoist Insurgency in India-April 2009 (From Institute of Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org>)

¹⁹⁰ Map drawn from Site of Institute of Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap.htm> (accessed September 28, 2010)

This section will look at the counterinsurgency efforts of India in three time frames: 1967 to 1980, 1980 to 2000, and 2000 to 2009. These time frames have been chosen primarily based on the changes in counterinsurgency approach by the state. In the first phase, a strong enemy-centric approach suppressed the insurgency. From 1980 onwards, the strategy changed to a more population-centric developmental approach as the insurgency was splintered and uprisings were being dealt with by the state governments using the state police forces. In the current decade, the strategy has again shifted to an enemy-centric approach especially since 2004 when CPI (Maoist) was formed. The focus of the study is on the third phase of the counterinsurgency. Unlike in the Malayan case, we see a lack of a unified command across the time frames in India, a lack of intelligence-led operations, and an insufficient focus on resource control measures.

1. Initial Gains: Suppressive Approach (1967–1980)

The initial response to Naxalism in India was highly enemy-centric with some population centric measures. The first incidents of Naxalite activity in Naxalbari were met with a stern reaction by government authorities and were squashed by late 1967. In 1969, the movement erupted again in West Bengal with the murder of landlords, the redistribution of property and the cancellation of peasants' debts, but this uprising was stopped in early 1970 only to flare up and be violently extinguished once again that same year. In 1971 the Naxal movement started losing its momentum with about 50,000 CPI (ML) members in jail and continued targeting of the Naxalites. For instance, in one incident 150 Naxalites were targeted near Calcutta. In 1972, security forces succeeded in capturing the movement's pre-eminent leaders including Charu Mazumdar, whose death in custody in July 1972 signaled the end of the Naxalite movement in West Bengal¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ All information in this paragraph is drawn from : Sarabjit Kaur, "Towards Understanding Naxalism," *Mainstream Weekly* 48, no. 12 (March 10, 2010), <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1953.html> (accessed October 11, 2010).

This strategy was called a “carrot and stick” approach. The President’s Rule (an administrative device under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, allows the center to assume executive authority in a state if the ruling government can no longer form a majority in the state legislature) was imposed in West Bengal from March 1970 until March 1972 except for three months in between.¹⁹² This rule gave the government the freedom to pursue the Naxalites aggressively, which it did with efficiency and heavy-handed tactics.¹⁹³ With the stick of the security forces augmented by the carrot of cursory development and land reforms, the initial outbreak of Naxal violence was quashed in a little over a year. Rural economic and development initiatives undercut the Maoists’ support, and what remained of the movement was all but destroyed by government security actions.¹⁹⁴ The movement also emerged in a significant way in 1968 in the northern parts of Andhra Pradesh, where guerrillas seized property, killed landlords and engaged in acts of terror.¹⁹⁵ It was met with a swifter and heavy response and was quelled there by early 1970.¹⁹⁶ During the emergency period from 1975 to 1977, the security crackdowns also hit the Naxalite movement hard, and the movement was nearly destroyed by the center’s expanded powers during the emergency.¹⁹⁷ Like most other opposition groups, all Naxalite organizations were banned and scores of leaders and party activists were rearrested under the newly instituted Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA).¹⁹⁸ Among them were some of the Maoists’ most effective organizers, including Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee, and Satyanarayan Singh.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, the security

¹⁹² Data taken from Government of India, Constitution of India, Ministry of Laws and Justice, <http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html> (accessed December 05, 2010).

¹⁹³ Jawaid, Sohail. *The Naxalite Movement in India: Origin and Failure of the Maoist Revolutionary Strategy in West Bengal 1967–1971* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1979), 83–84.

¹⁹⁴ Prakash Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2006), 99–100.

¹⁹⁵ Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, 45–81.

¹⁹⁶ Sankar Ghosh, *The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist Experiment* (Calcutta: Firma K.L.Mukhopadhyay, 1974), 84.

¹⁹⁷ Ajay Mehra, “Naxalism in India: Revolution or Terror?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12, no. 2 (2000): 51–52.

¹⁹⁸ Sumanta Banerjee, *India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1984), 297.

¹⁹⁹ Singh, *The Naxalite Movement in India*, 211–212.

forces were given wide latitude in dealing with any opposition that escaped the prison.²⁰⁰ After the emergency, the Janata party government's promise to undo the excesses of the emergency resulted in the release of hundreds of Naxalite prisoners all across the country in 1977 and 1978, as well as the legalization of most of their organizations, and the easing of pressure by government security forces.²⁰¹ While this ultimately had the effect of moderating several factions and co-opting them into the political process, it also provided an opportunity for the more hard-core cadres who resumed their subversive activities.²⁰²

In the initial stages of the insurgency, primarily enemy-centric repressive measures by the government coupled with population-centric reforms and development crushed the uprising before it attained any substantial strength. Moreover, in the initial phase, the movement was not using guerilla tactics which allowed the state forces like police to take necessary action without any special training or intelligence effort to identify the members of the movement.

2. The Failing Years: Developmental Strategy (1980–2000)

During this period, the counterinsurgency response by India was more population-centric with a focus towards development; the weak enemy-centric part of the response use of police forces that treated Naxalism as a law and order problem. Responses differed from state to state. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh the response was more enemy-centric (see Chapter IV), while in West Bengal, it was more population-centric. When the Indian National Congress party returned to power in New Delhi in 1980, it did not resume its previous repressive enemy-centric activities against the Naxalites. In part, this was due to the still weak state of the movement and the repressive measures of emergency period were viewed negatively across the country which made congress lose popular support during the 1977 elections.²⁰³ More importantly, however, the government already had its

²⁰⁰ Mehra, "Naxalism in India: Revolution or Terror," 51–52.

²⁰¹ Singh, *The Naxalite movement in India*, 122.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Myron Weiner, "The 1977 Parliamentary elections in India," *Asian Survey* 17, no. 7 (July 1977): 619–621.

hands full with the growing unrest in Punjab and the Northeast in the 1980s as well as the political unrest that occurred across the country following the emergency.²⁰⁴ Through the 1980s, Naxalite violence was sufficiently low at the national level, to permit the central government to largely dismiss it as a state law and order problem, though some states experienced high levels of insurgent violence, for instance Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.²⁰⁵

The non-Congress administration that emerged in Andhra Pradesh proved quite successful in dealing with Naxalism alone without the central government's support. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh pursued a combination of enemy-centric and socio-economic development initiatives that constrained Naxalite activity to a few isolated pockets.²⁰⁶ Moreover, apart from using the regular state police, Andhra Pradesh formed the Greyhound, an elite police commando force in 1989 as an anti-Naxal arm of its police force; the Greyhound force was trained in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare. It is pertinent to note that after the initial crackdown in the 1970s, most Naxalites moved to the forests of north Andhra Pradesh and southern Madhya Pradesh (present day state of Chhattisgarh). (Chapter IV analyzes in more detail the cases of Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh.)

Since the 1990s, however, shifts in Indian politics such as the emergence of coalition governments have handicapped the central government's efforts to eliminate Naxalism.²⁰⁷ The persistent weakness and fragility of India's coalition governments constrained state capacity to addressing domestic security concerns, a situation compounded by New Delhi's initial reluctance to acknowledge the growing problem of

²⁰⁴ For political unrest post emergency see: Davidson R. Gwatk, "Political Will and Family Planning: The Implications of India's Emergency Experience," *Population and Development Review* 5, no. 1 (March 1979): 29-59.

²⁰⁵ Keith J Harnetiaux, "The Resurgence of Naxalism: How Great a Threat to India?" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, June 2008), 70-71.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 109.

²⁰⁷ For example of limitations of coalition government in dealing with Naxals see: NDTV Correspondent, "BJP Attacks Divided Government over Naxal strategy," NDTV.com, <http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/bjp-attacks-divided-govt-over-naxal-strategy-20078.php> (accessed December 3, 2010).

Naxalite violence.²⁰⁸ Consequently, the level of coordination among the security and intelligence organizations remained remarkably low during the period highlighting the lack of a unified command.²⁰⁹ This resulted in generally incoherent anti-Naxal policymaking and prevented the formation of a concerted national strategy to address the insurgency.²¹⁰ Changes in the center-state relationship based on the party in power also influenced the ability of local governments to confront the Maoists' activity.²¹¹ In India the responsibility for matters of internal security is constitutionally devolved to the individual states.²¹²

During this period, the only positive effort against Naxalism were the strong enemy-centric measures taken by the Andhra Pradesh state government using its elite police commandos and state intelligence agencies. As analyzed in more detail in Chapter IV, the late 1990s, especially since 1997 under the administration of Chief Minister Naidu saw the state of Andhra Pradesh aggressively pursuing the Maoists using the elite Greyhounds in the Nallamalla jungles of north Andhra and bordering regions with other states. In almost all the other states the approach was of enhanced policing. At the national level, like in the previous phase, there was no clear strategy to deal with the insurgency primarily because the gradual growing threat was not appreciated in its entirety. There was no unified command structure or intelligence organization like the one in the Malayan case under the British. While the state police capabilities were improved by Andhra Pradesh, the other states continued to use their regular state police without any specialized training.

3. Combined Center-State Failure: An Incoherent Strategy (2000 to 2009)

During this period, there was once again a change in strategy from a population-centric to a more enemy-centric approach at the center. The gradual growth of Naxalism

²⁰⁸ NDTV Correspondent, "BJP Attacks Divided Government over Naxal strategy," 90.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ NDTV Correspondent, "BJP Attacks Divided Government over Naxal strategy," 109.

²¹¹ Harnetiaux, "The Resurgence of Naxalism," 109.

²¹² Ibid.

in isolated jungles got a boost in 2000, with the creation of separate states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand out of the tribal regions in the states of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar respectively. The creation of new states allowed the situation to worsen as the two states had substantial tribal and marginalized populations coupled with inexperienced and weak new administrations that proved incapable of dealing with the problem.²¹³ Due to economic poverty and rampant corruption, these states became top strongholds of the Maoists who exploited these very drawbacks of the government to their advantage.²¹⁴ Today these states are among the worst Naxal affected states in India.²¹⁵ Overall across India, this period saw a rapid growth in Naxalite incidents and consequent deaths (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Naxalite Incidents and Deaths in India 2000-2009(After Government of India, MHA Annual report 2008–09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

During this period, the politics of coalition governments at the center interfered with the formation of a comprehensive anti-Naxal strategy. Moreover, earlier Naxalism was contained within a fewer number of states; in contrast, the expanded nature of the conflict now crossed state boundaries. This new situation meant that the Naxalites took

²¹³For details of problems arising out of creating the two new states see: Forum Alert “India-the Naxalite insurgency,” European interagency security forum, June 21, 2010, <http://www.eisf.eu/alerts/item.asp?n=9591> (accessed December 5, 2010).

²¹⁴Jairus Banaji, “The Ironies of Indian Maoism,” *International Socialism*, Issue 128, <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=684&issue=128> (accessed December 5, 2010).

²¹⁵ For details of Naxalite incidents and deaths see Table 2.

advantage of the prevailing environment both at centre and limitations of state jurisdictions. The center focused on liberal economic policies and chose to sideline the problem until the merger of the two major Maoist outfits, the MCC of Bihar and PWG of Andhra Pradesh in end 2004, when the violence escalated.²¹⁶ Continuing with the enemy-centric approach, the center's responses became more intensive in the affected states after 2005. For instance, at the state level during this period, the Greyhound police commando campaign in Andhra Pradesh was seeing intensive operations while in neighboring Chhattisgarh, the state government had opted for a vigilante solution in the form of the *Salwa Judum* campaign after 2005.

During the first part of the decade, the central government took the position that Naxalism was primarily a state law and order problem, and therefore, left the states to find their own ways of dealing with Naxalism, which varied with the party in power as well as the level of insurgent threat. For instance, in Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), the government took a hard stance however when the Congress government came back to power in 2004, the first decision was to initiate talks with Naxalites. This shift in behavior could be explained by the May 2004 state elections, when the Naxalites used their influence among the local population to vote against the TDP, making the Congress indebted. However after CPI(Maoist) was formed and Naxalite attacks increased, the Andhra state government changed stance and continued with the hard counterinsurgency measures with Greyhound police commandos and achieved substantial success.²¹⁷

After these early years, later on in the decade, the central government shifted toward a more hard-line stance against the insurgents. In 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called Naxalism the single largest internal security threat to India

²¹⁶ The Times of India, "MCC, PWG merge to form new party," October 14, 2004, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/MCC-PWG-merge-form-new-party/articleshow/885191.cms> (accessed December 5, 2010).

²¹⁷ Piratala, Maoists: a threat to internal security, 31.

during meeting with chief ministers of Naxal affected states.²¹⁸ Similarly, at the Chief Ministers' Conference on Internal Security in New Delhi in December 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in his closing remarks, "affected states must set up special task forces on the Andhra Pradesh pattern and the center would provide assistance for this purpose. I would also urge the Ministry of Home Affairs to also consider establishing a dedicated, trained force at the center either as part of an existing force or as a separate one." This showed the intent of improving the capability of the forces in dealing with the Maoists.

In spite of the central government's new focus on the insurgency, it was still at the state level where counterinsurgency efforts were defined and carried out. For example, resource control measures at the state level have varied. In Andhra the focus was on targeting the insurgent resources and their supporters based on intelligence inputs while in Chhattisgarh, the method employed was population control by moving large populations into government-run camps as was done in Malaya.²¹⁹ The population control measures for disrupting resources of insurgents have proved to be ineffective in India, as the Maoists are not entirely dependent on the tribal population of a given state unlike in Malaya where the insurgents were dependent on the ethnic Chinese population for resources.²²⁰ Moreover with the spread of the insurgency to neighboring states, the isolation of the population in one state would fail to control the problem across state boundaries where the Maoists operate.²²¹

There were some efforts towards winning hearts and minds of the affected population. While these measures were a good step, they were limited. For example, in December 2007, the prime minister declared only 33 districts in eight of the affected

²¹⁸ From the text of Speech by Indian Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh for the 2nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers about Naxalism on April 13, 2006, on the Government of India Press Information Bureau Website at: http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp (accessed April 10, 2010).

²¹⁹ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 50.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

²²¹ *The Economist*, "A Spectre Haunting India," August 17, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/7799247> (accessed December 4, 2010).

states had been chosen to bring about socio-economic development.²²² Today the insurgency is spread to over 220 districts out of the 626 districts of India.²²³ Not only were the hearts and minds measures limited, but inter-state coordination in terms of intelligence sharing was also weak.²²⁴ The Naxalites exploited this weakness by crossing state borders to conduct their activities.²²⁵

Importantly, during the second half of the decade, the central government has taken initiative to lead a national-level counterinsurgency effort, and there has also been an increase in coordination among state-level actors. Though it is worthwhile to review these efforts in this section, it is also critical to note that they have been limited in that counterinsurgency in India continues to lack a unified command, in contrast to the Malayan case.

The central government's anti-Naxal initiatives included the establishment of the Naxal Management Division (NMD). It was created within the Ministry of Home Affairs in October 2006 to effectively tackle the Naxalite threat by improving co-ordination between the ministry and the various affected states.²²⁶ It is headed by its own additional secretary, and includes on its staff both senior bureaucrats of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and officials of the Indian Police Service (IPS).²²⁷ In addition, an inter-ministerial group also headed by its own secretary was created in the MHA to review, monitor and ensure the implementation of the government's scheme for socio-economic development. A meeting of chief ministers held in September 2006 decided to set up an empowered group of ministers, headed by the home minister and comprising select

²²² Jane's Intelligence Review, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," Terrorism and Insurgency section, posted on May 15, 2008.

²²³ Siddharth Srivastava, "India probes Maoists' foreign links," Asia Times, November 11, 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK11Df03.html (accessed December 3, 2010).

²²⁴ Devyani Srivastava, "Review of Chief Ministers' conference on Naxalism," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, August 21, 2009, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/2954.html> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²²⁵ Col. Chander Malhotra (Retd.), "Red Terror," South Asia Defense and Strategic Review, February 10, 2010, <http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frnArticleDetails.aspx> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²²⁶ From the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual report 2006-07, 32, <http://www.mha.nic.in/pdf/ar0607-Eng.pdf> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²²⁷ Jane's Intelligence Review, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," Terrorism and Insurgency section, posted on May 15, 2008.

Union ministers and chief ministers, to closely monitor the spread of Naxalism and develop effective strategies.²²⁸ These steps have improved the coordination to an extent. However, in terms of interstate cooperation and intelligence capabilities at the grass root level the gaps still exist. While these initiatives highlight the realization for a better organized command and control structure, a unified command with suitable authority has yet to be formed.

Efforts are being made to improve coordination between agencies. Given New Delhi's current enemy-centric perspective of the Maoist insurgency, the government has sought to improve co-ordination between its federal agencies and state security forces. A task force headed by the Special Secretary for Home Affairs aims to increase co-ordination among the various state police, as well as between these forces, the Intelligence Bureau and the central paramilitary forces deployed in counter-Maoist operations.²²⁹ For instance, the horizontal and vertical inter-agency co-operation has led to critical information sharing, which contributed to the discovery of the Maoist joint arms production and research and development unit in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh on January 10, 2007, and another arms-making unit in Rourkela, Orissa in the same month.²³⁰ While such coordination efforts are a welcome step, there is a large scope for improvement especially with reliable intelligence gathering ability. The incident highlights the importance of intelligence as the key variable in the counterinsurgency effort.

Better intelligence and information sharing between the states is being attempted. The states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal have decided to share intelligence and information and to coordinate with each other's police forces in adjoining border areas via a proposed unified command as per the Union Home Minister,

²²⁸ Ajay K Mehra, "Naxal Taming, without Success, Indian Express, December 26, 2007, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/naxaltaming-without-success/254159> (accessed November 29, 2010).

²²⁹ Janes Information Group, "Red storm rising-India's intractable Maoist insurgency," Jane's Intelligence Review, Terrorism and Insurgency section, May 15, 2008.

²³⁰ P.V. Ramana, "Rockets and rocket launchers now in Maoist arsenal," South Asia Monitor, March 12, 2008, <http://paulsoren.wordpress.com/2008/03/14> (accessed December 2, 2010).

P Chidambaram.²³¹ In the past similar co-ordination between the CRPF, the Provincial Armed Constabulary of Uttar Pradesh and the Bihar police, led to the seizure on December 29, 2007 of 11 kg of RDX, 176 gelatin sticks, 10 bundles of fuse wire, dry cells, and 10 container bombs from a rebel arms dump in the Lekherula forests, in Uttar Pradesh, on the state's eastern borders with Bihar and Jharkhand.²³² While the coordination is improving there is a lot more to be desired in terms of sharing of intelligence between states and agencies and the cross-state border operations of the Maoists highlight the need for a unified command that will enable better intelligence sharing.

A number of committees are set up to further improve critical communication between the center and the states. There is a co-ordination center, headed by the Secretary for Home Affairs, which includes as members director generals of police and the chief secretaries of the affected states.²³³ Above this is an inter-ministerial group, a high-level committee comprising secretaries of various ministries such as home affairs, law, tribal welfare, forests and representatives of the Planning Commission to outline plans to comprehensively address Maoism.²³⁴ There also exists a similarly composed empowered group of ministers, headed by the minister for home affairs and including some chief ministers of the affected states.²³⁵ At the highest level is the conference of chief ministers of Maoist-affected states, which has met twice annually since 2006 and is chaired by the Home Affairs minister.²³⁶ Formation of these committees is a positive step towards better interaction. However, critically, these committees have not been merged into one unified command for operations.

²³¹ Daily News and Analysis, "Four States to have Unified Command against Naxalism," July 14, 2010.

²³² Janes Information Group, "Red storm rising."

²³³ PV Ramanna, "Spreading Naxalism-Napping government, Indian Defense Review 22, no. 1 (Jan-March 2007).

²³⁴ As per Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual report 2006-07, 30-32, <http://www.mha.nic.in/pdf/ar0607-Eng.pdf> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

4. Explaining the Failure of the Indian Counterinsurgency

This section highlights the factors that underlay the failure of Indian counterinsurgency efforts before 2009. Then it shows how the five independent variables interact with each other and with the Indian approach in comparison to the Malayan approach.

After the initial repression using enemy-centric measures in the first phase when the insurgency was in its early stage, the effort against Naxalism in the 1980s and 1990s showed complacency with the center focusing on development and on other insurgencies and economic liberalization especially since the 1990s. This period gave Naxalism the required time to grow in terms of numbers and strength which is reflected in their activities in the current decade. Inability to contain this growth has allowed the spread of the insurgency to other states that were previously never affected. In most respects, it appears that India is presently confronted with more internal challenges to countering the Naxalite threat than it experienced at any time in past. Administrative confusion and inertia at the national level, persistent corruption and governance problems at the state level and systemic political changes at all levels are conspiring to constrain the state's freedom of action and prevent it from confronting the Maoists as aggressively as it did in the past.²³⁷

With weak center-state relationship, in light of the resurgent Maoist threat over the decades, the ability of states to independently counter the insurgency is increasingly suspect. The proliferation of regional and state-level political parties after 1991 further strained center-state relations. The states have so far proven incapable of coordinating their current anti-Naxal efforts with any administration in New Delhi. Inter-state cooperation remains similarly elusive. Though political competition is an important part of this problem, another contributing factor is the poor level of governance in many of the Naxal-affected areas, as incompetent leadership sabotages efforts to synchronize policies across state lines.²³⁸ This persistent maladministration particularly in Bihar,

²³⁷ Harnetiaux, "The Resurgence of Naxalism," 92.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa severely undermines these states' ability to fight the insurgency in other ways, as well. A dearth of effective local government leaves an administrative vacuum that the Naxalites are able to exploit, while rampant corruption and the misallocation of resources contribute to popular unrest in the countryside. With development initiatives failing and their police forces under funded, many of these states are turning to poorly supervised vigilante groups to counter the Maoists, usually only exacerbating an already volatile situation. While Andhra Pradesh has been successful in its fight against the Naxalites, the less than salutary efforts by most of the other affected states leave little hope that the current insurgency can be checked by their efforts alone.

The increased violence in the current decade both in terms of Naxal incidents and consequent deaths indicates the failure of the counterinsurgency approach. With the exception of Andhra Pradesh which was able to control the Naxalite violence substantially, all the other affected states have seen growth in the violence. The worst-affected states are Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Currently in India, 16 of the 28 states are affected by Naxalism to different degrees. In the past decade, violence by the Naxal movement has cost thousands of lives. See Table 2 for state wise details of Naxal incidents and deaths.²³⁹

²³⁹Data for the table taken from Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2008-09, available online at: [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)0910.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)0910.pdf) (accessed December 1, 2010).

Table 2. Naxalite Incidents and Deaths 2000–2009 (From Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Reports 2008-09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

STATE	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Andhra Pradesh	461 (180)	346 (96)	575 (139)	310 (74)	532 (206)	183 (180)	138 (90)	92 (46)	66 (18)
Bihar	169 (111)	239 (117)	249 (127)	323 (171)	183 (94)	107 (51)	135 (69)	164 (73)	232 (72)
Chhattisgarh	105 (37)	304 (55)	254 (74)	352 (83)	380 (165)	715 (462)	582 (435)	620 (242)	529 (290)
Jharkhand	355 (200)	353 (157)	341 (117)	379 (169)	308 (118)	310 (144)	482 (170)	484 (207)	742 (208)
Maharashtra	34 (7)	83 (29)	74 (31)	84 (15)	95 (53)	98 (61)	94 (30)	68 (22)	154 (93)
Orissa	30 (11)	68 (11)	49 (15)	50 (46)	42 (14)	44 (23)	67 (24)	103 (101)	266 (67)
Other States	54 (18)	72 (17)	48 (10)	50 (46)	54 (19)	52 (29)	67 (17)	21 (4)	5 (0)
Total	1208 (564)	1465 (482)	1590 (513)	1533 (566)	1594 (669)	1509 (950)	1565 (835)	1591 (721)	2258 (908)

Lack of a cohesive national strategy to deal with Naxalism is most important factor which explains the Indian failure. The only approach used was to direct the states to deal with the problem treating it as a law and order problem. Since 2004, when the violence by the Maoists increased, the state governments have fought the insurgency using different approaches without much guidance in terms of policy from the center. This is another key factor for failure. As compared to the Malayan case, where the population-centric measures for winning hearts and minds were undertaken only once the fighting potential of the MRLA was substantially reduced, in India, developmental measures were tried before the combat capability of the insurgents was reduced. In fact,

the funds towards these development projects in many cases have aided the fighting potential of the Maoists through the extortion rackets, corruption in the government system.²⁴⁰

Inconsistent response by the Indian government is another factor in the failure. The ruling party in power at the state lays down its guidelines for dealing with the insurgency. The state's ability to counter the Naxalite threat varied over the three phases. These fluctuations were largely determined by India's broader political context, specifically the central and state governments' freedom of action and relative levels of policy coordination. Given the proliferation of new parties and the evolution of political dynamics in recent decades, it should come as no surprise that dealing with Naxalism is more complicated now than in the past. In comparison, in Malaya, the consistency in following the strategy of Briggs by Templar and Bourne which eventually led to success.

Institutional professionalism is lacking within the politicians in some states which undermines the ability to deal with the problem in totality. In the case of India, this is owing to the corruption and the nexus of some local politicians with the Maoists in the mineral industry and other small businesses, and owing to vote bank politics, wherein the tribal community, who have substantial numbers in some states, vote based on the directive of the Maoists. These issues highlight the lack of political consensus to fight the problem. Moreover, the coalition politics at times have had their own dynamics, resulting in decisions being more accommodative than practical as was seen when UPA government came to power in 2004 due to an alliance with the CPI (Marxist).²⁴¹

India has not dealt effectively with the military capability and guerrilla tactics of the Maoists with their well established sustenance networks of finance, weapons and manpower. This challenge calls for a sustained enemy centric approach with intelligence

²⁴⁰ For instance, the golden quadrilateral highway construction project of the government has become a huge source of money for the Maoists through extortion of the contractors and workers. For details see: Ajit Kumar Singh, "Red Money," Outlook India, April 05, 2010, <http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?264950> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²⁴¹ For details see report by Havard WorldMUN 2011, "Special meeting of the Indian Cabinet on Security," (scheduled March 11-14, 2011 at Singapore), 8, <http://www.worldmun.org/admin/scripts/uploaded/Indian%20Cabinet%20on%20Security.pdf> (accessed December 4, 2010).

led operations. The failure thus far is indicative of the limitations of police capability at the state level in terms of training and tactics to deal with jungle based guerilla fighters. This also highlights the lack of intelligence organization from the grassroots. While additional training facilities are being established for training in jungle warfare and counterinsurgency for the police, they have yet to translate on ground in terms of successful operations. The tactics of small unit operations in jungles with trained personnel proved effective against the MRLA guerillas.

The presence of mining industries and the use of substantial funds to improve infrastructure, and progress development projects have indirectly aided in India's counterinsurgency failure. The money pumped into mining and development projects for winning hearts and minds is adding to the growth of the insurgency as this money indirectly feeds the extortion markets of protection. The largest contributors to this problem are the mining industries operating in these Naxal affected areas that overlap with the richest mineral belts of India. Also, the contractors of development projects either have nexus with the Maoists or pay substantial amounts as protection tax from Maoist attacks. This again points to the importance of reducing the fighting potential of insurgents through enemy-centric methods before population-centric development measures are undertaken to win hearts and minds.

Apart from the factors above, when viewed from the perspective of the independent variables, and how they vary across the Indian case in comparison with the Malayan case, we see that lack of unified command with suitable policymaking authority at the national level and intelligence capability (both of gathering and of sharing between states) stand out as the key variables explaining failure. The use of measures to win hearts and minds before the insurgency is controlled by strong enemy-centric measures is an additional contributing factor.

In regard to the intelligence variable, in India, limited intelligence is being generated by the state intelligence agencies, and there is also a lack of coordination between states and of reliability of the generated intelligence. The counterinsurgency operations continue to incorporate methods such as search and attack with large formations. These operations rely on finding insurgents using search methods than on

reliable and actionable intelligence. Moreover, states have different approaches to intelligence gathering. While some like Andhra Pradesh have a dedicated special branch, the rest have relied only on state police intelligence. In addition, sharing of intelligence between states and agencies is limited to certain instances rather than being regular as a matter of policy. In contrast, for the British in Malaya, intelligence was the backbone of the counterinsurgency operations. After, the initial setbacks owing to lack of specific intelligence, the British restructured the intelligence organization by forming a special branch. General Briggs had instituted the committee system of coordination at every level between the army and the police, with a focus on generating reliable intelligence from informants and captured insurgents. In all, the lack of accurate and reliable intelligence comes out as a key variable explaining failure of Indian counterinsurgency operations.

Unified command is required for better command and control structure and to bring about policy decisions to deal with the insurgency at the highest level. This further improves coordination and synergy between the various agencies involved including intelligence, police, paramilitary forces, and politicians. In the British case, this was achieved by having a central command under the director of operations which was later merged with the head of commission. This avoided duplication of effort and enabled the enforcement of policies and better coordination between agencies especially in the field of intelligence. In India, as the insurgency is primarily being fought at the state level, with different states having different political parties in power, there is a dilution of central policy. Even at the state level, in many states it is basically the police forces that have controlled the actions with their own state intelligence and with minimal support of politicians and other intelligence agencies. There was a clear lack of coordination in the conduct of operations. Better intelligence sharing and unified command are interrelated and not independent of each other. Also, while unified command at state level alone can prove effective within the state as was the case in Andhra Pradesh, it would end up spilling the problem to other states. At the national level, initiatives like the formation of NMD and other committees only improve coordination and do not form policy. Until the created organizations have the authority for policy implementation, they serve a limited purpose.

The capability of forces is another variable where considerable shortcomings were felt in India. While the effort for improving the training, tactics and equipment capability of the forces exists, the time lag is large before it shows any effect on ground. Also in terms of the numbers, the personnel trained in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare are limited considering the strength of the armed guerillas though many more are undergoing training. Also the use of untrained state sponsored vigilante groups to meet the shortage of personnel has further complicated the problem and made it even worse. When compared to the case of the British, new schools were established to improve the quality of training. Many of the police personnel were sent to Britain and the home guards and other auxiliary police forces that were initially raised were disbanded later as they were creating more hindrance to countering insurgents. Even if India's capability is built up over time, without reliable intelligence to lead the operations, the capability would not make any substantial change in the outcome. Hence this variable is to be viewed in relation to corresponding capability of intelligence agencies.

The resource control measures variable is about controlling the resources reaching the insurgents including finances, weapons and explosives. In the Malayan case, the British were able to target the resource networks based on the intelligence. Also, as they had moved large numbers of the Chinese local population into government run camps, the primary source of food and other supplies to the insurgents was denied which caused the insurgents to venture out of their hideouts to fight for essential resources. In the Indian case, the networks of the Naxalites extend well beyond state boundaries; hence the disruption of networks and tracking of sympathizers is a problem beyond the state. Also, due to limited sharing of intelligence between states, the insurgent resources have continued to thrive although there have been a few cases of successful targeting of logistic and weapon dumps of Maoists. Population control measures are ineffective at the state level owing to sheer numbers of people to be controlled and the spread of insurgency beyond state borders. The Maoists have only limited dependence on any one state population. On the other hand resource control measures focusing on insurgent

resource networks proved effective in the state of Andhra Pradesh. As with the capability of forces, resource control is possible only in conjunction with having reliable intelligence to support the operations.

Winning hearts and minds is another key variable that is not directly dependent on any other variable but is linked in terms of the timing of these measures in relation to the effectiveness of other counterinsurgency efforts. In the Indian case, while substantial funds have been given by the center to the states for undertaking developmental activities, as these activities are being undertaken early on in the affected regions before the violence is reduced, and thus most projects are getting stalled or have not been completed. Those projects that are completed are being targeted by the insurgents, who want to avoid losing their control over the local population. Moreover, with the Maoists still operating almost with impunity and running their parallel government in many districts, the developmental projects have become the major source of extortion for the Maoists and government funds are being used against them in an indirect way. Except for Andhra Pradesh, where these measures were successful, there are few worthwhile developmental activities in the affected regions of the other states. In Malaya, after the back of MCP was broken in General Briggs administration, the emphasis was on population-centric measures such as employment, road construction, representation of minorities in state affairs and the integration of the Chinese populations into the mainstream. From 1952 onward, the government gradually gained the upper hand as the hearts and minds approach began to take effect.²⁴² Another aspect of winning hearts and minds is perception management. In the Malayan case, millions of leaflets were dropped to separate the sympathizers from the insurgents. In addition older methods were used, like loud speakers using the surrendered insurgent to give messages were used. Also the surrender policy was made attractive. These methods proved to be effective for the British campaign. In India, although some measures were taken, they are more localized and limited to some states considering the vastness of the area in which the Maoists

²⁴² Dixon, "Hearts and Minds," 368.

operate, these measures are insufficient. Moreover, these methods are useful only when an area is under the protection of government forces and not under the influence of the Maoists.

C. CONCLUSION

In the two case studies of Malaya and India, despite their similarities on several counts, the outcomes have been different. While the British succeeded in Malaya, the Indian efforts so far have failed and the struggle is still in progress. This chapter has gone over the two cases of counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and India and analyzed them to identify the factors and causative variables that explain success in one case and failure in the other.

In Malaya, the British were able to defeat the MCP at the grassroots level by attacking the MCP from outside the organization by isolating the population and then working their way toward the interior. The Briggs Plan with the outside-in strategy proved effective to defeat the insurgency's fighting potential. This strategy was effective because the government was able to halt the insurgents' initial momentum, stabilize the situation, and then take the initiative and offensive. The insurgents, initially in control, lost their momentum and were forced into a downward spiral of retreat. Effective population and food control were the necessary conditions for separating the population from the insurgents. Resettlement of the Chinese squatters placed the population in an environment where they could be effectively protected and controlled. Food and resource flow from the population to the MRLA was stopped in the controlled white areas. Though the Malayan insurgency was protracted and comprised of many small engagements, overtime the insurgents were weakened and forced to surrender or flee. From 1948 to 1950, the insurgent forces expanded rapidly without an effective counter strategy against them. From 1950 onwards, once the British developed an appropriate strategy to defeat the guerillas, the insurgency was on the decline. By 1953, the tide clearly turned as the government forces became more effective and rebel numbers and influence dwindled; government forces systematically cleared settled districts of rebels

and hunted down rebel bands in the jungle. With the insurgency clearly on the wane, the British granted Malaya independence in 1959 and by 1960, the emergency was declared over in Malaya.²⁴³

Factors that led to a successful counterinsurgency in Malaya were unified command, intelligence, resource control measures and small unit operations.²⁴⁴ Unified command focused the government as a whole on defeating the insurgency and created mutual support between civil, military, and intelligence operations. Detailed intelligence increased the government's understanding of the insurgents' leadership, organization, and support bases, and this increased the success rate of operations, lowered civilian casualties, and eliminated the number of uneventful patrols. Resource control was achieved by isolating the Chinese population into camps, thereby stopping the flow of food and other supplies to the insurgents in jungles who were heavily dependent on their supporters. Small unit operations expanded the government's influence at the local level, increased tactical surprise, and increased contacts and success ratios of government security forces. Also measures to win hearts and minds were undertaken including social reforms to merge the Chinese into the main stream and perception management by both coercive means as well as propaganda.

In the case of India, Naxalism was viewed as a larger case of lack of policing in the remote and forest areas of the country. It was only since 2006 that the center viewed it as an internal security threat and taken action. Moreover, constitutionally, internal security of states is a state-level function and the central government is in more of a supportive than directive role. Governments both at the center and the state level are continuing in an ongoing struggle against the Naxalites who are now spread to over 16 of the 28 states in the country, covering vast portions of the mineral belts of India. After the suppression of the initial movement in the 1960s and early 1970s using strong enemy-centric measures, the period of the 1980s and 1990s saw the reconsolidation of the Maoists coupled with a weak response from the state. In the current decade, the growing violence from Maoists was responded with varying counterinsurgency approaches by the

²⁴³ Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency*, 4–5.

²⁴⁴ Bottiglieri, "How to Defeat Insurgencies," 70.

states. While Andhra has continued its use a predominantly enemy-centric approach using Greyhound police commandos, West Bengal has used population-centric social reforms, while few states have taken to using state sponsored vigilante groups. Except for the state of Andhra Pradesh, the majority of the affected states have failed in their efforts. The government considered Naxalism to be a law and order problem of the state, and its resulting strategy proved to be ineffective. However, after the surge in violence following the formation of CPI (Maoist), the central government added to the state-level counterinsurgency by forming the NMD and committees for monitoring the progress of the campaign as well as for better coordination. In addition, center has provided central police forces and funds for the states to pursue more concrete steps to deal with Naxalism.

The key factors that explain the failure of the Indian counterinsurgency efforts are as follows: the lack of a comprehensive national strategy (primarily because internal security of states is a state function with the center giving only guidelines and states pursuing their own strategies); lack of coordination between states and various agencies involved (as there is no unified command and NMD is for management and is not empowered to issue policy directives); limited capability of the police forces in terms of training, tactics, and equipment; limited quality and reliability in intelligence gathering, sharing and its utilization; weakness of political institutions in some states; and the limitations of coalition politics yielding inconsistent responses based on center-state relations.

Taking the Malayan and Indian cases into consideration, a successful counterinsurgency model against the Maoists can be explained by a combination of the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches. Additionally, the successful campaign must be under a unified command at the highest level which would ensure better coordination, utilization and sharing of intelligence and resources. In the initial phases of the combined strategy, the focus is to be on the enemy-centric aspects to bring down the military capability of the insurgents, with a focus on gathering reliable intelligence and on targeting insurgents and their resources based on that intelligence. The capability of the security forces would need to be suitably upgraded in terms of training, tactics and

equipment to deal with the insurgent's tactics and difficulty of terrain. Activities for winning hearts and minds should include development projects and social reforms which should follow once the fighting potential is reduced to levels that can be managed by regular police.

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IV COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACHES BY STATES: CASE STUDY OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND CHHATTISGARH

In keeping with the Indian government's approach of dealing with Naxalism as a state-level law and order problem, the Naxalite insurgency is dealt by the respective state governments. Meanwhile, the center provides additional reserve police forces and funds for supporting the state efforts. In terms of outcomes of counterinsurgency efforts among the affected states, an interesting across-state variation has occurred.

This chapter will cover the counterinsurgency strategies of the two states to find what explains success in one case and failure in the other. It will first cover the Andhra case, noting how the strategy changed overtime and determine which independent variables were effective in bringing about success. Then, it will cover the failed counterinsurgency approach in the state of Chhattisgarh in a similar manner. The study focuses on the period from 2000 to 2009 because major counterinsurgency efforts took place underway during this period.

Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh stand out as typical cases of Naxalism expansion as the variations between them are also visible in some other case. The state of Andhra Pradesh in the southeastern part of India has largely experienced success in fighting the insurgency, whereas in the neighboring Chhattisgarh counterinsurgency has failed.²⁴⁵ This variation across Indian states, works well for a comparison, given that they exhibit several relevant similarities such as the overall setting. The lessons learnt from the study of the two states could be utilized on a larger scale across the country.

The states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh are similar on several counts. First, the insurgent zones of both states have similar geographical terrain in terms of forests and rural villages adjoining the forests.²⁴⁶ The terrain provides Maoists with considerable protection and presents a challenge for the security forces seeking to

²⁴⁵ Ajay Sahni, "So Who's Losing Sleep Over Chhattisgarh?" Outlook India.com, July 16, 2007, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?235078> (accessed November 1, 2010)

²⁴⁶ Jason Motlagh, "The Maoists in the Forest: Tracking India's Separatist Rebels," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 84, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 102.

conduct operations. Second, in the early phase, both states have primarily relied on their police forces to fight the insurgency. Third, a substantial tribal population that is largely illiterate and poor lives in the affected parts of the two states. Owing to their deprivation and resulting grievances in both states, the Maoists enjoy considerable support ideologically and logistically from the villagers and tribes. Fourth, both the states present a stronghold for the insurgents for a considerable time during the current decade. Lastly, in both the states the Maoists resorted to similar mechanisms to sustain their operations.

In spite of these similarities, the counterinsurgency efforts in the two states vary significantly. In Andhra Pradesh an enemy-centric approach using specialized police along with improved intelligence proved to be successful while in Chhattisgarh, a population-centric approach to control and isolate the population into camps using regular police force and untrained vigilante groups failed. The Andhra state government targeted the insurgents and their resource networks using intelligence and an elite state police commando force called the Greyhounds during the period from 1997 to 2007.²⁴⁷ Commandos were well-trained in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare and equipped with sophisticated weapons and communication systems. While the Greyhounds carried out military operations, a special intelligence bureau, operating directly under the chief minister's office, gathered reliable and effective intelligence. Backed by actionable intelligence, the commando operations were successful in eliminating a large number of Maoists from Andhra Pradesh.²⁴⁸

In contrast, when we look at Chhattisgarh, one of the poorest states in India with a large tribal population, the region remains a Maoist stronghold. A number of Maoists training camps are known to operate in the state forests. The state approached the problem through the use of the state police without any special training in fighting the insurgency or in jungle warfare. The state police forces used combing operations for searching and attacking in the jungles to deal with the insurgents. However, these operations failed to achieve the larger objective. Moreover, the state also encouraged the

²⁴⁷ Ajay Sahni, "Fighting The Maoists with Mantras," Outlook india.com, July 25, 2008, http://www_outlookindia_com /Fighting The Maoists With Mantras/.mht (accessed November 1, 2010).

²⁴⁸ Colonel Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm," Indian Defense Review 25. no. 2 (April-June 2010).

formation of vigilante groups in villages for the villagers' self-defense which is another variation that did not happen in Andhra Pradesh. The clashes between the Maoists and vigilante groups led to the killings of hundreds of civilians, who were presumed to be informants. In addition to the state police forces, the central government also provided central police force battalions to the state. However, these efforts did not halt the deteriorating situation and the insurgency has grown. The state government's strategy was to tackle the insurgency as a case of inadequate policing, but the use of larger numbers of police forces is clearly failing.

Chhattisgarh is currently the worst-affected state, particularly its southern Bastar and Dantewada regions. For instance, in Dantewada district, massacre of 76 personnel of CRPF on patrol in the jungles in April 2010 by a group of Naxalites speaks volumes about the present status of affairs in Chhattisgarh in terms of intelligence, capability of security forces and effectiveness.²⁴⁹ In Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, insurgents are currently retreating, and the state is presenting itself as a successful case of counterinsurgency operations. With this variation, the two states make for a worthwhile comparison. It was in the current decade that major counterinsurgency action was taking place in both the states. After 2004, the violence in Chhattisgarh increased. With the formation of the vigilante, *Salwa Judum* in 2005, the rival killings have also increased. See Figure 5 for the increased Maoists related deaths in Chhattisgarh as compared to reduction in Andhra Pradesh.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Indian Express, "Chhattisgarh: Maoists kill 76 security personnel," April 6, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/maoistscontinueterrorreign-maulcrpf/600684> (accessed November 14, 2010).

²⁵⁰ For details see GOI Ministry of Home Affairs 2006-07 and 2008-09 Annual Reports, [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)0910.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)0910.pdf) (accessed October 16, 2010).




Figure 5. Deaths by Naxalite Attacks in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (After GOI, MHA Annual Reports of 2008-09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

A. ANDHRA PRADESH: A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH

Andhra Pradesh was initially affected by Naxalism since the 1960s, when radical elements of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), waged a rebellion called the Srikakulam armed struggle against the state.²⁵¹ Prior to this, the region also saw the Telangana movement in 1951, which was a communist uprising against the feudal lords demanding a separate state carved out of Andhra Pradesh.²⁵² After the suppression of the original Naxalbari movement in West Bengal in the early 1970s, a number of ideologues moved to Andhra and spread their ideology as discussed in Chapter II. The Peoples War Group (PWG) emerged as the main Naxalite force in the state in April 1980.²⁵³ Since 1980, regular clashes between police and Maoist revolutionaries have taken place in north-western Andhra Pradesh. See Figure 6 for details of the state.²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Janes Information Group, “Red Storm Rising.”

²⁵² Elliot, Carolyn, “Decline of a Patrimonial regime: The Telengana Rebellion in India, 1946-51,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no.1 (November 1974): 24-47.

²⁵³ Hindustan Times, “History of Naxalism,” May 09, 2003, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/History-of-Naxalism/Article1-6545.aspx> (accessed November 16, 2010).

²⁵⁴ Map of Andhra Pradesh with districts (September 2010 version). taken from online website: <http://www.mapsofindia.com> (accessed October 15, 2010).



Figure 6. Map of Andhra Pradesh with Districts (From the Maps of India website, <http://www.mapsofindia.com>)

Andhra Pradesh's unique success relies on its unique counterinsurgency strategy in dealing with the Maoists. The state used the enemy-centric approach followed by population associated development efforts. The counterinsurgency approach by the state can be understood by looking at the two chief minister regimes and their efforts during the period from the late 1990's until 2009 when the insurgency incidents sharply receded in the state. For instance there were 425 and 461 incidents in 2000 and 2001 respectively.²⁵⁵ By contrast, in 2009 the incidents were reduced to 66.²⁵⁶

1. Chandrababu Naidu Approach (September 1995–May 2004)

During the regime of Chief Minister Chandababu Naidu, the state police were reorganized and galvanized with the elite Greyhound commandos for dealing with the Naxalites. By September 1998, the police killed 102 Naxalites in approximately 80

²⁵⁵ Magnus Oberg, *Resources, Governance and civil conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 87.

²⁵⁶ For details see GOI Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2008-09, [http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR\(E\)0910.pdf](http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/AR(E)0910.pdf) (accessed October 14, 2010).

encounters.²⁵⁷ Between 1999 and 2001, several hundred deaths a year were attributed to Naxalite and government fighting as the state increased its efforts. The revolutionaries sought to carve out a compact revolutionary zone, however the government prevented that from happening by continued suppressive measures, which prevented the Naxalites from forming a central zone for the battle.

The state also presented a political solution to the problem in keeping with the central government's approach toward getting the tribals into the mainstream. Consequently, in February 2002 the Home Ministry held several rounds of talks with the state government of Andhra Pradesh and representatives of the PWG. In June 2002, the group withdrew from the talks following a police encounter against the group members.²⁵⁸ From January 2003 onward, the Naxalite revolutionaries were not violently active in the state, and the government appeared committed to implementing the 1997 court ruling that stipulated development and improvement for the tribal and other affected population.²⁵⁹ The government decided to reduce the number of police forces in the area and agreed to unconditional talks with the revolutionaries. By May 2003 the tensions seemed to ease. However, an assassination attempt against Chief Minister Chandababu Naidu on October 1, 2003 marked a serious downturn in the peace process, and the government ordered the police to intensify their action against Naxalites.²⁶⁰ The state government realized that with the growing violence, a political solution was not an option and consequently, the state took the enemy-centric approach of targeting the Maoist's strongholds using its elite anti-Maoist commando police force called Greyhounds.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Research Response Report, "PWG in India," Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, October 28, 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b6fe20a1d.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²⁵⁸ P.V. Ramana, "Andhra Pradesh: A Blow to the Bastion, but Naxalites Still a Force," *South Asia Intelligence Review* 1, no. 37 (March 31, 2003), *Weekly Assessments & Briefings*, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/1_37.htm (accessed November 25, 2010).

²⁵⁹ Asha Krishnakumar, "A Tribal Struggle," *The Frontline* 21, no. 19 (2004), <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2119/stories/20040924006200400.htm> (accessed November 23, 2010).

²⁶⁰ Globalsecurity, "Andhra Pradesh Naxalite," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm> (accessed November 25, 2010).

²⁶¹ N Rahul, "Down but not out," *Frontline* 24, no. 18 (September 8–21, 2007), <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2418/stories/20070921500601000.htm> (accessed November 16, 2010).

The capability of the Greyhound commandos was one of the best in the country. Numbering about 2,000 personnel, the Greyhounds were specially trained for deep forest pursuit and combat. They were equipped with the latest weapons and technological gadgets like satellite communication sets and GPS tracking equipment. Also, as incentives, the Greyhounds were provided with special perks such as insurance policies. The capability of Greyhound forces was far superior to the guerilla forces, as is comparable to those of the British forces that operated in Malaya after returning from specialized training. The state police also underwent a total transformation in its work culture and level of accountability by working under unified command setup by the Chief Minister.²⁶²

Utmost importance was accorded to gathering intelligence and the intelligence agency was separated from the police headquarters as a special branch dedicated to anti-Naxal operations which allowed them to independently pursue the Naxals. Additionally, the intelligence operations were supplemented by technical intelligence teams working under the special DIG, to intercept wireless transmissions of the Maoists.²⁶³ The intelligence agency was able to gather effective actionable intelligence by centrally collating from the various agencies and progressing independently under the chief minister's office.²⁶⁴ Then the Greyhounds could follow up on leads to target insurgents and their resource networks anywhere in the state.²⁶⁵ The coordinated actions by the Greyhounds and the intelligence agencies saw considerable success in the state against the Naxalites and their supporters.²⁶⁶

This information sharing was possible because of the unified command. The unified command structure in Andhra was created under the Chief Minister's office. A separate deputy inspector general (DIG) of police was instituted to take charge of the

²⁶² All information in the paragraph from: Colonel Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm," *Indian Defense Review* 25. no. 2 (Apr–Jun 2010).

²⁶³ Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists."

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶ Jason Motlagh, "Tide turning against Indian Maoists," *Asia Times*, October 19, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ19Df03.html (accessed December 3, 2010).

Maoist operations and lead the Greyhound commandos operations. The DIG was also directly under the chief minister's office. The operations undertaken by the Greyhounds were intelligence-led small unit operations with strong parallels to the operations under General Briggs in the Malayan insurgency. The unified command also provided additional leverage by the removal of jurisdictional restrictions.²⁶⁷

This state also used some innovative tactics followed by the state police and propaganda drive to expose the insurgent atrocities and destruction. For instance, the Andhra Pradesh police used a three-pronged approach to tackle the Naxalites using effective intelligence. First, they focused on eliminating the dangerous elements within the Maoists, such as the state and zonal leadership of the Naxalites. Second, they targeted the technical capability and resources of the Naxals, such as the bombs and IED factories and to unearth their arms and money dumps deep in the forests.²⁶⁸ These weapons were causing the maximum violence and damage. Third, they organized the surrender of lesser cadres in the Naxalite hierarchy giving them an opportunity to separate themselves from the hardcore leadership.²⁶⁹ The use of these tactics by the Andhra police improved the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency operations. Some of these tactics were unique to Andhra case and no such means were seen both the national level cases of India and Malaya.

2. YS Reddy Approach (May 2004–September 2009)

Chief Minister, YS Reddy dealt the Naxalite problem by focusing more on population-centric approach with continued application of enemy-centric measures. His administration reiterated the need for peace talks. However, upon the failure of talks, the state police and Greyhound commandos were given free hand to pursue the

²⁶⁷ Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists."

²⁶⁸ N Manoharan, "Left Wing Extremism(LWE) in India, " Centre for Land Warfare Studies, April 29, 2009, <http://www.claws.in/index.php> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²⁶⁹ South Asia Terrorism Portal. "The problem of Left-wing extremism in India," status paper by Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil tabled in Parliament on March 13, 2006, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/06mar13_naxal%20problem%20.htm(accessed December 4, 2010), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/06mar13_naxal%20problem%20.htm (accessed December 4, 2010).

Naxalites.²⁷⁰ Reddy's approach was akin to Templer's approach in Malaya. Reddy effectively continued with the gains of Naidu to successfully control the insurgency in the state.

For instance, in September 2004, his government made an attempt at peace talks with a surrender policy for the Naxalites. However, the talks failed again as the Maoists refused to lay down arms and accept a political solution.²⁷¹ Following the merger of PWG and MCC into CPI (Maoist), the Maoist activities escalated in the state. For instance, in August 2005, Naxals killed Narsi Reddy, a sitting Congress party MLA from the Mahbubnagar district at an Independence Day function.²⁷² In the wake of these events, the YS Reddy government banned Naxalites and ordered the police to step up the offensive action against the insurgents. The crackdown was spearheaded again by the Greyhound commando force. The offensive led to the death, arrest and surrender of many Naxals. The Greyhounds virtually routed the Naxals in the state. The state agencies gathered effective human intelligence from the informants and some of the Naxals also provided the police with crucial information about insurgents and their supporters. The security forces relentless actions forced some Naxals to escape to neighboring states.²⁷³ On July 23, 2006 in a major blow to Naxalite forces, the Naxalite leader of the Andhra Pradesh zone was killed in a police raid along with seven other people in the Prakasam district. The government of Andhra Pradesh's effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for Naxalites also produced positive results.²⁷⁴

The Greyhounds continue to prove their effectiveness over the years. The Greyhounds forces prowled the forests supported by informants at the village level. With

²⁷⁰ Piratala, *Maoists: A Threat to Internal Security*, 191.

²⁷¹ Ajai Sahni, "Andhra Pradesh: The State Advances, the Maoists Retreat," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, September 18, 2007.

²⁷² Amarnath K. Menon, "Maoists suffer severe setback with killing of leader Azad," *India Today*, July 2, 2010, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/103904/114/naxal-bandh-centre-warns-railways.html> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²⁷³ T S Sudhir, "The return of the Naxal to Andhra." *NDTV news*, November 3, 2009, http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/the_return_of_the_naxal_to_andhra.php (accessed December 5, 2010).

²⁷⁴ Status paper on Naxal Problem by South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/06mar13naxal%20problem%20.htm>. (accessed November 26, 2010).

the reliable intelligence, the Greyhounds managed to arrest or kill several top rebels. For instance, in 2008-2009, the Naxalite ranks have fallen from around 1,000 members in the state to about 400 in 2009, according to Andhra Pradesh chief Minister YS Reddy.²⁷⁵

The state police also initiated a crackdown on Naxal resources including finances and weapons. For instance, a Naxal weapons dump was unearthed in Hyderabad. In another instance, the Warangal district police raided a hideout belonging to the CPI(ML) group, *Pratighatana*, a splinter Naxalite outfit, and unearthed resources worth Rs 44 Lakh (US \$100,000) along with few weapons and ammunition.²⁷⁶ Incidents such as this indicated the approach of resource control using intelligence-led operations.

The administration also focused on population-centric measures to win hearts and minds by improving the material conditions of the rural and poor population while continuing to apply force against the Maoists using the Greyhound commandos. Interestingly, the lack of population-centric measures under Naidu contributed to his loss in the elections. So, it was not a surprise that the Reddy administration added more population-centric developmental measures. There was an emphasis on improvement in the irrigation and agriculture sectors in areas that were brought under control. Further, a new healthcare program, *Arogya Sri* aimed at the underprivileged. The industrial sector expansion like the mining industry also provided employment to many locals. YS Reddy's strong focus on rural development reduced the influence of Naxalites on young men and women whose basic demands were met. The population-centric measures were substantial as compared to the Malayan case.²⁷⁷

3. Explaining the Success in Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh was among the top Naxal-affected regions of India at the beginning of this decade with the presence of the groups such as the PWG. Since the well-coordinated efforts of the state government have successfully controlled the

²⁷⁵ The Times of India, "Greyhounds must be replicated in other states, said YSR," posted September 3, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/4968199.cms> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²⁷⁶ Indian Express, "More Naxal dens uncovered in state capitol," July 09, 2005.

²⁷⁷ Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists."

insurgency, the incidents of Naxal attacks are now minimal. The state was able to bring down deaths by Naxal incidents to 18 in 2009 (see Table 3 for details over the current decade).²⁷⁸

Table 3. Naxalite Incidents and Deaths in Andhra Pradesh 2001 to 2009 (After GOI MHA annual reports 2008-09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

Event/Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Incidents	461	346	575	310	532	183	138	92	66
Deaths	180	96	139	74	206	180	90	46	18

The enemy-centric approach involving a unified command, special task force supported by intelligence and a large number of social and economic development projects initiated by the state government helped the government gain legitimacy in the erstwhile Naxal-affected regions. Because of their success, the model of Andhra Pradesh was presented to other states as a way to overcome their Naxalite insurgency.²⁷⁹ When the success of Andhra Pradesh is analyzed across the independent variables we see that intelligence-based operations, capability of the police forces and unified command form the key variables driving the outcome of success.

The intelligence variable was about generating and using actionable intelligence. In Andhra Pradesh a separate intelligence organization was formed specifically to gather intelligence on the Maoists and their operations. The methods varied from human intelligence to electronic surveillance using the latest technology. This variable was effective only in conjunction with the specialized capability of the police force to achieve

²⁷⁸ Data for the Naxalite Incidents and Deaths Taken from Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual reports, 2006–07 and 2008–09.

²⁷⁹ The Times of India, “Greyhounds must be replicated in other states, said YSR,” September 3, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/4968199.cms> (accessed November 6, 2010).

successful targeting. Also the unified structure improved the intelligence sharing. Intelligence proved to be the key variable for the success of the counterinsurgency in Andhra Pradesh as it was in the successful Malayan case.

The variable of capability of forces, which included training, tactics, and equipment of the forces, proved to be another important variable for the success of the campaign. The Greyhound commandos who were specialized in jungle warfare were also using the latest weapons and equipment in addition to material incentives. Moreover, the state police forces were systematically organized into areas to deal with the insurgency in addition to using innovative tactics for the campaign. At the national level in India, though the capability exists with the Indian army, it is unlikely to be utilized against the Naxalite insurgency primarily because the army is already involved in other ongoing insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeastern states and also because Naxalism is a considered a domestic state level problem by the central government.²⁸⁰ In Malaya, the colonial British trained troops existed in other colonies that were brought to Malaya as the campaign progressed, so the state did not rely on the local recruits, In Andhra Pradesh, the Special Forces are needed since the local police are not able to operate for various reasons.

The variable of unified command was effective in Andhra Pradesh. The unified command and control structure under the chief minister's office to deal with the insurgency at the state level brought in better coordination and synergy between the various state agencies involved including intelligence, police, paramilitary forces, and politicians. Unified command was also helpful in improving intelligence sharing and optimizing state resources. Apart from the intelligence variable, the unified command is the other important variable which led to the overall success in the state. In addition, the absence of an organization at the national level with the ability to issue policy directive is evident. Comparatively in Malaya, the presence of a unified structure at the national level also helped with the control of resources and led to ultimate success.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ India today, "No plan to use Army against Naxals: Chidambaram," April 07, 2010, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/91619/html> (accessed November 23, 2010).

²⁸¹ Newsinger, British counterinsurgency, 52–53.

In addition, non-bifurcation of the state despite the demand over the years further inhibited the insurgency from growing. After the reduction of the Naxalite activities in the state, the movement for a separate Telangana state within Andhra Pradesh again picked up with large-scale protests wherein, the political parties such as the Telangana Rashtirya Samiti (TRS) were seeking a separate Telangana state out of Andhra Pradesh.²⁸² Interestingly, the movement is still active today in the state.²⁸³ The Naxalites were using the Nallamala forests in north western Andhra and adjoining areas as a sanctuary while their main theater of operations was in the Telangana region, which is also the proposed new state. The CPI (Maoist) supported the TRS for the cause of a separate state, however as the separate state has not materialized yet, the Maoists are not able to consolidate their grip in the state.²⁸⁴

In sum, it was the cohesive interaction of the factors that led to success in Andhra Pradesh. Strong administration with unified command enabled better coordination and optimization of available resources and capability. Specialized capability of the police through training such as adaptability to conditions and jungle survival proved effective with intelligence.²⁸⁵ Also, in terms of equipment and weaponry the forces were well organized adding to capability.²⁸⁶ The reorganization of intelligence by forming the special intelligence branch under the unified command functioned as the nodal agency for coordination of operations.²⁸⁷ Lastly, measures to win hearts and minds involving both development activities and coercive means proved along with resource control measures proved effective.

²⁸² Piratala, Maoists: A Threat to Internal Security, 192.

²⁸³ Indian Express, "Telengana gets Naxal Twist," January 05, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/563542/> (accessed November 24, 2010).

²⁸⁴ PV Ramana, "Small States: Potential Maoist Strongholds," Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, December 17, 2009, <http://www.idsa.in/node/4722/59> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²⁸⁵ The Times of India, "Greyhounds must be replicated in other states, said YSR, September 3, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Greyhounds-must-be-replicated-in-other-states-said-YSR/articleshow/4968199.cms> (accessed December 5, 2010).

²⁸⁶ Vinita Priyadarshini, "Fighting Left wing extremism through Special task forces," Centre for Land Warfare Studies, August 12, 2009, <http://www.claws.in/index.php> (accessed December 3, 2010).

²⁸⁷ All information in this paragraph drawn from article by Colonel Achuthan, "Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm," Indian Defense Review 25. no. 2 (April-June, 2010).

B. CHHATTISGARH: A FAILED COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH

Chhattisgarh is one of the poorest states in India, with a lack of basic facilities and infrastructure. It is located in the eastern part of India and north of Andhra Pradesh (see Figure 7). Chhattisgarh was carved out in 2000 from the state of Madhya Pradesh. Tribes form over 32 percent of the state population and live mainly in forested terrain.²⁸⁸ It also shares a border with Andhra Pradesh. Chhattisgarh contains large number of natural resources in the form of ores of coal and bauxite which are exploited by officials, contractors as well as the Naxalites for making money through illegal means for mutual gains.²⁸⁹ The state machinery is ineffective in dealing with the problem. The center has provided funds for development activities and additional paramilitary personnel, but the violence in the state has only increased especially since 2004. Chhattisgarh is a top stronghold for the Maoists in the country and the state administration has been ineffective.

²⁸⁸ From GOI report available online at site: <http://cg.gov.in/profile/corigin.htm> (accessed December 4, 2010).

²⁸⁹ KC Dixit, "Tracking Naxalism, Post-Dantewada," April 08, 2010, Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, <http://www.idsa.in/node/5286/239> (accessed December 4, 2010).




Figure 7. Map of State of Chhattisgarh with Districts (From the Maps of India website, <http://www.mapsofindia.com>)

In Chhattisgarh, the state’s counterinsurgency strategy has been incoherent since 2000. The state has a weak administration that did not have an effective strategy for dealing with Naxalism. The year 2005 became a crucial year for the counterinsurgency because of the merger of the Maoists groups in late 2004 to form CPI (Maoist); this substantially strengthened the Maoist capability and Chhattisgarh became a top Maoist stronghold.²⁹⁰ This necessitated a shift from the weak enemy-centric approach of policing to a strong population control strategy with main thrust in the form of state-supported vigilante groups like the Salwa Judum. However, this has not worked either because of the lack of capability of the Salwa Judum and the targeting of its members by the Maoists resulting in more violence. In addition the lack of reliable intelligence and a unified command have contributed to the failure.

²⁹⁰ See Table 4 for increased Maoist violence since 2005 in Chhattisgarh.

Rampant poverty along with exploitation exists in the state since its inception. The plight of the dispossessed and exploited adivasis provides a classic setting for a communist revolution. As the Maoists took over state tasks and provided protection to the adivasis against exploitation by corrupt government officials, police, forest department officials, timber mafia, and money-lenders, the adivasis increasingly related to the Maoist ideology. The adivasis do not necessarily share the Naxalites dream of establishing political leadership in New Delhi one day with People's Liberation Army, but they do want their plight to improve and bring an end to exploitation. However, the Naxalites also came with the baggage associated with communist armed insurrections such as the execution of petty bourgeois amongst the most impoverished, extortion, and other harsh punishments, which terrorizes the population. Therefore, the enemy-centric approach has to be part of the solution

In Chhattisgarh, the killings and confrontations between security forces, the Naxalites, and the Salwa Judum have risen since 2005 (See Table 4). For instance, in the Dantewada district, whenever a Salwa Judum meeting takes place, tribals are forced to attend and those who refuse are attacked by the Salwa Judum cadres, the police and the paramilitary forces stationed in the area. In the course of the Salwa Judum campaign, villages that refuse to participate were burnt, and their cattle looted and their crops destroyed.²⁹¹ Alleged Maoist sympathizers are then tracked down and handed over to the police or killed. Similarly, the Naxalites have violently crushed any rebellion or support for the state. The state of violence can be gauged by the figures shown in Table 4.²⁹² Since 2005, in Chhattisgarh, a dramatic escalation of violence was seen due to forced resettlement of thousands of people.

²⁹¹ ACHR Report, "The adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 25.

²⁹² Based on the data as per the GOI MHA Annual Report 2008-09.

Table 4. Naxalite Incidents and Deaths in Chhattisgarh 2001 to 2009 (After GOI MHA annual reports 2008-09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

Event/Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Incidents	105	304	254	352	380	715	582	620	529
Deaths	37	55	74	83	165	462	435	242	290

Conditions for civilians, including the villagers and tribals are worsening in Chhattisgarh due to the increasing violence between the state, the Naxals, and the vigilante groups. For instance, on February 28, 2006, there was a landmine blast conducted by the Naxalites at the village of Darbhaguda under the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh killing 27 civilians and injuring 32 others.²⁹³ In addition, the counterinsurgency response of the state government by way of the Salwa Judum involves civilians directly into the fight including teenagers as special police officers. Similarly the Naxalites policy of forcibly recruiting a cadre from each adivasi family irrespective of age has compelled many families to give their female members to the Naxals breaking their traditional taboos. Caught in a deadly tug of war between an armed Maoist movement on one side, and government security forces and vigilante group on the other, civilians suffer a host of human rights abuses during forced displacement.²⁹⁴ Neither the government nor the Naxalites leave any room for civilian neutrality. The Asian Commission for Human Rights report highlights the plight of the adivasis who are caught in the conflict between the Naxalites and the state of Chhattisgarh.²⁹⁵

1. Pre-2005 Counterinsurgency Approach

Between 2000 and 2005, the counterinsurgency approach in Chhattisgarh(which was part of Madhya Pradesh) was a weak enemy-centric that used the state police forces

²⁹³ ACHR report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 24.

²⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch Report, "Being Neutral is Our Biggest crime: government, vigilante, and Naxalite abuses in India's Chhattisgarh state," July 2008, 8.

²⁹⁵ For details see: ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chattisgarh."

and other paramilitary forces. This was primarily because the state viewed the problem as isolated incidents. The population-centric aspects during this period were to undertake limited and badly implemented development in the form of roads and infrastructure in the remote regions. The large forested terrain of the state and the tribal population oppressed by the ills of feudalism and caste-related discrimination provided the fertile ground for the Maoists. The Naxalites purported to defend the rights of the poor, especially the landless, *Dalits*, and tribal communities. Naxalites have maintained a strong presence in southern parts of Chhattisgarh since the 1980s.

Although many indigenous tribal communities living in these areas supported Naxalite interventions against economic exploitation, an escalating pattern of Naxalite abuses, including extortion of money and food, coerced recruitment of civilians, and killings of perceived police informants or traitors, gradually alienated many villagers.²⁹⁶ Consequently, in now what is Chhattisgarh, with the limited state effort, local groups and landlord militia emerged to fight the Naxalites. Many tribal people stood up against the atrocities by forming their own small local vigilantes. Taking advantage of such local response to the Maoists, some larger vigilante efforts were undertaken by influential individuals in their areas but were weak due to lack of state support. For instance, Mr. Mahindra Karma, the architect of the Salwa Judum campaign of 2005, earlier launched the *Jan Jagran Abhiyan* (People's Awakening Campaign) in 1990 and 1996 without much success. These campaigns were undertaken by landlords, traders and contractors in trading towns and *tehsil* (district) headquarters such as Bijapur and Bhairamgarh. Armed militia led campaigns against the Maoists who were forcibly acquiring lands from large holdings and redistributing them to landless households. The militias were also against the downsizing of role of headman and high caste priest by creation of *Sanghams* (organizations or union) by the Maoists.²⁹⁷ The Maoists violently crushed such

²⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch report, "Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime," 9.

²⁹⁷ Peoples Union for Civil Liberty Report, "Where the State Makes War on its Own People," April 12, 2006, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Human-rights/2006/salwa_judum.pdf(accessed November 24, 2010).

campaigns. A similar program against the Naxalites from 1992 to 1993 had to be dropped after the Naxals killed 70 adivasis in retaliation.²⁹⁸

In terms of intelligence effort, the small amount of intelligence gathered regarding Naxalism was weak. This was in contrast to neighboring Andhra Pradesh, where most operations were intelligence-led. Chhattisgarh the campaign were more reactionary. Moreover, the state police and security forces capacity was limited to basic policing without any special training or equipment. Resource control measures were hardly being undertaken. The state was focusing on the basic development of infrastructure in other parts of the state with limited focus on the remote regions.²⁹⁹

Since the formation of Chhattisgarh in 2000, the new administration's weakness along with the lack of state capacity aided the insurgency during the early phase. Moreover, the successful anti-Maoist campaigns in the neighboring state of Andhra Pradesh brought some escaping Maoists into the forests of Chhattisgarh. Despite these developments, the efforts of the state remained limited to the use of state police in isolated pockets without a focus on the overall problem. It was after the formation of CPI (Maoist) in 2004 that the government started to grasp the seriousness of Naxalism and viewed the issue as a security threat. The weal efforts until 2005 were largely ineffective and created a setting in which the Maoists could consolidate their position within the state.

2. 2005 to 2009 Counterinsurgency Approach

After 2005, the state used a more population-centric effort, along with limited but concerted enemy-centric measures to deal with Naxalism. The spearhead of the combined strategy was the vigilante group, Salwa Judum that was established in 2005, which was now to be a campaign assisted by state security forces. Under this strategy, the plan was to isolate the population from the insurgents in addition to large-scale population and

²⁹⁸ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 18.

²⁹⁹ Purnima S Tripathi, "Ajit Jogi's Battle," *Frontline* 20, no. 23 (November 8–21, 2003), <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2023/stories/20031121002703600.htm> (accessed December 5, 2010).

resource control measures. Also elements of enemy-centric measures were adopted including the limited targeting of Maoists and their supporters by the state security forces and members of Salwa Judum.

The creation of Salwa Judum in June 2005 was sparked by popular protests against Naxalites in the Bijapur district in southern Chhattisgarh. From June 2005 onward, reports started appearing in the local Chhattisgarh press about a “spontaneous people’s uprising” against the Maoists in the Dantewada district, under the name of Salwa Judum, accompanied by the mass displacement of villagers into camps along the main roads.³⁰⁰ Mahendra Karma, a member of legislative assembly (MLA) from Dantewada, was the brain behind the campaign. Salwa Judum means purification hunt in the local Gondi dialect of adivasi people. It soon became, a state-sponsored vigilante group aimed at eliminating Naxalites. The supporters of the campaign translate it as peace campaign. For the Naxalites, the campaign implies group hunting of innocent adivasis who support the people’s movement of the Maoists. Salwa Judum activities can be found in villages across many districts including Bijapur and Dantewada districts in southern Chhattisgarh.³⁰¹

The government lent its support to the Salwa Judum in different ways including logistics, arms, and funding, encouraging violence against the Maoists and its supporters. With the support of the state, Salwa Judum members conducted raids on hundreds of villages suspected of being pro-Naxalite, forcibly recruiting civilians for its vigilante activities, and relocating tens of thousands of people to government camps. They also attacked villagers who refused to participate in Salwa Judum activities or who refused to be in camps. Human rights reports indicate widespread coercion, killings, arson and other forms of violence by the Salwa Judum in the villages of Baster and Dantewada districts.³⁰² With limited intelligence on the Maoists and their hideouts, the state adopted

³⁰⁰ Ramachandra Guha et al., “Salwa Judum: War in the Heart of India: Excerpts from the Report by the Independent Citizens Initiative,” *Social Scientist* 34, no. 7 (July–August 2006): 47.

³⁰¹ Saji Cherian, Chhattisgarh: Populist Follies, Confounded State, *South Asia intelligence Review* 4, no.33, *Weekly Assessments*, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/4_33.htm(accessed December 3, 2010).

³⁰² Guha et al., “Salwa Judum: War in the Heart of India,” 9.

screening measures to locate Maoists and their arms and supporters carrying equipment into the jungles. The methods used included checking of all vehicles passing through their area by members of Salwa Judum. In addition, the members indulged in the levying of illegal taxes (like the Naxalites) from the drivers or occupants of the vehicles, seizing the contents they found objectionable and subjecting the occupants to extensive interrogations. Naxalites in turn retaliated against this aggressive government-supported campaign by attacking residents of camps and abducting and executing individuals identified as Salwa Judum leaders or supporters, police informers, or residents appointed as auxiliary police.³⁰³

Population control was a part of the strategy to control resources reaching the Maoists. Consequently, thousands of tribals and rural communities were forced into camps where the displaced tribal communities lived as inmates. For instance, as of March 2006, a total of 45,958 tribals from 644 villages out of 1153 of the Dantewada district have come under the Salwa Judum resettlement program.³⁰⁴ In addition, the camp conditions are deplorable with minimum provisions and no educational facilities. Many of the existing schools in the affected regions are converted into relief camps and training centers. With inadequate basic living conditions and hygiene issues, the camps are breeding grounds for diseases, increasing the grievances of inmates. Also, with the camps doubling as detention centers of surrendered Naxalites and the population being kept under hard conditions themselves, it is difficult for the people to view the state as their protectors rather than as oppressors. Consequently, many tribals have tended to join and seek the support of the Maoists for their protection. In contrast, in the case of Malayan population control, the living conditions were better for the people, councils were formed, and social reforms such as voting rights were instituted, which improved the legitimacy of the government. In Chhattisgarh no such effort to better the lives of the tribal's has further added to insurgency.

As far as improving the capability of forces, the camps also functioned as recruitment and training centers for the Salwa Judum members who join as special police

³⁰³ Guha et. al., "Salwa Judum: War in the Heart of India," 47.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 23–38.

officers getting a fixed honorarium of Rs 1500 (US\$ 35) per month.³⁰⁵ Many people have joined the Salwa Judum with the hope of being regularized into the state police forces. The people who joined the Salwa Judum campaign were from four categories: first, the family members of victims and relatives killed by the Naxalites, second, persons who enrolled for food rations and money, third persons who wanted job security in the form of recruitment as special police officers and police informers and lastly, those who opposed the Naxalite movement and their ideology. With Salwa Judum becoming the spearhead of state sponsored counterinsurgency program, the peaceful campaign, as the name suggests, has created an internal civil war between the hundreds of cadres being recruited as special police officers of Salwa Judum and the Naxalites. Sadly, often members of the same family being are pitted against one another.

The state has also resorted to coercive methods for control of population and as a means of gaining information. To improve upon the lack of reliable intelligence in the state, it has resorted to coercing the population and the surrendered Naxalites within the relief camps to gain information on the hideouts and identities of other supporters of the movement. This has been one of the main sources of intelligence in the state which lacks a dedicated intelligence unit to deal with the insurgency like was used in the case of Andhra Pradesh.

Apart from the strategies as discussed in the section above, there were some other key aspects to the counterinsurgency approach undertaken by Chhattisgarh. To improve upon the enemy-centric effort within its state, Chhattisgarh has at times used the services of forces such as the Greyhounds from the neighboring states. For instance, on March, 2008, the Greyhounds, who have capability for quick deployment and adaptability for diverse terrain, were deployed in Chhattisgarh, wherein, they launched a joint assault on Maoist insurgents, resulting in the killing of 17 Maoists in the Pamedu area of Chhattisgarh. The successful operation dispelled the idea of impregnability of the Bastar forests, which are Maoist stronghold.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 9.

³⁰⁶ Jane's Intelligence Review, "Red storm rising - India's intractable Maoist insurgency," Terrorism and Insurgency section, posted on May 15, 2008.

With the aim of enhancing the authority and power of the security forces, the Chhattisgarh government passed the Special Public Security Act in 2005. This act allows for extended powers of arrest and other security provisions to deal with the insurgency. While this act has strengthened the forces capability in terms of authority, there are some serious repercussions. For instance, local journalists who investigate or report abuses by *Salwa Judum* and government security forces are often harassed and are described as Naxalite sympathizers and live in fear of arbitrary arrest under this act.³⁰⁷

To enhance the strength of forces in terms of numbers, the state also relies on security forces from the center. The large presence of security forces in Chhattisgarh includes National Security Guard commandos, Indian Reserve Battalion (Nagaland Regiment), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).³⁰⁸ These are in addition to the vigilante group, *Salwa Judum*, whose members, despite lack of training operate alongside the police forces armed with their traditional weapons like sticks and bows.

3. Explaining the Failure in Chhattisgarh

Currently the estimated strength of the Maoists in Chhattisgarh is about 8,000 cadres, which includes those from the *Dalams*, the armed companies of the CPI (Maoist). In addition, there are about 35,000 to 50,000 of the people's militia or *Sangam* members, who are sympathizers and supporters providing logistics.³⁰⁹ Given that over half of the incidents and killings in India from the Naxalite insurgency occur in Chhattisgarh, the anti-Naxal approach of the Chhattisgarh government highlights a failing strategy.³¹⁰ There are several factors that explain the failure of the state's counterinsurgency campaign.

³⁰⁷ ACHR Report, "Indian Human Rights Report 2007, Chhattisgarh," <http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/AR07/chhattisgarh.htm> (accessed December 5, 2010).

³⁰⁸ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh," 39.

³⁰⁹ Deccan Chronicle, "I don't think we need the Army," posted April 11, 2010, <http://www.deccanchronicle.com/op-ed/idonthink-we-need-army99-094> (accessed November 24, 2010).

³¹⁰ Asian Centre for Human Rights report, "Evaluate the Anti-Naxal Policies of the Chhattisgarh government, Quarterly newsletter, Naxal Conflict Monitor, 11 Apr 2007, <http://www.achrweb.org/ncm/NCM-VOL-02-01.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2010).

Chhattisgarh has a weak administration that shows a lack of institutional professionalism among politicians. There is rampant corruption in the administration.³¹¹ Also, as in some other Maoist affected states, some local politicians have links to the Maoists for benefits from the mining lobby and in order to gain the vote of the tribal community who are under the influence and control of the Maoists.³¹² This was a key factor in the failure of the strategy, as it has made the problem more complicated. Politicians, those benefiting from this symbiotic relationship tend to take a lenient view of the problem, and those at the highest level direct policy to their advantage. Also the mineral rich region has become a source of illegal income for the Maoists as well as the officials owing to corruption. For instance, the mining companies, both government and private run are the Maoists' main source of financing with illegal mining being particularly lucrative. The Maoists force the mining companies to give protection money. Chhattisgarh and adjoining states form the richest mineral belt in India. Also there is an apparent nexus between the mining lobby, politicians and the Maoists.³¹³

Lack of state capacity in terms of intelligence and capability of forces are other major factors that contribute to the failure. Intelligence-generating capability of the state is limited, when compared to the intelligence gathering in Andhra Pradesh. There also appears to be no focus on reforming the organization or improving the capability. The effort primarily relies on state police and the captured Naxalites or the tribals in the camps. Also, the lack of capability of the forces in terms of numbers, training and equipment has allowed the Maoists to thrive. This shortfall has caused a number of casualties for the security forces. The state has not adopted reform measures to improve the capability of security forces and has instead relied on forces from outside the state in trying to meet the requirements, which are not there for long.

³¹¹ Ashish Kothari, "Behind the Concern," *Frontline* 27, no. 4 (February 13-26, 2010), <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2704/stories/20100226270408800.htm> (accessed December 2, 2010).

³¹² Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Losing Spree," *Frontline* 27, no. 9 (April 24, May 07, 2010), <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2709/stories/20100507270901400.htm> (accessed December 3, 2010).

³¹³ Sudha Ramachandaran, "India digs Deep to Outflank Maoists," *Asia Times*, August 04, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH04Df04.html (accessed December 1, 2010).

Long term displacement has also increased grievance. Despite the Salwa Judum's portrayal as a protector of the state's adivasis, the landless indigenous forest dwelling tribal people, its violent activities have led to the displacement of hundreds of adivasis into the state run camps. It is unclear how long these Salwa Judum-run camps, will exist and when the adivasis will be allowed to return to their villages. Most people also lost their houses, and land when they moved to these camps. The violent atrocities, uncertainties, and losses owing to the displacement have prompted many to join the Maoists for protection, leading to a growth in the insurgency in the state.

Civilians such as the members of Salwa Judum are being used to fight against Naxalites and in controlling the people in the camps.³¹⁴ This involvement of civilians in state functions creates dynamics that aid in the insurgency. Within the camps, it makes the tribal populations insecure as the empowerment of authority without understanding its limits contributes to violent abuse of power by the Salwa Judum members. This subsequently, creates more disgruntled and disoriented populations who look to the Maoists for protection and support. It is clear that involvement of civilians in conflict through the Salwa Judum campaign's special police officers is producing disastrous consequences.³¹⁵ By contrast, during the British campaign in Malaya, the British dismantled the vigilante and auxiliary forces that were initial

Lack of state capacity to protect the economic infrastructure and assets like mineral and ore mines have led to further rise in the insurgency. Availability of natural resources and industrial mining along the mineral belt in Chhattisgarh has strengthened the Maoists, as they now extort money from the industry. The weak administrative control of the state in many districts is unable to stop the Maoists from running a parallel government. The Maoists in these areas carry out large-scale extortion, especially in the mining areas. Maoists also make money both by illegal mining as well as by collecting

³¹⁴ South Asia Terrorism Portal Report, Chhattisgarh Assessment 2010, January 02, 2010, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/Assessment/2010/chhattisgarh.htm> (accessed December 2, 2010).

³¹⁵ ACHR Report, "Evaluate the Anti-Naxal Policies of the Chhattisgarh government," Naxal Conflict Monitor, Quarterly Newsletter, April 11, 2007, <http://www.achrweb.org/ncm/NCM-VOL-02-01.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2010).

protection tax from workers and contractors. Moreover, the Maoists have attacked the economic infrastructure to undermine state development projects and to target those companies that refuse to pay the protection tax. For instance, in a period of six months from January 2009, the Naxals attacked 56 economic infrastructure targets across the country.³¹⁶ Many economic targets were attacked in Chhattisgarh. For instance, the attack on Essar pipelines, NDMC mines, Gramin Sadak Nirman Yojna (Road construction project) were attacked in 2009.³¹⁷ Lack of state security capacity has allowed the Maoist insurgency to grow in the state.

All these factors have led to the failed legitimacy and trustworthiness of the government in the eyes of the population. Salwa Judum is seen as an arm of the state. The outright support for Salwa Judum by the state security officials has been a contentious issue, and the state official's refusal to take notice of human rights abuses inflicted by Salwa Judum has caused the people to lose trust in the activities of the state. As a result, the government has lost its legitimacy, which further aids the Maoists.

When we analyze the Chhattisgarh efforts across the five independent variables to understand how they interact with the counterinsurgency strategy and among themselves, we observe that lack of a unified command, lack of state capacity in intelligence, the capability of forces and resource control prove to be major variables that explain the failure of the state.

Unified command is absent in the case of Chhattisgarh as Naxalism was primarily treated as a larger case of lack of policing and was therefore, localized; the police forces and the Salwa Judum that were controlling the counterinsurgency effort in the state with their own state intelligence and with minimal support of politicians and other intelligence agencies. There was a clear lack of coordination and synergy between the various state agencies involved in the conduct of operations, which was reflected in the rise of

³¹⁶ Govin India, "Naxalite movement," posted August 31, 2009. http://www.governindia.org/wiki/Naxalite_Movement (accessed August 29, 2010).

³¹⁷ For examples of economic target attacks see : Jharkhand.org report, "Naxals Acting as Anti-Development Force," July 28, 2009, <http://naxal.jharkhand.org.uk/2009/07/naxal-is-acting-as-anti-development.html> (accessed December 3, 2010).

incidents and growth of Maoists within the state. By contrast, in Andhra Pradesh and Malaya, central coordination was achieved by having a unified command.

The absence of dedicated and reliable intelligence was apparent because the operations are police and vigilante-led search raids rather than being intelligence-led. The large loss of security personnel indicates the limited and unreliable intelligence that was being gathered by state police intelligence. For instance, the Maoist ambush in April 2010 that led to the death of 76 CRPF personnel could have been avoided with good intelligence.³¹⁸ While intelligence had proved to be a key variable for the success of the counterinsurgency in Andhra Pradesh and Malaya, its absence resulted in failure in Chhattisgarh.

Capability of forces in terms of numbers, training, tactics and equipment were found wanting in Chhattisgarh. The strike arm of the counterinsurgency effort was the Salwa Judum campaign, which used civilians who were hastily recruited to become part of the vigilante group as special police officers. Their weapons were country-made rifles and sticks as the state made no effort to provide them with protective bulletproof jackets or any kind of surveillance cover. By contrast, in the successful cases of Andhra and Malaya, capability of forces was a key variable that gave the edge to the state forces over the Maoist guerilla forces. In Chhattisgarh, the presence of civilians has complicated the problem.

The variable of resource control measures was partially effective in Chhattisgarh. It was undertaken by the resettlement of large numbers of the local tribal population into camps to disrupt the support networks of the Maoists, which was also implemented in the Malayan case by the British. While the population-control method had its effect on the control of resources, it could not control out-of-state sympathizers who were supporting the Maoists especially through financial networks. This variable could be effective only with reliable intelligence and unified command. In the Andhra case, with the generation

³¹⁸ Jim Yardley, "In Ambush, Rebels kill 76 officers in India," New York Times, April 7, 2010, East Coast Edition.

of reliable intelligence, resource control was achieved through the targeting of resource dumps and the arrest of sympathizers and supporters who were sustaining the networks within the state.

The winning hearts and minds variable in Chhattisgarh is also ineffective. While the effort was undertaken through projects such as building roads and schools, most projects got stalled or never began because of the violence, and many of those that started were disrupted by Naxal activity. Moreover with the Maoists still operating almost with impunity and running their parallel government in many districts, the developmental projects became the major source of extortion for the Maoists. By contrast, in the Andhra case, development projects were undertaken with success and had proved to be effective.

C. CONCLUSION

When we observe the two cases of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, both states used a combination of population-centric and enemy-centric approaches for their counterinsurgency effort. More precisely, the balance was more heavily in favor of the enemy-centric approach in Andhra Pradesh. In Chhattisgarh, there seems to be weak effort in either approach. Each of the states had its enemy-centric part of the counterinsurgency effort focused in one main element that was the center of gravity of the effort and spearheaded the campaign. In Andhra Pradesh it was the elite, well-trained, and capable Greyhound police commando force, and for Chhattisgarh it was the untrained vigilante group, Salwa Judum who were untrained civilians.

In Andhra Pradesh, the strong enemy-centric approach proved successful as the Maoist-related violence has decreased.³¹⁹ By contrast, in Chhattisgarh, the enemy-centric part of the effort involving the state police and Salwa Judum to target the insurgents and their supporters is not working. It was not supported by reliable intelligence proving to be disastrous. Also, the population-centric part of the approach, which isolated the population as a means of population and resource control, was

³¹⁹ For reduced violence in the state see remarks by Chief Minister Y.S. Reddy in: The Times of India, "Greyhounds must be replicated in other states, said YSR," September 03, 2009. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Greyhounds-must-be-replicated-in-other-states-said-YSR/articleshow/4968199.cms#ixzz0ymdQQANu> (accessed October 23, 2010).

ineffective, considering the conditions in the camps were deplorable and the cases of human rights abuses, further alienating and grieving the population instead of gaining legitimacy for the state. These issues combined with the absence of a trained and capable force proved to be the elements of a failed approach. The success of Andhra and the failure of Chhattisgarh can be gauged by the variation in Naxalite incidents over the current decade as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Naxalite incidents in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh 2001 to 2009 (After GOI MHA annual reports 2008–09, <http://www.mha.nic.in>)

The outcome of counterinsurgency success needs to be measured against the three conditions of legitimacy of government, marginalization or separation of insurgents from the population, and the dissolving and reintegration of the armed insurgent force. When we look at the case of Andhra Pradesh, the state was able to achieve considerable success, as it was able to meet all three conditions to a substantial degree. It ensured legitimacy of the government in the insurgent zones as the government was in control of social, political, economic, and security institutions in the state. The state successfully separated the insurgents by elimination, arrests and surrender. The insurgents who surrendered were given a policy for rehabilitation and reintegrated into society. On the other hand, the case of Chhattisgarh failed on all three counts. The legitimacy of the

government in the eyes of the population did not exist and was further damaged by the actions of Salwa Judum. The insurgents could not be separated from the population and their resources as the movement continued to grow during the decade. The insurgents could not be dissolved or reintegrated into the society. On the contrary, many from the population joined the Maoists for protection from abuses.

In sum, the combination of both the enemy-centric and population-centric approach is the key to success. More specifically, Andhra Pradesh case illustrated that it is essential that the enemy-centric approach be pursued initially to bring down the combat potential of the insurgents before any effective population-centric approach can yield results. The success of Andhra Pradesh and the failure of Chhattisgarh point to five independent variables that potentially account for success in counterinsurgency operations. When we analyze the independent variables and their variation across the cases, while all the variables have to come together to explain success in counterinsurgency operations, there are some which stand out as driving variables for this success. The driving variables that stand out are unified command and intelligence. The other three variables, capability of force, winning hearts and minds and resource control measures are necessary but not sufficient to explain success.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

India's counterinsurgency approach against Naxalism has failed in the majority of affected states. This failure is a matter of serious concern as it has allowed the insurgency to grow and become strong, affecting 16 out of the 28 states to different degrees.³²⁰ With an aim of finding a strategy to counter India's growing insurgency, the following question was posed at the beginning of the research: what explains success in countering insurgency? To answer the question, case comparisons were undertaken at the national level by comparing the successful Malayan counterinsurgency approach by the British with the largely failed Indian approach to Maoist insurgency. At the state level within India, a comparison was made between the successful case of Andhra Pradesh and the failed case of Chhattisgarh.

This chapter will answer the research question by bringing out the factors that have contributed to the failure of the Indian approach. Then, it will present the model that was developed based on the analysis of independent variables across the four cases. Following the model's elaboration, the chapter will apply the model to the current Indian strategy called Operation Green Hunt (started in 2009) in order to predict success or failure in the future. Lastly, based on this application, the chapter will provide policy recommendations.

The initial Naxalite uprising in the 1960s and 1970s in West Bengal was successfully crushed by an enemy-centric approach used by the state.³²¹ However, since the 1980s, the Naxalite insurgency erupted in different states. Coupled with a weak population-centric strategy to deal with it, the insurgency grew overtime in strength and

³²⁰ Centre for Security Analysis, "Naxalism: a threat to internal security," May 21, 2010, <http://internalconflict.csa-chennai.org/2010/05/lt.html> (accessed November 15, 2010). Based on lecture by Lt. Gen. (Retd) K.M. Seth, Former Governor of Chattisgarh given on November 21, 2008.

³²¹ Sujjan Datta, "Clamour to let army fight Maoists rises- Bengal, only state with military experience, adds voice to chorus," *The Telegraph*, Calcutta Edition, September 27, 2009, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090927/jsp/nation/story_11546415.jsp (accessed November 26, 2010).

capability. In the current decade, Naxalism has spread at a fast pace and the violence has increased in the Maoist-dominated areas, especially since the unification of the two major Maoist groups in 2004, the MCC of Bihar and the PWG of Andhra Pradesh.³²² The predominantly enemy-centric approach by India has resulted in increased confrontations between the Maoists and the security forces, and yet the *insurgency* has continued to enhance its fighting capability and gain popular support among the rural and tribal people of India.

The rapidly growing support base emerges from the underlying factors including lack of basic administration in remote areas, unrepresented farmers and tribals, rampant corruption among government officials and civil society, lack of judicial remedies, violence by militias of the upper caste against members of lower caste, insensitivity of the government towards tribal culture and traditions, and economic deprivation compounded by illiteracy and unemployment. In this context, the Maoists have taken over state functions.

With regard to India's largely failed counterinsurgency approach, this study analyzed the outcomes of the four counterinsurgency efforts across five independent variables to identify how they vary across the cases and interact with each other. A unified command provides better coordination between agencies and improves optimization of force and sharing of intelligence. In the case of the British in Malaya, unified command was achieved through the formation of a new office of the director of operations, which enabled enforcement of policies, avoided duplication of effort, and allowed for better coordination between agencies, especially in the field of intelligence. In Andhra, the unified command was established through the unified structure under the chief minister's office. In India at the national level there was only partial progress toward creating a unified command, by way of the NMD and other coordinating committees, and no progress in Chhattisgarh at state level.

Given the presence of a unified command, intelligence and the capability of force together proved crucial in explaining counterinsurgency success. In terms of intelligence,

³²² Ramana, *The Naxal Challenge*, 164.

in Andhra Pradesh case, the intelligence network was reformed, and the Special Intelligence Branch was created to form the backbone of the counterinsurgency campaign. In the British case, after the initial failure upon realizing that combat through direct military means alone was not possible, the focus was shifted to intelligence-based operations along with a change in tactics to the use of small jungle patrols and jungle ambushes; these were effective as the intelligence improved.³²³ Intelligence-led operations also required a risk-benefit approach to patrolling, which improved the success rate against insurgents.³²⁴ In the Indian case, while intelligence was limited within the states, the sharing was even less between them. In Chhattisgarh, state intelligence was not effective as was evidenced by the use of large numbers of forces and the use of search and attack tactics.³²⁵ Search and attack tactics have led to large numbers of casualties.³²⁶

Turning from intelligence to capability of forces, in Malaya, the British did not initially have well-trained forces which proved disastrous; later, units with better experience and training, along with improved low-level tactics and procedures, ultimately were important in succeeding.³²⁷ In Andhra, the Greyhounds were a highly trained commando force that spearheaded the campaign. They were trained in jungle and guerilla warfare, used technology to their advantage, and proved very effective against the guerillas. Other focus areas that improved capability were improved communications, arms, equipment, and training. In Chhattisgarh, there were some units of capable NSG commandos; however they were not utilized due to a lack of reliable intelligence as well as the absence of a unified command with an effective strategy. In India at national level, capability was limited among the police, although the Indian army had highly trained

³²³ Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 47.

³²⁴ Mackinlay et al., *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 11–12.

³²⁵ For further details on large numbers of forces see ACHR report, “The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh.” 9., Ifor an example of use of search and attack tactics see: Indian Express, “Chhattisgarh: Maoists kill 76 security personnel,” April 6, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/600684> (accessed Novemebr 28, 2010).

³²⁶ Search and attack tactics involve searching large areas using conventional methods by the resources and manpower of the combat force itself. These tactics are used when there is no reliable intelligence which is generated for targeting. These are long drawn methods and have not been effective in jungle warfare especially when the insurgent has better knowledge of the terrain and is well entrenched into hideouts.

³²⁷ Mackinlay et al., *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 11.

forces in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare. However, the policy prohibited the use of the army, so this capability was not used. One of the essential requirements observed for success was operational capability that was multiagency and multifunctional and under unified civil control; these elements provided the capability to implementing strategy to win the support of population.³²⁸

The resource control measures variable was important to success but it was not a key variable. After the initial British failure, population control measures were implemented to stop the flow of food, money, medicines, clothing, and supplies, as well as intelligence and fresh recruits.³²⁹ These measures aided in the overall campaign as the insurgents were dependent on the population for resources and were thus drawn out of the forests. However, as long as the insurgents' capacity to fight remained, the insurgency continued. Even in case of Chhattisgarh, population control measures were undertaken by security forces and the Salwa Judum; however, they did not prove effective in reducing the insurgency. In Andhra, limited resource control was achieved using intelligence-based targeting of supporters and resource storages. At the national level in India, no major effort was undertaken for resource control, though state governments did act in this arena.

The winning hearts and minds variable was found to be effective, if the strategy was employed after the insurgency was weakened by the combat forces. The Andhra Pradesh approach was one of calibrated use of Greyhound Special Forces to weaken the insurgency, in addition to the implementation of development initiatives.³³⁰ These initiatives included building of roads, schools, and government offices. Also, viable surrender and rehabilitation schemes for the Naxals were used, which proved useful in turning around some insurgents. In Malaya, the British used the coercive means and propaganda effectively. In the case of India and Chhattisgarh, the developmental efforts were ineffective, as the insurgency was still strong enough to disrupt the initiatives. The

³²⁸ Mackinlay et al., *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, 11–12.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

³³⁰ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "Limitations Of Operation Green Hunt," *Eurasia Review News and Analysis*, May 19, 2010.

variable of winning hearts and minds gains maximum advantage in conjunction with intelligence. This variable also requires proper timing, since funds pumped in for development indirectly aid the insurgency if the area is still under the insurgent control.

B. CURRENT INDIAN STRATEGY: OPERATION GREEN HUNT

Operation Green Hunt (as labeled by media) came about in 2009 as the latest response against an estimated 22,000 Maoist insurgents.³³¹ The strategy is a two-pronged approach. The initiative by the center to intensify anti-Naxal operations is a reinforcement of the existing strategy by increasing policing and initiating development. Operation Greenhunt is likely to achieve only partial success when viewed against the five variable model explaining success. This is because while the effort towards capability of forces, and measures to win hearts and minds are seen in this approach, the key driving variables of unified command and intelligence still appear to be weak.

Indian counterinsurgency strategy and tactics have remained fundamentally conservative and have favored the population-centric developmental approach, influenced substantially by accounts of British experiences in Malaya. Indian strategists believe that a successful counterinsurgency campaign must focus on gaining the popular support of population. However, as was seen in the analysis of Malayan case and substantiated by historian Karl Hack, the back of the Malayan insurgency was broken by the enemy-centric effort during Briggs' tenure before Britain set about its population-centric measures to win hearts and minds during Templar and Bourne tenures.³³²

There were a few politico-economic factors that led to the launching of Operation Green Hunt strategy. In the 2009 national election, the UPA government came to power at the center for the second consecutive term, however unlike the 2004 election, this time, it was without the support of left wing political parties like CPI (Marxist) who were not in favor of a strong response against the Maoists. The non-interference of left-wing parties gave the government the opportunity to take on the Naxal problem more earnestly

³³¹ Sankar Sen, "Lessons from Dantewada," *The Statesman*, April 26, 2010, <http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php11584> (accessed November 22, 2010).

³³² Praveen Swami, "For a Review of Counterinsurgency doctrine," *The Hindu*, April 13, 2010.

and to come up with a strategy. In addition, with the Maoist government coming to power in neighboring Nepal in 2009, the Indian Maoist movement was likely to be strengthened, as there were links of some Indian Maoist outfits with the Maoists in Nepal. Moreover, on the economic front, mineral export projects of the country were affected due to the ongoing Maoist violence and their control over the vast mineral belt region of the country. For instance, the single largest economic domain over which the Maoists hold control is the iron-ore-rich Bastar region in Chhattisgarh, which spreads over 40,000 sq km.³³³ Within this context, the current strategy reflects the growing concern that the Maoists were becoming too strong and India's rapid economic development did little to bring out of poverty the millions of poor villagers and tribals whose situation helps provide support for the Maoists.³³⁴

The strategy since 2009 is a strong enemy-centric approach along with population-centric measures. The center has sanctioned additional central reserve police battalions and provided additional funds to the affected states to deal with the insurgency. As mentioned earlier, the counterinsurgency strategy has a two-pronged approach. First, it has sought to recapture territory from Maoists by enforcing police measures and targeting insurgents with search and destroy tactics through large armed patrols deep into jungles. Second, the strategy has sought to gain the support of the local population using socio-economic developmental projects at the state level.

Anti-Naxal operations were launched by the government at three different areas, considered to be the tri-junctions of the worst Naxal-affected states. The tri-junctions are Andhra Pradesh-Maharashtra-Chhattisgarh, Orissa-Jharkhand-Chhattisgarh and West Bengal-Jharkhand-Orissa. About 70,000 paramilitary personnel including 75 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalions will assist the state police forces during the operations. Almost 7,000 troops specially-trained in jungle warfare are also part of the

³³³ Amarnath K. Menon, "Tackling the Red terror: The centre unveils a new caliberated, two-pronged strategy to neutralize the Maoist threat with the biggest-ever offensive using crack forces. Can it succeed?" India Today, October 26, 2009.

³³⁴ Bappa Majumdar, "India moves to stamp out Maoist insurgency; the government launches an offensive against the Naxal rebels, who say they are fighting for farmers," Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2009, A24.

total strength of the central forces to be deployed for the task. The government's new plan to counter Maoists was approved by Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Under this plan, the affected states will have an effective coordination and the police will take a lead role.³³⁵

The approach of "clear, hold, and build" underlines the strategy of Operation Green Hunt. The forces will penetrate Naxal-dominated areas, clear and sanitize the locations, and hold the territory so that other government agencies can move in to initiate developmental work. The operations are expected to last around two years, considered as an ample time frame for winning the hearts and minds of local people through developmental activities, claimed police sources. The paramilitary forces for the offensive include the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in addition to the central police forces. A paramilitary force company is positioned at each of 18 bases in the core jungle areas, and they have initiated anti-Naxal search operations in coordination with the special action group (SAG) and anti-Naxal special action squads (C-60) of the state security agency. The companies of Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), specially trained in jungle warfare, are also likely to move into the district in the later stages of the operation. There will also be a deployment of six helicopters from the Air Force for transportation and rescue operations of troops.³³⁶

In addition, the anti-Naxal plan includes Rs 7,300 Crore (US\$ 1.6 billion) package for developmental works in areas cleared of the Maoists. The plan is to combine the offensive with large-scale development, including schools, health services, police stations, and roads. Around 2.5 million live in the tri-junction areas where Maoists operate freely. There has not been any worthwhile development in these areas, owing to the large-scale violence in the affected regions. For instance, the Naxalites have killed

³³⁵ All information in the paragraph is drawn from: International Institute of Strategic Studies, "India's Maoist Challenge," strategic comments on past issues from Vol. 16, September 2010, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/september/> (accessed December 3, 2010).

³³⁶ All information in this paragraph is from: Mazhar Ali, "First phase of Operation Green Hunt begins," *The Times of India*, November 2, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5187541.cms> (accessed November 11, 2010).

more than 2,600 people, including civilians, in 5,800 incidents in last three years. The highest number of incidents of violence has taken place in four worst-affected states of Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa, where 2,212 people lost their lives from January 2006 to August 2009. Naxalism has spread to 16 states with over 2,000 police station areas in 223 districts partially or substantially affected.³³⁷

The Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA) opposition to using the army in Maoist has led to the commitment of central para-military forces (CPMF) despite their lack of expertise in the tactics of tackling the Maoists. With the state police being in the forefront of anti-Maoist operations with assistance from CPMFs, states such as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are likely to see only limited results. While the MHA also plans to develop anti-Naxal special units within the paramilitary forces, such training would involve considerable time to take effect on ground and would call for a larger role by the army in training the CPMF units.³³⁸

In all, the Indian strategy over the years has focused on states fighting Naxalism by using police forces and other state resources, treating the insurgency as a problem of lack of policing. This strategy has proved to be unsuccessful. Even with the center providing additional paramilitary forces and funds for development, the basic strategy has essentially not changed.

C. EVALUATION OF OPERATION GREEN HUNT USING THE PROPOSED MODEL

When we analyze the current strategy with regards to the five independent variables addressed in the success model that was developed based on the four case studies, we realize that there are shortcomings of the current strategy, especially in terms of intelligence and resource control variables.

³³⁷ The Hindu, "Centre to launch anti-Naxal operations in tri-junctions," November 1, 2009, <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article41634.ece> (accessed September 07, 2010).

³³⁸ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "Limitations of Operation Green Hunt," Eurasia Review News and Analysis, May 19, 2010.

The variable of unified command was a shortcoming both at the national level and in most states. Along with the NMD and other coordination committees that existed previously, the current impetus to improved coordination among the agencies has improved the standing of the unified command variable. The importance of a functional unified command is understood by the government as per the prime minister's statement in July 2010 however, its implementation is yet to come.³³⁹ Joint operations committees at the district level have been set up to achieve better synergy between the state and central police and intelligence agencies; however, the degree of co-ordination leaves much to be desired.³⁴⁰ Even the role of organizations such as the NMD is limited and more for management than for control of operations. Better coordination is crucial as the insurgency is spread over many states and the Naxalites have used the border areas to slip over into other states to exploit this gap in operations. The area most affected by lack of coordination is in the field of intelligence gathering and sharing. In the absence of policy directives, issues with coordination exist. The Indian strategy lacks a unified command structure to control and coordinate events at the national level, primarily because the insurgency is being fought independently by the affected states. Further indicating the lack of cohesion in the strategy, operation Green Hunt began as an all-out offensive has since stalled to become a large-scale holding operation, with forces holding on to the territory and making little progress into the Maoist strongholds.³⁴¹ Lack of coordination and synergy of operations and intelligence sharing between the various security agencies is a major impediment to success of the anti-Naxal operations.

In terms of intelligence, instead of operations being led by intelligence, the stated focus is on search and attack operations; this amply highlights the lack of reliable intelligence. The primary sources of intelligence continue to be the police intelligence agencies that are not yet reformed. In most states no major changes or effective

³³⁹ Bappa Majumdar, "India sets up unified command to tackle Maoists," Reuters, July 14, 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66D3FV20100714> (accessed November 17, 2010).

³⁴⁰ Lt. Gen (Retd.) Tej Pathak, "Armed Forces in Anti-Naxal Operations-I: Identifying the Problem," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, September 15, 2010, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/3235.html> (accessed November 12, 2010).

³⁴¹ Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, "Flawed Operation," *The Frontline*. 27, no.9 (April 24–May 07, 2010), <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2709/stories/20100507270900400.htm> (accessed September 22, 2010).

reorganization has taken place that can compare with the changes that were undertaken in the case of Andhra Pradesh. Additionally, there is a lack of coordination among the state and central intelligence agencies, specifically regarding Naxalism. Because intelligence is a driving variable, lack of reliable intelligence also affects resource control and overall progress of the campaign. Also, with coordination at the center needing improvement, intelligence sharing is also affected, which again restricts the progress of the campaign. For the Special Forces to be effective, both intelligence gathering methods and the availability of actionable intelligence have to improve. For instance, the lack of intelligence severely affected the operation when 76 CRPF personnel were massacred in April 2010 ambush by Maoists during a search and attack patrol in the jungles of Chhattisgarh.³⁴² The forces had no prior intelligence about the location of the insurgents.

In the current approach, the capability of forces requirement is present to a degree, in that specialized forces have been made available to the states. However, there is a lot of work left to be done on this front. While the Special Forces use the latest equipment and are well trained, the majority of police forces deployed for anti-Naxal operations do not have specialized weapons and still use the old vintage rifles; most lack of quality bullet-proof jackets. Police training is another area of concern. There is a limited number of current police the present numbers of police forces trained to operate successfully in forested terrain against Maoists who hide in the jungles and use guerilla warfare; this has resulted in a large number of casualties since the operation began. For instance, in Operation Green Hunt, as of September 2010, the forces have suffered 312 casualties compared with 294 insurgent casualties.³⁴³ In addition, while some special forces are positioned strategically, a lack of communications and coordination is creating difficulties in providing rapid reinforcements and carrying out rescue missions.

This variable of winning hearts and minds is addressed to a limited extent. This is because the clear, hold and build strategy is stuck at the clear stage. While development

³⁴² Indian Express, "Chhattisgarh: Maoists kill 76 security personnel," April 6, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/maoistscontinueterrorreign-maulcrpf/600684/> (accessed November 16, 2010).

³⁴³ Fakir Mohan Pradhan, "India: A Withering Green," Eurasia Review News and Analysis, November 23, 2010, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/9915> (accessed November 30, 2010)

initiatives in areas cleared from Maoists bring positive results, the Maoists are stalling the development in areas that are within their influence. For instance, it is evident from recent media reports and articles by strategic think tanks that, the increase in violence by the Maoists has resulted in large-scale casualties of police forces and civilians and the inability of the state to advance developmental activities in a majority of states.³⁴⁴ Moreover, these projects become sources of extortion and nexus with officials, which aid the insurgency. In the absence of intelligence and coordination, pursuing these initiatives is taking its toll.

With regard to resource control, under the current strategy no major effort has been dedicated to controlling the resource networks of finance, weapons, and explosives that sustain the armed insurgency. Again, the lack of intelligence is hindering the effectiveness of this variable. Moreover, the continued use of population control in some states such as Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh has not produced any effective results, primarily because of the vastness of the region under Maoist control and the extension of resource networks beyond state boundaries. Also, with insurgents having some links to foreign sympathizers and suppliers like Maoists in Nepal and some terrorist outfits operating from Pakistan, the problem of resource control needs to be taken seriously.

In sum, the current period exhibits the lack of a cohesive national strategy. Faced with increasingly well-equipped Maoists carrying out large-scale and better coordinated attacks, the central and state governments have so far failed to co-ordinate their respective counterinsurgency strategies, providing no cohesive national response to the violence. Moreover, the affected states have adopted their own largely enemy-centric responses to the violence with mixed results. New Delhi's approach to the insurgency is heavily enemy-centric but without reliable intelligence and a unified command to back their strategy, it may achieve limited results. The concern for addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency exists as evidenced by an April 2008 planning commission

³⁴⁴ Priyedarshi Vinita, "Fighting Naxalism: Need for Change in Strategy," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (April 8, 2010), http://www.ipcs.org/search_result.php?keyword=Fighting+Naxalism (accessed May 27, 2010)

panel report that investigated the root causes of insurgency.³⁴⁵ However, the causes can be addressed only once the violence and combat potential of the insurgents is reduced substantially below the tipping point.

D. OTHER FACTORS DEGRADING EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGY

There are a few factors beyond the scope of the strategy that are indirectly aiding the insurgency and reducing the effectiveness of the strategy. These factors include corruption in the system, lack of institutional professionalism among some politicians, effect of coalition politics on strategy and self-imposed constraint on the use of armed forces.

1. Corruption and Markets of Protection

Corruption is an inherent problem within the administration in some states and has taken a toll on counterinsurgency efforts, as was seen in the case of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. While this calls for a long-term solution, corruption also gives insurgents the added advantage of controlling policy issues in the affected states. Lack of remedies against corruption and oppression in some states has led many tribals to join the Naxal movement. In the meantime, the Maoists have formed their markets of protection to gain control over the population which further weakens the position of the government in imposing remedial action.³⁴⁶ Corruption within the government machinery is a cause of concern more so when colluded with the Maoists for political and economic benefits. In some places the relationship is almost symbiotic and thriving which has deterred states from taking strong action against the Maoists and is also a reason for the rapid growth in insurgency in the recent past.³⁴⁷

Fear of competition from other agencies and fear of the Maoists themselves drives the creation of markets of protection. Not only the locals, but even the state officials seek

³⁴⁵ Janes Information Group, "Red storm rising."

³⁴⁶ Alpa Shah, "Markets of Protection: The Terrorist Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India," *Critique of Anthropology* 26, no. 3 (September 2006): 297.

³⁴⁷ Sudha Ramachandaran, "India Digs Deep to Outflank Maoists," *Asia Times*, August 04, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH04Df04.html (accessed December 1, 2010).

the support and protection of Maoists in states like Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh for siphoning off the money that comes for rural development projects such as road and infrastructure construction. Maoists have control in many places where the funds of the state government are indirectly aiding the Maoist agendas.³⁴⁸ Maoists have created for themselves an image of both invisible and visible organization: visible through their armed confrontations with police, running of a parallel government, and resolution of court cases; and invisible and omnipresent through their grass-root penetrating organizations, where one does not know who else in his community is involved with the Maoists, prompting everyone in a given village or region to support them out of consequential fear.³⁴⁹

2. Lack of Institutional Professionalism in Some States

A symbiotic relationship exists between the Maoists and the state in some places. Maoists use coercive methods of gaining support from the population for themselves and for the political parties that they support. In some states, the political constraint created by the nexus with the Naxals is a major hindrance to the progression of the operation.³⁵⁰ Naxal coercive control over a large tribal population forces politicians to engage in what is also referred to as “vote bank politics.” Therefore, despite knowing that they need to take measures to control Naxal violence, the politicians do not take necessary security measures against the Naxalites in order to accumulate votes from the tribals to win elections. For instance, in some Naxal-affected regions of Bihar, there is an understanding between the Naxals and the ruling coalition government, resulting in no action by the government against the Naxalites.³⁵¹

³⁴⁸ Sankarshan Thakur, “Who funds Maoists?The govt,”The Telegraph, April 9, 2010, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100409/jsp/frontpage/story_12320570.jsp (accessed December 6, 2010).

³⁴⁹ Alpa Shah, “Markets of Protection: The Terrorist Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India,” *Critique of Anthropology* 26, no. 3 (September 2006): 297.

³⁵⁰ For an example of nexus, see Diptosh Majumdar, “Soren Contacts Maoist Boss, Doesn’t Tell Delhi,” CNN-IBN, January 7, 2010, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/soren-contacts-maoist-boss-doesnt-tell-delhi/108305-37.html> (accessed December 7, 2010).

³⁵¹ Radha Vinod Raju , “Countering The Naxal Threat: A Case For Specialized Units,” Eurasia Review News and Analysis, June 14, 2010.

3. Limitations of Coalition Politics

Limitations due to coalition politics were a factor for the central government's inability to tackle the problem head-on despite the formation of CPI (Maoist) in 2004 and the prime minister's acknowledgement of Naxalism as the single largest internal security threat to the nation in 2006. This was because the communist-left political parties were a part of the ruling coalition alliance, supporting the INC party to achieve the requisite numbers to hold power politically; this did not allow action against the Maoists.³⁵² It was only in 2009, when the INC came back to power without the support of the leftist parties that the CPI (Maoist) was banned and large-scale offensive was launched. Even at the state level, different political parties tend to use different methods to deal with the issue, thereby changing or modifying the strategy.³⁵³ This leads to ineffective implementation of the strategy every time the ruling party changes. Unless the fight against the Maoists is laid down as a national directive policy, coalition politics will continue to undermine the progress of the counterinsurgency.

4. Imposed Constraints on Use of Armed Forces

The self-imposed constraints by the center regarding the use of armed forces, specifically the Army and the Air Force, have curtailed the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency campaign. Despite the long experience of the Army, the government has decided not to use the armed forces, as the Maoist insurgency is considered an internal insurgency without any separatist claims and without any credible support outside the country, unlike the other insurgencies in the past. For instance, Indian Army's counterinsurgency experience since the 1950s includes Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, and

³⁵² For an example of complacent actions by the left government in West Bengal and against the Maoists in general, see Uddipan Mukherjee, "Red Faces the Redder: Operation Lalgah," from *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, June 24, 2009, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/red-faces-the-redder-operation-lalgah-2894.html>(accessed November 24, 2010)

³⁵³ For instance in the case of Chhattisgarh, when the congress party government was in power until 2003, the strategy was of development however, once the BJP government came to power the strategy changed to using security-centric methods against the Naxalites with state police and the vigilante groups like Salw Judum.

Punjab insurgencies which were separatist movement supported by external actors.³⁵⁴ In addition, in Jammu and Kashmir the Army has also been involved with Operation *Sadhbhavana* illustrate the Army's capability of rehabilitation and resettlement.³⁵⁵ Similarly, the Air Force is not being utilized; through it has the capacity to conduct surveillance with UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), training to aid in aerial surveillance, and helicopters for rapid reinforcements.³⁵⁶

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDIAN STRATEGY

Having gathered basic inferences from the case studies and analyzed the constraints and drawbacks of the Indian government's approach, there is a need for modification of the present strategy; although the present strategy is moving in the required direction, there is a need for some modifications in order to achieve success.

1. Intelligence Based Operations

Intelligence-based operations used in counterinsurgency rely heavily on the ability of the intelligence agencies to gather reliable and actionable intelligence and also to provide information for the disruption of the insurgent resource networks. There is a need for generating actionable intelligence by setting up a reliable intelligence network to enable information to flow fast and without compromise. To gather actionable intelligence from the grassroots, India will have to develop an elaborate network of operatives and informants, especially from the local villagers and tribal communities. Also, surveillance will have to be done using the latest technological assets available for real-time updates. The other aspect of intelligence-based operations is disrupting insurgent resource networks. Intelligence will have to focus on disruption of these Maoist networks of finance, weapons, and sympathizers. As was revealed by the research, the

³⁵⁴ Namrata Goswami, "India's counterinsurgency experience: the 'trust and nurture' strategy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20, no. 1 (March 2009): 66.

³⁵⁵ Operation Sadhbhavna is a development initiative by the Indian army to win hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir by way of construction of schools, roads, bridges and hospitals.

³⁵⁶ For example of use of AirForce in counter insurgency in India, see: Sudha Ramachandran , "Chopper ruling raises Maoist tensions," Asia Times, South Asia section, August 17, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH17Df04.html (accessed October 25, 2010)

resource networks of sustenance extend beyond rural areas well into the cities and beyond state boundaries. The networks could possibly extend to even neighboring nations if not checked and disrupted.

2. Capability of Forces

Specialized training and other initiatives are essential to improve capability. This should include rapid deployment capability and training in jungle warfare and counterinsurgency, much like the Greyhounds of Andhra. Further personnel trained in local language and specific terrain training could aid the intelligence gathering ability. In addition, these units should have remuneration and insurance for better motivation, like the Greyhounds received, such as extra pay, special insurance packages, and housing. For long-drawn patrols, the forces need to be trained for survival to live off the jungle, as was the case with the Greyhounds while operating in the Nallamalla forests in Andhra Pradesh.³⁵⁷

The counterinsurgency operations should take advantage of technology in the fields of weapons, surveillance and communication. This would include gadgets such as GPS and satellite phones for the police personnel involved in special operations. For better surveillance and real time information, UAVs could be used by the Army and Air force. The provision of mobile phones at subsidized rates to the locals could aid intelligence gathering and monitoring. In addition, the communication and networking equipment used by the security forces needs to be upgraded and integrated within a unified command. The use of improvised communication equipment with GPS data link would be useful in addressing the issue of positioning and communication.

Tactically, speed and mobility are more important than mass of effort, as evidenced by both of the successful cases of Malaya and Andhra Pradesh. Considering the importance of rapid deployments, helicopters from Air Force could be used and further trained forces could be suitably positioned at strategic points.

³⁵⁷ K. Srinivas Reddy, "All Greyhounds units in Nallamala," *The Hindu*, September 03, 2009, <http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/03/stories/2009090359680500.htm> (accessed November 29, 2010)

3. Integration of Power

A unified command would mean that the state agencies involved in counterinsurgency are coordinated both within the state and at the center for the purpose of this operation. Unified command helps in better coordination and sharing of intelligence and avoids the duplication of efforts, as was evidenced by the case of the British in Malaya during General Briggs tenure. Unification also aids in optimization of available resources. Although the Indian approach is to fight the insurgency at the state level, the successful case studies show that coordination at the center is required for issues such as intelligence sharing, overall monitoring, and policymaking. The central initiatives such as the NMD need to be given more authority for policymaking. Hence, having a unified command at the national level is a necessity to deal with the problem in its entirety. Based on the Andhra model, the proposed unified command in states are to be expedited to deal with Naxalism, more so when the socio-economic costs of insurgency are affecting business and investment.³⁵⁸

4. Measures for Winning Hearts and Minds

As most of the area under Naxalite insurgency is backward and lacks basic amenities, it is essential that India focuses on these measures where they can be implemented, once the violence-making potential of the Maoists in that region is reduced. These measures can be on two fronts. First, there is the area of infrastructure development such as building roads and schools. Second, the economic avenues to the local population, such as jobs and other opportunities like encouraging cottage industries in which the tribal talents could be utilized. The opening of SEZ could also be a useful way of generating additional job opportunities. Apart from these efforts, the state could also provide socioeconomic reforms such as resolving their judicial cases early and providing government-sponsored health care.

³⁵⁸ Rahul K Bhonsle, "A stagnating anti-Naxal policy." Livemint, posted July 16, 2010, <http://www.livemint.com/2010/07/16003052/A-stagnating-antiNaxal-policy.html>. (accessed November 28, 2010)

There is a need for a viable exit policy for Naxals by keeping the channel of negotiations open with the Naxalites; this could help to end the effort earlier, especially once the fighting potential of the Maoists is substantially reduced. However, mere ceasefires that allow the insurgents to regroup and rearm need to be avoided so as to preserve the advantage. In addition, there is a need for providing suitable surrender policies for the Naxalites. Surrenders are important to get the latest and best intelligence about the Naxals' activities, including the locations of their hideouts. Efforts to gain vital intelligence from surrendered and arrested Naxals should continue throughout the campaign along with better coordination between the state intelligence agencies and anti-Naxal units.³⁵⁹In addition, to hearts and minds efforts, perception management needs to be undertaken. The government should employ media campaigns and distribute leaflets to communicate the atrocities and other anti-social actions being performed the Naxalites.

5. Controlling Insurgent Resources

Government-supported vigilante groups need to be disbanded to avoid further bloodshed. Instead, the states should rely on trained police forces for fighting the insurgents and intelligence-based targeting of resource dumps and supporters who supply resources. This would require that the central government issue directives for the disbanding of all such vigilante groups in all states and to terminate the indirect support being given by the state governments. Moreover, the relief camps in Chhattisgarh need to be disbanded, as they do not serve the purpose of isolating the population and resources from the insurgents

6. Avoiding Collateral Damage and Human Rights Violations

Finally, human rights violations need to be kept to the minimum. Not using the firepower of the Army and Air Force by the central government is a positive step towards

³⁵⁹ Radha Vinod Raju, "Countering The Naxal Threat: A Case For Specialized Units," Eurasia Review News and Analysis, June 14, 2010.

avoiding collateral damage.³⁶⁰ The federal government must intervene with the state government to stop the vigilante group campaign and ensure that civilians are not involved in the conflict with the armed opposition groups.³⁶¹ Another area of abuse of human rights is the enrollment of teenaged children as special police officers to fight the insurgents as was seen in Chhattisgarh.

F. LONG-TERM ISSUES

In addition to the recommendations for modifying the Indian strategy, there are also some long term issues that need to be addressed to find a lasting solution to the problem, or else the problem will resurface after a few years.

1. Addressing Underlying Factors

The most crucial long-term recommendation is to address the underlying causes of the insurgency that have provided the conditions for sustaining the insurgency for decades and have made the Naxalite insurgency the single largest internal security challenge for India. This would require ensuring accountability among politicians and other officials by institutionalizing professionalism and by genuinely undertaking anti-corruption measures. Judicial remedies for the perpetrators of caste-related violence and the long pending land disputes would be required. There is a need for understanding and accepting the tribal way of living off the forests and to provide them with sheltered habitats. The living conditions of the tribals and rural villager's needs to be improved by way of literacy and employment additionally, the tribals and deprived population can be provided with suitable training to get jobs in their present capacity thereby improving their economic status over time. Also, effective affirmative action for the tribal community would help in this transition process. Moreover, the opening of additional Special Economic Zones and providing agricultural land at subsidized rates would help

³⁶⁰ For explanation of collateral damage when using Air Force, see remarks by Air Chief PV Naik in: Sudha Ramachandaran, "India's anti-Maoist strategy under fire," Asia Times, May 26, 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsia/.html> (accessed May 26, 2010).

³⁶¹ ACHR Report, "The Adivasis of Chattisgarh," 6.

the farmers and tribals in merging the tribals into the mainstream. These efforts would go a long way toward making the tribals accept the legitimacy of the government and weaning them away from Maoist ideology.

2. Strengthening Intelligence Network

The failure of the police forces over decades for lack of reliable intelligence reflects directly at the need for reforming the intelligence organizations at the state level and better coordination at national level. This would mean improving upon the capabilities of the existing internal intelligence agencies and their capacities in terms of reliability of information and better analysis. Focusing on generating actionable intelligence that would give desired results should be the overall aim. Another aspect that has come out of the study is the need for better coordination between state and federal intelligence agencies and also between states. Most Maoist insurgents and their activities thrive in the borders between states, which gives them the advantage of exploiting this gap in sharing of intelligence. There is an apparent need to enlarge the scope for intelligence agencies' capacity more on lines of a homeland security. In all, intelligence being the backbone of all insurgency operations, the present organization has gaps that need to be addressed, and there is a need to revamp the intelligence gathering capability by making use of technology and improving upon the human intelligence capability.³⁶²

3. Issues of Securing Borders

In the context of Maoist insurgency, the securing of borders from infiltration of arms and personnel with neighboring countries such as Nepal, which has had a Maoist government since 2009, is essential to finding a lasting solution to the already expanded insurgency. It is important to understand that forming a red corridor from Nepal to Tamilnadu is a part of the Maoist ideology. With such an aim, and with links existing between Maoists in the two countries, and the growth of the Maoist insurgency in the recent years, it is essential to secure the porous borders with Nepal, Bangladesh, and with

³⁶² ExpressIndia, "The killing lack of intelligence in Dantewada ," July 7, 2010, <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/The-killing-lack-of-intelligence-in-Dantewada/643182>(accessed December 3, 2010).

Pakistan which has supported uprisings within India in the past. Apart from stopping the insurgent movement across the borders, this securing further aids to sever the flow of resources especially through the bordering states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal and West Bengal.

4. Avoiding Creation of New States

The creation of additional states carved out of existing states in India, especially within the Naxal-affected states, has only increased the violence in the new state under a new and weak administration. In the red corridor, further bifurcation of states until the Maoist insurgency is controlled, is to be avoided. This was attempted in Madhya Pradesh by the creation of Chhattisgarh and in Bihar by the creation of Jharkhand. Both the newly-created states had administrative and political problems in addressing Naxalism and the issue of socio-economic development.³⁶³ Creation of new states has aided the Maoists, who then have a better grip over the population in the new state, as the new state neither has a strong administration nor the state capacity to deal with problems such as an armed insurgency. The current claims of the Telangana state out of Andhra Pradesh and Gorkhaland out of West Bengal could only further aggravate the already overgrown problem.

5. Addressing Shortage of Police Forces

The police shortage in the Maoist-affected states is indeed a major problem. The number of policemen in these states is half (current vacancies stand at over 300,000) of the national average of 120 policemen for a population of 100,000 (developed countries have 450). The entire Bastar district in Chhattisgarh, a hotspot of Maoist activity, has only 6,500 policemen. Moreover, routine policing is one thing, but fighting Maoist guerillas is quite another unless the personnel are specially trained for the job like the Greyhound police commandos of Andhra Pradesh. While funds are designated to set up 12 more specialized combat training schools to add to the existing eight, each can train only 300 to

³⁶³ For an excellent example of problems after division read an article by Bipankar Bhattacharya, "Bihar after Bifurcation: A Challenging Future," *Economic and Political Weekly* 35, no. 43(2000):3800-3804.

500 men a year, leaving a lot to be desired in the present shortage.³⁶⁴ International norms suggest 13 to 20 security personnel per 1,000 people or three to eight personnel per sq. km for critically affected districts, and around 220 security personnel per 100,000 people in other areas, which is also the United Nations standard. Going by this matrix, the police requirement for the Naxal-affected areas in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, the two worst affected states will exceed 200,000 and 130,000, respectively, while availability is limited to about 60,000 and 50,000, including the central paramilitary forces. The large differential means continued Naxal domination of these areas until force levels are increased. Current capacity for training only caters for training 10,000 to 12,000 personnel for anti-Naxal operations per year.³⁶⁵

G. FINAL THOUGHTS

The Maoist insurgency in India has become a threat to internal security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces and on civilians. With the increased numbers in cadres, better weaponry, and guerilla tactics, the Maoists have challenged the police forces over the past few years causing many casualties. With the formation of vigilante groups by some states such as Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, the tribal community has been targeted by both the groups. The case studies of Malay and state of Andhra Pradesh in India provide a good understanding for explaining success in the Maoist insurgency. While both the successful cases used a combination of enemy-centric and population-centric approaches to achieve success, the backbone of the enemy-centric operations was a reliable and effective intelligence network that helped in targeting the Maoists and their resource networks. Moreover a unified command is the other key aspect of a successful campaign.

With Prime Minister Manmohan Singh voicing his preference for a “two pronged” strategy to deal with the Maoists, India must pursue this approach at a national

³⁶⁴ Prassana Mohanty, “Maoists’ financing - the blood flows as long as the cash flows” *Governance Now*, April 07, 2010, <http://www.governancenow.com/news> (accessed August 27, 2010).

³⁶⁵ Rahul K Bhonsle, “A stagnating anti-Naxal policy,” *Livemint*, July 16, 2010, <http://www.livemint.com/2010/07/16003052/A-stagnating-antiNaxal-policy.html> (accessed November 28, 2010)

level, but with significant modifications to the initiatives advanced thus far. The most glaring needs are the formulation of a unified command for a coherent national policy to address the insurgency and direction of the federal and state governments' efforts to implement it. The multiplicities of anti-Naxal committees, agencies, and task forces that currently exist in New Delhi have so far generated more bureaucratic inefficiency and confusion than cogent policymaking. The formation of the Naxal Management Division and the Inter-Ministerial Working Group should help address this problem, but these bodies still lack the administrative authority to direct counterinsurgency efforts at the state level. This is needed, since most of the affected states are proving incapable of formulating any kind of effective challenge to the Maoists on their own and indeed, some state strategies are actually making the problem worse.

On the socio-economic front, efforts at development like market reforms and the SEZ initiative should continue, but in a way that is more sensitive to those it will disadvantage in the short-term. Laws designed to protect the land rights of the rural poor, like the Scheduled Tribes Recognition of Forest Rights Bill, have been on the books for years.³⁶⁶ Enforcement of such legislation must be improved, and funding must be increased for other rural aid and other progressive initiatives, like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program, that can address the problem of rising inequality in the countryside.³⁶⁷ Such efforts proved quite successful in keeping Naxalism in check during the 1970s and 1980s. To ensure the efficient implementation of these programs, however, corruption needs to be rooted out and local governance improved, particularly in states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh. Besides holding back the provision of badly needed social services, their persistent maladministration undermines faith in the Indian state, giving a critical boost to the Maoists' legitimacy. Cleaning up problems this pervasive will not be easy, but New Delhi could increase the use of President's Rule to begin to address the challenge.

³⁶⁶ man Sethi, "New Battle Zones," *Frontline* 24, no.18 (September 9, 2007), <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2418/stories/20070921501101800.htm> (accessed October 12, 2010).

³⁶⁷ Sreelatha Menon, "Sarpanches Clash with Govt. Over NREGP," *Business Standard (India)*, February 5, 2008, <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/sarpanches-clashgovt-over-nregp/312596> (accessed October 13, 2010).

On the security front, aggressive center-directed policing actions were effective in the past but are probably not currently viable. India is already under significant pressure over human-rights issues, and widespread offensive security operations carry significant risk of abuses and collateral damage.³⁶⁸ These are already visible in the excesses of the *Salwa Judum* campaign. Instead, New Delhi should strive to improve local policing in Naxal-affected areas, shore up the border with Nepal to inhibit collaboration with the Communist Party of Nepal, prevent the movement's spread to other areas, and kill or capture the Naxalite leadership.

Given a lack of central coordination, counter-Maoist strategy will remain focused on state responses. As a result, the varying levels of commitment in the various state governments would hinder effective counterinsurgency policies across affected areas. The center should coordinate the intelligence between states and provide the resources such as funds and trained personnel. It must make the functioning of the state administrative machinery more efficient either by making the state governments more accountable or by imposing President's Rule which would bring the state apparatus under the center for better control and flexibility of operations. There is a strong need for institutionalizing the feedback and accountability procedures between the center and the states. Also development committees need to be activated and pending court cases resolved. There is a need for enforcing the rule of law which will eventually bring about legitimacy of the government.

The Indian strategy from 2009 onward needs modifications especially in fields of intelligence and resource control measures in order to achieve success in the overall counterinsurgency campaign. While the combination of enemy-centric and population-centric efforts explains the success in counterinsurgencies, there are two major aspects involved that India needs to consider. First is the issue of reducing the fighting potential of the enemy before any worthwhile development can take place without interruption or

³⁶⁸ Alan K Kronstadt, "India-U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (RL 33529), January 22, 2008, 61.

disruption. This would point to effective enemy-centric approach. Second is that within the enemy-centric approach, the key driving causal variables that explain success are intelligence and unified command.

In the Indian context, this would imply that utilizing the existing framework of police presence, intelligence-based targeting should be undertaken using Special Forces like the Greyhounds and operations should be in small units rather than large units in jungles. The operations will have to be controlled centrally at state levels and coordinated nationally to eradicate the problem, as otherwise it will just spill over from one state to the other as it did from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh. The offensive will have to address the entire affected area and not just one state. This would call for having effective control over the entire Naxal zone by placing suitably positioned rapid action Special Forces. Operations will have to be technology driven and use more speed based operations by better connectivity and transportation by air and land.

Finally, with the implementation of suitable modifications to the existing strategy and better coordination from the center, the states should be able to successfully defeat the Naxalite insurgency. Lastly, political institutions are to be in place before the campaign can completely succeed, as weak and corrupt administrations having nexus with insurgents cannot deal effectively with insurgencies. In addition, the government in the long run must deal with the underlying factors of the insurgency which must be addressed to avoid resurgence of the insurgency in the future.

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