A new understanding of warfare appears under development in Russia. Whether it is actually “new” is open for discussion, but ideas were advanced by Russia’s top leadership indicating that is the case. In June 2019 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated that modern conflict requires new approaches and that developing a new theory of warfare is the main task of the Armed Forces. Shoygu offered that “conflicts of a new generation involve a combination of ...Read more >

Authoritarian regimes are, by their very nature, insecure. They tend to view Western democracies as an existential threat to their way of rule and they fear the development of any type of opposition or protests in the streets. In Russia's case, the latter fear of protests leading to a "color revolution" often appears as important as the ISIS threat to its southern border.Lacking political ...Read more >

American battle command is not Russian battle command. The US Army’s operations process is not the Russian Army operations process and the U.S. Army Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) process does not exist in the Russian Army. There is no Russian courses of action development. The Russian commander initiates the planning process by making his decision about how the mission will be accomplished and then the staff conducts the necessary coordination and war-gaming to convert the ...Read more >

THE military that the Russian Federation inherited in the 1990s had a bloated command structure designed for the command and control of literally thousands of divisions , regiments, and battalions, with the vast majority of these units being 'skeleton units' manned by small cadres that would help flesh out the unit with conscripts and reservists in the event of a mass mobilization. ...Read more >

A wide-spread Russian perception is that Russia is back as a significant Eurasian power whose opinions and desires need to be understood and accommodated. Russia has regained its national pride, confidence and sense of destiny. Russia still feels threatened from the south and the west and is taking political and military steps to deal with that unease. Historically, Russia feels most secure when it has a strong leader and a strong military. Russians are willing to forego much in order to ...Read more >

The reform of the Russian conventional armed forces, announced in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, as part of an agenda that became known as the “new look” cannot be understood, or properly assessed, unless its fundamental drivers are defined. Overall, following Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, declaring the key features of the reform on October 14, 2008 on the day he briefed a closed session of the defense ministry collegium, the reform agenda appeared ...Read more >

Information weapons (IWes) have a comprehensive meaning in Russia that encompasses both strategic and operational applications. IWes are considered as nonnuclear strategic weapons that have the capability, with their cyber and precision-weaponry components (among others), to conduct economic, social, or physical disorganization or destruction of an opponent’s infrastructure or normal operating procedures and induce deterrence without the use of nuclear weapons or ground-based ...Read more >

Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has continually requested that the Academy of Military Science provide him with ideas about new forms and methods of warfare. One source defined “methods” as the use of weaponry and military art. 1 Weaponry is now advanced and is characterized by new speeds, ranges, and agilities, which introduce new ways for Russian commanders to apply force. Military art takes into consideration advanced ...Read more >

This paper traces the evolution of Russian views on the art of coercion, and on the roe of nuclear weapons in it, from the post-Cold War "regional nuclear deterrence" thinking to the ...Read more >

The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent large-scale deployment of Russian troops near the Russo-Ukrainian border were popularly referred to in Russia as �Operation Russian ...Read more >

While Hamas adopted a strategy of psychological exhaustion of Israel�s civilians, Israel employed physical attrition of Hamas� military capabilities. This article examines how these strategies interacted with each ...Read more >

This article analyzes Hamas� strategic and political calculations during the 2014 conflict with Israel in Gaza. I argue Hamas did not plan the conflict, which came mostly in response to Israel�s crackdown on Hamas ...Read more >

The fabrications and distortions propagated by the Kremlin during the Ukraine crisis have made the concept of �information warfare� common currency. Less widely appreciated is the Russian leadership�s understanding of the term ...Read more >

Russia is modernizing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads. It currently has 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,780 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber ...Read more >

A strategic concept of �hybrid wars� or �non-linear wars� has reshaped the new doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces. While its underlying principles are still imprecise small states should study such ideas with an eye ...Read more >