CI Ops |
 | THE CLOSERS : HOW INSURGENCIES END
There are four ways to close an insurgency. Each of them is either good or bad depending on which side one is on. The first way is the best end for the insurgent; that is for the insurgents to win outright. It usually ends with the insurgents triumphantly marching through the nations capital after ousting the incumbent government in a final battle. This is how the Chinese Communists came to power and Castro triumphed in ...Read more > | 5 Pages 371.25 KB |
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 | COIN MANPOWER RATIOS: DEBUNKING THE 10 TO 1 RATIO AND SURGES
Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting ...Read more > | 26 Pages 568.56 KB |
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 | COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN
The most immediate threat to the security of Pakistan is an Islamist insurgency raging in the north-west tribal regions. They have launched a deadly campaign of terror attacks throughout Pakistan over the last few years which have killed large number of civilians and non-civilians alike, devastated infrastructure, and hindered NATO success in ...Read more > | 21 Pages 496.01 KB |
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 | A COMBINED ARMS RESPONSE TO DEATH OF THE ARMOR CORPS
Since the emergence of Counterinsurgency (COIN) as a strategy in 2004, it has gained widespread acceptance both within and outside of the military. It has gained so much acceptance that it has essentially become Army dogma. Most writing on the subject is overwhelming ...Read more > | 4 Pages 289.08 KB |
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 | REBUILDING THE FORCE
The United States Military strategy is in the midst of the largest disarray since the ending of the cold war with global communism in the early 1990s. US Ground forces are now split between two competing and divergent missions: Counterinsurgency Warfare and the projection of High Intensity Combat (HIC) capabilities to its potential ...Read more > | 9 Pages 765.04 KB |
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 | WHOSE HEARTS AND WHOSE MINDS? THE CURIOUS CASE OF GLOBAL COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking
and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a
remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to
two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school.
The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as
a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination
of the evolution of these two ...Read more > | 42 Pages 526.36 KB |
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 | TEN WAYS TO LOSE AT COUNTERINSURGENCY
Much of the literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) emphasizes broad and simple
approaches to victory, such as winning hearts and minds, searching and destroying, clearing and holding, applying costs and benefits, etc. Such prescriptions provide
invaluable baselines against which to judge military and government performance and
to measure progress against one’s adversary. However, there are also costs associated
with strictly adhering to such ...Read more > | 19 Pages 391.52 KB |
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 | CONCEPT FAILURE?
The general theory of strategy, which explains the structure, content, and working of the strategy function, has a domain of intellectual authority that is universal and eternal. This logical precedence over the wide variety of historically unique strategic phenomena means that the theory can provide order and discipline to help those who argue about particular ideas and their practical expression in ...Read more > | 16 Pages 293.79 KB |
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 | RE-BALANCING SECURITY AND JUSTICE THE REFORM OF UK COUNTER-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
The British approach to counter-terrorism is unashamedly based
on intelligence-led policing; and in the decade since the 9/11
attacks of 2001 this has proved to be successful. RUSI’s terrorism
database records some forty-three potential plots or significant
incidents arising from jihadist terrorism, and only one plot – the
London bombings of 2005 – has been successfully carried ...Read more > | 18 Pages 1.46 MB |
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 | OPERATION SARP VINASH
The operation was carried out primarily by Counter Insurgency Force (R). CIF (R) is commonly referred to as Romeo Force. The operation took place in four phases. In the first phase, from about November 2002 to January 2003, CIF(R) developed the physical infrastructure necessary
for conduct of operations, by constructing helipads and mule tracks. In the second phase,
bases surrounding the target region were established, and migrant herders from the area were
resettled elsewhere and ...Read more > | 8 Pages 719.47 KB |
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 | NATO PARTNERSHIPS AND THE ARAB SPRING : ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 2012 CHICAGO SUMMIT
In November 2010, heads of state and government at the Lisbon Summit called for a streamlining of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partnerships. In early 2011, the Alliance developed a more flexible and efficient partnership policy. It did so in accordance with the Lisbon tasking, and prepared simultaneously for a new mission, with contributions from several partner countries, as events unfolded in Libya. These developments involved significant NATO consultation with partner countries. ...Read more > | 40 Pages 1.53 MB |
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 | COUNTERINSURGENCY(COIN) INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE(ISR) OPERATIONS
Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge to wage a successful ...Read more > | 122 Pages 2.76 MB |
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