China's Decision for War with India in 1962

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Why Did China's Leaders Decide for War against India?

Why did China go to war with India in 1962? What were the reasons for that war from the standpoint of China's leaders? What were the considerations that led China's leaders to opt for large-scale use of armed force against India in 1962? And how accurate were the views held by China's leaders? These are the questions this essay addresses.

The 1962 war with India was long China’s forgotten war. Little was published in China regarding the process through which China decided for war --- unlike for the Korean War, the Indochina wars, the conflicts over the Offshore Islands in the 1950s, and the 1974 Paracel Island campaign. Foreign analysts, such as Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting writing in the early 1970s, were thus compelled to rely on inferences drawn from Chinese public statements.¹ This situation began to change during the 1990s when there appeared a half dozen Chinese publications on the 1962 war. On the Indian side, the publication in 2002 of India’s long-classified official history of the 1962 war offered additional new and authoritative material.² While these sources are far from complete, they do offer sufficient new materials to warrant a revisiting of China’s road to the 1962 war.
This study will postulate two major, inter-related sets of reasons why China's leaders decided for war with India in 1962. Ordered in the chronological fashion in which the preoccupied China's leaders, these two sets of factors were:

1) a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet,

2) a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border.

This study is also concerned with the accuracy of Chinese perceptions in these two areas. It will attempt to ascertain whether China's decision for war was based, to some degree, on misperceptions rather than on accurate assessment of the situation. This study will argue that in terms of deterrence along the border, Chinese perceptions were substantially accurate. Chinese perceptions regarding Indian policy toward Tibet, however, were substantially inaccurate.

The historiography of any war is politically sensitive because it touches on the question of which nation bears responsibility and thus the implicit moral onus for initiating that war. The 1962 war is especially sensitive in this regard. The historiography of that war figures prominently in the contemporary political psychology of Sino-Indian relations --- on both sides of that relationship. While a scholar should ideally be oblivious to the requirements of any such pressures, this ideal is hard to realize in practice. Fortunately for a scholar who feels deep empathy with both sides of the 1962 war, this study will argue that both sides share responsibility for that war. This study will argue that India's policies along the border, and especially the Forward Policy adopted in November 1961, were seen by China's leaders as constituting incremental Indian seizure of Chinese controlled territory. Moreover, there is little basis for deeming
these views inaccurate. But this study will also argue that Chinese perceptions of Indian policies toward Tibet were fundamentally erroneous, and that, moreover, these misperceptions contributed substantially to the 1962 war. Thus this study will arrive at the felicitous conclusion that both sides bear onus for the 1962 war, China for misconstruing India's Tibetan policies, and India for pursuing a confrontational policy on the border.

Regarding the border, this study will test the Whiting-Maxwell hypothesis regarding China's road to the 1962 war by drawing on recently available Chinese accounts of the PRC decision making process. Broadly speaking Whiting and Maxwell reached the same conclusion: China's resort to war in 1962 was largely a function of perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory. As noted earlier, Maxwell and Whiting were forced to rely largely on inferences based on official Chinese statements at the time of the 1962 war. Newly available Chinese materials allow us to go "inside" the Chinese decision-making process in a way that was not possible in 1962. This offers a useful testing of the Whiting-Maxwell thesis.

This study will also examine the accuracy of Chinese perceptions in a way that Whiting and Maxwell did not attempt. Maxwell and Whiting stressed the role of Beijing's concerns regarding Tibet in the formation of Chinese perceptions of foreign threat in 1962. They generally took Chinese perceptions as a given, however, and were not concerned with exploring the objective accuracy of those Chinese elite perceptions. As Whiting said regarding Chinese perceptions of U.S. policy: "It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the accuracy of Chinese charges (against the United States)." Yet Whiting went on to note that "Preconceptions can act as filters for selecting relevant
evidence of intention as well as determinants of bias in assessing the degree of threat to be anticipated."

Two concepts from psychology are useful for understanding the Chinese perceptual filters that linked Tibet and the 1962 war: fundamental attribution error and projection. Attribution involves an individual's inferences about why another person acts as he or she does. It is a process beginning with the perception of other persons in a particular social context, proceeding through a causal judgement about the reasons for the other person's behavior, and ending with behavioral consequences for the person making the judgment. A fundamental attribution error occurs when one person incorrectly attributes particular actions to the internal motives, character, or disposition of another individual, rather than to the characteristics of the situation in which that individual finds him or her self. Commission of a fundamental attribution error entails systematic underestimation of situational determinants of other's behavior, determinants deriving, most importantly, from the political and social roles of an individual, and compulsions on the individual arising in particular situations due to those roles. Instead of recognizing that the other individual acts as he/she does because of their particular roles and the requirements of a particular situation, an observer attributes their behavior to the personal motives or interior disposition of the other person. Social psychologists have found this to be a very common malady. There is a pervasive tendency for individuals to attribute others behavior to interior motivations, while attributing their own behavior to situational factors. Below I will argue that Mao committed a fundamental attribution error by concluding that Nehru sought to seize Tibet from China.
Projection involves transference by one individual onto another individual of responsibility for events deriving, in fact, from actions of the first individual. It is very difficult for people to deal with the dissonance arising from the fact that their actions were inept and/or created pain for themselves and others. Rather than accept the blow to self-esteem and the psychological discomfort that comes from that acceptance of responsibility, individuals will often assign responsibility to some other individual. Thus the person actually responsible is able to reach the comfortable conclusion that they were not responsible. The fact that people suffered was not due to one's own actions, but to the actions of some other person. In this way, the positive self-concept of the first individual is maintained. Below, I will argue that India became the main object of Chinese transference of responsibility for the difficulties that Chinese rule encountered, and in fact created, in Tibet circa 1959.

A premise of the argument developed below is that what leaders think matters. Some Realists find it satisfactory to look only at interests and policies, black-boxing or ignoring the specific psychological processes through which leaders arrive at their determinations about interests and policies. It is not necessary or possible to engage this fundamental issue here. But it should be stipulated that the argument below rests on the premise that particular policies derive from specific sets of beliefs and calculations linked to those beliefs, and that different sorts of beliefs and calculations could well lead to different policies.
Tibet and the 1962 War: The Chinese View of the Root Cause

A starting point for understanding the Chinese belief system about the 1962 war is recognition that, from the Chinese point of view, the road to the 1962 war begins in Tibet. Although Chinese deliberations in 1962 leading up to the war were closely tied to developments on the border, Chinese studies of the 1962 war published during the 1990s link Indian border policies to Tibet, and insist that Indian border policies derived from an Indian effort to weaken or overthrow Chinese rule over Tibet. Chinese studies of the 1962 war insist that an Indian desire to "seize Tibet," to turn Tibet into an Indian "colony" or "protectorate," or to return Tibet to its pre-1949 status, was the root cause of India’s Forward Policy and the 1962 war. These contemporary assertions mirror the views of China's leaders circa 1962. In other words, Chinese beliefs about the nature of Indian objectives regarding Tibet deeply colored Chinese deliberations regarding India's moves along the border.

There is unanimous agreement among Chinese scholars that the root cause of the 1962 war was an Indian attempt to undermine Chinese rule and seize Tibet. The official PLA history of the 1962 war argues that India sought to turn Tibet into a "buffer zone" (huanzhongguo). Creation of such a buffer zone had been the objective of British imperial strategy, and Nehru was a "complete successor" to Britain in this regard. Nehru's objective was creation of a "great Indian empire" in South Asia by "filling the vacuum" left by British exit from that region. Control over Tibet was, Nehru felt, essential for "mastery over South Asia, and "the most economical method for guaranteeing India's security." A study by Xu Yan, professor at the PLA's National Defense University and one of China's foremost military historians, follows the same
line of argument: Nehru aspired and worked consistently throughout the 1950s to turn Tibet into a "buffer zone." According to Xu, Nehru imbibed British imperialist ideology, and believed that India should dominate neighboring countries. He quotes Nehru and other early Congress Party leaders about their aspirations that India should lead and organize the Indian Ocean region. The Indian independence struggle was also marred by an emphasis on "pure nationalism" --- communist-jargon for non-Marxist nationalism not underpinned by a "class analysis." Regarding Tibet, Nehru aspired to turn that region into a "buffer zone" between China and India. This was Nehru's consistent objective throughout the 1950s. The "decisive factor" in the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, according to Xu Yan, was Nehru's policy of "protecting" the Tibetan "splittists" after the Lhasa rebellion of March 1959.  

An article by Wang Hongwei of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and one of China's senior India hands, presents a similar view. Prior to 1947, Britain's objective, Wang argues, was to bring Tibet within its "sphere of influence." Britain sought "Tibetan independence," and continually attempted to instigate Tibet to "leave China" (touli zhongguo). Nehru was deeply influenced by this British thinking, Wang argued, through education in Britain and by assimilation of the mentality of the British ruling class. In 1959, the Indian government "supported the Tibetan rebels," permitted them to carry out "anti-China activities" on Indian territory, and even gave some Tibetan rebels military training. Simultaneous with this, India advanced claims on Chinese territory. Implicitly but clearly, the purpose of India doing this was to achieve Tibetan "independence" by instigating Tibet to "leave China."
One of the most extensive and nuanced Chinese accounts of events leading up to the 1962 war is by Zhao Weiwen, long time South Asian analyst of the Ministry of State Security. Zhao's account of the road to war also begins with Tibet and attribution of aggressive motives to Indian policy moves. From 1947 to 1952, Zhao writes, "India ardently hoped to continue England's legacy in Tibet." The "essence" of English policy had been to "tamper with China's sovereignty in Tibet to change it to 'suzerainty' thereby throwing off the jurisdiction of China's central government over Tibet under the name of Tibetan 'autonomy'." (shishi shang shi yao ba zhongguo zai xizang de zhuquan cuangai wei 'zongzhuquan', shi xizang zai 'zizhi' de mingyi xia, touli zhongyang zhengfu de guanxia). By 1952, however, the PLA's victories in Korea, in Xikang province, the conclusion of the 17 Point Agreement of May 1951, the PLA's occupation of Tibet, and Beijing’s forceful rejection of Indian efforts to check the PLA's move into Tibet, forced Nehru to change course. Nehru now began direct talks with Beijing over Tibet. There were, however, "right wing forces" in India who "refused to abandon the English legacy" in Tibet and who pressured Nehru in 1959. Moreover, Nehru himself "harbored a sort of dark mentality" (huaiyou moxie yinan xinli), the exact nature of which is not specified but which presumably included aggressive designs on Tibet. These factors led Nehru to demonstrate an "irresolute attitude" (taidu bu jinyue) in 1959. On the one hand he said that Tibet was a part of China and that he did not want to interfere in China's internal affairs. On the other hand, he permitted all sorts of "anti-China activities and words" aimed against China's exercise of sovereignty over Tibet. Zhao is more sensitive than other Chinese analysts to the domestic political pressures weighing on Nehru in 1959. Yet even she suggests that Nehru's "dark mentality" led him to give free reign to "anti-
China forces” in an attempt to cause Tibet to "throw off the jurisdiction of China's central government."

The attribution to India by contemporary Chinese scholars of a desire to seize Tibet mirrors --- as we shall see below --- the thinking of Chinese leaders who decided to launch that war. This is probably due to the fact that published scholarship in China is still expected to explain and justify, not to criticize, the decisions of the Chinese Communist Party, at least on such sensitive matters as war and peace.

**Indian Policy toward Tibet**

Assessment of the accuracy of Chinese views regarding Indian policy toward Tibet depends on ascertaining what actually transpired in Indo-Tibetan-Chinese relations in the years prior to the 1962 war. A brief review is thus requisite.

In 1949 and 1950 India covertly supplied small amounts of arms to the Tibetan government. During the same period and while the PLA was preparing to move into Tibet, the Indian government sought via diplomatic protests to the new PRC government to prevent or limit PLA occupation of Tibet. Beijing rejected these Indian protests with stern warnings. New Delhi also initially sought to uphold Indian rights in Tibet inherited from Britain and embodied in treaties with the old Republic of China. These rights included trading missions, representative officers, telecommunications facilities, and small military contingents to guard these facilities in several Tibetan towns. Beijing viewed these rights as products of imperialist aggression against China and unilaterally abrogated the treaties upon which they were based. By 1952 or so, Nehru had accepted China's views of these old treaties and of India's derivative special rights in Tibet. Many
in India, including a number of very prominent individuals though not initially Nehru, were concerned with the fate of Tibet's Buddhist-based and Indian-influenced civilization under rule by the Chinese Communist Party. Nehru became increasingly sensitive to this "sentimental," "cultural" (terms Nehru used) interests in Tibet as the years passed.\textsuperscript{13}

On the other hand, India actually helped China consolidate its control over Tibet. In October 1950 India refused to sponsor a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations. When El Salvador sponsored such an appeal, India played a key role in squashing it. Many governments, including the U.S., the British, and many Middle Eastern, were willing to follow India’s lead on this issue, and India’s opposition to the Tibetan appeal to the U.N. was, in fact, a major reason for its non-consideration.\textsuperscript{14} New Delhi also turned down U.S. proposals 1950 of Indo-U.S. cooperation in support of Tibetan resistance to China.\textsuperscript{15} India also played a key role in persuading the young Dalai Lama not to flee abroad and try to rally international support for Tibet, but to return to Tibet and reach an accommodation with China's Communist government --- an accommodation that occurred with the 17-Point agreement of May 1951. Then in 1954 India formally recognized China's ownership of Tibet as part of an effort to reach a broader understanding with China. Again, most countries recognized India’s leadership on this matter. After the 1954 agreement between China and India regarding Tibet, the Indian government encouraged the Dalai Lama and his local Tibetan government to assert its autonomy under the 17-Point agreement. Perhaps most important of all, until mid-1959 India allowed trade with Tibet to continue unimpeded. Prior to the mid-1950s when newly PLA-built roads into Tibet were opened, India's supply of foodstuffs, fuels, and basic goods was essential to restraining inflation in Tibet created by demand for these
commodities due to the introduction of large numbers of Chinese soldiers and construction workers into a region with a subsistence economy.

In mid 1957 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began covert assistance to rebels in the Kham region of southeastern Tibet. Assistance rendered through this CIA program was actually quite limited totaling only 250 tons of munitions, equipment, and supplies between 1957 and 1961. But CIA operations came to the attention of Chinese intelligence, and thus became a concern of China's government. Tibetan refugees that found asylum in northern Indian cities (especially Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Gangtok) in the 1950s also supported in various ways resistance movements inside Tibet. Covert operatives from various countries including the U.S., Nationalist China, and the PRC, were also active in those cities. By late 1958 Beijing began demanding that India expel key leaders of the Tibetan resistance based in India, and suppress activities supporting opposition to Chinese policies within Tibet. Nehru sought a middle course, restricting Tibetan activities, but refusing to expel Tibetan leaders. A key question we will return to below is how much Nehru knew about CIA operations in 1958-61.

Once the Tibetan national rising began in Lhasa on 10 March 1959, India did not wash its hands of Tibetan affairs as Beijing insisted. Rather, Indian media and elected Indian politicians, including Nehru and virtually every other Indian politician, expressed greater or lesser sympathy with Tibet's struggle. Beijing condemned a large number of Indian moves that it said encouraged the rebellion. These Indian moves included: the Indian Consul General in Lhasa met with demonstrating Tibetans in the early days of the Lhasa uprising; granting asylum to the Dalai Lama; having official contact with the Dalai Lama; treating the Dalai Lama as an honored guest; permitting the Dalai Lama to
meet with the media and foreign representatives; not quashing the Dalai Lama's appeal to the United Nations; granting asylum to ten thousand or so Tibetan refugees who followed the Dalai Lama to India; concentrating those refugees in camps near the Tibetan frontier; not suppressing "anti-China activities" conducted in those refugee camps; permitting or encouraging negative commentary by Indian newspapers about China's actions in Tibet; Nehru raising the "Tibet issue" in India's parliament and making critical comments about China's policies in Tibet; Nehru permitting the Indian parliament to discuss Tibet; allowing "anti-China activities" by protesters in Indian cities; not punishing Indian protestors for defacing a portrait of Mao Zedong; instigating an "anti-China campaign" in the Indian press; restricting trade between India and Tibet; and allowing the Dalai Lama to speak of "a Tibetan government in exile." All these acts constituted, in China's view, "interference in the internal affairs of China." Beijing saw these Indian actions as ways in which New Delhi was attempting to "seize Tibet."

**CCP Leaders Perceptions of Indian "Expansionism" in 1959**

As noted earlier, the uniform belief of PRC historians of the 1990s that India wanted to seize Tibet, mirrors the beliefs of China's leaders in 1959. In the aftermath of the uprising that began in Lhasa on 10 March 1959, the CCP decided to dissolve the Tibetan local government, assert its own direct administration, and begin implementing social revolutionary policies in Tibet. On 25 March "central cadre" met in Shanghai to discuss the situation in Tibet. Mao gave his views of the situation. India was doing bad things in Tibet, Mao Zedong told the assembled cadre, but China would not condemn India openly at the moment. Rather, India would be given enough rope to hang itself
China would settle accounts with India later, Mao said. \(^\text{18}\) Three weeks later, as thousands of Tibetans fled into India where outraged Indian and international sympathy welcomed them, Mao intensified the struggle against India. On 19 April Mao ordered Xinhua news agency to issue a commentary criticizing unnamed "Indian expansionists." Mao personally revised the draft commentary. \(^\text{19}\) Four days later Mao ordered a further escalation. Renmin ribao should now openly criticize Nehru by name, Mao directed. When Mao was presented with the draft, he rejected it. The draft missed the point, Mao said. The target should not be "imperialism," but "Indian expansionists" who "want ardently to grab Tibet" (wangtu ba xizang naleguo\text{\textmu}chu). \(^\text{20}\) Days later, on 25 April, Mao convened a Politburo Standing Committee meeting. Mao immediately asked about the status of the revised editorial criticizing Nehru. He then directed that the criticism should "be sharp, don't fear to irritate him [Nehru], don't fear to cause him trouble." Nehru miscalculated the situation, Mao said, believing that China could not suppress the rebellion in Tibet and would have to beg India's help. Here Mao implied that Nehru was pursuing a strategy of fomenting rebellion in Tibet in hopes that Beijing would solicit Indian help in dealing with that rebellion. The objective was to maintain Sino-Indian friendship, Mao said, but this could only be achieved via unity through struggle. Nehru's incorrect ideas had to be struggled against. \(^\text{21}\) Implicit in Mao's comments was the notion that Nehru’s instigation was responsible for the rebellion in Tibet.

The polemic ordered and revised by Mao appeared on 6 May 1959 under the title "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy." \(^\text{22}\) The main charge leveled against

\textit{(guo xing bu yi --- literally "to do evil deeds frequently brings ruin to the evil doer")}.
India was conduct of an "anti-China slander campaign" being waged by Nehru and the Indian media over events in Tibet. Nehru's main offense against China was what he was saying about Tibet, and the encouragement those words gave to rebels in Tibet. In his comments, Nehru denied "that a handful of upper-strata [Tibetan] reactionaries are responsible for the rebellion in Tibet, describes the just action of the Chinese people in putting down the rebellion as a 'tragedy' and expresses sympathy for the rebellion. Thus, he commits a most deplorable error," according to the article. The "vociferous self-styled sympathizers of the Tibetan people" in fact "sympathize with those who for generations oppressed, exploited, and butchered the Tibetan people" -- with the "big serf-owners" who tortured and oppressed the Tibetan people under the "cruelest and most savage serfdom in the world." Nehru was spreading such "slanders" against China in Tibet via speeches to the Indian parliament and interviews with Indian newspapers. This "slander campaign" against China had to cease. If it did not, China would hit back:

"So long as you do not end your anti-Chinese slander campaign, we will not cease hitting back. We are prepared to spend as much time on this as you want to. We are prepared too, if you should incite other countries to raise a hue and cry against us. We are also prepared to find all the imperialists in the world backing you up in the clamor. But it is utterly futile to try to use pressure to interfere in China's internal affairs and salvage the odious rule of the big serf-owners in Tibet.

Nehru's sympathy for the Tibetan serf-owning class stemmed from the "dual character" of the Indian "big bourgeoisie," which by its class nature "has a certain urge for outward expansion." Thus Nehru and the Indian "big bourgeoisie" strove "to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its territory in Tibet." They wanted Tibet to have "a kind of semi-independent status," to be a "sort of buffer zone between China and India."
It is significant that Nehru's most egregious offense was his words. It was these words which were reflective of his "philosophy," of his inner nature, of his class character, of his role as a representative of the Indian "big bourgeoisie" and its ambitions for expansion in Tibet. Mao's close involvement in the drafting of this document makes clear that it fully represented Mao's own views.

The same day Renmin ribao published this commentary Zhou Enlai outlined Chinese views for an assembly of socialist country representatives in Beijing. In doing so, Zhou underlined the links between Nehru's words, his "class nature," and his counter-revolutionary objectives in Tibet. Nehru and people from the Indian upper class, Zhou explained, "oppose reform in Tibet, even to the extent of saying that reform is impossible." Their motive in doing this was to cause "Tibet to remain for a long time in a backward state, becoming a 'buffer state' between China and India." "This is their guiding mentality, and also the center of the Sino-Indian conflict," Zhou said. (emphasis added) "A section of the Indian upper class had inherited England's old policy of saying Tibet is an 'independent country', saying that China only has 'suzerainty', or saying Tibet is a 'protectorate.'" All these formulations were violations of China's sovereignty, Zhou said. Nehru and company claimed sympathy for the Tibetans, but "Actually, they sympathize with the serf-owners. Their objective is to cause Tibet not to advance, not to reform, to become a 'buffer country,' to remain under India's influence, and become their protectorate." This was "Nehru and company's" "basic class reaction."23

The question of responsibility for the crisis in Tibet figured prominently in the contentious talks between Mao Zedong and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in Beijing on 2 October 1959. After a complete disagreement over Taiwan, Khrushchev turned to
India and Tibet, saying: "If you let me, I will tell you what a guest should not say --- the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet, you should have had your intelligence [agencies] there and should have know about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama" [to flee to India]. "Nehru also says that the events in Tibet occurred on our fault," Mao replied. After an exchange over the flight of the Dalai Lama, Khrushchev made the point: "If you allow him [the Dalai Lama] an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault." "No, this is Nehru's fault," Mao replied. "Then the events in Hungary are not our fault," the Soviet leader responded, "but the fault of the United States of America, if I understand you correctly. Please, look here, we had an army in Hungary, we supported that fool Rakosi --- and this is our mistake, not the mistake of the United States." Mao rejected this: "The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them."24

The proposition that an Indian desire to seize Tibet underlay Indian actions continued to be central to Chinese thinking in the weeks prior to the 1962 war. On 16 October 1962, two days before the Politburo approved the PLA's plan for a large scale "self defensive counter-attack" against India, General Lei Yingfu, head of the PLA's "war fighting department " (zuo zhan bu), reported to Mao on why India had six days previously launched a major operation to cut off Chinese troops atop Thagla Ridge. Lei had been appointed to head an ad hoc small group established to probe the motives and purposes behind Indian actions. Tibet headed Lei's list of five major Indian motives. "Nehru has consistently wanted to turn China's ethnically Tibetan districts into India's colony or protectorate," Lei reported to Mao. Lei adduced various Indian actions of
1950, 1956, and 1959 to substantiate this proposition. In March 1959, Lei reported to Mao, Nehru "incited the Dalai Lama group to undertake rebellious activity of openly splitting the motherland." Nehru "always wanted to use the strength of a minority of Tibetan reactionaries to drive China out of the Tibetan areas of Tibet, [western] Sichuan, and Qinghai." When Nehru saw this "plot" of using Tibetan reactionaries to split China had failed, he "sent Indian forces to aggress against China's borders." "Yes," Mao said as he nodded in agreement with Lei's conclusions about Tibet. "Nehru has repeatedly acted in this way."

Typically, Mao Zedong stated the matter most directly and forcefully. Speaking to a visiting delegation from Nepal in 1964, Mao told his foreign visitors that the major problem between India and China was not the McMahon line, but the Tibet question. "In the opinion of the Indian government," Mao said, "Tibet is theirs."

**The Erroneous Nature of Chinese Perceptions of Indian Policy toward Tibet**

The fact that China's leaders saw Indian efforts as attempts to "grab Tibet," to turn Tibet into "a buffer zone," to return Tibet to its pre-1949 status, to "overthrow China's sovereignty," or to cause Tibet to "throw off the jurisdiction of China's central government," does not necessarily mean that those perceptions were accurate. In fact, this core Chinese belief was wrong. This belief which Chinese analysts explain underpinned China's decision for war in 1962, was, in fact, inaccurate. It was a deeply pernicious Chinese misperception that contributed powerfully to the decision for war in 1962.
The Indian government indisputably was attempting to influence events inside Tibet, as well as relations between the Tibetan local government and Beijing. What is in question is not Indian actions, but the motives and purposes which lay behind those actions.

Nehru’s policies derived not from a desire to seize Tibet or over-throw Chinese sovereignty there, but from a desire to uphold Tibet’s autonomy under Chinese sovereignty as part of a grand accommodation between China and India --- an accommodation that would make possible a global partnership between India and China. Nehru envisioned a compromise between Chinese and Indian interests regarding Tibet, with Chinese respect for Tibetan autonomy combined with Indian respect for Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. This accommodation would, Nehru believed, provide a basis for a broad program of cooperation between China and India on behalf of the peoples of the developing countries and against the insanity of a nuclear-armed bipolar Cold War. Nehru believed that by demonstrating India’s acceptance of China’s ownership and military control of Tibet while simultaneously befriending China on such issues as war in Korea, the PRC’s U.N. admission, the peace treaty with Japan and transfer of Taiwan to the PRC, Indochina, and decolonization and the Afro-Asian movement, China could be won to cooperation with India. The two leading Asian powers would then create a new axis in world politics. In terms of Tibet, Nehru hoped that China would repay India’s friendship and consolidate the Sino-Indian partnership by granting Tibet a significant degree of autonomy.27

A series of moves by Nehru in 1959 contradicts the proposition that he sought to undermine China’s rule over Tibet. When he granted asylum to the Dalai Lama in March
1959 he believed, on the basis of earlier comments by Zhou Enlai regarding such a possibility in 1950, that Beijing would not regard it as an unfriendly act. After the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, Nehru initially thought the Tibetan leader could work out a deal with Beijing restoring a degree of autonomy and permitting his return to Lhasa --- as had been the case in 1951. Nehru stated repeatedly and publicly that Tibet was part of China and that events there were an internal affair of China. After the Dalai Lama’s 1959 flight to India, Nehru urged the Tibetan leader to avoid speaking of independence, saying that such a goal was “impractical.” Instead, Tibet should seek mere autonomy instead, Nehru said. India refused to support, and indeed actively discouraged, a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations in 1959 and 1960 --- as it had in 1950. New Delhi urged Britain and other states not to open contacts with the Dalai Lama and worked to obstruct the Dalai Lama’s efforts to establish such contacts. Even after the U.S. State Department stated in February 1960 that the United States believed the principle of self determination should apply to the Tibetan people, India did not welcome this move. These moves do not suggest a policy of seeking to overthrow China’s control over Tibet. As Tsering Shakya concluded, Nehru’s handling of Tibet during 1959-1960 (and indeed all the way to the 1962 war according to Shakya), amounted to an effort to placate Beijing at the expense of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence. 28

Nehru believed that India had certain “cultural” and “sentimental” interests in Tibet by virtue of several thousand years of intimate interaction between Tibet and India, and from the fact that Tibet’s unique culture had been deeply influenced by India. These interests were very limited, Nehru believed, and could be best be achieved by respect for China’s sovereignty over Tibet. Nehru had explained India’s interests, and their limited
nature, to Zhou Enlai in 1956, and believed that Zhou had been quite reasonable and even generous in his recognition of them. That agreement accommodating Chinese and Indian interests regarding Tibet was to be the foundation for Sino-Indian partnership in Asia and the world. Then came Beijing's discarding of Tibetan autonomy in 1959.

Nehru believed that he and Zhou Enlai had reached a meeting of the minds, an "agreement," in 1956 whereby India agreed to recognize China's sovereignty over Tibet in exchange for China's granting of a significant degree of autonomy to Tibet. This "agreement," according to Nehru, accommodated India's "sentimental," "cultural" interests in Tibet, and China's security and sovereignty concerns in that region, and thus provided a foundation for Sino-Indian partnership. India's encouragement of Tibetan efforts to uphold their autonomy in the 1950s, were, Nehru believed, in accord with China's promises to uphold Tibet's autonomy. During the mid-1950s Zhou Enlai had been remarkably understanding of India's cultural interests in Tibet, or so it seemed to Nehru. India's various moves to strengthen Tibetan autonomy in the mid 1950s (tutoring the Dalai Lama on the 17 Point Agreement and the ways he could use it to uphold Tibet's autonomy, etc.) had been in accord with the Sino-Indian agreement. Following the uprising in Lhasa in March 1959, however, China's destruction of Tibetan autonomy "broke" this agreement. In 1959, Beijing still had its half of the bargain (Indian recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet), but had demolished India's part (Tibetan autonomy). Yet Nehru's response was to press Tibet to forgo claims to independence or appeal to the United Nations. Only under the mounting pressure of Indian public criticism, and sharp polemics from Beijing, did Nehru begin to adopt a more sympathetic
attitude toward the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan resistance to Beijing. Nehru’s clear if implicit objective was to return Tibet to its *pre-1959, not the pre-1949* status quo ante.

Nehru was dismayed in 1959 by Beijing’s breaking of what he believed was the agreement between him and Zhou Enlai regarding Tibetan autonomy. He was dismayed too that Beijing apparently did not value India's friendship highly enough to respect its side of the bargain with India. Nehru's strategy was not to oust China from Tibet, but to press China to compromise with the modest and limited Indian “cultural and sentimental” interests in that region. This compromise that would permit broad Sino-Indian cooperation on the world scene. Nehru's objective, in other words, was not to "seize Tibet" or deny Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. It was to persuade Beijing to respect India’s limited interests in that region within the framework of Indian support for China's sovereignty over Tibet.

A second Indian objective (other than upholding India's "cultural" interest) in Tibet can be reasonably inferred: minimizing the threat posed to India by Chinese military forces positioned on India's northern borders in Tibet. While Nehru and other Indian leaders were not explicit about this, this concern almost certainly helped inspire their desire to maintain Tibetan autonomy. An autonomous Tibet would be one with fewer Chinese soldiers and Chinese military bases. Again, this does not equate to a desire to "seize Tibet" or cause Tibet to "leave China.” Rather, persuading Beijing not to militarize Tibet required reassuring Beijing that India respected and would help uphold, China's sovereignty over Tibet, and that there was, consequently, no reason for China to militarize that region. As Nehru told Sadar Vallabhai Patel in late 1949 when Patel pointed out to Nehru the adverse consequences for India of China’s impending military
occupation of Tibet, since there was not very much that India (or any country for that matter) could do to prevent China from asserting sovereignty over Tibet, it was best for India to recognize Chinese sovereignty and work to secure India's interests within that framework. Rather than challenging Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, it is more accurate to say that Nehru sought to persuade Beijing to respect Indian interests regarding Tibet by assuring Beijing of India's acceptance of China's sovereignty over Tibet and convincing Beijing of the benefits that would accrue to China if it compromised with India over Tibet thereby winning Indian friendship. Nehru's policy for minimizing China's military presence in Tibet during the mid 1950s was to befriend China to the greatest possible degree thereby convincing Beijing that it had no need for a large military presence in Tibet. Nehru's hope was that Beijing would repay India's friendship by keeping the Chinese military presence in Tibet low.

There were also powerful domestic pressures working on Nehru in 1959. Criticism of Nehru’s policy of befriending and placating China began to mount in 1958 as Indians became aware that China rejected the legitimacy of the McMahon Line. With China's fierce repression of the Tibetan resistance in 1959, domestic Indian criticism of Nehru’s China policies became intense. Nehru struggled to respond to this mounting criticism of his handling of relations with China. Nehru explained the political reality in comments to parliament on 4 May: failure to grant the Dalai Lama asylum would have won the support of only a "few thousand" Indians, while "hundreds of millions" welcomed the granting of asylum. It was simply "impossible" not to grant asylum, Nehru explained. Tibetan refugees streaming into India after March 1959 offered first hand accounts of Chinese repression that were further sensationalized by India’s media. There
was widespread revulsion in India at China’s bloody and brutal repression in Tibet. As Jaiprakash Narayan, one of India's foremost Gandhians, put it in mid-1959: "Tibet may be a theocratic state rather than a secular state and backward economically and socially, but no nation has the right to impose progress, whatever that may mean, upon another nation."  

Ascertaining the exact relation of Nehru to Tibetan resistance, armed and non-violent, and to U.S. covert operations is crucial for determining the accuracy of Chinese perceptions. Regarding non-violent Tibetan resistance, the evidence is fairly clear: Nehru, and India, did give low-key support to such resistance. Nehru's statements to parliament in 1959, plus his comments to Intelligence Bureau chief B.N. Mullik in the mid 1950s, indicate that Nehru saw strong but non-violent and unarmed Tibetan resistance to unlimited Chinese rule in Tibet as one way to help maintain a substantial and genuine degree of Tibetan autonomy --- while recognizing and accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.  

Regarding Nehru's attitude toward armed Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule, and his knowledge of covert CIA operations in support of that armed resistance, the evidence is, unfortunately, unequivocal. The closest study of India’s decision-making process during this period, by Steven Hoffman, concluded "It is unclear how much India's government knew in 1958 or 1959 about the major CIA program" to support the Tibetan armed resistance. Nor does the official Indian history of the 1962 war, published in late 2002, shed any light on this question. Mullik maintained in his memoir that Nehru told him that armed Tibetan resistance would be suicidal, counter-productive, and insisted that peaceful, non-violent resistance was the best way. Tsering Shakya also
concluded that Nehru and other Indian leaders were not aware until after the 1962 war of the extent of U.S. activities in support of Tibetan armed resistance. They had assumed, Shakya concludes, that Chinese Nationalist airplanes had been making the various mysterious flights protested by Beijing. On the other hand, John Knaus, the CIA field officer in charge of covert support for the Tibetan rebels in the late 1950s and early 1960s, points to a communication by an official of the Indian Home Office regarding fighting inside Tibet and Tibetan insurgent’s need for arms. The U.S. government might be interested in this information the Indian told the U.S. representative. Knaus calls this a "signal" to the U.S. from Nehru. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, in a study based on interviews of U.S. participants in those covert operations, concluded that Nehru and Mullik, at least, knew the general parameters of and tacitly condoned U.S. covert operations into Tibet.

This author’s guess is that that Nehru, Mullik and perhaps a few other people in the Indian government understood at least the broad contours of U.S. covert operations into Tibet, but chose to turn a blind eye to them. Given the scope of U.S. activities among the Tibetan refugee community at that juncture, and given India’s good domestic intelligence services, to conclude otherwise seems improbable. But even if we stipulate that Nehru knew of and turned a blind eye toward U.S. covert operations in Tibet, it does not necessarily follow that the Indian objective was to seize Tibet or overturn Chinese sovereignty over that region. A far more economical explanation, and one in line with Nehru’s conciliatory handling of the Tibet issue outlined above, and also congruent with the evidence of Nehru’s hope of striking a grand bargain with China, is that Nehru's objective was to create a set of pressures that would induce Beijing to accommodate
India's interests in Tibet. In other words, Nehru’s turning a blind eye to U.S. covert activities, was probably a way of persuading Beijing of the wisdom of securing Indian cooperation in upholding Chinese sovereignty over that --- not a way of driving China out of Tibet or over-turning Chinese sovereignty over that region.

It is clear that Nehru sought to persuade and pressure Beijing to grant Tibet a degree of genuine autonomy. It is also probably true that Nehru sought to limit the level of Chinese military presence in Tibet for the sake of India's own security. It is an insupportable leap from these elements of Indian policy to the conclusion that India sought to overthrow or undermine Chinese rule over Tibet. The proposition that because India recognized and acted on interests within Tibet, it was ipso facto attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty is untenable, although this proposition certainly constitutes one element of the Chinese belief system.

Narrower elements of the Chinese belief system were also clearly inaccurate. The proposition that Nehru sympathized with Tibet's "serf-owning class" and wanted to maintain Tibet's traditional social-political system unchanged, is palpably wrong. Nehru deemed himself a socialist, a secularist, and in religious terms, an agnostic. He had little sympathy for the reactionary, religion-based political system of Tibet. He was also deeply cognizant of the urgent need for reform of Tibet's traditional structures. Indeed, it was partially because of that recognition that he concluded circa 1950 that the CCP would be able to consolidate its rule over Tibet. To some degree, Nehru's conciliatory approach to Beijing's rule over Tibet in mid 1950s was based on active sympathy with the CCP's mission of progressive reform in Tibet. In sum, the conclusion that Nehru desired
to maintain Tibet's traditional system, to keep Tibet poor, or to prevent progress in Tibet was simply wrong.

China's leaders erred in attributing to Nehru a desire to seize Tibet from China, transforming it into an Indian protectorate or colony, and overthrowing Chinese sovereignty over that region. Nehru sought, rather, to induce Beijing to respect Indian cultural and security interests in Tibet within the framework of Chinese sovereignty over that region. Once "expansionist" motives were attributed to Nehru and judged to arise out of his "basic class character," "British influences," or "dark psychology," it followed that China would have to struggle against and punish Nehru and his ilk. A determination that Nehru sought a balanced compromise of Chinese and Indian interests regarding Tibet within the framework of Indian support for Chinese sovereignty and for the sake of Sino-Indian global cooperation, would have led to a very different Chinese course of action.

This fundamental attribution error must be laid at Mao's door. It was he who first determined, at the central meeting on 23 April 1959, that "Indian expansionists" wanted to "seize Tibet." Mao completely dominated China's foreign policy decision making process by 1959. Once Mao made that determination, China's other leaders were compelled to chime in. Indeed, even today China's scholars are still compelled to affirm Mao's erroneous judgment.

The consequence of Mao's fundamental attribution error regarding Nehru was compounded by projection onto India of responsibility for Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. Confronted with strong Tibetan resistance to Chinese policies in Tibet, Mao and his comrades responded by blaming that resistance on India. It was Indian
encouragement, Indian "expansionist" machinations, that was responsible for resistance to Chinese policies in Tibet.

It is certainly true that demonstrations of Indian sympathy such as conveyed by Nehru's comments in March-April 1959 did, to some degree, encourage Tibetan resistance to the dictates of Beijing. Far more fundamental, however, were such factors as those analyzed by Tsering Shakya in his monumental study of Tibet's history: the introduction of large numbers of PLA soldiers and road construction crews into Tibet and the increased demand for foodstuffs and derivative inflation that followed; the socialist reforms --- especially collectivization of agriculture --- introduced in ethnically Tibetan regions of western Sichuan and the flood of refugees into Tibet those reforms produced; the civilizational clash between CCP atheism and Tibet's deep religiosity; and perhaps most important of all, the pervasive sense of unease Tibetans felt as they watched more and more Han Chinese pour into the Tibetans ancestral land where Han had previously been scarce. These factors weighed far heavier than anything India may or may not have done.

Chinese leaders felt very strongly that road building, socialist reforms, suppression of religion, and other Chinese measures in Tibet were "correct" and "progressive." This very strong Chinese sense of self-righteousness prevented them from recognizing the responsibility of their own actions for producing the rebellion against Chinese rule. How could "correct" and "progressive" policies rouse rebellion against them --- unless there were outside machination? It was cognitively impossible for Mao and his comrades to recognize that their own policies had produced a popular rebellion against them. It was psychologically more comfortable to conclude that India
had fomented the rebellion in order to undermine Chinese rule in Tibet so that India could turn that region into a buffer zone. Responsibility for that rebellion was projected onto India.

Chinese misperceptions of Indian motives in 1959 were linked to the border conflict of 1961-62 (discussed in the next section) in two ways. First, Mao’s beliefs about Nehru’s desire to “seize Tibet” structured the Chinese interpretation of Indian border policies --- especially the Forward Policy. A more accurate understanding of Nehru’s increasingly desperate effort to maintain his cooperative, friendship policies toward China in 1959-60 might have produced a more conciliatory Chinese response to the Forward Policy. If the Forward Policy had not been seen --- as Mao saw it --- as part of an effort to “seize Tibet, but as arising from a desire on the part of Nehru to demonstrate toughness and resolve in the face of mounting domestic criticism, such a firm Chinese rebuff as came in November 1962 might not have been deemed necessary.

This deconstruction of Chinese propositions of March-May 1959 might seem overblown until we come back to the conclusion of Chinese leaders and scholars that Indian policies regarding Tibet lay at the root of the 1962 war. Indian policies had to be firmly rebuffed, China’s leaders believed, because they were part of an effort to seize Tibet. Different Chinese beliefs about the Indian motivations underlying more assertive Indian border policies initiated in 1961 might have led to different Chinese responses to that policy.

The second link between Mao’s misperceptions of 1959 and the border conflict of 1961-62 was that Beijing’s strident polemics and diplomatic protests in 1959-1960 helped propel Nehru toward a more forceful border policy, toward the Forward Policy.
Beijing’s strident denunciations of Nehru’s policies in spring 1959 contrasted sharply with Nehru’s equivocation and weakness during the same period. This discrepancy fueled the mounting chorus of criticism of Nehru’s “weakness” and “naiveté” that drove him toward the Forward Policy. If Beijing had responded to Tibetan events in 1959 not by polemicizing against Nehru, but by lauding and courting him, by finding a few face-saving sops for him regarding Tibetan “autonomy” that Nehru could use in fending off his domestic critics, Nehru might not have felt compelled to prove his toughness on the border issue. Instead of adopting the Forward Policy, Nehru might have stood by a still-not-discredited friendship policy.

**China's Response to India's Forward Policy**

If Chinese perceptions regarding India's Tibet actions and policies were deeply flawed, the same cannot be said about Chinese views of India's Forward Policy. Succinctly stated, the orthodox scholarly view in this regard, established by Maxwell and Whiting, is that, in deciding for war, China’s leaders were responding to an Indian policy of establishing Indian military outposts in territory claimed by both India and China but already under effective Chinese military occupation, the purpose being to expel Chinese forces from territory claimed by India.

Because war is a continuation of policies, it is important to understand the evolution of Chinese policies toward the Indo-Tibetan border. The crucial background in this regard was Nehru’s rejection of a Chinese proposal --- subtly and unofficially but nonetheless effectively raised by Zhou Enlai during his April 1960 visit to India --- that China drop its claims in the eastern sector in exchange for India dropping its claims in the
western sector. Such a swap would have given each side legal right to territory already in
its possession and most important to each nation’s security. Nehru rejected the swap
proposal and insisted that China abandon its claim in the east and withdraw from Aksa
Chin in the west. The grounds for Nehru’s position was a belief that are already existed a
legally based boundary between India and Tibet tracing to the 1914 Simla conference.
The question, for Nehru, was whether China would respect that legal and already existing
boundary. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, saw the Simla agreement as without legal
or moral basis. It had been rejected by China’s central government in 1914 and had been
implemented by British force majeure during China’s century of national humiliation.
China was nonetheless willing to accept the McMahon line as the basis of a settlement, as
was intimated by Zhou to Nehru during discussions in 1956 and 1957. By doing this,
however, China believed it was making a substantial concession that reasonably required
an Indian quid pro quo in Aksai Chin. Nehru, for his part, and in the words of the official
Indian history, “did not agree to barter away the Aksai Chin area, under illegal
occupation of China, in return for China giving up its unreasonable claim to Indian
territory south of the McMahon Line.”39 From the Chinese point of view, the offer of an
east-west swap was eminently reasonable and took into consideration the interests of both
countries. Its rejection by Nehru was, China’s leaders felt, entirely unreasonable.

Three rounds of border talks were held in 1960 following two visits by Zhou to
India. Those talks soon deadlocked. Zhou’s repeated visits to India were seen by Beijing
as further tokens of Chinese sincerity. (Zhou visited India four times, while his
counterpart Nehru visited China only once.) Then in February 1961 India published in
full its final report on the talks along with an English translation of the Chinese report to
India. New Delhi hoped that publication of this voluminous documentary record would cause China to “adopt a reasonable attitude.” Beijing saw it as further Indian effort to force China to accept an unreasonable and unfair settlement. When Indian representatives found no change in China’s position, New Delhi became uninterested in further talks. This led Beijing to charge, in March 1962, that India “refused to hold negotiations.” New Delhi replied that while it was prepared for negotiations, Chinese withdrawal from Aksai China was “an essential step for the creation of a favorable climate for negotiations … regarding the boundary.”

Unlike with Chinese perceptions of India’s Tibetan policies in 1959, there is no basis for concluding that Chinese views of India’s border policies were inaccurate. In part this is due to the difference between evaluating a purely empirical proposition (i.e., what motives lay behind Nehru’s Tibetan policies?) and a normative question (i.e., were Beijing’s offers of a border settlement fair and reasonable?) Normative propositions are intrinsically subjective. It should perhaps be noted, however, that had Nehru accepted Zhou’s 1960 offer of an east-west swap, he (Nehru) could very probably have carried Indian public opinion with him --- and avoided war. Thus Nehru’s rejection of Zhou’s package-deal solution, plus his insistence on Chinese abandonment of Aksai Chin, must be seen as crucial steps on the road to the 1962 war.

Nehru’s insistence on Chinese abandonment of Aksai Chin established a link in Chinese minds between the border issue and China’s ability to control Tibet. The road built via that desolate plateau was very important to PLA logistic capabilities in Tibet. Chinese abandonment of that road would have significantly diminished PLA capabilities in Tibet, further increasing pressure on Beijing to compromise with India regarding Tibet.
Whether this was, in fact, Nehru’s intention we do not and probably never will know. While this surmise was certainly plausible, there is no evidence indicating that this was, in fact, India's objective. Steven Hoffman traced Nehru's concern with Aksai Chin to a vision of India's historic boundaries adversely compromised by British colonial bureaucrats.43 The recently declassified official Indian history of the 1962 war also attributes the Indian fixation on Aksai China to “national sentiments” roused by “loss of national territory.”44 Very probably the powerful but inaccurate Chinese belief about India's desire to "seize Tibet " led to an incorrect Chinese conclusion that Nehru's insistence on Aksai Chin was part of a grand plan to achieve that purpose.

The Militarization of the Border Conflict

The military forces of both sides began pushing into remote and previously mostly unoccupied mountainous frontier regions in 1958 and 1959. Beijing’s greater public assertiveness in challenging the McMahon line in 1958, combined with growing Indian awareness of China’s road building in Aksai China, led India to begin pushing Indian forces into forward regions. As for China, following the Lhasa uprising in March 1959, the PLA launched an "all out war" against the Tibetan rebels. The first objective of the operation was to seal the border between the Lokka region of Tibet southeast of Lhasa and India’s North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Bhutan. By August the PLA had sealed the border.45 That brought Chinese forces into forward areas.

The first incident of bloodshed on the Sino-Indian border occurred at Longju on the Lokka-NEFA frontier on 25 August 1959. That clash apparently occurred, or at least escalated, at the initiative of the Chinese side but without the authorization of China’s
central authorities. Soviet leader Khrushchev discussed this incident with Mao and Zhou during his early October 1959 visit to Beijing. Khrushchev was dismayed with the spiraling tension in Sino-Indian relations and wanted an explanation of the 25 August incident. Both Zhou Enlai and Mao assured Khrushchev that the Chinese handling of that incident had been at the initiative of the local commander and without central authorization. "We did not know until recently about the border incident, and local authorities undertook all the measures there without authorization from the center," Zhou told Khrushchev. "The rebuff was delivered on the decision of local military organs," Mao said. Mao and Zhou assured the Soviet leader that China desired peaceful resolution of the border problem and avoidance of conflict with India.

In September, just before Khrushchev's visit, Chinese leaders had met in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, to consider how to avoid further bloodshed on the border with India. Mao, Zhou, PRC President Liu Shaoqi, Beijing mayor and Politburo member Peng Zhen, Mao's secretary Hu Qiaomu, and General Lei Yingfu participated. The meeting began with a report by Lei on the border situation. Lei recounted repeated calls from front line commanders for "rebuff" (huanji) of India's "blatant aggression" against China. Mao became somewhat exasperated at this and observed that conflict was inevitable as long as soldiers of the two sides were "nose to nose." He therefore proposed a withdrawal of 20 kilometers. If India was unwilling to do this, Mao suggested, China would unilaterally withdraw. "Meeting participants unanimously supported Chairman Mao's suggestion," according to Lei Yingfu. Thus, Chinese forces were ordered to withdraw 20 kilometers from what China felt was the line of actual control, and to cease patrolling in that forward zone. Further Chinese measures to decrease tension on the
border were adopted in January 1960 (prohibiting target practice, food gathering, exercising, etc, within the forward zone). Tension declined for 23 months.

It began to spiral again in November 1961 when India started implementing its Forward Policy. According to the official Indian history, before 1961 a “wide corridor of empty area” separated Chinese forward outposts from Indian outposts. But Chinese forces were steadily pushing forward their posts “occupying more and more of the empty area.” In an effort to prevent further Chinese advances by demonstrating “that the remaining area was not empty,” Indian forces were ordered to “push forward.” The assumption underlying this critical decision was that China was not likely to use force against Indian outposts “even if they were in a position to do so.”

Under the new policy, Indian forces were ordered to "patrol as far forward as possible from our [India's] present position toward the International Border as recognized by us … [and] prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established on our territory." As Whiting observed, this new policy "sowed the seeds of conflict." When Indian forces initially began implementing the Forward Policy, Chinese forces withdrew when they encountered the newly advanced Indian outposts. This “encouraged” the Indian side and led to the further acceleration of the Forward Policy. According to the official Indian history. “A large number of Indian posts were established quickly.”

Shortly after Indian forces began implementing the Forward Policy, Mao Zedong convened a Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in Beijing to consider China’s response. Mao had earlier asked the Tibet and the Xinjiang military regions for proposals, and those were apparently on the table when the central meeting convened.
Mao compared India's Forward Policy a strategic advance in a game of Chinese chess in which one side pushes pawns across the centerline of the board, a line known as the Han-Chu border in reference to the frontier between those two ancient Chinese states:

Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that's great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up (ba tamen chi diao) [in a chess metaphor this would mean to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.\(^{52}\)

In line with Mao's comments, the CMC ordered China's border forces to resume patrols within the zone 20 kilometers north of the McMahon line --- patrols suspended since October 1959. Accelerated construction of roads to forward areas was also ordered. As the crisis built, Mao Zedong took personal charge of the "struggle with India." Mao stressed to PLA Chief of Staff Lou Ruiqing that the firing of the Chinese "first shot" must be personally approved by himself, Mao Zedong.\(^{53}\)

On 26 February 1962 Beijing delivered a lengthy and conciliatory sounding note to India. The note called for negotiations to reach a peaceful settlement of the boundary problem. India's reply came on 13 March. It reiterated India's standard position that Chinese withdrawal from Aksai China was an essential precondition for negotiations.\(^{54}\)

A while later Mao met again with Lin Biao, then vice chair of the CMC and minister of defense, Zhou Enlai, and Luo Ruiqing. Again the topic was the situation being created by implementation of India's Forward Policy. Zhou Enlai first reported on India's rejection of China's many diplomatic proposals for negotiations. Lin Biao then reported that Indian forces continued to set up outposts next to Chinese outposts, continued to dispatch patrols into forward areas, and continued to fire (sheji) on Chinese
border defense personnel. Mao noted it would be hard to make Nehru change course: "A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily roused by someone else's snoring," he commented. After discussion, the CMC decided that the PLA absolutely should not retreat before Indian advances. When Indian forces established outposts encircling Chinese positions, Chinese forces should build even more outposts counter-encircling the new Indian positions. In this fashion, Chinese and Indian positions would develop in an inter-locking, zigzag fashion. But Chinese forces were also to seek to avoid bloodshed. They were absolutely not to fire without orders from above. In this fashion a situation of "armed coexistence" (wuzhang gongchu) would develop. Mao's comment on this situation was:

Nehru wants to move forward and we won't let him. Originally, we tried to guard against this, but now it seems we cannot prevent it. If he wants to advance, we might as well (jiu zhi hao) adopt armed coexistence. You wave a gun, and I'll wave a gun. We'll stand face to face and can each practice our courage (keyi lian danliang).  

Following this meeting further orders went out to the Tibet and Xinjiang military regions accelerating construction of new PLA outposts and roads. All levels of the PLA and frontier forces were ordered to report developments immediately, and it was reiterated that lower levels absolutely could not decide matters on their own. At all costs, troops and units were to avoid actions that would cause a further worsening of the border situation. Chinese forces were also ordered to conduct propaganda work toward Indian soldiers, calling out to them on encounters to urge them to stop their aggression against China, extolling the traditional friendship between China and India, and recounting the efforts of the Chinese government to achieve a peaceful resolution of the border issue.
Chinese border forces also abandoned their initial policy of withdrawing when encountering new Indian posts. Chinese forces began standing their ground. According to the official Indian history, “When some Indian posts, for example in the Galwan valley [in Aksai Chin] were established outflanking the Chinese posts, the Chinese attitude changed and became more threatening.” Rather than withdraw as previously, Chinese forces countered the Indian move by building positions surrounding the new Indian post and cutting off its supply routes to rear areas.  

As Whiting and Maxwell maintained, Chinese leaders believed they were defending territory that they believed was legitimately Chinese and had already been under de facto Chinese occupation for some time when Indian forces arrived on the scene. To fail to contest India's forward policy would be to acquiesce to continual Indian “nibbling” of Chinese territory resulting, finally, in unilateral Indian establishment of a new de facto line of control between Indian and Chinese territory.

China’s abandonment of the initial policy of withdrawal in face of Indian advances, in favor of the tougher policy of armed coexistence, “clearly showed that the basic assumption behind the Forward Policy decision [that the Chinese would withdraw rather than use force] was no longer valid, and a serious reappraisal of the new situation should have been undertaken” by India. “This reappraisal, however, never took place and the situation was allowed to drift,” according to the official Indian history. Instead of reexamining the assumptions of the Forward Policy, Indian leaders made that policy still more aggressive. Rather than merely seeking to preempt Chinese occupation of vacant land, “It was now decided to push back the Chinese posts they already occupied.”
In April 1962 India accelerated implementation of the Forward Policy in the eastern sector, apparently because Nehru believed that the situation there favored India more. More Indian posts were built on commanding heights near existing PLA outposts, and aerial and ground reconnaissance was increased. This produced a "strongest protest" from China's foreign ministry. "Should the Indian government refuse to withdraw its aggressive posts and continue to carry out provocation against the Chinese posts," the note said, "the Chinese frontiers will be forced to defend themselves." India pushed forward with implementation of the Forward Policy in spite of China's protests. On 5 May 1962 the first officially protested exchange of gunfire occurred. Another Chinese protest followed on 19 May: Unless India "desists immediately" from intrusions into the Longju region, "the Chinese Government will not stand idly by." By the end of June, the Indian foreign office reported that Indian forces had brought under Indian control over than 2,000 square miles of China-claimed territory since the beginning of the Forward Policy. Moreover, in July 1962, Indian Army Headquarters “gave discretion to all post commanders to fire on the Chinese if their [Indian] posts were ever threatened.”

Egregious Indian miscalculation regarding China’s willingness to resort to military force underlay the increasingly assertive Indian policies that unfolded between November 1961 and October 1962. There was a virtual consensus among Indian leaders that China would not respond with military force to Indian advances, or if it did, any military response would be extremely limited. A Chinese resort to large-scale military force was deemed impossible. This conclusion was established by Nehru and Defense Minister Krishna Menon, and became unchallengable political orthodoxy.
clear Indian recognition of China’s military superiority in the frontier regions, Indian leaders reached the conclusion that that China’s superiority was irrelevant. If India demonstrated firm intent, China would back down. In the words of the Indian Chief of General Staff regarding the final order to Indian forces in September 1962 to drive Chinese forces from atop Thagla ridge: “experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away.”

Since our concern is with China’s decision making process, we need not delve into the origins of this monumental Indian miscalculation. It is important to note, however, the two-fold impact of this Indian assumption on China’s thinking. First, it deeply offended Chinese nationalist pride. China had “stood up,” as Mao said when proclaiming the establishment of the People’s Republic in October 1949. It would no longer be bullied by foreign powers. The PLA had fought the United States in Korea and performed creditably, at least in the judgment of China’s leaders. Yet here was India acting as though the PLA would turn tail and run rather than fight to defend Chinese territory and honor. Apparently India had not yet learned the lesson that the Americans had learned in Korea --- to respect the power of New China. The second implication of India’s apparent disdain for Chinese power, was that a very strong jolt would probably be necessary to cause Indian leaders to acquire a sober appreciation of Chinese power. The gradual hardening of China’s response to India’s forward policy --- ceasing withdrawal when confronted by Indian advances and adoption of a policy of “armed coexistence,” acceleration of China’s own advance, building positions surrounding, threatening, and cutting off Indian outposts, steady improvement of PLA logistic and other capabilities in the frontier region, increasingly strong and direct verbal warnings, and by September
1962 outright but small-scale PLA assault on key Indian outposts --- did not cause India to abandon its illusion of Chinese weakness. The final Chinese decision to inflict a big and painful defeat on Indian forces derived substantially from a sense that only such a blow would cause India to begin taking seriously Chinese power.

The Final Five Months

While India’s Forward Policy was gathering steam in mid-1962, Beijing received indications that a war between China and India would not draw in other powers. First Beijing secured indications from Washington that the United States would not support a Nationalist Chinese attack on mainland China. In late May 1962 Premier Zhou Enlai recalled Ambassador Wang Bingnan from vacation and ordered him to return to his post in Warsaw to ascertain U.S. intentions regarding the Nationalist Chinese invasion then being ostentatiously prepared on Taiwan. (Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw was then the main venue for U.S.-PRC interactions.) The crisis in Laos was still raging and Zhou was also concerned that Laos might serve as a corridor for a possible Nationalist attack. Were Washington to support a Nationalist invasion, a conflict between India and China might become linked to that invasion, possibly touching off a larger conflagration across China’s entire southern borders. Thus Wang was “extremely relieved” when he heard from his U.S. counterpart on 23 June that the United States did not desire war with China and would not, “under present circumstances” support a Nationalist Chinese invasion of the mainland. Wang later learned that this information played a “very big role” in China’s decision making process.67
Next the war raging in Laos between Hanoi and Beijing supported Laotian communists and U.S. supported Laotian anti-communists was put in hiatus via a de facto partition of that country. On 23 July, exactly a month after the Warsaw ambassadorial meeting, the major powers signed at Geneva an agreement “neutralizing” Laos. The end of intense fighting in Laos, plus a U.S. pledge not to introduce its military force into Laos (part of the “neutralization” agreement) reduced the prospect that U.S or U.S.-supported Nationalist Chinese forces might attack China via Laos. This development increased the prospect that a war between China and India would remain limited.

During the Geneva conference on Laos, Beijing also made another effort to halt the Indian advance via diplomatic means. Zhou Enlai directed China’s representative, foreign minister and former veteran General Chen Yi, to seek out India’s representative, Defense Minister Krishna Menon, and urge him to find ways of preventing the border situation from further deteriorating. This would be advantageous not only to Sino-Indian relations, but even to the peace of the whole world, Zhou told Chen to tell Menon. Chen Yi was one of the PLA’s the most combat-experienced PLA generals, having been left to defend CCP base areas in the south when the central leadership moved north with the Long March in 1935. Chen spend the next 14 years fighting with considerable success Japanese and Nationalist forces. One can imagine the meeting in Geneva between this hard-headed general and the idealistic Krishna Menon who believed in the susaive force of moral opinion. On 23 July the two men met. Chen asked Menon what ideas the “honorable Indian government” had about solving the Sino-Indian border problem? Menon replied that, in India’s view, there was no border problem between China and India. The location of the boundary was very clearly displayed on Indian maps. Implicit
in this was the notion that the way to a solution lay in Chinese withdrawal from all territory claimed by India. Moreover, this message was conveyed in an arrogant tone of voice, according to the Chinese account. Chen Yi then said that Indian forces were steadily advancing into Chinese territory, and could it be that the Indian representative did not know this? Menon replied that the movements of Indian troops were taking place on Indian territory. He did not wish to argue, Chen said, but the border problem was a "big one," and the two sides should sit down and calmly discuss it. Chen proposed that he and Menon issue a joint communiqué announcing future talks on the "problem of preventing border conflict." Menon declined this proposal but said he would report the matter to his government. The next day Chen flew back to Beijing to report to Zhou Enlai.\footnote{68}

After hearing Chen Yi's report, Zhou commented "It seems as though Nehru wants a war with us" (yao tong women da jiang). Yes, Chen replied. Menon had showed no sincerity regarding peaceful talks, but "merely intended to deal in a perfunctory way with China" (zhibuguo fuyan women). "At least we made the greatest effort for peace," Zhou reportedly replied. "Premier," Chen replied, "Nehru's forward policy is a knife. He wants to put it in our heart. We cannot close our eyes and await death." "We need to discuss the matter with the Chairman," Zhou concluded.\footnote{69}

Circa July 1962 Mao issued a "twenty character directive" in response to India's "forward policy." The CMC later embodied Mao's directive in a decision that provided the "general direction" (zong fangzhen) until several weeks before the October war. According to Mao's directive, the PLA should "absolutely not give ground, strive resolutely to avoid bloodshed, interlock [with Indian forces] in a zigzag pattern, and
undertake a long period of armed coexistence” (jue bu tui rang, lizheng bimian liu xie, quan ya jia cuo, chang qi wuzhang gongchu). 70 To implement this new “general direction, Luo Ruiqing issued to the Xinjiang military region orders specifying 22 measures which PLA front line troops were to follow. If Indian forces advanced on PLA positions, PLA forces would give warning and urge the Indian forces to withdraw. If the Indian forces did not heed these warnings, the warnings could be repeated 2, 3, or even more times. Only if Indian forces advanced to within 50 meters of PLA positions and Chinese forces "could not survive without self defense,” would PLA forces "prepare for self defense” (shi jun ziwei). If the enemy then withdrew, PLA forces would not seek to block that withdrawal.

It is not clear whether Lou Ruiqing's 22 Measures authorized Chinese soldiers to fire on Indian forces closing in a threatening fashion within 50 meters of Chinese forces. Reading between the lines, Xu Yan's account implies that it did. But that is only implicit. It may be that PLA forces were ordered to prepare to fire, but not authorized to actually open fire unless first fired upon by Indian forces. In any case, firefights intensified. On 9 July, following deployments the previous day by an Indian platoon cutting off a PLA position in the Galwan valley of the western sector, a Renmin ribao editorial delivered another warning: "The Indian Government should reign in a the brink of the precipice.”71 Another major clash occurred on 21 July 1962. According to Xu Yan, some Indian forces interpreted PLA restraint under the July CMC guidelines as weakness. The result, according to Xu, was repeated provocations against PLA outposts. In one such "provocation" on 21 July, Indian forces opened fire first on Chinese forces manning a "newly constructed” outpost. Chinese forces returned fire. After a 20-minute firefight,
Chinese forces had suppressed Indian fire. The PLA then ceased fire and allowed Indian forces to withdraw. The same day, 21 July, Renmin ribao Observer further intensified China's warnings to India: China would wage a "tit-for-tat" struggle with India in the eastern sector, the article said. It also indirectly raised the possibility of a PLA advance south of the MacMahon Line and even the eviction of Indian forces from India's entire NEFA.

These Chinese warnings did not cause Nehru to halt the Forward Policy or to agree to unconditional talks on the border dispute. Beijing noted a speech by Nehru to the Lok Sabha on 13 August in which he reiterated that the precondition for negotiations was complete Chinese withdrawal from all Indian territory it had "unilaterally occupied," i.e. Aksai Chin. An Indian note of 22 August formally presented the same demands. From Beijing's perspective, this "closed the door to negotiations."

Chinese leaders spent considerable time in mid 1962 analyzing Nehru's objectives in attacking China (wei shemo yao lai gao women). Three main reasons were identified. First, Nehru wished to direct outward internal contradictions within India. Second, he hoped to win international, and especially U.S., support. Third, he hoped to "attack China's prestige in the third world." Pursuit of these objectives by attacking China was based on the belief, Mao concluded, that China would not hit back (rewei women bu gan da ta). Notably absent from this Chinese understanding of Nehru's motives was the proposition that Nehru believed that through the Forward Policy, India was recovering legitimately Indian territory arbitrarily and illegally occupied by China during the 1950s. Again Chinese leaders simply failed to understand Nehru's motives, and attributed to him far-fetched motives deriving from his evil class nature.
In August Lei Yingfu received CMC orders to inspect and report on the situation in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. Lei’s report concluded that without firing, PLA forces “without firing could no longer prevent Indian forces from advancing further” (bu da bu zhu yi zhuzhi yinjun ruqin de chengdu). While considering Lei’s report, the CMC also noted among Indian public opinion and political personages a rising chorus for the "expulsion of Chinese aggressors from Indian territory”.

The situation in the rugged terrain in the Tawang tract east of the Tibet-Bhutan-NEFRA tri-border juncture was growing increasingly tense. There the massive Thagla ridge dominated the local terrain at the forward line of actual control. Indian forces had established an Indian outpost at Dhola at the southern base of Thagla in June 1962 as part of the Forward Policy and as part of a plan to push Chinese forces from atop the Thagla ridge. Chinese forces responded by entrenching themselves atop that ridge in August, according to the official Indian history.

By early September Beijing was warning New Delhi that if India "played with fire" it would be "consumed by fire." On 8 September a force of 800 Chinese soldiers descended from the Thagla heights to surround the Indian post at Dhola. Neither side opened fire for twelve days, but this display of overwhelming Chinese power was a clear warning that China would resist the Indian advance. As Whiting demonstrated, there was careful calibration of Chinese verbiage conveying warnings, plus implementation of corresponding moves on the ground designed to give substance to the verbal warnings. Within India, the Chinese military demonstration before Dhola “gave rise to strong public clamor to throw the Chinese out from Thagla Ridge,” in the words of the official Indian history. “The [Indian government] in its fond belief did not expect serious retaliation
from the Chinese and it assumed that whatever mild reaction came from the Chinese, the Indian Army would be capable of neutralizing it.” Thus “the Government of India ordered the Army to rid the Thagla Ridge of the Chinese as early as it was possible to so and the Army accepted the task --- both having based their decision on the unmilitary assumption that the enemy would not react strongly and that mere starting of military activity by India would make the Chinese vacate the Thagla Ridge.”

On 18 September an Indian government spokesman announced the government’s intention of driving Chinese forces from the Dhola area at the base of Thagla. Indian Army efforts to achieve that objective led to clashes at Dhola on 20 and 24 September.

The increasingly tense armed confrontation at Thagla Ridge forced Mao and other Chinese leaders to reconsider in late September the earlier policy of armed coexistence. The purpose of armed coexistence had been two-fold: 1) to use armed confrontation to prevent further aggression by Indian forces into Chinese territory, and 2) to prevent the expansion of the Sino-Indian conflict. Neither of those objectives had been achieved. The policy had not halted the Indian advance. Mao and other Chinese leaders now began considering administering a large scale and “painful” military rebuff to Indian forces. Nehru had mistaken China's policy of restraint for weakness, they believed. A number of factors had apparently contributed to an Indian judgment that China would not "counter-attack," Mao and his comrades concluded. China faced internal economic difficulties. China-Soviet relations had soured. The center of Chinese security concerns were along the Pacific coast and regarded the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. China had relatively few troops in Tibet, having withdrawn most forces after the successful repression of the Tibetan rebellion circa 1960. On these grounds, China's leaders
surmised, Nehru had concluded that China would not "counter-attack" in response to India's Forward Policy, but would merely issue protests.\textsuperscript{83} In these circumstances, a sharp, major blow was necessary to disabuse Nehru and force him to stop his aggression against China.

Nehru's insistence on pushing the Forward Policy rendered ineffective China's previous policy of very limited use of force. Confronted with continual Indian attacks, the previous policy of defending Chinese positions with "little blows" (xiaodá), no longer worked. Even if Chinese "little blows" in one place forced Indian forces there to retreat, Indian attacks elsewhere would continue. This might permit the entire border region to become unstable. A large and punishing blow was thus necessary. The PLA should strive for a "big blow," for a "war of extermination" (jianmiejian). In Xu Yan's characterization of the thinking of China's leaders: "If we strike, we must strike in a big fashion, moreover wage a war of extermination, resolutely hit the wolf and make it hurt (dálángdátóng). Only in this way can we completely destroy his aggression and cause the aggressors to receive their proper punishment. Moreover, we can guarantee that for a long time to come [the aggressors] will not dare to come again to conduct aggression against China's borders."\textsuperscript{84}

In early October (probably on the 6\textsuperscript{th}) China's leaders met to review the escalating conflict with India. Deputy CMC chair Lin Biao led with a briefing on the situation. Reports from both the Tibet and the Xinjiang military regions indicated continual Indian advance and firings on Chinese outposts in both the eastern and western sectors. Ten Chinese personnel had been killed or wounded, Lin reported. Yet Chinese forces had strictly followed the principle of not firing the first shot, and "have throughout not fired"
Even more serious, India was concentrating military forces in both sectors and had deployed artillery to positions threatening Chinese outposts and camps. The situation was rapidly worsening, according to Lin. Reports by PLA intelligence units indicated that Indian forces might undertake on 10 October an attack on Thagla Ridge. After hearing Lin's report, Mao commented:

> It seems like armed coexistence won't work. It's just as we expected. Nehru really wants to use force. This isn't strange. He has always wanted to seize Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge. He thinks he can get everything he desires.

Then Mao declared himself for war:

> We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of these did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indian's want to fight a war with us. Naturally we don't have fear. We cannot give ground (rang bu), once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province. . . . Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough (bu da jiu bu gou pengyou). Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity.

Zhou signaled his concurrence:

> We don't wish for a war with India. We have always strove in this direction [of avoiding war]. We wanted India to be like Nepal, Burma, or Mongolia, and solve border problems with us in a friendly fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads (ba suoyoude lu dou sile). This leaves us only with war. As I see it, to fight a bit would have advantages. It would cause some people to understand things more clearly.

Mao concurred:

> Right! If someone does not attack me, I won't attack him. If someone attacks me, I will certainly attack him.

Apparently following this consensus among Mao, Zhou, and Lin, a larger meeting of military leaders was convened at xishan (western hills) on the western outskirts of
Beijing. Participants included Mao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Lin Biao, Marshals Ye
Jianying and Liu Bocheng, Chief of Staff senior general Lou Ruiqing, vice Chief of Staff
full general Yang Chengwu, head of the PLA General Political Department full general
Shao Hua, head of the General Logistic Department full general Qiu Huizuo, commander
of the Tibet military region lieutenant general Zhang Guohua, and commander of the
Xinjiang military region major general He Jiachan. Mao opened by indicating that war
had already been decided upon and that the purpose of the meeting was to consider
problems associated with that projected war. "The purpose of bringing all of you
together today is to convene a military meeting," Mao began.

Our border conflict with India has gone on for many years. We do not want war
and originally sought to solve it through peaceful negotiations. But Nehru is not
willing to talk and has deployed considerable forces, insistently demanding a fight
with us (ying bezhe yao he women da yi jia). Now it seems not to fight is not
possible (bu da shi bu xingde). If we fight, what should be our method? What
should the war look like? Please everyone contribute your thoughts on these
policy issues.

Mao then asked Chen Yi to brief the group on the "diplomatic struggle." Chen
traced the problem to 1954 when India had published an official map showing the
MacMahon line as a definitive national boundary. At present, Chen said, India "occupies
or claims" 1,250,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory. Forty-seven Chinese
personnel had been killed or wounded in attacks by Indian forces on the border. China
had devoted considerable diplomatic effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, Chen said,
but "Nehru is not willing to sit down and talk, and moreover has adopted a provocative
forward policy. … It seems we can only meet him [Nehru] on the battlefield."

Mao then placed the projected war in a broad historical context. "A war between
China and India is truly a most unfortunate event," Mao said. He had recently been
reading books on Indian history and was struck by the friendly, beneficial interactions between China and India in the 7th - 9th centuries. After some discussion of those interactions, Mao turned to the history of China-India wars, of which there had been "one and a half." The first war, Mao said, had been in 648 A.D. when a Tang dynasty emperor had dispatched troops to assist the legal claimant to a throne to a subcontinental kingdom (jieri diguo) --- after the other claimant had killed 30 members of a Tang diplomatic mission. A Tang-strengthened force defeated the usurper, who was captured and sent to the Tang capital Changan, where he lived out his life. The "half war" came in 1398, said Mao, when Timurlane captured Delhi. This was a great victory, but was followed by the slaughter of over 100,000 prisoners and looting of all precious metals and gems across the land. This was a "half war" because Timur and his army were Mongols from both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Mongolia was then part of China, making this attack "half" Chinese. Two key points followed from this history, according to Mao. First, the PLA had to secure victory and "knock Nehru to the negotiating table." Second, Chinese forces had to be restrained and principled.91

After Yang Chengwu reported on the military situation in the border regions, Mao called on Ye Jianying to tell the meeting about his impressions of Indian Army commander Kaul. Ye had met Kaul during a 1957 visit to India. Even though Kaul had apparently served in the Burma Theater during World War II, Ye said, the Indian commander had no actual combat experience. He also seemed to be a very rigid if impressive looking soldier. Still, he was one of India's most outstanding commanders. "Fine," Mao interjected, "he'll have another opportunity to shine." Mao concluded the meeting by warning that China would find itself internationally isolated during the
coming war, but that this would not be the decisive factor. The United States and the Soviet Union would, of course, oppose China's action. So too would many other "uninformed countries." Chiang Kai-shek might "adopt measures." But China needn't fear this isolation, Mao said. As long as the front line troops fought well, "We will be in an advantageous position. … It's better to die standing, than to die kneeling." If China fought successfully and in an awe-inspiring (wei feng) way, this "will guarantee at least thirty years of peace" (qima yao baozheng sanshi nian de heping) with India.  

On 6 October New Delhi rejected a Chinese proposal of 3 October to start peaceful negotiations to settle the border issue. Xu Yan terms this a "final effort to secure peace" and asserts that its rejection The rejection by India of this 3 October final offer, together with Nehru's declared intent to continue the Forward Policy, led Mao and the CMC to begin "final consideration" of a large scale "counter-attack" against India.  

On 6 October Mao and the CMC decided in principle for a large scale attack to severely punish India. The same day the PLA Chief of Staff Lou Ruiqing received a directive from the CCP center and Chairman Mao authorizing a "fierce and painful" (da lang da tong) attack on Indian forces. "If Indian forces attack us, you should hit back fiercely" (langlangde da yi xia) … [you should] not only repel them, but hit them fiercely and make them hurt" (da lang da tong). The 6 October directive also laid out the broad directions of the projected offensive. The main assault was to be in the eastern sector, but Chinese forces in the western sector would "coordinate" with the eastern assault. 

The CMC staff was then directed to draw up a detailed operational plans for a campaign to expel Indian troops from the area north of the traditional, customary
boundary (that is, China's claim line at the southern foothills of the Himalayas) in the eastern sector. It was in the process of this staff work that the idea of terminating the war by a unilateral Chinese halt, ceasefire, and withdrawal was developed. In view of "practical difficulties associated with China's domestic situation," the operational plan developed by the CMC staff proposed that after achieving military objectives, Chinese forces would quickly disengage and end the fighting as quickly as possible.96

Chinese leaders began finding other reasons for war with India. They observed an increasingly "hegemonist attitude" by India toward its smaller neighbors, Nepal and Pakistan. In this way, India's relations with these countries "became connected to " (jiefā) the border conflict. On 29 September, for example, Indian "armed personnel" provoked an incident on the border with Nepal. When the Nepali government expressed anger over the incident, the Chinese government issued a statement of "firm support" (jinjue zhichi) for Nepal's "protection of national sovereignty." Beijing noted that some Indians went so far as to suggest that India act to prevent Nepal from becoming a "Chinese satellite." Toward Pakistan too, Beijing detected a more aggressive Indian policy. In early October, an armed conflict erupted on the East Pakistan-Indian border. It continued with artillery and automatic weapons fire for twelve days.97 It seemed to Mao and his comrades, that Indian hegemonism was increasingly running amuck. In spite of sympathy for Nepal and Pakistan, punishing Indian “hegemonism” toward its small neighbors was probably not a major motive for the 1962 war. Rather, this was probably an example of the common tendency of people facing a difficult decision to seek out and “pile up” reasons substantiating their preferred solution. Doing this mitigates somewhat, at least cognitively, the recognized negative costs of the favored solution.
In deciding for war with India, Mao recognized many difficulties and dangers. Nehru enjoyed great international status. India was a leader of the non-aligned movement. India enjoyed great international prestige as an advocate of non-violence. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were courting India and Nehru. India saw itself as the leader of the "third force" in the world. India's military inferiority to China would play into Indian efforts to depict China as the "aggressor." (Indian military forces were about 1/6 th of China's, according to China's calculations.) China could anticipate a negative reaction from both Washington and Moscow. Even among "some Afro-Asian countries" there would be some "misunderstanding." These costs were more than offset, however, by the long-term gains of inflicting a severe if limited "war of extermination" on India.

On 8 October the CMC ordered several additional divisions in the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions to prepare to move into Tibet. All these forces were veteran, high quality units. Most had previously participated in anti-rebel operations in Tibet and were therefore acclimated to combat operations at high altitude. The PLA judged Indian forces inferior to the Chinese in combat and war-fighting capability. But uncertainty about Indian military strength led the CMC concentrated larger forces than might otherwise have been necessary.98

Even as the PLA moved toward war with India, Mao continued to mull over vexing problems. Should China permit Indian forces to advance a bit further into Chinese territory under the Forward Policy, thereby making clearer to international opinion that China was acting in self defense? What should be the focus of PLA attack? The major piece of territory in dispute between China and India was Aksai Chin in the
west. This suggested focusing the Chinese offensive there. But geographic
circumstances for China were worst in the west. Roads to that region "were not
convenient" for the PLA. India's geographic situation in the west was also difficult,
making it hard for India to concentrate large forces there. The Chinese objective of
inflicting a big, painful defeat on India that would cause it to sober up, meant that a "big
battle" was required.\textsuperscript{99} A powerful Chinese offensive that met only thin Indian forces
would not fulfill the political objective. The east, where India could more readily rush in
large reinforcements, better served Chinese objectives in this regard. It was also in the
eastern sector that Nehru insisted the McMahon Line was an "established fact." Focusing
the Chinese offensive there would hit at Nehru's "hegemonist attitude" and compel India
to accept the fact that negotiation with China was the only way to achieve a complete
settlement of the territorial issue.\textsuperscript{100}

A "strategy small group" (\textit{zhanlue xiaozhu}) set up in the CMC staff paid
considerable attention to problems of conduct of the war. Marshal Liu Bocheng headed
that group. On 10 October Liu laid out four "opinions" regarding the upcoming war. Liu
was one of China's leading military strategists, having studied at Soviet military
academies, commanded a division during the anti-Japanese war and a Field Army in the
post-1945 civil war, before becoming a Marshall and Politburo member in 1955. He was
one of China's foremost exponents of mobile warfare.\textsuperscript{101} The crux of success in the
coming war, Liu argued in his 10 October letter, was "concentration of local superiority
to achieve a swift war and swift decision" (\textit{jizhong zhubu youshi bingli, su zhan su jue}).
It was absolutely vital to concentrate superior material, weapons, and forces in one
locality to wage a quick battle and achieve a quick decision. The PLA must not disperse
its forces, Liu warned. It must also absolutely fight well. Victory in the war was a matter directly connected to the prestige of the Chinese army and nation, Liu warned. It was thus essential to deploy crack troops. The upcoming fight would not be against Indian border police, Liu warned, but against India's best, regular forces that had participated in World War II. The PLA could not be arrogant in this situation. Nor could it rely on such "mechanistic" tactics as infiltration, isolation, and encirclement. Such measures would not produce victory. The correct approach was to "kill, wound, and capture the enemy" by "gnawing the flesh off their bones" (ken ying gutou), that is by attacking fiercely.

On 9 October the anticipated Indian offensive in vicinity of Thagla Ridge began. The purpose of this operation was to evict Chinese forces from atop that Ridge. Chinese positions were deemed too powerful or direct assault, so Indian forces moved to outflank by seizing a previously unoccupied peak to the west of and outflanking Thagla.

According to Xu Yan, on the evening of 9 October over a hundred Indian soldiers crossed the stream flowing along the base of Thagla, and closed on a Chinese outpost. The next morning Indian forces opened fire on the Chinese. In response a full PLA battalion (about a thousand men) assaulted the Indian advance force. Eleven Chinese soldiers were killed and twenty-two wounded in the firefight. The intensity of the Chinese response led Indian leaders to delay further offensive operations in the Thagla region, though not to alter the fixed policy of eventually driving Chinese forces from that dominating feature. In fact, on 12 October Nehru told the press that Indian forces were still under orders to “free our country” from Chinese occupation --- a comment embroidered
considerably by India newspapers. Indian forces also continued “aggressive patrolling” and “harassing fire.”

In Xu Yan's view, this Indian attack on 10 October signaled the beginning of relatively large scale fighting in the eastern sector. The fact that the Indian side "shot first" created a advantageous political situation for China. Chinese leaders also noted that Nehru had made public comments on 12 October (just prior to a trip to Ceylon) about ordering Indian forces to clear Chinese forces from all "Indian territory." This too made clear Nehru's "stubborn and war-mongering attitude" (ji wangu you haozhan de taidu), according to Xu.

Shortly after the start of the Indian move to out flank Thagla, Zhou Enlai appointed Lei Yingfu and Lou Ruiqing to research and report on the reason for India's "expanded offensive" against China. On 16 October Lei reported to Mao. Lei laid out five key reasons for India's new offensive posture. The first was a desire to turn Tibet into "a colony or a protectorate" of India --- the core Chinese belief discussed earlier. Other reasons adduced were: a desire to gain increased U.S. and Soviet military assistance by becoming a part of their anti-China campaign; a desire to "achieve hegemony in Asia" by using anti-China activities to increase India's status with poor and small countries of the Third World; a desire to divert class and national contradictions with India. The final and probably most important reason adduced by Lei's group was a belief that China was "bluffing" (dui ta changde shi kongchengji). Lei returned repeatedly to the notion that Nehru believed that Nehru believed that China "was weak and could be taken advantage of" (ruanrou ke qi) and "barks but does not bite" (zhi jiao bu yao). Because of U.S.-Soviet-Indian "encirclement" of China compounded by
China’s "economic difficulties," Nehru "believes that no matter how they attack us, we will not hit back." Mao agreed with Lei’s analysis:

It seems like it is indeed that sort of a situation. In this case, we cannot but fight a war. Well, since Nehru says we only 'bark but don't bite,' we absolutely must fight. We have no other choice. We might as well accompany him [in fighting a war].

On 16 October, the same day Lei Yingfu reported to Mao, the CMC formally decided to "annihilate" (jianmie) Indian forces that had aggressed against Chinese territory in the east. This decision apparently involved approval of the war plan drafted by the CMC staff.

When China’s leaders made their second crucial 16 October decision for war, they had in hand indications of Soviet support. On 8 October, Beijing had formally notified Moscow that India might launch an attack on China forcing China to respond. On 14 October China’s ambassador in Moscow, Liu Shao, had secured from Khrushchev guarantees that if there was a Sino-Indian war, the USSR would “stand together with China.” A neutral attitude on the Sino-Indian border conflict was impossible, the Soviet leader said. If China were attacked, it would be an act of betrayal to declare neutrality.

Chinese leaders attributed this Soviet support and the stark reversal of earlier Soviet policy of neutrality in the Sino-Indian dispute it entailed, to a Soviet desire for Chinese support in the event of war with the United States over Cuba. The Cuban missile crisis would not erupt until 22 October when President Kennedy announced the U.S. discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba along with the U.S. decision for a naval quarantine. It seems, however, that Moscow had earlier given Beijing some glimpse of the plan to deploy missiles to Cuba. According to Moscow’s timetable, the new deployment of missiles to
Cuba was not to be made public and the anticipated crisis erupt, until mid-November, after the U.S. mid-term elections. Thus Chinese leaders may have anticipated a Soviet-U.S. confrontation in late November, coinciding with the second, expanded stage of the projected punitive war against India unleashed, in fact, on 18 November.

Approaching winter also forced China’s decision. The best time for military operations in the Himalayas was July-September. By October the weather was already becoming cold, and heavy snowfalls were possible. The Tibet Military district reported to the CMC in that once such snowfalls began the PLA would encounter “great difficulties” in moving supplies and reinforcements across the high passes to front line Chinese forces. Major PLA action would have to come soon, or be deferred to mid 1963. On the other hand, PLA intelligence made it apparent that the military balance in the front regions currently weighed heavily in China's favor. In terms of number of troops, the number of heavy weapons, and logistic roads supporting front line forces, the PLA held a distinct advantage. Indian forces were short even of winter clothing and food. Were China to postpone the attack by six months, Indian forces might become better prepared.

On 17 October the CMC cabled the appropriate orders to the Tibet military region. PLA forces were ordered to "exterminate the Indian aggressor forces." On 18 October, the CMC met yet again to give formal approval to the decision for a "self defensive counter-attack war" (yi chang ziwei fanji zuozhan). Participants in the meeting included Mao, Zhou, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Lo Ruiqing, and Marshals Liu Bocheng, He Long and Xu Xiangqian.
On 18 October Mao the decision for war was approved by an expanded Politburo meeting. In attendance were Mao, Zhou, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, He Long, Lou Ruiqing, Yang Shangkun (then Deng Xiaoping's assistant and in charge of organizational matters for the Central Committee), Tibet MR commander Zhang Guohua, General Wang Shangrong (professional soldier, Long March participant, then head of the Operations Department of the PLA), the diplomats Zhang Hanfu and Qiao Guanhua, and General Lei Yingfu. The meeting opened with a statement by Zhou that from many different aspects, it was apparent that China could not but launch a "self defensive counter-attack" against India as quickly as possible. Mao seconded Zhou's "opinion," but warned of the need not to underestimate India's military forces. General Zhang Guohua, designated to command the upcoming attack, reassured Mao in this regard. Finally the PLA's war plan was approved. The attack was set for 20 October.

The PLA offensive launched on that day in the Tawang region continued for only four days, culminating in the seizure of strategically located Tawang on 23 October. In the western sector, the offensive continued until 27 October. Chinese forces then halted and a three-week lull followed. Allen Whiting was probably correct in his surmise that this hiatus was intended to provide an opportunity for Indian leaders to rethink their approach and abandon their Forward Policy. The weeklong PLA offensive that began on 20 October followed by a pause was in line with the gradual escalation of Chinese moves underway since early 1962. The 20 October offensive was a step considerably more forceful than the encirclement and then attack on the Dhola outpost in September, but a measure considerably more limited that the massive assault that came in November. Yet there is nothing in the new Chinese sources, however, that directly substantiates this
Chinese signaling-opportunity for Indian drawback hypothesis. Currently available Chinese sources do not indicate another decision for war after the 6 and 16 October decisions. It seems that those decisions were for a multi-stage war. Indian forces would first be given a sharp and bloody warning, after which Chinese forces would halt and reorganize for their next offensive. If after this first bloody warning and during the interregnum after the first Chinese advance, India did not reorient its frontier policies, and perhaps if nothing occurred in the international situation pointing toward United States intervention in a Sino-Indian war, then the next stage, a truly massive assault to southern fringe of the Himalayas would follow.

Roderick MacFarquhar raises the important point that Nehru could and should have used the early November lull to reorient Indian policy. By then it was abundantly clear that the key assumption underlying the Forward Policy --- that China would not go to war over the border --- was wrong. The realities of the military balance, that is the PLA’s clear superiority over Indian forces in the frontier region, should also have been clear. Given this, it was unfortunate that Nehru did not order suspension of Indian offensive operations and find a way of starting boundary negotiations, as Zhou Enlai proposed on 24 October, the day after the first phase of the Chinese offensive ended. Had Nehru reoriented Indian policy in early November, the next phase of the war very probably could have been avoided.

In fact, Indian offensive operations to oust Chinese positions both in the Tawang and Walong areas of NEFA resumed on 14 November. Chinese forces responded by launching a pre-planned massive offensive on 18 November. Indian defenses in the east
rapidly crumbled. PLA forces would not halt until Chinese soldiers looked out from the
Himalayan foothills to the broad valley of the Bramaphutra River.

**Internal Mobilization and International Confrontation**

It is now pretty well established that Mao’s domestic mobilization concerns
occasionally helped inspire his preference for confrontational international policies.
Thomas Christensen has demonstrated this dynamic in Mao’s 1950 decision for war with
the United States in Korea and for Mao’s 1958 decision to bombard the offshore
islands. A similar dynamic may have been operating in 1959 and 1962. In early 1959
when Mao decided to launch polemical struggle against Nehru, Mao was struggling to
push the agricultural collectivization movement to a new high tide. And in fall 1962, as
Mao was guiding his comrades toward war with India, he was also beginning his
struggle to revive “class struggle” in agricultural policy as part of a broader effort to
reverse the post-Great Leap retreat from collectivized agriculture. On the other hand,
there is a danger of over-determining an event, and the border conflict viewed on the
Chinese side through the prism of Tibet, certainly seems adequate to explain the 1962
war. In any case, both the highly selective Chinese sources on the 1962 war available
thus far, and constraints of space associated with a single book chapter, do not allow
testing of the internal mobilization hypothesis here.

**Conclusions**

There was an underlying reason why China’s leaders decided for war in 1962
which has been alluded to earlier: a belief that India’s leaders did not appreciate the fact
that the People’s Republic of China was a “new China,” that had “stood up” and, unlike old pre-1949 “old China,” could no longer be “bullied” and “humiliated” by foreign powers. Indian leaders believed that China would not strike back, but would back down before Indian provocations, or so China’s leaders concluded. Indian leaders did not respect New China, but arrogantly believed they could impose their will on it, just like Britain, India’s imperial mentor, had done repeatedly in the Nineteenth Century. Indian leaders were oblivious to the power and determination of New China.

This image of India was linked, I believe, to a fundamental asymmetry of Chinese and Indian worldviews regarding the role of military power in world affairs, an asymmetry symbolized perhaps by the meeting of Chen Yi and Krishna Menon at the 1962 Geneva conference. China’s leaders saw military power as playing a central role in politics, both domestic and international. Careful preparation and prudent use of military power was vital to political success. When and how to use military power were, for China’s leaders, a matter of pragmatic calculation. (This was exemplified by the prominent role of combat veterans in China’s decision making: Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao, Chen Yi, or even Mao, Deng, and Zhou.) Nehru and Menon, on the other hand, believed that war among the major powers was an obsolete phenomenon. In the nuclear age, major power war would inevitably escalate to nuclear war, which was so horrible it would never be undertaken. Moreover, world moral opinion would constrain potential aggressor states. And certainly among the African-Asian states who had shared the common experience of national oppression, resort to war was unthinkable. Thinking along these lines led India to disregard the realities of power in the Himalayas and to conclude that China would not resort to war against India. China’s hardheaded leaders
took India’s disregard for China’s power as disdain. They took the Indian belief that China would not fight, would not resort to war, as a belief that China was weak and would back down before assertive policies.

Was China’s resort to war in 1962 prudent? Did it achieve its policy objectives at an acceptable cost to China? The official PLA history of the 1962 war stresses that “quickly achieving peaceful, stable borders in the west” was the objective of the 1962 war (ba xibu bianjiang dichu xunsu wending xialai). This was the "basic direction" of China’s border policy to be achieved by inflicting a painful defeat on India thus demonstrating the futility and danger of aggressing against borders defended by the PLA, would force India to abandon the Forward Policy. Sharp military defeat would also "compel India to again [sic] sit down at the negotiating table and solve the Sino-Indian border problem." This too would "achieve peaceful stability along the western borders."

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The harsh defeat inflicted on India in 1962 did, in fact, cause Indian leaders to look much more soberly and respectfully at Chinese power. India did in fact swiftly abandon the earlier policy of suing military force to challenge Chinese control over disputed territory. India abandoned the policy of attempting through military means to establish a new de facto line of actual control. The reality of Chinese power also ultimately led New Delhi to resume border negotiations with China still in possession of Aksai Chin --- although it would take twenty-seven years for this to happen. After 1962 Indian leaders were, in fact, much more cautious in dealing with China and more respectful of China’s power.
These Chinese gains were secured at significant cost. The PLA’s drive to the southern foothills of the Himalayas had a profound effect on Indian opinion. China became a nemesis of India ranked only after Pakistan. Even forty-some years after the war this sentiment remains significant in India. The experience of 1962 made India deeply skeptical of Chinese professions of friendship and more wary of the expansion of Chinese security ties with South Asian countries neighboring India. What Indians view as China’s “betrayal” of India’s desire for friendship in the 1950s has made India far less responsive to Chinese diplomatic friendship offensives, and more determined to keep China out of places like Nepal or Bangladesh. Fear of Chinese rooted in 1962 was a major factor impelling India to keep open its nuclear weapons options and then, in 1998, to openly acquire nuclear weapons. There exists in Indian military culture a desire for payback against China, which would someday erase the humiliation of 1962. The trauma of 1962 impelled New Delhi into close strategic alignment with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, a development “encircling” China with Soviet power. Even in the 2000s when India began developing a military partnership with the United States, the defeat of 1962 was a remote but distinct factor in India’s deliberations. India also began serious military modernization after the 1962 defeat, and this would eventually change the equation of military power between the two countries. One component of the new military capabilities developed by India was a highly trained, professionally led, and militarily very potent Tibetan armed force of 6,000-or so men, the Special Frontier Force. It is quite plausible that had China not opted for war with India, or perhaps had opted for a far less powerful and traumatic assault, China and “China’s Tibet” would today face far less threat from India.
Notes


3 There was a third set of factors underlying China's road to the 1962 war --- a perception of U.S.-Indian-Soviet collaboration against and encirclement of China. Considerations of space require limitation to consideration of the first two factors which were, I believe, rather more important than the third.

4 Whiting, Calculus, p. 36, 34.


6 Zhong yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi (History of the Sino-India border self defensive war), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994, p. 37-40. This is the official PLA history of the 1962 war. It labors at considerable length to demonstrate that India's aggressive intentions and actions precipitated the 1962 confrontation, and provides copious detail on PLA military operations. Yet it gives very short shrift to the actual process through which China's leaders decided to resort to war. Only four out of 567 pages deal with China's decision making process. Still, these few pages provide important information when pieced together with other equally fragmentary accounts.

7 Xu Yan, Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhanishi zhenxiang (True history of the Sino-Indian border war), Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1993, p. 28, 29-30, 50, 53. This is the most important Chinese work thus far on the 1962 war. It is significant that Xu's work was published in Hong Kong rather than in the People's Republic of China. The work deals at considerable length with China's actual decision making process. Xu apparently has access to primary documents, although he does not reference those sources.

Zhao Weiwen, *Yin Zhong guanxi fengyun lu (1949-1999)* (Record of the vissitudes of India-China relations (1949-1999), Beijing: Shi shi chubanshe, 2000, p. 103. Zhao is one of China's authoritative India hands. From 1950 until the mid 1990s she worked for the China Institute for Contemporary International Studies and the organizational predecessors of that body. This was the analytical organ of China's ministry of state security.

Zhao Weiwen, *fengyun lu*, p. 110.

Zhao Weiwen, *fengyun lu*, p. 129.


Regarding India’s Tibet policies see, Sakya, *Dragon in Land of Snows*. Also, Claude Arpi, *The Fate of Tibet, When Big Insects Eat Small Insects*, New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999.

Arpi, *Fate of Tibet*, p. 338-43.

Sakya, *Dragon in Land of Snows*, p. 21-23.


Zhao Weiwen, *fengyun lu*, p. 124-29. Yang Gongsu also enumerates these Indian transgressions in Yang Gongsu, *Xin zhongguo duiwai zhengce*, (New China's foreign policies), unpublished manuscript, p. 68-69. Yang was foreign affairs assistant to the PLA in Tibet in the 1950s. He was later China's ambassador to Nepal. Yang charges the Indian Consul General in Lhasa with encouraging Tibetan demonstrators to draft a statement of demands, which eventually became a Tibetan declaration of independence, and with promising to convey such a statement of demands to the Indian government. Nehru in testimony to the Indian parliament denies this, and says that the Consul merely talked with the Tibetans who had pushed their way into the Consulate building. Nehru also said that the consul explained that he could not render any assistance, and declined to become involved in their protests in any concrete way. See *Dalai Lama and India; Indian Public and Prime Minister on Tibetan Crisis*, New Delhi: Institute of National Affairs, 1959, p. 75. This volume contains Nehru's various comments to parliament about Tibetan developments in 1959.

Wu Lengxi, *Shi nian lunzhan, 1956-1966, Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu*, (10 year polemical war, 1956-1966, a memoir of Sino-Soviet relations), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999, Vol. I, p. 195. Wu Lengxi was head of Xinhua News Agency plus General Editor of Renmin ribao at the time. He was also the Politburo's record
keeper for relations with the Soviet Union. His two volume is an extremely rich source for scholars. See my review in The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2002), forthcoming.

19 Wu Lengxi, Shi nian lunzhan p. 197.

20 Wu Lengxi, Shi nian lunzhan p. 198.

21 Wu Lengxi, Shi nian lunzhan p. 198-99.


25 Lei Yingfu, as told to Chen Xianyi, Zai zuigao songshuaibu dang sanmo --- Lei Yingfu jiangjun huiyilu (Serving on the staff of the high command - memoir of General Lei Yingfu), Nangchang, Jiangxi province: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1997, p. 207.


27 Apri, Fate of Tibet, p. 320-47, 392-98; Shakya, Dragon in Land of Snows, p.


29 Nehru returned repeatedly during his parliamentary testimony in 1959 to this theme of a two part agreement. See Nehru's statements to parliament, 30 March 1959, 27 April 1959, and press conference on 5 April 1959, all in Dalai Lama and India, New Delhi: Institute of National Affairs, 1959, p. 80, 103, 105, and 120-21.


31 Dalai Lama and India, p. 127.


Knaus, *Orphans*, p. 159.


Sakya, *Dragon in the Land of Snows*.

History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. 56.

History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. 56.

History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. 72.


Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2 October 1959, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 12/13, p. 266, 268.


From Whiting, *Calculus*, p. 46.

Chinese accounts of the 1962 war are almost entirely devoid of specific dates for specific events. With several exceptions, reference to meetings is by very general terms like "later" or in "mid 1962". I have therefore tried to order reported meetings by the context of other events discussed by the book at the time of the reported meeting, or by matters discussed in the meeting themselves.

52 Shi Bo, editor, Zhong yin da zhan jishi (Record of events in the big China-India war) Beijinjg: Da di chubanshe, 1993, p. 182.
53 Xu Yan, lishi zhenxiang, p. 110.
54 Whiting, Calculus, p. 51.
55 Shi Bo, da zhan jishi, p. 183-84.
56 Shi Bo, da zhan jishi, p. 184.
60 History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. 415-16.
61 Whiting, Calculus, p. 55.
62 Whiting, Calculus, p. 58.
64 History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. xx.
65 History of the Conflict with China, 1962, p. xx, 415-17, 428.
68 Shi Bo, da zhan jishi, p. 185-86.
69 Shi Bo, da zhan jishi, p. 187-188.
Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 87.

Whiting, *Calculus*, p. 78.

Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 88.

Whiting, *Calculus*, p. 82.

Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 91. This corresponds to Whiting's judgment in *Calculus*, p. 92.

Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 113.


*History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, p. 415. A map of this region is available in Palit, *War in High Himalaya*, p. 239.

*History of the Conflict with China, 1962*, p. 94.

Whiting, *Calculus*, p. 95-96.


Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 103.

Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 103-04.

Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 110.

Shi Bo, *da zhan jishi*, p. 188.

Shi Bo, *da zhan jishi*, p. 189.

Shi Bo, *da zhan jishi*, p. 189.

Sun Shao, Chen Zhibin, *Ximalaya shan de xue, zhong yin zhanzheng shilu* (Snows of the Himalaya mountains, the true record of the China-India war), Taiyuan: Bei Yue wenyi chubanshe, 1991, p. 95. As far as I can ascertain, this was China's first book-length study of the 1962 war. It was not a scholarly, but a popular work. It lacked reference notes and was written in an often-breezy style. Yet the work was authored by two long-time PLA soldiers (the front page of the book contains brief biographical information about the two authors indicating their military background) and contained
one long section with an extensive verbatim quote of Mao Zedong. Much of the text of these long quotes were lacking in later more authoritative Chinese accounts of the same events, yet their love of literary and historical allusions give them the ring of truth. Mao loved such language. The work also conveyed ostensibly verbatim negative comments by Marshal Ye Qingying about Indian Army commander Kaul. The book was banned shortly after its appearance, but this author was lucky enough to find the book on a street bookstall of a small city in Sichuan before it was banned. To date this work provides the fullest, most direct account of Mao Zedong's thinking about the road to war with India.

CASS's Wang Hongwei gives an account of a CMC meeting in "mid-October" with some quotations using the exact same language as Sun Shao and Chen Zhibin, but omitting not only quotation marks and precise dates but also the more off-hand comments by Mao quoted in the Shao/Chen book. Omitted too in Wang's account are the negative comments by Ye Jianying about Kaul. Wang Hongwei, *Ximalaya shan qingjie, zhong yin guanxi yan jiu* (The Himalayas Sentiment: A Study of Sino-Indian Relations, Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1998, p. 228-30. It may well have been Sun and Chen's too full and direct quotations of Mao, plus Ye Jianying's negative evaluation of Kaul's abilities, that were deemed inappropriate for open publication and led to the volume's recall. For these reasons, I believe the Sun/Chen book is credible, indeed extremely valuable.

89 Sun Shao, Chen Zhibin, *Ximalaya shan*, p. 96.
90 Sun Shao, Chen Zhibin, *Ximalaya shan*, p. 97.
91 Sun Shao, Chen Zhibin, *Ximalaya shan*, 97-98.
92 Sun Shao, Chen Zhibin, *Ximalaya shan*, p. 99-100.
93 Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 104.
94 Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 104.
95 Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi, p. 179.
96 Shi Bo, *da zhan jishi*, p. 189.
97 Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 106.
99 Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 111.
100 Xu Yan, *lishi zhenxiang*, p. 111.


*Zhong Yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi*, p. 178.

Conboy and Morrison offer a good account of the evolution of this force in *Secret War*. 