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 | COUNTERINSURGENCY IN INDIA: THE MAOISTS
The Maoist insurgency follows on a long history of peasant and tribal rebellion against predatory state
structures on the subcontinent. It originated in its present form in a small village in Naxalbari, West
Bengal, where in 1967, villagers armed with bows and arrows resisted police and feudal landlords with
bows and ...Read more > | 13 Pages 386.86 KB |
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 | ON COUNTERINSURGENCY : THOUGHTS ON THE REWRITE OF FIELD MANUAL 3-24
I would like to offer a synopsis of my thoughts on what the re-write of FM 3-24 should encompass. These
thoughts take their cues from my own intellectual journey through lessons the military supposedly
learned about Vietnam, other examples of COIN operations, my peers stories about Iraq and other
places, and my own experiences in South America and ...Read more > | 8 Pages 330.54 KB |
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 | THE MISSING OPERATIONAL LEVEL
This article is conceived and written at the end of my six month deployment to ISAF Joint Command
CJ35 FUOPS, as a psychological operations planner, in the spring of 2010. In the beginning I was greatly
frustrated with two things. Firstly, the internal works of the command, its meetings and its ...Read more > | 10 Pages 343.03 KB |
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 | THE FALLACY OF COIN: ONE OFFICERS FRUSTRATION
General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he will inevitably continue to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Talibans heartland and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or ...Read more > | 3 Pages 445.72 KB |
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 | COIN, COMPLEXITY AND FULL-SPECTRUM WARFARE
The United States Army uses a concept called the Center of Gravity (CoG) to help determine where the focus of efforts should be during warfare. For instance, during recent U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) practical exercises, students many times identified an enemys most powerful corps or armored division as the Operational CoG that must be defeated in order for U.S. forces to be successful in a conventional ...Read more > | 10 Pages 520.74 KB |
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 | BETWEEN CLAUSEWITZ AND MAO
Insurgencies are dynamic, not static. The idea of dynamic insurgencies was previously developed by Mao Zadong. In his book1, Mao described guerrilla warfare as a pyramidal process divided into three linear but not definitive ...Read more > | 6 Pages 268.79 KB |
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 | BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR CONDUCTING ASSESSMENTS IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES
This guide provides practical advice to assessment strategy planners and practitioners. It aims to fill the gap between instructions provided in handbooks and field manuals, and the challenges faced when adapting these instructions to specific operations. Its purpose is to complement, not replace, the more detailed planning or instructional ...Read more > | 35 Pages 864.55 KB |
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