



Class 1: Irregular Warfare, COIN, Hybrid, Asymmetric Warfare, and "COIN next"



- Introductions/orientation
- What will we cover during POI
 - Background
 - Description of the lexicon
 - Recent/Current operations
 - Future implications



Readings

- DODD 3000.07 Irregular Warfare
- Irregular Warfare: JOC V1/2
- Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?

- Optional Readings
 - The Battle for Peace, Tony Zinni

- Recommended
 - Small Wars Manual
 - COIN manual
 - Stability Ops manual
 - ICAF




IW Background



- How old is IW, the term? When was it used, practiced?
- NSS
- 2006 QDR
 - Defined IW
 - Based on OEF/OIF issues
 - IW Roadmap
- IW JOC ver 1.0 2007 (signed by who?)
- New terms, new acronyms emerged, (SFA, TAA etc)
 - How did they fit into the lexicon, who was the lead?
- What authorities to do SOF like missions?
- New Directives and instructions were published as a result

2006 QDR/NDS “Quad Chart”



VULNERABILITY

<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Higher</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Irregular</u></p> <p>Non-state and state actors employing “unconventional” methods to counter stronger state opponents—terrorism, insurgency, etc. (<i>erode U.S. power</i>)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Catastrophic</u></p> <p>Terrorist or rogue state employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (<i>paralyze U.S. power</i>)</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><i>Lower</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Traditional</u></p> <p>States employing military forces in well-known forms of military competition and conflict. (<i>challenge U.S. power</i>)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Lower</i></p>	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Higher</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Disruptive</u></p> <p>Competitors employing technology or methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (<i>capsize U.S. power</i>)</p>

LIKELIHOOD

Strategic Guidance: broader set of challenges of which the most complex would be combinations.



Irregular Warfare (per 3000.07) Tasks to MilDept/Services



Departments shall:

- a. Maintain military capabilities and track the capacity and proficiency of the Military Services to meet CCDR IW-related requirements in accordance with strategic guidance documents.
- b. Maintain *scalable* organizations to train and advise foreign security forces and security (unilaterally or as part of civilian-military teams) in permissive and uncertain environments.
- c. Maintain expeditionary units organized, trained, and equipped that, when directed, are able to provide civil security, restore essential government function, repair key infrastructure necessary to government function and to sustain human life, and reform or rebuild indigenous security institutions until indigenous, international, or U.S. civilian personnel can do so.
- d. *Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and Military Department schools prepare personnel for IW. Ensure all Service schools develop appropriate education and training programs and courses, reflecting joint and Military Department IW-relevant doctrine.*
- e. Establish through designation at the Military Department and/or Service level, as appropriate, a representative accountable for discharging the responsibilities delineated in this Directive.




DoDD 3000.07



- What does this policy, directive mean to the services?
- What is the Title X impact?



IW JOC Ver 2.0



Central Idea

- *The joint force must collaborate with other agencies and partners to:*
 - *Understand the situation in depth*
 - *Act in concert*
 - *Continually assess and adapt*

Guiding Principles

- *Priority to the battle of the narrative*
- *Persistent engagement and sustained efforts*
- *Build partner capacity*
- *Balanced approach*
- *Overcoming institutional seams*

Environment


- *Fluid environment: subject to constant change*
- *Adaptive adversaries: multiple actors, varying motivations*
- *Centrality of population*

The Military Problem

- *How the joint force operates in coordination with other agencies and multinational partners to:*
 - *Prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats*
 - *Support efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict*



Conventional and Irregular Warfare






What is Hybrid and Asymmetric warfare?



- Hybrid warfare, is it new?
 - Frank Hoffman
 - GAO report on Hybrid warfare
- Asymmetric warfare?

Future Conflicts according to Hoffman



Hybrid threats: Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same battlespace to obtain their political objectives.

Hezbollah: Hoffman's Prototype Hybrid

-State-like capabilities

- Long Range Missiles
- Anti-ship Cruise Missiles
- Anti-armor systems
- UAVs
- SIGINT

-Selected tactics—

- Highly trained in traditional and irregular modes

-Extensive preparations

-Exploitation of political effects



“The resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either...it was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between. This is the new model.” Nasrallah

Georgia 2008; Hybrid, Asymmetric?



“Several Georgian state computer servers have been under external control since shortly before Russia’s armed intervention into the state commenced on Friday, leaving its online presence in disarray.”



GAO report summary

DOD has not officially defined “hybrid warfare” at this time and has no plans to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare.

- DOD officials from the majority of organizations we visited agreed that “hybrid warfare” encompasses all elements of warfare across the spectrum. Therefore, to define hybrid warfare risks omitting key and unforeseen elements.
- DOD officials use the term “hybrid” to describe the increasing complexity of conflict that will require a highly adaptable and resilient response from U.S. forces, and not to articulate a new form of warfare.
- The term “hybrid” and hybrid-related concepts appear in DOD overarching strategic planning documents (e.g., 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*); however, “hybrid warfare” has not been incorporated into DOD doctrine.



GAO report

DOD officials have differing views:

- According to Air Force officials, hybrid warfare is more potent and complex than irregular warfare due to increased tempo, complexity, diversity, and wider orchestration across national borders, which are all exacerbated by the ease with which adversaries can communicate, access international resources and funding, and acquire more lethal and sophisticated weaponry.
- Special Operations Command officials stated that hybrid warfare is no different from current doctrinal forms of warfare employed across the spectrum of conflict.
- Navy officials stated that hybrid is synonymous with full spectrum and encompasses both conventional warfare and unconventional warfare.
- Marine Corps officials use the term “hybrid” to describe the potential threat posed by both state and non-state actors and believe that hybrid warfare is not a new form of warfare; rather it is synonymous with full spectrum conflict and is already adequately covered in current doctrine



Asymmetric Warfare

- Strength vs. Weakness
- Crosses IW and conventional/traditional
- Defined as “*war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly.*”
- U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), Fort Meade MD
- U.S. Navy Center for Asymmetric Warfare (CAW) , Naval Post Graduate School, CA



Asymmetric?

**Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN)
“Live Fire” SWARM Boat Operations
During “Great Prophet 5 Naval Maneuvers”
In The Persian Gulf During April 2010**



FARS

Photo : Mahdi Marizad

Open Source Materials



FARS NEWS AGENCY



American Way of War ?



- Aggressive—Offensive
- Annihilation oriented—kill em all.
- Large scale-conventional
- Combat is face to face--manhood
- Firepower is King/Queen
- Force on Force---machine against machine, system against systems
- Logistical support is good
- Impatient—quick win, some one else to clean up and put it back together
- Overly Sensitive to friendly casualties
- Industrial in nature
- Technologically dependant--Precision
- Closed loop, internal communications, Info is protected
- Media/Info is a sideshow
- A Political-we like clear division of labor-Pol-Mil
- A Historical (often ignore lessons that could be learned, applied)
- A Strategic (overlook consequences)
- Problem solving; Opportunistic; altruistic -
 - Hope is always a COA
- Culturally challenged—We want everyone to be like us



Irregular Warfare Concept



- **Protect the People (social system)**
- **Culture is supreme—reinforce their beliefs, attitudes, behaviors**
- **Intelligence is King (not artillery)**
- **Ideology Matters (What we promise and then what do we do)**
- **Protracted – Time/patience is a weapon**
- **The target you are shooting at may not be your enemy**
- **Unity of Effort (s), first, then unity of command—fuzzy division of labor**
- **Alternative decision, communication cycle in public domain**
- **Opens up broader aspects of the Pol-Mil spectrum**

Irregular Warfare is another method of “war”



Irregular Warfare Concept

Degrade the opponents strategy rather than attrite his force (tactics)

Strategic Principles of War—emphasis is long term

- **Determine the nature of the conflict**
- **Identify center of gravity (yours and opponent)**
- **Criticality and risks of assumptions**
- **Legitimacy- credible capacity to coerce**
- **Know your opponent, what does he want, why is he fighting you?**
 - **Shape w/psychological precision; influence operations**
 - **Fracture, de-legitimize, demoralize, and**
 - **Isolate internal and external supporters – isolate your opponents**

Integrate all agencies and elements of power

- **Focus on undermining opponent politically-make him irrelevant**

Irregular Warfare is another method of “war”



Applying the concept

Is traditional overwhelming firepower the American way of war? history tells us otherwise....

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnGpwNmF430&feature=related>

"Don't fight the insurgent, but the source of the insurgency."



COIN...Or IW?



- What are our strategic “ends” in Afghanistan? Stability?
- What are the strategic “ends” of the Taliban and Al Qaeda? US out, IRoA removed, Taliban in rule
- Are our political objectives limited or unlimited? What about those of our adversaries?
- What is our strategic approach and that of our adversary (annihilation or erosion)?
- How often have our political objectives in Afghanistan changed?
- How often has our military strategy changed?
- What are some of the most significant challenges associated with a protracted conflict like Iraq or Afghanistan?



Implications

- What strategy adjustments are needed?
- What is next for the joint force?
 - Will we forget what we have learned
- What should the USMC be after AFG?



Questions?





“Warfare” is a mix of both Irregular and Conventional

FID / SFA



PREVENT

STAB OPS



PROTECT

COIN / CT



PREVAIL

“Future conflict will not be dominated by tests of strength that characterize industrial war, it will be dominated by wars fought among the people, where the objective is not to crush an opponent’s war making ability but to influence a population’s ideas and collective will.”

Marine Corps Operational Concepts

“Three Block” Warfare