An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999

By Shaukat Qadir

Shaukat Qadir is a retired soldier from the Pakistan army, the founder and Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and now works as an independent analyst.

‘The purpose of deterrence is to deter’

In May 1998 India tested its nuclear weapons, and Pakistan, despite the half-hearted attempts of the international community to prevent it, soon followed suit. Many analysts viewed this development as dangerous. Almost an equally large number felt that it was for the best, however, since this brought deterrence fully into place. It was not long before the latter were rudely shocked out of their assessment. In February 1999, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, visited Pakistan as part of the much touted ‘bus diplomacy’, on the invitation of his counterpart, Mr Nawaz Sharif. Vajpayee was greeted with great pomp and show, unaware that Kargil had been (or was being) occupied.

In early May 1999, the Indian army learnt that intruders had occupied the heights close to the Dras region in Kashmir. A patrol of ten soldiers sent to investigate was wiped out. Over the next few days the Indian army, without yet reporting to their political leadership (as any other army would do), proceeded to first attempt the eviction of the intruders and, on failing to do so, assess the extent of their intrusion. At some point they went to the political leadership to inform them of the intrusion. The event led to a military takeover in Pakistan and sent shock waves round the world. And according to some analysts, it almost led to a nuclear war. It is still too early to assess the final outcome of the event. For Vajpayee, this was a particularly un-propitious moment in time - he was heading an interim government, coming up for re-election in a few months, and, following a courageous trip to Lahore, in the teeth of opposition from all his colleagues.

Let me state at the outset that, while I have considerable knowledge of the course of events (pieced together from private discussions with friends and colleagues in positions of authority, who played a role), I have neither the official Pakistani version nor, quite obviously, any input from the Indian side. There is, therefore, some conjecture in what follows. Only the actual actors will be able to judge the accuracy of this conjecture. That said, this analysis is based on my (not inconsiderable) personal knowledge of: the terrain around Kargil; the character of the principal actors in the Pakistan army; the decision making process in the Pakistan army (in which I served in numerous command and staff assignments); and the collective character of the Pakistan army (on which basis I also judge the Indian army, being essentially no different).

Background

When the British finally decided to leave India in 1947, the ‘Princely States’ were given the freedom to decide their own fate. They could join either of the two new states created by partition, India and Pakistan, or opt for independence. Junagarh, a predominantly Hindu state, with a Muslim ruler, opted for Pakistan, but was forcibly occupied by India on the principle that the population was predominantly Hindu. Hyderabad chose independence, but was again forced into the Indian Union. The territories that
formed the state of Jammu and Kashmir were governed by a Sikh ruler, who kept delaying his decision until 1948, when finally some tribal lashkars (a loosely grouped force) decided to intervene on behalf of their Muslim brethren. He then announced his accession to India over the radio, and Indian troops were airlifted into Kashmir (reinforcing those already there), ostensibly to defend the Maharaja (Prince). Interestingly, India claims that the Maharajah also signed the document of accession, although no one has ever seen the document.

Indian troops moved into the valley of Srinagar and managed to evict the lashkars, where they established what was later to be called the Line of Control (LOC). Despite lobbying by India, the United Nations unanimously passed a resolution in favour of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. Jawaharal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, accepted the resolution and promised to abide by it, but later reneged. Kashmir became ‘disputed territory’, divided into Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) and Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K, or AK), as the Pakistanis came to refer to them.

Pakistan and India have fought three wars. Of these, two were fought over Kashmir, in 1948 and 1965, when Pakistan attempted to liberate the people of Kashmir. The 1971 war was imposed by India, to liberate East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Kashmir has been the site of numerous mini-wars between the two countries, which have constantly sought to take advantage of the other’s perceived vulnerabilities. Since India occupied the vacant heights at Siachin glacier in 1984, there has been an annual exchange at what is the highest battleground in the world. Pakistan too, has seized every opportunity to gain an advantage. Kargil was, in fact, on the Pakistani side of the LOC until 1971, when the Indians evicted Pakistani troops in a surprise attack.

The Terrain
The terrain around Kargil is amongst the most beautiful in the world. It is also amongst the most difficult to conduct military operations in. The Kargil mini-war was fought over an area extending from Dras to Kargil and Batalik, an area spanning about a hundred kilometers in length. Craggy peaks abound the region range in height from 13000 feet to 18000 feet, with the floor of the valleys at around 7000 feet. Each crest line is followed by another, with ravines in between, and there are frequent depressions (even along the crest line of one continuous feature), which could range from a few hundred feet in depth to a few thousand. Therefore, infantry attacks, unless backed by surprise, are an exceedingly costly venture. What is more, they are almost certainly doomed to failure. The extremely harsh and inhospitable nature of the terrain was the reason for the Indian troops taking a ‘calculated risk’, leaving it unoccupied during winters, and returning at the advent of spring.

What are referred to as ‘roads’ in this mountainous region are usually tracks, which nevertheless can accommodate heavy traffic, including military vehicles. The tracks invariably run along valleys, in this case from Dras to Kargil fairly close to the heights. At Dras, the road curves right under the predominant heights, making the entire Main Supply Route (MSR) feeding the predominant heights, including Siachin) vulnerable to interdiction, even with small arms. Most valleys in the region range in span from a few hundred metres to a couple of thousand. At Dras the valley is at its widest, ranging between five to seven thousand metres, which enables it to house a small cantonment. It is from this cantonment that, at the advent of spring, troops return to occupy the heights they have vacated in winters.

Preliminaries
Sometime around mid-November 1998, Lt Gen Mahmud, then commanding 10 Corps, sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Aziz. When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (COC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan. They sought permission to execute a plan, which had previously been shelved, to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter. The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement. The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations. Knowledge of this plan was to be confined to the four people present, for the time being.

It is useful to interrupt the sequence of events here, in order to draw a brief
Pakistan generals sought permission to execute a plan to occupy terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, vacated by the Indians every winter. The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement.

pen-picture of each of these four characters, as I know them. Doing so will provide a better understanding of the Pakistani adventure in Kargil, in which these characters played a prime role. Obviously, these will be incomplete, focusing essentially on the traits relevant to the events at Kargil. Equally obvious is the fact that the assessment of their characters is mine and, only as accurate as my knowledge of them, and my ability to assess another human being.

Gen Pervez Musharraf: A sharp and intelligent artillery officer, he commanded infantry formations from brigade upwards, and held a large variety of staff and instructional appointments. A bold commander, who takes pride in being decisive, quick to take decisions and, therefore, a good commander of troops and keen to assume responsibility.

Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed: Again an artillery officer, with a wide variety of experience. He is sharp, intelligent and arrogant. So arrogant, in fact, that towards the end of his career it became overwhelming. A strong, forceful, decisive and highly ambitious individual, he was secular until he ‘discovered’ the force of Islam late in life. As a consequence, perhaps, he became dangerous in the way that anyone will become if they believe they are ‘incapable of doing wrong’.

Lt Gen Muhammed Aziz: More than anyone else, he has been painted the villain, and the ‘fundo’ (someone prepared to misinterpret religion in its puritanical form so as to justify acts of violence), which he is not. Deeply religious, but very balanced, he was born Kashmiri, and has served in some of the most rugged reaches of it at various stages of his career. He is strongly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of Kashmir, but not to the extent that it might jeopardize Pakistan. He is intelligent, sharp, very balanced, progressive and dynamic.

Major General Javed Hassan: A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he is more of an academic than a commander, and bears that reputation. He, therefore, was the only one with a point to prove.

While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December 1999, the subject was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif at some point in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the type of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. The military leadership had not presented a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, nor had they set out its political aim and how it would be achieved.

At this stage the rest of the army was unaware of plans for the operation (as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff [CAS] and the Chief of Naval Staff [CNS] too), and preparations proceeded in secret. The operation was, in my view, not intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, until finally they were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square kilometres over a front of over 100 kilometers, and a depth ranging between seven to fifteen kilometres. They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes. Whereas the total number of troops occupying these posts never exceeded 1000 (from all ranks), four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the operation. While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local Mujahideen assisting as labour to carry logistical requirements.

It was at this stage, in March 1999, that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfil a political objective. Given the fact that they were developing a plan to justify an operation already underway, the response was no less than brilliant. Given the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was about 2.25:1, the MO concluded that the initial Indian reaction would be to rush in more troops to IHK, further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan. It is for this reason that I maintain the view, which is held by no other analyst (to my knowledge) of this episode, that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possibility.
The political aim underpinning the operation was 'to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir'. However, the military aim that preceded the political aim was 'to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness'. The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant. The only flaw was that it had not catered for the 'environment'. Quite clearly, it was an aberration to the environment, and the international reaction soon left little doubt of that.

Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the prime minister in April, in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS was on a visit abroad, the navy's reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war. He also voiced the view that in the event of war, the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might seek.

The Battle
By the third week of May, the Indian leadership began to have some idea of the extent of the penetration. They tempered their initial boastful claims of ousting the intruders in a matter of days, to weeks, then to months, and finally they expressed a hope that they might be able to evict them before the onset of winter, but were not sure of achieving even that. Meantime, in Pakistan, the decision had been taken to deny that the intrusion had been perpetrated by military troops, and instead put the blame on the Mujahideen. In the period up to the third week of May, the Indian army made numerous unsuccessful forays into the region and suffered heavy losses. At about this time, the Indians decided to escalate the war vertically, by using air power. They also decided to bring in their 400 odd 'Bofors guns'. In fact only about 170 were introduced, but these were destined to play a decisive role. The inclusion of air power was not very successful. Within a few days, on 28 May, two MiGs were shot down by Pakistan. The following day Pakistan shot down two helicopters. The Indians' lack of success had nothing to do with effort, but rather the nature of terrain, which ensured that bombing had little chance of working unless it was laser-guided - the only kind that could be accurate in this terrain. Since this terrain also made it impossible for the Indians to put troops on the ground, they tried using helicopters, which forced them to expose themselves.

Early in June the Bofors guns began to arrive. Since Dras was the locality where Indians were most vulnerable, they decided to start there. Deployment was possible because the great depth of the valley provided the necessary space. While only forty or so guns could be deployed here, they were sufficient. Under cover of fire, elements of 2 Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called 'Tololing top', (Point 45907), the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras, on 12 June. An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June. Without in any way undermining the courage and determination of the Indian soldier, the deployment of the Bofors could not but result in the capture of these peaks (see Figure 1). But they could not effect the same military outcome in other places, merely due to the nature of the terrain, and the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors.

The Aftermath
Nawaz Sharif, who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he characteristically made no effort to analyze this aspect. The international pressure was becoming unbearable and, when the posts at Dras fell, he began looking for an escape route, not
appreciating the military causes of battle, which the army made no effort to explain. Sharif was very worried about the reaction of the military leadership, realizing that a withdrawal might result in his untimely ouster. He responded by dispatching his brother, Shahbaz Sharif to Washington, where he succeeded in getting the US administration to issue a warning that it would regard a military coup in Pakistan as unacceptable. Not only did this serve to warn the military leadership of the prime minister’s fears, it also shed some light on the possible course he might pursue later. The Indian leadership had been offering Sharif an ‘out’ – a statement by him that the Pakistani army had undertaken the operation without political sanction. Had Sharif accepted this offer in time, he might have survived (even though it would have made him look foolish). He lacked the political acumen, however. When he finally accepted the offer – after being forced from power – he found few believers.

During the last briefing in late June, the COAS, General Musharaf, told Sharif that, while the military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting Pakistani troops from the posts they were holding, the army would pull back if the government so desired. After some frantic telephone calls by Sharif to US President Clinton, in which he conveyed his desperation at the course of events, he went to Washington. He met Clinton on 4 July, and armed with guarantees of his support, returned to announce the withdrawal of the ‘freedom fighters’ occupying Kargil.

Sharif was still apprehensive, however, and also uncertain of his ability to survive his decision to pull back. Had he been otherwise, things might have continued more or less as normal, and the Pakistani people may still be saddled with him. Instead, he began to call upon the COAS to proceed against the principal actors in this episode and get rid of them. He also convinced Mr Niaz Naik to give an interview to the BBC stating that India and Pakistan had been working towards a peaceful solution of Kashmir, which was hijacked by Kargil. Musharaf resisted, believing that if heads were to roll, his would be the first. Sharif’s plot to get rid of him was unsuccessful, and the rest is history. Sharif was deposed and Musharaf assumed the mantle of leadership.

As indicated above, Pakistan’s first error of judgment was to undertake the operation at a juncture when the entire international community was bound to condemn it. Not only was the ‘Lahore...
Musharaf resisted, believing that if heads were to roll, his would be the first. Sharif’s plot to get rid of him was unsuccessful, and the rest is history

process’ being viewed with hope, India had returned to the limelight in the US’s eyes and Vajpayee was just establishing himself in power. Kargil had the capacity for creating political chaos in India, which was the last thing the world wanted. If it had succeeded, the Advanis and George Fernandes’ would have been India’s future. This, in my judgment, would have meant disaster for everyone, including Pakistan. If Kargil had taken place a year earlier, the reaction might have been less adverse.

As if this were not enough, Pakistan decided, for some inexplicable reason, to disclaim responsibility for the incursion. Not only did this cause considerable politico-diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful assertions suspect. American intelligence had already confirmed a military presence there. Tapes obtained in Pakistan of a conversation between the COAS and the CGS during a trip to China added further confirmation. To top it off, Pakistan was giving away gallantry awards (including the highest military award in Pakistan) to soldiers who, we averred, were not fighting a war!

Nonetheless, having suffered the condemnation and the embarrassment of being caught in a blatant falsehood, if the planning of the complete operation was as meticulous as I understand it to have been, the leadership might have been better to allow it to run its course. The operation was, beyond any doubt, brilliantly planned. If the military leadership was convinced (and some of them managed to convince me) of the possibilities of its success, it might have been better to see it to its logical conclusion.

The military takeover was ‘written on the walls of Kargil’. Even if Sharif had succeeded in his endeavours to oust Musharaf, he could not have lasted. No political government could survive the sacking of two army chiefs in one term10 in Pakistan - an unfortunate reality. It now appears that Pakistan will return to some sort of ‘controlled democracy’ (whatever that means), with Musharaf as the ultimate, untrammeled ‘check and balance’ to a puppet government, for a minimum of five years. His steps so far are appreciably in the right direction, but whether absolute power will corrupt absolutely, only time will tell. Even if it turns out for the best, the idea of democratic dictatorship is unpleasant. Yes, Kargil is an ongoing process, with the ultimate outcome still awaited.

FOOTNOTES
1. The size of the feature dictates the number of soldiers it can accommodate: usually between four to twelve per post. The size of the approach to the top dictates the number of soldiers that can approach it abreast, typically between eight to twenty. Consequently, the battle is heavily weighted in favour of the defender.
2. It is generally accepted that the required ratio for a force launching an offensive to have chances of success is 3:1. However, in mountainous terrain the required ratio may be many times more. If the present total military capabilities (including quality, quantity, numbers, etc.) were measured, I would support the estimate that MO came up with in 1999. However, this relationship is not permanent, and, given their proposed military spending, will undergo a drastic change in favour of India in a year or two.
3. While the general view was that nuclear deterrence was the cause of Indian restraint, I tend to agree with the conclusions of MO. It is my view that India toyed with the idea of an all-out war in late May/early June, but the military leadership could not guarantee the defeat of Pakistan. Consequently, it was decided to confine the battle to this small chunk of territory.
4. My input on the subject is from a number of highly placed sources, on the condition of anonymity, during and immediately after the episode. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the words, but can vouch for the essence of the two statements.
5. At the National Defence College, while teaching operational planning, the first factor to be considered is ‘environment’. The word refers to the national and international dimensions, on the basis of which one can decide whether the political aim could be acceptably achieved, and if so, to develop a military plan that could succeed within the given environment.
6. Swedish made field howitzers, light and portable enough to be inducted into area.
7. Point heights indicate the height of the feature in metres.
8. The army had continued to assert that no posts had fallen to the Indians, which reaffirms the contention that no effort was made to explain such a loss, or why it could not recur. However, in this case, it appears that Sharif found the Indian claims more credible than the Pakistan army’s denials.
9. An ex-foreign secretary of Pakistan involved in ‘track two’ diplomacy with India.
10. In October 1998, Sharif sought and obtained the resignation of Gen Jehangir Karamat, then COAS, over a disagreement, when he publicly recommended the formation of a National Security Council.
CHAPTER I

APPOINTMENT, APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Appointment

1.1 The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report had brought to light many grave deficiencies in India’s security management system particularly in the areas of Intelligence, Border Management, and Defence Management. It had also drawn attention to the fact that the original framework for management of the country’s security, formulated by Lord Ismay and recommended by Lord Mountbatten, had been accepted by a national leadership, which was not fully conversant with the complexities of national security management. Since then the country has had to fight five wars and grapple with a plethora of internal and external threats. Indeed, in just the last decade, India’s security scenario has witnessed nothing short of a sea-change as a result of the end of the Cold War, the proxy war in Kashmir, militancy fuelled from abroad in many parts of the country, the Revolution in Military Affairs and the increasing nuclearisation of the neighbourhood. Notwithstanding these far-reaching developments, the original structure of India’s national security system has by and large remained unchanged.

1.2 In the context of the foregoing, the KRC had urged a thorough and expeditious review of the national security system in its entirety. It further contended that the proposed review should not be undertaken by an ‘over-burdened bureaucracy’ but by an independent body of credible experts, whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise, as expedient.

1.3 Following the submission of the KRC Report, the Prime Minister set up a Group of Ministers (GoM), vide Cabinet Secretariat OM No.141/1/2000/TS dated April 17, 2000 (copy enclosed at Annexure A), to review the national security system in its entirety and in particular, to consider the recommendations of the KRC (detailed at Annexure B) and formulate specific proposals for implementation. The composition of the GoM was as follows:-

Shri LK Advani, Minister of Home Affairs.
Shri George Fernandes, Minister of Defence.
Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs.
Shri Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance.

1.4 The National Security Adviser (NSA), Shri Brajesh Mishra, was designated as a special invitee to the meetings of the GoM and the Cabinet Secretariat (National Security Council Secretariat) was tasked to service it. The GoM was initially given a time frame of six months to submit its proposals. However, due to some delay in submission of the reports of the four Task Forces setup by the GoM to facilitate its
tasks and due to the other pressing preoccupations of the Ministers involved, its term was extended till mid-February 2001.

Approach

1.5 The GoM held its first meeting on April 27, 2000, to discuss its terms of reference and modalities of work. It noted that its mandate was substantially wider than that of the KRC. While the KRC had been required to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil district and to recommend measures necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions, the GoM was, inter alia, required to review the national security system in its entirety and to formulate specific proposals for implementation. Conscious of the scope and extent of the holistic nature of its remit, the GoM saw in it a historic opportunity to review all aspects of the national security system, impinging not only on external threats but also on internal threats.

1.6 In view of its comparatively more limited remit, the KRC naturally did not address matters concerning internal security. The GoM, however, considered it necessary to do so in the light of the problems posed by insurgencies, narco-terrorism, collapse of law and order machinery in certain states, violence by left wing extremists, degradation of the efficacy of the Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) and the State police forces etc. Accordingly, the GoM set up a separate Task Force for issues concerning Internal Security.

1.7 While the concept of national security has today acquired a much wider connotation than in the past and includes within its sweep diverse issues like a nation’s economic and technological capability, its food and energy security, etc., the GoM felt that addressing all these issues together would diffuse the focus of this report. Accordingly, a conscious decision was taken to exclude these issues so as to be able to address in detail the management of national security as more traditionally conceived while taking into account the need for flexibility in the context of the newly emerging challenges. Such issues are, of course, extremely important and must be factored into in any holistic evaluation of national security. A significant step in this direction has already been taken on Government’s direction by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which completed in 1999 a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review for the first time in the country’s history. The NSAB is in the process of upgrading this study which will now more appropriately be called a National Security Review. Important as they are, the various components of national security need to be tackled on a continuous basis by the concerned Ministries with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) taking a holistic view and advising the Government from time to time.

Appointment of Task Forces

1.8 The chairpersons for the Task Forces set up by the GoM as detailed below were
chosen keeping in view their expertise in the areas they were required to deal with:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Task Force</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus</td>
<td>Shri GC Saxena*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force on Internal Security</td>
<td>Shri NN Vohra&amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force on Border Management</td>
<td>Dr Madhav Godbole$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force on Management of Defence</td>
<td>Shri Arun Singh#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.9 The terms of reference for the four Task Forces, as well as their composition, were finalised in consultation with the concerned chairpersons. The orders relating to the appointment of the Task Forces, are enclosed at Annexures C, D, E, F, G and H. As may be noted therefrom, the Task Forces were multidisciplinary in character and made up of acknowledged experts, most of whom were no longer serving in the Government.

**Administrative Support**

1.10 Each of the four Task Forces was provided administrative and secretarial support by the concerned organisations i.e. by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the Task Forces on Internal Security and Border Management; by the DG DPS (Ministry of Defence) for the Task Force on Management of Defence and by the NSCS for the Task Force on Intelligence Apparatus. In addition, one officer for each of the four Task Forces was deputed by the NSCS for liaison work.

**Time-Frame**

1.11 The Task Forces on Intelligence Apparatus, Internal Security and Border Management were set up on May 16, 2000 while the Task Force on Management of Defence was set up on May 17, 2000. They were required to submit their reports within three months from the date of their constitution i.e. by around mid-August 2000. The Task Force on Border Management presented its Report on August 29, 2000, the Task Forces on Intelligence Apparatus and Internal Security presented their reports on September 29, 2000 and the Task Force on Management of Defence presented its report on September 30, 2000.

**Methodology Adopted by the Task Forces**

1.12 Each of the Task Forces evolved its own methodology including, inter alia, circulation of questionnaires to elicit responses from the concerned organisations, interaction with key actors both in and outside the Government, requests for responses

---

* Shri GC Saxena is presently Governor, Jammu & Kashmir & former R&AW Chief
& Shri NN Vohra is presently Director, India International Centre and former Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, and Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.
$ Dr Madhav Godbole is a former Union Home Secretary.
# Shri Arun Singh is presently Advisor (Security) in the Ministry of External Affairs and former Minister of State for Defence.
from the public through press notes and advertisements and on the Web, presentations by concerned organisations and internal deliberations. The Task Forces took into account not only the KRC’s observations and recommendations but also those made by several other relevant committees. Furthermore, as per the orders setting up the Task Forces, they also interacted with the concerned administrative ministries so as to keep in view, their perception of problems and issues, as well as the feasibility of the various recommendations that they may make.

1.13 The GoM had authorised the Task Forces to engage consultants for their assistance. Accordingly, some Task Forces commissioned a number of studies to examine specific issues. The Task Forces on Border Management, Internal Security and Intelligence Apparatus also undertook field visits to interact with the State administrations, people in the affected areas and local officials. Such field visits, particularly in the case of the Task Force on Border Management facilitated an on-the-spot assessment of the security arrangements already in place and their deficiencies.

1.14 The NSCS arranged interactions of each Task Force with the NSAB in order to enable the former to have the benefit of the views of a select group of our strategic experts. The NSCS also organised informal discussions amongst the chairpersons of the four task forces to sensitise each to the perceptions of the others and thereby not only to promote an overarching harmony of approach to the extent possible but also to avoid duplication in the reports submitted.

**GoM’s Deliberations**

1.15 The GoM held 27 meetings in all. These were arranged to organise the plan of work; decide on terms of reference and composition of the Task Forces; take stock of progress made; receive presentations from the chairpersons of the Task Forces; take decisions regarding references to various ministries/organisations in respect of certain KRC recommendations and deliberate on the issues emerging out of the KRC Report as well as on the reports of the four Task Forces. The Task Force reports were referred to the concerned administrative ministries for their comments, so that these could be taken into account by the GoM. In the light of these comments, the recommendations of the Task Forces were processed in several Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) meetings, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, for the benefit of the GoM. The GoM also held detailed discussions on the subject with the three Service Chiefs to ascertain their views on the Task Force reports in general and issues concerning Defence Management, in particular. Similarly, the GoM had detailed discussions with the SA to Raksha Mantri, concerned DRDO officials and Secretary (DP&S) on issues impinging on Defence Research, relating to the recommendations of the Task Force on Defence Management. The chairpersons of the four Task Forces were associated by the GoM in several subsequent deliberations, to clarify a plethora of issues thrown up as a result of IMG discussions and also to get a clearer understanding for the rationale of certain recommendations.
1.16 The GoM would like to place on record its deep appreciation for the labours of the members of the four Task Forces, particularly, their chairpersons who grappled with a variety of complex issues concerning national security and presented their very valuable reports in so short a time.
CHAPTER II

CHALLENGES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

2.1 National security is a function of a country’s external environment and the internal situation, as well as their interplay with each other. The former is influenced by the major features of the prevailing international order, the disposition of its immediate and extended neighbours and the major powers. The internal situation encompasses many aspects of national life, ranging from law and order to economic fundamentals and from the quality of governance to national cohesiveness. The external environment and internal situation of a country do not subsist in watertight compartments but act and react on each other in ways which affect its security. In today's interdependent world, the distinction between internal and external security concerns often gets blurred.

2.2 The traditional concept of national security has undergone fundamental changes over the years. It is no longer synonymous with sufficient military strength to defend the nation and its interests. In today's world, military might alone does not guarantee either sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security also includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health. A strong sense of nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of national security; as does the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and autonomy of decision making, in an era of globalisation and increasing economic interdependence.

2.3 Both the external and internal environment are changing at an incredibly fast pace, with developments in nuclear weapons and missiles, increasing cross-border terrorism, the emergence of non-state actors, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the narcotics-arms nexus, illegal migration and left wing extremism, gravely impacting upon the security of the country. The rapid technological developments underway at the same time not only facilitate these events by reducing our reaction time but add entirely new dimensions of threats and challenges, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and offensive/defensive information warfare.

2.4 Amidst these dramatic developments, the traditional structures and processes for the management of national security are under considerable stress. Not only are most of them over 50 years old but their effectiveness has also, over time, been attenuated. These need to be suitably restructured and strengthened, to cope with the new and emerging challenges facing us in the areas of Intelligence, Internal Security, Border and Defence Management, so as to help develop a more efficient and cost-effective national security system for the 21st century.
I Emerging External Security Environment

U.S. Pre-eminence in the World Order

2.5 The hope that the demise of the Cold War era would bring into being a multipolar world order has greatly diminished. Instead, the pre-eminence of the USA in political, economic, military and technological fields is more in evidence today than ever before. Its capabilities to forge coalitions and alliances and have its way on any issue is unmatched. This has resulted in increasing concerns in countries like Russia and China and to some extent, even in Europe. US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Meaningful, broad-based engagement with the United States spanning political, economic and technological interests and commonalities, will impact beneficially on our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible impact on our internal security environment. Conversely, an adversarial relationship with that State can have significant negative repercussions across the same broad range of issues and concerns.

Role of Nuclear Weapons

2.6 Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to be legitimized by treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US, European, Russian etc. doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective defence strategies. The continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in our neighbourhood and in particular, in Pakistan poses major threats to our security.

2.7 The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 altered India’s security environment in fundamental ways.

Rapid Technological Developments

2.8 The new strategic environment will be affected by technological developments in a more fundamental manner than ever before. Although technology has been a harbinger of change throughout history, the sheer scope and pace of current technological change is unprecedented. The revolution in Information Technology (IT) which is sweeping the world has deepened the process of globalisation. The role of the media in creating, shaping and changing perceptions will continue to expand. In the military sector, the technology-driven Information Warfare (IW) and the RMA will have a dramatic impact in the coming decades. Developments in communications and space technologies are shaping everyday life and economy in a far more fundamental fashion than is ordinarily realised.

* Government Security Deletion
Possibility of Conventional War

2.9 Notwithstanding the deterrence provided by India’s nuclear tests, the possibility of a conventional war between two nuclear powered states cannot be ruled out. This was amply demonstrated by the Kargil War of 1999. The battle field of the future, however, will be vastly different from the past - it would be non-linear in nature, with real-time surveillance, integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence and Information (C4I2) assets, target acquisition, and highly lethal precision weapon systems.

2.10 In essence, the future battlefield in our context is likely to be more digitized and transparent and would experience an exponential increase in the deployment of electronic devices, signalling the growing primacy of the electromagnetic spectrum. The future conflicts would be dominated by a wide variety of platforms and delivery systems with increased ranges and accuracy, as well as terminally-guided and precision-guided munitions.

2.11 Thus, while India needs to ensure credible nuclear deterrence to prevent the possibility of a nuclear misadventure by its potential adversaries, it has to simultaneously maintain adequate and duly modernized conventional forces which are properly managed, led and equipped to take advantage of the RMA and which can take care of any possible conventional conflicts.

Increase in Tensions and Conflicts

2.12 While instances of inter-state wars have significantly declined and are expected to continue to do so, there is an increase in cross-border interference by one State in the internal environment of another arising out of territorial, religious, cultural and ethnic factors and the easy availability of sophisticated weaponry in international markets. As a result, there has been no let up in tensions and conflicts across the world. This trend is likely to continue at least in the short and medium terms. New doctrines of interventionism are being applied taking into account the experience of the Gulf War and the on-going RMA.

Impact of Globalisation

2.13 As a result of globalisation, many aspects of national life which were considered to be within the domain of sovereignty have become subjects of multilateral consideration. This includes the vulnerability of many developing countries on issues such as the politicization of human rights and increasingly intrusive international regimes which curtail the autonomy of national decision making. There has also been a remarkable growth and influence of non-government and other voluntary non-profit organisations. These developments impinge on the sovereignty of nations in a subtle manner.
Emergence of Non-State Actors

2.14 The emergence of non-state terrorist actors and the rise of their international influence is accelerating. Much of their activity is clandestine and outside the accepted international norms. International and state-sponsored terrorism, often motivated by fundamentalist ideologies, backed by secretive but efficient financial networks, use of IT, clandestine access to chemical-biological and nuclear materials, and illicit drug trafficking, has emerged as a major threat to international stability. They pose threats to multi-religious, multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies. India is at the receiving end of these violent elements and is likely to remain a target of international terrorism in the future. Strategies need to be evolved to counter the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism as well as cyber-terrorism; the latter especially against infrastructural and economic assets such as banking, power, water and transportation sectors.

II India's Neighbourhood

2.15 India faces multiple and complex threats and challenges to its security from the land, sea and air. Since Independence, five wars have been imposed on us - four with Pakistan and one with China. Many of the insurgencies faced by India have been fuelled or drawn sustenance from abroad.

2.16 The rapid economic growth of China in the last few years coupled with its ambitious military modernisation programme will enable it to attain near superpower status by 2020. […………………………………………………………………………………………] \[* Special note must be taken of China’s wide-ranging defence modernisation with a special focus on force-multipiers and high technology weapon systems.\]

2.17 […………………………………………………………………………………………] \[* 2.18 Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India’s security in the future also. Its traditional hostility and single-minded aim of destabilizing India, is not focussed just on Kashmir but on a search for parity. This arises out of the two-nation theory, coupled with a desire to exact revenge for the 1971 humiliation over the separation of Bangladesh. This has been accentuated by the Kargil War of 1999.\]

 Government Security Deletion
2.19 Pakistan has been waging a proxy war against India since the 1980s. Since the Kargil War and the military coup of October 12, 1999, Pakistan's support to cross-border terrorism has intensified and is expected to continue in the future. The rapid growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is also of serious concern to India.

2.20 Through its nexus with the Taliban and Jihadi elements, as well as its involvement in religious extremism, international terrorism and the narcotics trade, Pakistan poses a threat not only to India but to the stability of the region as well. Hence, attempts to make Pakistan conform to international value systems and norms of behaviour is a problem [.………………………………………………………………………………..].* As a result of Pakistan’s political and economic instability, its military regime may act irrationally, particularly in view of its propensity to function through terrorist outfits.

2.21 Pakistan’s weapons acquisitions from the West and China and its close collaboration with China and North Korea on nuclear and missile matters, will continue to be of grave concern to India. Pakistan will continue to seek further enhancement in the quality of its weapons to attempt to offset its conventional quantitative military inferiority vis-à-vis India. China can continue to make both hardware and technology available to Pakistan to offset the latter’s domestic weaknesses.

2.22 Pakistan believes that nuclear weapons can compensate for conventional military inferiority; its leaders have not concealed their desire to use nuclear weapons against India. General Musharraf's proclaimed desire to talk to India rings hollow against the backdrop of continuing Pakistani support for militants and his unremitting obsession with Kashmir. Pakistan is following the policy of "bleeding India through a thousand cuts".

2.23 The heavily militarized Indian Ocean will continue to adversely affect India's economic, political and military interests in the area. India has a vital interest in the security and stability of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean; our energy security is closely linked to maritime security. [.…………………………………………………………………………………………..].* The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, far removed from the Indian mainland, are increasingly vulnerable particularly in the context of the emergence of the Islamic separatist movement in Aceh. Illegal fishery, arms and narcotics trafficking and piracy attacks take place quite regularly on the seas adjacent to India. US nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range land-attack missiles continue to operate in the Indian Ocean, with increased emphasis on base facilities in Diego Garcia adjacent to India's own seabed mining area.

* Government Security Deletion
III Internal Security Environment

Jammu & Kashmir

2.24 Pakistan is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy to destabilize India and annex J&K. Militancy is a direct consequence of the unremitting efforts of Pakistan's covert agencies, particularly its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to exploit the prevailing discontent and destabilize the established authority by creating an anarchic situation. Since January 1990, terrorism in J&K has resulted in the loss of over 20,000 lives, including nearly 2000 security personnel. Ethnic cleansing efforts have also been part of Pakistan's strategy.

2.25 Militancy has caused enormous human and economic losses in the State and shattered its economy. There is enough evidence that destabilizing India through actively sponsored terrorism is a matter of state policy for Pakistan. There are numerous training centres in Pakistan, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Afghanistan, where potential extremists are being trained.

The North East

2.26 Insurgency [………………………………………………………*]* is in some measure due to the ethnic divide accentuated by migrations from without and exacerbated by foreign intervention. Several insurgent groups in the region are currently demanding independence. Apart from maintaining an unacceptably high level of violence in some of the states in the region, they [………………………………………..…………………](*)* are engaged in widespread extortion from all sections of society, […………………………………………………….…….* Drug smuggling and gun running are rife. Intelligence reports suggest that the ISI is extremely active in fomenting unrest in the area. The paucity of roads, railways, communication facilities, and slow economic growth, have further contributed to the grievances of the local populace.

Punjab

2.27 The situation in Punjab needs to be kept under close watch. Many pro-Khalistan militants continue to enjoy shelter in Pakistan and there are reports of plans to revive terrorism in Punjab. Subversive propaganda is being aired from Pakistani Punjab. The appointment of a former head of the ISI as Chairman (a Muslim) of the Sikh Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee in Pakistan is an indicator of Pakistan's malafide intentions.

Islamic Fundamentalism and Pakistan's ISI

2.28 The Taliban success in Afghanistan has brought about a qualitative change in the security environment of the region. It has also given rise to groups of “Jihadi”

* Government Security Deletion
forces. These forces are unlikely to stop in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fired with religious zeal, a large number of the so-called “jihadis” have already entered into the bordering States and are in the process of penetrating deeper inside the country. These bands of religious fanatics are indulging in subversive activities and have expansionist designs. They will work relentlessly for the break-up of the Indian Union.

2.29 A recent phenomenon is the mushrooming of pan-Islamist militant outfits with links to radical organisations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and some other West Asian countries. Funded by Saudi and Gulf sources, many new madrassas have come up all over the country in recent years, especially in large numbers in the coastal areas of the West and in the border areas of West Bengal and the North East. Reports of systematic indoctrination of Muslims in the border areas in fundamentalist ideology is detrimental to the country's communal harmony.

2.30 The so-called “Mujahideen” and the “jihadis”, operating from bases outside the country, have virtually taken control of the secessionist movement in J&K. Aided and abetted by the ISI, these forces are also active in the North East, West Bengal and in Tamil Nadu. The ISI has built new networks in Bangladesh and Nepal. The secessionist movements in J&K and elsewhere in the country are being transformed into a pan-Islamic movement against India.

The Narcotics-Arms Nexus

2.31 The narcotics trade and the smuggling of arms and explosives are intimately linked and adversely influence the security and the social fabric of the affected region. India is located between two drug producing areas of the Golden Crescent in the West and the Golden Triangle in the East, which has resulted in drug trafficking through the country as well. The drug mafia has been improving its network and escalating its level of activities.

2.32 Terrorists/insurgents are receiving weapons mainly from across the borders with the assistance of organised smuggling groups. Most of the arms are coming from Pakistan through the ISI, Pakistani based fundamentalist organisations, Afghan Mujahideen groups and the militants themselves, who bring arms from Durrah in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). While arms were being smuggled through J&K and Punjab borders, of late, due to the strict vigil along these borders the smuggling routes have been diversified. While the J&K border is still active, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and the West Coast of the country are also being used for this purpose. The smugglers have also acquired high- powered speed boats, which can land at uncharted beaches and creeks. Arms are also coming through the long and porous Indo-Nepal border. In addition, arms are being smuggled via Bangladesh and Myanmar. [ …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ].*

* Government Security Deletion
Fake Currency and Money Laundering

2.33 Due to the narcotics and illicit weapons trade, the resultant generation of black money and money laundering, there is a progressive blurring of lines between legal, financial and business operations and criminal activities; these create ample space for collusion between organised criminal and legitimate enterprises. A large amount of fake Indian currency is being smuggled into the country, giving a totally new dimension to the internal security scene. Laundering of proceeds from criminal activities has far-reaching implications; it sustains a large variety of criminal activities, including kidnapping and blackmail. Co-operation and collusion between organised crime and terrorist elements has also grown. Given the law and order as well as insurgency situation in some parts of our country, the narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, fake currency and money laundering rackets, provide a boost to the already adverse situation.

Illegal Migration

2.34 The law and order problems of the North East have been aggravated by large-scale unchecked migration from Bangladesh. […………………………………………………………………………………………].*

2.35 The post 1971 illegal migration from Bangladesh into various States of the North East is estimated to be of the order of approximately 12 million people. This has generated a host of destabilizing political, social, economic, ethnic and communal tensions. Politically, the Bangladeshi migrants are in a position to influence the results of the elections in a large number of constituencies in the North East (about 32% of the constituencies in Assam). Economically, increased pressure on land, resulting in depletion of forest wealth, undercutting of wages of unskilled jobs, forcible occupation of Government land by the migrants and a host of other such issues, generate a ripple effect in the entire North East.

2.36 Social and ethnic frictions have also led to violence. Lately, attacks on the new immigrants by tribals have increased. Fundamentalist groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) have engaged themselves in organising the Muslim youth to counter the attacks. Some have been given training in the handling of arms. The problem of security in the Siliguri Corridor needs no emphasis. Illegal migrants are not only confined to the North Eastern states but have spread to far off states like Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Delhi.

Caste, Communal and Sectarian Violence

2.37 The rise of fundamentalism threatens the plural and secular fabric of the Indian nation. Fundamentalist rivalry tends to turn into a vicious circle. All communities have experienced this problem. It is important to note that there is no Indian community which is not a minority in some other part of the country. It is the

* Government Security Deletion
experience of each community that wherever they are in a local minority, they are subjected to tensions, victimisation and a regime of fear. This has resulted in large scale movement of people in some States, most notably in J&K and Assam.

2.38 While there have been some incidents of caste violence in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, large scale caste conflicts have, over the past years, been confined to the State of Bihar. However, this cannot constitute the basis for any complacency. Widespread political mobilization on the basis of caste has deepened cracks in India's social fabric and urgent attention needs to be paid to ensure that heightened tensions do not boil over into violence, particularly at times of political crises, electoral contests, or failures of administration. Bihar is, in fact, a case in point and the rising caste violence in the State can be interpreted as the cumulative consequence of political mobilization based on caste, compounded by the failures of the State's administration.

**Left Wing Extremism**

2.39 Left Wing Extremist violence is on the increase in Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, in parts of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. Organisations like the People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) are very active and brazenly commit serious acts of violence in these areas. Armed caste-senas, some of them set up to represent powerful landed interests in the State, have multiplied in Bihar and massacres of innocent persons, including women and children, have become a regular feature. The Left Wing Extremist groups have virtually launched a war against the armed groups of higher castes, turning it into a caste conflict. The problem is compounded by the fact that these groups are often used, abetted and helped by various political parties. Though it is highly unlikely that these groups can succeed against the powerful State apparatus, they have the potential to create a serious instability in the affected areas.

2.40 The Left Wing Extremist groups are able to increase their followers in economically backward areas by exploiting their sense of economic deprivation. While the administration is not effective in the tribal areas, the people have no easy access to law and order machinery and the lower judiciary, is not easily available to the people.

**IV National Security Management**

2.41 The developments in the country’s security environment, outlined in the preceding sections, gravely impact upon the effectiveness of the existing national security structures and processes. To cope with these challenges and maximise our opportunities in the emerging world order, it is most timely that the Honourable Prime Minister took the initiative to mandate this GoM to review our national security structures in their entirety. While undertaking this review, the GoM has focussed in particular on the apparatus for the management of Intelligence, Internal Security, the Borders and Defence. In the succeeding chapters the GoM have outlined a series of
recommendations designed to overcome the deficiencies/problems in each of these areas. It may be mentioned that those of the recommendations of the KRC, which the GoM felt should be accepted, have also been subsumed in these chapters.
CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL SECURITY

Introduction

4.1 The management of internal security is extremely complex as the internal security scenario is influenced by many factors including its historical legacy, geography, population size, quality of governance, sense of national unity and pride, economic development, poverty, socio-economic disparities and socio-cultural as well as ethno-religious traditions. Regional and global developments also affect our security interest. The Group of Ministers (GoM) deliberated at length on the challenges faced and on the efficacy of the measures required in order to arrive at an effective strategy for internal security management.

4.2 The responsibility of the Union of India and the State Governments for the management of internal security has to be viewed in the context of the Constitutional provisions, which empower the Centre and the States respectively to deal with the problems pertaining thereto. The responsibility of the Central Government for management of internal security problems has increased manifold. On the other hand, the amendments to the Constitution over time, have circumscribed the powers of the Union Government to intervene in matters pertaining to internal security. This has impacted adversely on the internal security scenario of the country. In this context, there is a need to examine the impact of certain amendments made to the Constitution and to identify and reverse those of them, which have eroded the Union Government’s authority to deal effectively with any threat to the nation’s security.

4.3 The paramount importance of maintaining the civil face of Government, even while the Armed Forces of the Union are deployed in aid of civil authority, cannot be over-emphasised; though it is equally necessary that clear cut procedures and unambiguous legal backing are provided to the Armed Forces, to enable them to operate more effectively when called upon to assist civil authorities.

4.4 The Constitution of India provides the basis for the rule of law in the country. The supremacy of the Constitution therefore has to be upheld by all the three wings of the Government i.e. the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Laws, which are archaic [………………………………………...],* have to be identified and rewritten or deleted from the statute book, as the case may be.

4.5 Present day trends reflect new threats to internal security emerging out of religious fundamentalism, illicit narcotics trade, smuggling of weapons and explosives, infiltration from across our borders and terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. The role played by the Pak ISI in generating internal disturbances in the country needs to be carefully monitored and countered. There is also need for strengthening our legal

* Government Security Deletion
and enforcement machinery and for greater co-ordination among the various institutions to tackle the present and emerging threats.

4.6 The fact that criminal and terrorist elements operating within the country, as well as from across our borders, are heavily involved in money laundering and hawala transactions, as well as a variety of other economic offences, is now commonly acknowledged. This demands not only a strengthening of the laws governing economic offences but also a much closer co-ordination between the agencies dealing with economic offences and issues, and those involved with criminal and terrorist issues. Detailed recommendations have been made in this matter in Chapter III.

4.7 The State police is the most visible symbol of administrative authority and its failure to effectively maintain law and order has not only eroded the credibility of the Government but has also emboldened criminal elements to persist with their unlawful activities with impunity. Hence, there is a need to restore the fitness, capacity and morale of the State police forces, through a transparent recruitment and promotion process, a well thought-out training regimen and improved living and working conditions. The police forces have also to be adequately sensitised to the demands of their profession and the expectations of the people. Thus, an exercise to modernise the police apparatus and simultaneously improve its image has to be undertaken on a priority basis.

4.8 The Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs), while playing a commendable role, have often been diverted for prolonged deployment on a variety of duties other than those for which they were raised. This has adversely affected their training and recuperation schedules. It is strongly felt that each Para-Military force should revert to its original role, for which it was raised, equipped and trained. These forces should also be suitably modernised and trained to cope with the tasks expected of them in the prevailing internal security scenario.

4.9 The slow pace of criminal justice is a matter of serious concern. The law enforcement machinery must be effectively backed by an efficient criminal justice system. Improvements in the investigation and prosecution functions have therefore to be suitably addressed by different wings of the Government. In this context, the provisions of various laws need to be examined and suitably modified wherever necessary. A comprehensive economic offence code would be necessary to deal with hitherto unknown varieties of organised crime including cyber crimes.

4.10 The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has the nodal responsibility for maintenance of internal security in the country and has to ultimately deal with the consequences of any dereliction of responsibility at the local level and must therefore play a more proactive role vis-à-vis the State Governments. The MHA would also have to catalyse the process of modernising and upgrading the CPMFs and the State police forces. Appropriate restructuring of the MHA is called for in order to better equip it to deal more effectively with the problems of internal security.
4.11 In the context of the challenges and requirements of the times, as also the existing shortcomings briefly touched upon above, the GoM has outlined in the succeeding paragraphs a series of recommendations designed to tone up the mechanisms for the management of the country’s internal security. In formulating these, the GoM was ably assisted by a multi-disciplinary Task Force of experts headed by former Home Secretary Shri NN Vohra.

**Constitutional Provisions**

4.12 The Union Government’s ability to deal with situations caused by grave threats to internal security has eroded over the years and needs to be strengthened. This capability should flow from the Constitution.

4.13 One way to do this is to strengthen the emergency provisions under Article 352 and 359. The other way is to exploit the vast untapped constitutional potential between the power to issue directives under articles 256 and 257 on the one hand and the power to proclaim Emergency under Article 352, on the other. The source of this potential lies in Article 355 which casts upon the Union the responsibility to protect every State against internal disturbances and to ensure that the Government of every State is carried on, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

4.14 It would be both appropriate and timely, if the provisions contained in Article 355, are made use of proactively. To do so, supporting legislation will have to be enacted to, inter-alia, cover the following:-

(a) Suo moto deployment of Central Forces, if the situation prevailing in the States so demands; the legislation will spell out situations in which such deployment may take place, as also its consequences.

(b) Defining powers, jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the members of Central Forces, while deployed in States, in accordance with Entry 2-A of the Union List.

(c) Specifying situations construed as failure/break-down of constitutional machinery in a State, in which the Central Government can intervene to advise or direct, as the case may be, a State Government and violation of these advisories/directions would invite action under Article 365/352.

4.15 Accordingly, the following action may be taken, with regard to the proposed legislation under Article 355:-

(a) The matter be taken to the Inter State Council (ISC) and a small group of members of the council be constituted to examine the issue in all its dimensions.
The matter be discussed with the leadership of all political parties to generate consensus.

4.16 Simultaneously, a comprehensive reference may be made to the Law Commission, on the question of strengthening articles 352 and 359, without compromising the spirit of democracy and federalism which guides the Constitution.

**Deployment of Armed Forces of the Union**

4.17 The Union Government and the State Governments have the constitutional responsibility for running the administration, in accordance with the Constitution. Although problems affecting public order are to be dealt with by the state police forces, the State may sometimes seek assistance from the Centre, and the Central Para-military Force/Army may be deployed in aid of civil power. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for doing this are laid down in the Instructions on Aid to the Civil Authorities by the Armed Forces, 1970/SOP of CPMFs.

4.18 The reins of Government must, of course, never be handed over to the Armed Forces. The civil face of governance must remain visible at all levels, even in situations of militancy and terrorism. The Armed Forces of the Union can be used only in aid of civil power and not in supercession of it.

4.19 Keeping in view repeated demands for the Army to be sent in to provide assistance to affected States, there is sometimes delay in making assistance available due to the process of seeking authorisation from higher formations/the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Since such responses conflict with the provisions contained in Section 130 Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC), what is required is proper enforcement of the existing law, to obviate the ground difficulties faced by the district administration. The MoD may reiterate instructions in this regard, and the MHA may also address the State Governments suitably.

4.20 A doubt has been raised about the competence of the Central Government to declare an area as ‘disturbed area’, under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The GoM noted that the constitutional validity of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 including Section 3 which deals with the power to declare areas to be disturbed areas, has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India, in Criminal Writ Petition No.550 of 1982 in Naga People’s Movement of Human Right Vs Union of India. However, since a doubt has been raised in this matter, the Law Ministry’s specific advice may be sought by the MHA.

**The Rule of Law**

4.21 The Ministry of Law may be asked to undertake a comprehensive review of the existing laws, with a view to removing from the statute book all laws, which are archaic or repugnant to the Constitution. Similarly, the Ministry of Law may also undertake a review of such judicial pronouncements as are construed to be
undermining the supremacy of the Constitution or have introduced distortions in its working. The MHA may make a reference to the Law Ministry in this regard.

4.22 It has been argued that the validity of the doctrine of sovereign immunity needs to be re-examined, in the light of constitutional provisions contained in articles 361 and 34. In the first instance, the Law Commission's advice should be sought on this issue.

**Internal Security**

4.23 The National Security Council (NSC)/Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should evolve an effective counter strategy against the security threats posed by the Pak ISI. This strategy should be pro-active rather than reactive.

4.24 The Home Minister must regularly meet and sensitise the Chief Ministers, about the need for them to devote the highest priority to security management issues. One way of making quick strides could be, by securing the required consensus under the aegis of the Inter-State Council. Hence, the salient recommendations of this report, having a bearing on states should be discussed as a regular agenda in the Inter-State Council.

4.25 The Chief Minister, and the entire state administration, must devote special attention to the implementation of various developmental schemes and welfare programmes, while the security forces are carrying out anti-insurgency/anti-terrorist operations. The pursuit of both these objectives must proceed apace, alongside each other, to achieve the desired results. There is a need to set up a special consultation mechanism for this purpose, between the Centre and the States concerned, for monitoring of the internal security situation and development schemes. This should be done at the bureaucratic level once in six months and at the political, once a year. Evaluation of the progress of the development schemes, may be carried out by the MHA, through any suitable agency.

4.26 Internal security disorders cannot be effectively managed unless central intelligence agencies provide timely operational intelligence to enable security forces to launch operations. Upgradation of the central intelligence agencies, notably the Intelligence Bureau (IB), as well as the intelligence apparatus in the States is essential in this regard. The specific remedial measures required for this purpose are detailed in Chapter III.

4.27 The MHA had proposed setting up of a federal agency, to deal with grave offences, which have inter-state and nation-wide ramifications. This was opposed by the States, on the plea that it infringed their constitutional right to maintain law and order. Considering the worrisome internal security scenario in the country, the States may be approached again, at an appropriate time, to agree to this proposal, since it may become increasingly difficult for the State Governments to handle such crimes entirely on their own.
4.28 A drive should be launched to unearth all unlicensed arms, followed by strong action against the offenders. State Governments should be requested to do the needful in this regard. In order to see that some concrete results are achieved, the drive should be monitored jointly by the Central and State Governments, for which modalities may be worked out by the MHA.

**Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking, Narco-Terrorism and Flow of Foreign Funds**

4.29 The prevention of money laundering is essential for safeguarding internal security. Given the close nexus between drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, it is also necessary to improve the effectiveness of the Narcotics Control Bureau. The aspects of money laundering, drug trafficking and narco-terrorism have been addressed in detail in Chapter III.

4.30 The funds generated through illegal means may sometimes find their way into the country through legal channels, for ostensibly supporting activities covered under the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA). It has not always been possible to ascertain the end use of these funds. Although it may be desirable to check the donee accounts under the FCRA as thoroughly as possible, cent percent check of these accounts may be a very unmanageable and expensive exercise. Instead, the MHA has already mooted a proposal to replace the FCRA with a new Act, under which registration and monitoring of the recipients of foreign contributions would be done at the district level. It is also proposed to involve the banks as an independent channel of data collection and monitoring. The MHA would continue to lay down policy, control directly the receipt of foreign contribution in border and coastal areas, as well as by religious organisations and exercise control over the manner in which delegated authority is exercised by the district collectors. Under the new law, the Government control over the recipients of foreign contribution would be much closer, since the district collector would be dealing with only a limited number of individuals/organisations. This would automatically achieve an almost hundred percent check.

4.31 In order to ensure effective administration of the FCRA and the Indo-Pak Visa Agreement, 1974, the Foreigner’s Division of the MHA, as well as the Bureau of Immigration, may be headed by the same Additional Secretary. Officers from various relevant streams like Income Tax, Banking, Revenue Intelligence, Enforcement, IB etc. should be taken in the Bureau of Immigration.

4.32 The Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance may take action to provide additional allocations for strengthening the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Enforcement Directorate (ED), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Central Bureau Narcotics (CBN) and Foreigners Division (MHA) under the Plan Head.
Functioning of the State Police Organisations

4.33 The MHA should take necessary steps to consult the State Governments, with regard to removal of factors, which have been responsible for weakening the functioning of the State police forces and for establishing clear cut policies in regard to promotions, transfers and tenures of police officers.

4.34 The MHA should initiate consultations with the State Governments, for replacing the existing Police Act. This task should be completed expeditiously so that a new Police Act can be put in place by 2003.

4.35 State Governments should be requested to maintain efficient police organisations, to effectively maintain law and order. For this purpose, they must mobilise necessary resources. They should also recognise their crucial role and responsibility, in providing strong and sustained support to the Central Government, in its efforts to maintain internal security all over the country.

4.36 The State police forces have to be strengthened and modernised. However, the MHA must closely monitor the modernisation grants it provides to the States. The State police forces should be involved in the operations planned and executed by the Central Armed Forces. This may be provided for in the SOP prepared by the MHA.

4.37 The MHA should provide assistance to the States, to maintain well trained and equipped civil and armed police forces, to the extent permissible under the Modernisation of State Police Forces Scheme. The States themselves should maintain adequate strength of police forces to meet their present and future requirements. This could be attempted by earmarking funds for supporting schemes for modernisation and strengthening. The level of assistance has already been enhanced to Rs.1000 crores per annum.

4.38 Every State, must be encouraged to create specialised forces, to meet its requirements. This is already being done by way of creation of India Reserve (IR) battalions. States could also be provided sustained financial support, under the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces to, inter-alia, improve the fitness, preparedness, strike capability, mobility etc., of their police forces. However, the strength of the police forces should not be frittered away in peripheral duties.

4.39 Proper police lines may be established urgently, at least in disturbed areas, to provide safety to policemen and their families. Establishment of police lines could be considered for inclusion within the purview of the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces.

4.40 Each State should take action to set up a first class Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) with state-of-the-art equipment and trained experts. The MHA could provide funds for this purpose under the scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces.
4.41 Apart from earmarking of funds, the MHA should have a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the funds provided to the State Governments, for modernisation of their police forces, are properly utilised and targets achieved.

4.42 A system may be devised for fixing annual targets for each State, in consultation with them, for upgradation/modernisation of their police forces. The objective is to make the State Governments self-sufficient in handling even the most serious law and order problems. Thereafter, the State Governments should be held fully accountable for enforcing law and order.

4.43 The State Governments should be required to pay special attention to the aspect of growing disillusionment among the people, on account of a high level of corruption among the police. Modalities to build systems to weed out corrupt police officials, would need to be worked out by the State Governments.

4.44 MHA should take up with the States the need for every State, or a group of neighbouring States, to establish state-of-the-art-training institutions to impart training/refresher training to personnel at all levels. The training curricula should, inter alia, cover modern trends of policing. The police should change their attitude and style in dealing with the public, so as to enlist their co-operation. This has to be an essential part of police training. State Governments should ensure, that existing training institutions have suitably qualified instructional staff, who enjoy adequate tenure, attractive incentives and facilities.

4.45 State Governments may be requested to introduce a shift system, in order to ensure that police constables do not have to work for more than 8 hours a day and on an average, 6 days a week.

4.46 A State level Police Establishment Board, headed by the State Chief Secretary/Home Secretary, should be set up in each state to decide transfers, postings, rewards, promotions, suspension etc., of gazetted police officers. Another Board, under the State Director General of Police (DGP), should decide these matters in respect of non-gazetted police officers. The State Governments would implement this recommendation. Therefore, it would be important to obtain their concurrence. The MHA may initiate necessary action in this regard.

4.47 The State Governments should forge a co-operative approach towards policing, including recruitment and training of police personnel. Efforts may be made to impel the State Governments in this regard. The MHA may take up this matter with the State Governments.

4.48 A model recruitment procedure should be prepared by the MHA and commended for adoption by the States, to ensure transparency of the recruitment procedure and in order that persons recruited, possess the requisite aptitude and potential.
4.49 Recruitment of the constabulary, should be entrusted to a State Police Recruitment Board, which should be headed by an eminent professional and not necessarily a police officer. Action in this regard will have to be taken by the State Governments.

4.50 The minimum qualification for a civil police constable should be 10\textsuperscript{th} pass, with an upper age limit of 18 years. Recruitment should be on the basis of a physical test, followed by an objective-type written test, to be held by the State Police Recruitment Board. Besides the physical and written tests, the candidates should also be subjected to an aptitude test, before the final selection. After this, selected candidates should be put through a rigorous two-year training-cum-teaching routine, at the end of which they should be given +2 level of the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE). This, in effect, will raise the educational qualification of the police constables to Higher Secondary level, without compromising the principle of catching them young.

4.51 Direct recruitment should be only at the level of Constable and Sub-Inspector. A proposal to stop direct recruitment at Inspector and Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) level is under the consideration of the MHA. Co-operation of the States will be required in implementing this. Also, the number of Sub-Inspectors in a police station, should be suitably increased.

4.52 State Governments should restore the orderly and systematic functioning of police stations, while ensuring that they are able to devote timely and methodical attention, to their intelligence gathering role. The police need to be more pro-active in their functioning.

4.53 Close collaboration between the State Special Branches (SSBs) and the IB along with upgradation of the capabilities of the former, is necessary for enabling the country’s intelligence apparatus to deal with emerging challenges. The precise steps recommended in this regard have been spelt out in detail in Chapter III.

4.54 The SSBs should keep close contact with the CPMFs deployed on the State borders and with central intelligence and enforcement agencies, to gain better insight and to be able to keep a closer watch over the activities of known smugglers and mafia groups. Meaningful flows of intelligence from the police stations and districts should be ensured. States should seek the help of the MHA and the IB to refurbish the SSBs. This should be an important component of the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces. The MHA may take up with the States the need to properly staff and equip the SSBs.

4.55 The MHA and all States should maintain an updated data/information base with regard to the activities of the organised crime/mafia networks, smugglers and racketeers. Modalities are already being worked out in the MHA for creation of such a database, which may be located in the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB); the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is also taking action in this regard. State
Governments may be asked to create their respective databases, with arrangements for regular updating. Arrangements should also be made for sharing and exchange of information between the Centre and the States.

**Central Para Military Forces**

4.56 A phased programme of modernisation of the CPMFs and their enlargement/restructuring is already in hand. This must be executed in a time bound manner. Decisions with regard to the extent of enlargement of individual CPMFs should be based on a clearly spelt-out future role and responsibility of each force. The ultimate objective should be to entrust Internal Security (IS)/Counter Insurgency (CI) duties entirely to CPMFs and the Rashtriya Rifles, thus de-inducting the Army from these duties, wherever possible.

4.57 In order to optimise utilisation of Border Guarding Forces, it is desirable to employ them on the principle of ‘one border – one force’, as spelt out in Chapter V. It is also imperative, in this context that Border Guarding Forces, which have been deployed for counter-insurgency and other allied duties, should revert to their role of border management and the counter-insurgency role be progressively taken over by the CRPF.

4.58 Similarly, each CPMF should revert to its originally mandated role. With the raising of [...] additional battalions, of CPMFs, Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and India Reserve (IR), the Central Forces, presently diverted from their primary roles, may be reverted in a phased manner over the next five years. Once these additional battalions are in place, the CPMFs, other than the CRPF, may have to be mobilised only for short durations, in cases of extreme exigencies, natural calamities, elections etc.

4.59 The experiment of adding one company (Coy) to each battalion of the CPMFs may be tried out. The efficacy of this arrangement would be reviewed by the MHA after one year of restructuring.

4.60 The SOP issued by the MHA, on the deployment of CPMFs in aid of State Governments, should be suitably modified to dispel the impression that when a situation has arisen where the use of Armed Forces of the union is called for, it is no more the primary responsibility of the State Government to maintain public order.

4.61 The State police should be fully involved in the IS operations. The tendency of police in certain States, to avoid getting involved with IS/CI operations, needs to be curbed. The MHA would need to work out a concrete plan of action to check this trend in consultation with the State Governments.

4.62 Whenever CPMFs are deployed in a State for an extended period, with or without the Army being also involved, an Apex Body under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister (CM) should be set up to overview the functioning of the security forces. The CM should chair every meeting of the Apex Body and only in exceptional

---

* Government Security Deletion
circumstances should it be chaired by his senior most cabinet minister. This body should include Home Minister, Finance Minister, and ministers in charge of various development departments, Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Director General of Police, the senior most Army and CPMF officers and others. States may be consulted on this issue.

4.63 In operations against insurgency, militancy and terrorism, arrangements for co-ordination of operational planning, deployment etc., should be evolved by the senior most officers representing the Central Armed Forces, in close consultation with the State Police Chief and officers of other concerned agencies. Nevertheless, even while Armed Forces are deployed to deal with civil agitations and public disorders, the control should remain with the civil authorities/magistracy. Standing instructions may be issued in this regard.

4.64 Whenever the functioning of two or more Armed Forces is involved, there should be no ambiguity whatsoever, in the chain of operational command. Thus, where the Army is involved, the senior most Army officer should have the clear responsibility and authority, for all operational planning and execution. Clear instructions may be issued in this regard.

4.65 The State Governments would have to take action to involve the district administration and make it fully responsible for the implementation of policy decisions taken by the State-level apex body.

4.66 The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) should continue to function as “striking reserve”, for providing assistance to the States, on terms and conditions notified by the MHA. Guidelines for the deployment of CPMFs have already been issued in the form of an SOP, which prescribes that CPMFs should be utilised only for operational duties and not for routine police duties or VIP security/static guard duties. The MHA may take necessary action to enforce the SOP on the deployment of CPMFs. The tendency on the part of State Governments, to circumvent the prescriptions of the SOP, will have to be curbed through constant vigil or even by withdrawal of forces, in the event of continuing violations.

4.67 A well-considered plan, will have to be drawn up by the MHA, to adequately enlarge, upgrade, equip and train the CRPF for discharging its future responsibilities. Keeping in view the present internal security scenario, the whole of the CRPF is being trained for counter insurgency duties. Separate Rapid Action Force (RAF) battalions, exist to deal with emergent law and order situations.

4.68 Nine training centers of the CPMFs have been identified for development as “Centers of Excellence” in specified fields. Training of trainers, for the CRPF, could also be done at the Army Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Varangete (Mizoram).
4.69 The training, equipment and weapons of CRPF should be upgraded and its restructuring should be based on clear decisions regarding the future role and responsibilities to be discharged by the force. The Intelligence set-up, in the CRPF, should be strengthened further.

4.70 An Inter-Ministerial Group should examine the feasibility of absorption of aging men and officers of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in other central forces.

4.71 Security of vital points, areas and installations, as also of the VIPs, should ideally be with the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which is a professionally trained force for industrial/installation security. A Special Duties Group (SDG) should be created in the CISF for VIP security.

4.72 The CISF should be imparted appropriate training, at par with other CPMFs, before induction at airports.

4.73 The National Security Guard (NSG) should not be deployed for duties, which stretch far beyond its original mandate, as this results in an enormous wastage of resources.

4.74 Deployment of operationally autonomous components of the NSG for anti-hijacking duty, at sensitive airports, especially at Srinagar, Amritsar, Delhi, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Calcutta and Guwahati, may be considered. In the long run, dispersal of the NSG units at strategic points across the country, would enhance its operational efficiency.

4.75 Arrangements should be made for the NSG to assist the States in training their commando instructors, at the NSG Training Centre, Manesar.

**Combatting Crime Through Quicker Justice**

4.76 There is an urgent need to revamp the Criminal Justice System, including making use of provisions in Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) by the trial courts, for the expeditious conclusion of trials.

4.77 A three member committee, headed by a retired Chief Justice of a High Court has already been constituted by the MHA, to recommend measures for the revamp of the Criminal Justice System. This committee should take into account the recommendations made so far on the subject by the Law Commission, Task Force on Internal Security and Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reforms. Upon conclusion of the deliberations of the three-member committee, a time-bound plan for the implementation of its recommendations should be formulated by the MHA.

4.78 The Law Commission has already given its report after a review of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Cr.PC. The reports are being processed in consultation with State Governments and concerned Ministries. This may be expedited. Legislative
department may be requested to arrange a similar review of the Evidence Act. The proposed review should be completed in a year’s time.

4.79 Urgent action may be taken to empower the local bodies to adjudicate on cases of a simple nature. An action plan in this regard should be prepared by the Inter-State Council for time-bound implementation.

4.80 The procedure for stay of proceedings in a court should be modified. The recommendations of the Law Commission in this regard, along with other recommendations, would be processed by the MHA, in consultation with State Governments and concerned Ministries.

4.81 A proposal to amend Section 438 of the Cr.PC, dealing with anticipatory bail, along with other amendments to the Cr. PC, has been considered and approved by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. The proposed amendment, puts certain restrictions over the grant of anticipatory bail and also makes the presence of the person seeking anticipatory bail in the court, mandatory at the time of hearing of the application. The MHA may pursue this matter in a time-bound manner, to ensure early amendments of relevant provision.

4.82 In serious cognizable and non-bailable offences, bail should normally not be granted. An amendment is being proposed to Section 437 of the Cr.PC, which puts certain restrictions over the grant of bail, particularly for those who have been previously convicted. Similarly, a person who has jumped bail, should remain in custody on re-arrest. This proposal also needs to be pursued for early implementation.

4.83 The Committee, constituted to recommend measures for the revamp of the Criminal Justice System, might also consider, if only the court competent to try a case, should be empowered to grant bail.

4.84 Parole should be granted only on the merits of each case and the police should be given advance information about the decision to release a person on parole. State Governments should be requested to issue necessary instructions in this regard to the prison authorities. These instructions may contain guidelines to restrict unfettered use of the authority to grant parole.

4.85 Burking of crime contributes to corruption in police. Therefore, free registration of cases should be encouraged and any dereliction in this regard should attract stringent punishment. The States/UTs should be urged to implement this recommendation, both in letter and spirit.

4.86 The Law Commission has already made a recommendation to separate staff engaged in investigation, from those to be deployed on law and order duties, in the police stations. The recommendation has also been referred to the State Governments/UT Administrations. The MHA may pursue this vigorously, with the States/UTs, for implementation in a specific time frame.
4.87 The issue, of reverting control over the Prosecution to the police, was considered. Noting that, presently, different systems were being followed in various States and that there was no uniformity in the Police-Prosecution relationship, it was felt that, while preserving the independence of the prosecution, an amendment may be made to Section 25 of the Cr.PC., to enable the State Government to exercise its control over the Assistant Public Prosecutor, through a police officer. The MHA should also examine the details of the existing system, in some of the States (UP, MP, Tamil Nadu, etc.) and study and evaluate the emerging patterns and based on this study, effect appropriate changes in the existing system.

4.88 A Prevention of Terrorism Bill should be enacted as early as possible, for dealing effectively with terrorism. Consultations in this regard with the State Governments, Law Commission etc., which are already in progress, may be expedited.

4.89 A scheme should be evolved for protecting witnesses. This is already under consideration and should be finalised quickly.

4.90 The MHA may appropriately, bring to the notice of the States, the provisions of the Act enacted by Maharashtra, to deal with organised crime. The States may also be sensitised about the need to have an effective legal framework to deal with the menace of organised crime.

4.91 Organised Crime Units should be set up in all States. Every State should also have a dedicated band of intrepid investigators, prosecutors and special courts, to deal with the challenges of organised and terrorist crimes. The MHA may request State Governments to do the needful.

4.92 Steps should be taken in consultation with and on the advice of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA); to secure international co-operation in countering the challenges posed by organised crime. An action plan for this purpose, may be prepared expeditiously by the MHA, after consultations with the MEA have been completed.

4.93 For tackling economic offences, effective co-ordination must be ensured among the concerned regulatory agencies. The Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB) may play a nodal role in this regard. The functions of the CEIB have been spelt out in detail in the Chapter on Intelligence Apparatus. Suitable legislation should be enacted expeditiously, for confiscating the assets of criminal and mafia elements and networks, in consultation with the Ministries of Finance and Law.

4.94 The 3-member committee, constituted to recommend measures for the revamp of the Criminal Justice System, might also consider the enactment of a separate Economic Offences Code.
Role of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Management of Internal Security

4.95 While, in the present constitutional framework, it is difficult for the MHA to monitor and bring about improvement in the governance of the States, an accountability mechanism does need to be built, in respect of the schemes being financed by the Central Government. The MHA may enter into MOUs with the concerned State Governments, with specific stipulations to ensure accountability.

4.96 A mechanism may be worked out, in consultation with the States, whereby the Central Government could guide and help the State Governments, in providing good governance. A detailed action plan in this regard should be prepared by the Inter-State Council, which should thereafter be taken up in a meeting of the council, for adoption and implementation. This would be particularly relevant in disturbed states.

4.97 A comprehensive development plan for Kargil and the work of restoration of damaged infrastructure in the area may be finalised and implemented in a time-bound manner by the MHA in collaboration with the Government of J&K. The MHA may submit a progress report on the subject after a period of six months to the NSC/CCS.

4.98 The Department of Internal Security in the MHA, should be strengthened and should function directly under the Home Secretary. Additional staff should be given to this Department, in accordance with its requirements.

4.99 The MHA may review the working of its Foreigners Division, to ensure its institutionalised interface with all concerned investigating, enforcement and intelligence agencies. As suggested at Para 4.31, both the Foreigners Division and the Bureau of Immigration should be headed by the same Additional Secretary.

4.100 A Policy Planning Division should be set up in the MHA, with a view to developing a ‘vision’ in matters related to internal security.

4.101 The Control Room of the MHA should be suitably upgraded, to transform it into a state-of-the-art nodal point, for round-the-clock flow of information.

4.102 There is need to further improve the Public Relations set-up in the MHA. A plan of action may be evolved by the MHA for this purpose.

4.103 The Home Secretary has made some proposals to make more effective, the functioning of the Nodal Group, which was established to take follow-up action on the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus. The MHA may get an Independent Review Committee (IRC) constituted and obtain its decision on these proposals.

4.104 The Home Secretary should be assisted by two staff officers, for timely attention to and pursuit of important matters. The Ministry of Finance may be approached for the creation of these posts.
4.105 The Department of Personnel and Training (DoP&T) may work out a scheme, in consultation with the MHA, MoD and other security agencies, for establishment of a pool of officers/core cadre, drawn from all services, for manning posts at all levels in the MHA, MoD, NSCS etc. The assignments in these ministries/agencies are perceived as exacting and unattractive. The members of such a pool should, therefore, be appropriately compensated by provision of non-monetary incentives.

4.106 The MHA may consider referring to the next Central Pay Commission, at the appropriate time, a proposal for building in greater flexibility in the management of the highest rungs of the Indian Police Service (IPS) cadre, by covering all senior IPS posts with a uniform salary scale etc.

4.107 There are provisions, under the relevant rules, based on which the performance of Government officials is to be reviewed after a particular age and those found unfit or with doubtful integrity must be weeded out. State Governments may be requested to follow and implement these rules meticulously. In respect of All India Services (AIS) officers, these provisions would have to be implemented by the Central and the State Governments in concert. In respect of Central Services Officers, a similar responsibility would devolve on the cadre controlling Ministries/Departments. In special situations, the provisions of Article 311(2) could be invoked. The action should begin with the top levels of the bureaucracy, both at the Central and State Government levels. This would serve as an example for the rank and file and facilitate the exercise to weed out undesirable elements from public offices.

**Inculcating Patriotism and a Commitment to the National Cause**

4.108 Action should be taken, to create awareness of the duties and responsibilities of citizens, through the introduction of imaginatively conceived modules, in the educational curricula in the schools, colleges and professional training institutions. The Department of Education in the Ministry of Human Resource Development (HRD) and the State Governments, may be involved in this extremely important endeavour. In this context, a proposal that it should be made obligatory for youth to either undergo national service, National Cadet Corps (NCC) or a stint in the Territorial Army (TA) was considered and it was decided that given its financial implications, the entire issue should first be processed, in the Committee on Non-Plan Expenditure and thereafter, since the State Governments are also involved, discussed in a meeting of the Inter-State Council. The Ministry of HRD may work out the precise modalities for these proposals for national service and the Ministry of Defence for the NCC and the TA, in consultation with the Committee on Non Plan Expenditure.

4.109 The rich potential, of the electronic media, should be exploited by the Government, to make people, even those who are illiterate, aware of their duties and obligations. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the State Governments, will need to be involved in this effort.
4.110 Political parties, have a significant role to play, in ensuring that the faith of the people in the system is maintained. It is, therefore, essential to prevent the alienation of people from the mainstream, by making the system more responsive and transparent. The Ethics Committee of Parliament could lay down norms and guidelines, for sensitisation of members and constituents of political parties to the need for maintaining exemplary conduct. A similar code should be devised for the Government servants.

4.111 The time has come, when those occupying high public offices, should set an example, for the people to emulate and follow. And those of them, who are found guilty of violating their legal or constitutional obligations, should be dealt with sternly.

**Civil Defence**

4.112 During times of war, natural calamities and other similar emergencies, Civil Defence Organisation has traditionally played a vital role in guarding the hinterland, supporting the Armed Forces, mobilising the citizen and in helping civil administration discharge its responsibilities. Over the years, however, new and complex challenges have emerged; the preparedness of the Civil Defence personnel has also suffered, as its periodic exercises have become routinised, and tended to get neglected. It is essential, therefore, for the Ministry of Home Affairs to carry out an in-depth review of the organisation’s effectiveness, identify its weaknesses and the new challenges it will be required to meet, in the contemporary scenario and evolve a concrete action plan to revamp it. This important task needs to be undertaken in close collaboration with the State Governments. It is advisable to complete this exercise on an urgent basis.

4.113 Steps should be taken to secure the involvement of communities in exercising requisite vigilance and in supporting and assisting the functioning of civil police. Defence parties may be formed in the villages. Similar defence parties could be formed in the urban areas in each mohalla and ward. The States and UTs would need to take action in this regard. The Government of India should bring out a detailed operational handbook and provide for training and funding of pilot projects.

**Disaster Relief Management**

4.114 It is imperative that appropriate procedures, structures etc. are expeditiously put in place to cope with natural calamities like cyclones, floods, earthquakes etc. Since disaster relief management requires dealing with one or more local authorities, and often requires the intervention of the CPOs, the law and order machinery etc., it may be appropriate to transfer this subject from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs (with the exception of Drought Relief and Famine which should continue to be handled by the Ministry of Agriculture). The relevant provisions of the Allocation of Business Rules may be amended for this purpose.
CHAPTER V

BORDER MANAGEMENT

5.1 India has 14,880 kms of land border running through 92 districts in 17 States and a coastline of 5,422 kms touching 12 States and Union Territories (UTs). India also has a total of 1197 islands accounting for 2094 kms of additional coastline. There are 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (area involved 7,110.02 acres) in India and 111 Indian enclaves (area involved 17,158.13 acres) in Bangladesh. In fact, barring Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Delhi and Haryana, all other States in the country have one or more international borders or a coastline and can be regarded as frontline States from the point of view of border management.

5.2 The proper management of borders is vitally important for national security. Different portions of our extensive borders have a variety of problems specific to them, which have to be appropriately addressed. These problems have become aggravated in recent times with Pakistan’s policy of cross border terrorism, along with its intense hostile anti-India propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of border population. The intensification of cross border terrorism, targeted to destabilize India, has thrown up new challenges for our border management policy.

5.3 The term border management must be interpreted in its widest sense and should imply co-ordination and concerted action by political leadership and administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal, regulatory and economic agencies of the country to secure our frontiers and subserve the best interests of the country. Looked at from this perspective, the management of borders presents many challenging problems.

5.4 The dynamic nature of the problems concerning management of borders is brought out by the manner in which the sensitivity of India-Nepal border has changed over a period of time. This border, which has been an open one, was once peaceful and trouble-free. However, with the increasing activities of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Nepal, the nature of the border has changed completely. These security concerns need to be addressed urgently.

5.5 The concept of border security has undergone a sea change with the growing vulnerability of the coastline and also of the airspace. In response to the gradual expansion and strengthening of security, so far, mainly along what has long been perceived as a sensitive land border, the transgressor is already on the look out for soft gaps, either on the land or along the coast and if need be, from the air. The Purulia incident of 1995 has already demonstrated our vulnerability from the air. The transgressors, with unprecedented money power, access to latest technology, organisational strength, manoeuvrability and scope for strategic alliances with other like-minded groups, can select their theatre of action for surprise strikes. While land
borders have from time to time received Government’s attention primarily because of the wars with Pakistan and China and the problems of insurgency, illegal migration from Bangladesh and smuggling activities, the same cannot be said of our coastal areas or of our airspace. It is necessary to adopt a holistic approach in formulating a comprehensive strategy towards improvement of border management.

5.6 The offensive agenda of Pakistan’s ISI to promote international terrorism and subvert India is expected to intensify. The J&K cauldron is expected to continue. Vigorous efforts are on to revive militancy in Punjab. Insurgent groups in different parts of the country are receiving support and encouragement. Illegal infiltration and smuggling of arms and explosives, narcotics and counterfeit currency are pressing problems. The porosity of our borders, in many parts, makes the task of anti-national forces that much easier. All this underscores the need for utmost vigilance on the borders and strengthening the border guarding forces.

5.7 In recommending an in depth review of the management of our borders, the Kargil Review Committee had in mind only our land borders. The GoM, however, felt that the scope of such a review should be wider and apart from including the land borders, should also include management mechanisms designed to help ensure the safety of our coastal areas and airspace. In undertaking this exercise, the GoM was assisted by a multi-disciplinary task force under Dr Madhav Godbole. Based on the report of the task force and the ensuing deliberations, the GoM have made a series of recommendations in this chapter designed to better manage our borders, our coastline and our airspace.

5.8 Problems of Border Management. Some of the main problems currently afflicting the management of our borders may be listed as follows:-

(a) Some of our maritime boundaries are still undefined and much of our land borders are not demarcated on the ground. The disputed and unsettled nature of our boundaries has made them a source of tension and made their policing much more difficult.

(b) Since many of our borders are man-made artificial boundaries and not based on natural features such as rivers, watersheds etc, they are extremely porous and easy to cross.

(c) Multiplicity of forces on the same borders has inevitably led to the lack of accountability as well as problems of command and control.

(d) Border Guarding Forces need to be distinguished from central police organisations. Being more akin to the Army and different from central police organisations which are called in aid of civil power from time to time, they need to be appropriately strengthened both in terms of equipment and manpower.
(e) The repeated withdrawal, in large numbers, of para-military forces from border guarding duties for internal security and counter insurgency duties has led to a neglect of the borders. These forces have also been unable to perform optimally due to cannibalisation of battalions and even companies.

(f) Lack of institutionalised arrangements for sharing and co-ordination of intelligence at various levels and particularly at the field level, is a primary weakness in proper management of borders. The present tendency on the part of each agency to guard its turf, even at the cost of compromising national security interests, needs to be deprecated and put down sternly.

(g) […………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………
coasts. The Pak ISI is also reportedly involved in encouraging these activities. Drug couriers are allowed passage on condition of collecting and reporting trans-border intelligence. Trained saboteurs and terrorists are prevailed upon to carry drugs for sustenance and operational expenses from the sale proceeds. Passage to couriers of contraband is often conditional to carrying and delivering of arms and ammunition. Smugglers are given assistance and facilities, in exchange of services for organising infiltration of terrorists and saboteurs and landing of explosives, arms and ammunition. A smuggler-drug trafficker-militant nexus engaged in anti-national activities has emerged.

(j) India’s long coastline and coastal areas have remained largely unprotected and unguarded. The presence of the Coast Guard is minimal. For a country of our size, the Coast Guard must be a strong and vibrant organisation. There is also need for a greater clarity in the role of the State Governments vis-à-vis the Coast Guard in so far as shallow water surveillance of the coasts is concerned.

(k) The arms drop over Purulia in West Bengal some years ago was a rude reminder of the ever-expanding arc of international and cross-border terrorism and the activities of the anti-national elements. [……………………………………………………………………………………………].* This once again highlights the need for utmost vigilance on the country’s airspace.

**Recommendations**

5.9 Keeping in view the aforesaid problems and to improve the management of India’s land boundaries, as well as its coastal and airspace security, the GoM has made a series of recommendations, as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.10 Concerted action needs to be initiated at the earliest by the Government to urgently take up the demarcation on the ground of our land boundaries and the settlement of our maritime borders with our neighbours. For this purpose an official level standing steering committee may be set up. Apart from the representatives of the concerned Central Ministries, the concerned State Government may also be represented thereon. A Group of Ministers, specially appointed for the purpose, may periodically and at least once in a quarter, review the progress of work in this behalf.

5.11 In order to pay focussed attention to the issues pertaining to border management, it would be desirable to create a separate Department of Border Management within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) under the overall charge of the Home Secretary. The question of augmenting the strength of officers and staff would be taken up in the due course.

5.12 At present there are instances of more than one force working on the same border and questions of conflict in command and control have been raised frequently. Multiplicity of forces on the same border has also led to lack of accountability on the part of the forces. To enforce the accountability, the principle of **one border one

* Government Security Deletion
force’ may be adopted while considering deployment of forces at the border. [...]

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

5.13 Border Guarding Forces need to be distinguished from other CPMF and the Central Police Organisations because of their distinctive functions. It is imperative that the Border Guarding Forces are not deployed in the States to deal with internal disturbances, law and order duties and counter insurgency operations. Withdrawal of Border Guarding Forces for such duties limits their capabilities to guard the borders effectively. While there may be exceptional circumstances where it may be necessary to utilise the services of Border Guarding Forces for performing law and order/counter-insurgency duties, as a rule, these forces should not be withdrawn from the borders.

* Government Security Deletion
5.14 The Border Guarding Forces will also have the responsibility bearing on internal security like preventing illegal immigration, carrying out anti-smuggling activities, checking infiltration, collection of intelligence etc. Therefore, for effective execution of these duties on the border, the ITBP and the Assam Rifles should be conferred with powers under the Customs act and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC), as in the case of the BSF. Whenever a border is placed under the charge of the Army, directly under it or through Border Guarding Forces placed under its operational control, it would be the responsibility of the Army to perform these and allied duties.

**Indo-Pakistan Border**

5.15 Consequent to the fencing/floodlighting of the Indo-Pakistan border and the development of patrolling tracks there is need to review the tactical deployment of the Border Guarding Forces and patrolling arrangements. Notwithstanding the fact that much of the Indo-Pakistan border has been fenced and provided with floodlighting, it remains vulnerable to smuggling activities and clandestine contact with anti-India elements. This, together with Pakistan’s efforts to rekindle terrorism in Punjab, leaves no room for complacency and calls for maintenance of utmost vigilance on this border.

5.16 Security and checking arrangements at Attari need to be strengthened, in the context of the fact that the Samjhauta Express is being used for gunrunning and drug trafficking. Similar arrangements are needed to ensure foolproof security checks, in respect of buses that ply between India and Pakistan.

5.17 As in the case of Punjab, so too in the case of Rajasthan, the MHA must take suitable action to step up vigilance, as there is not only gunrunning and drug trafficking across the Rajasthan border but also infiltration of terrorists.

5.18 The harsh living conditions in many parts of the Rajasthan – Gujarat border, particularly the desert and the Rann of Kutch, adversely influence the morale of the personnel posted in the area. Special attention needs to be paid on a priority basis to the problems being faced by the border guarding forces. The MHA should work out the financial implications of implementing this recommendation and process the same for approval.

5.19 The guarding of the coastal and creek areas of Gujarat pose extreme challenges due to the hostile terrain, inhospitable climatic conditions, hazardous nature of the sea and creek areas on this side of the border, the existence of about 400 sq. kms of mangrove swamp with interlacing intricate stretches of sub-creeks and deep inlets of varying dimensions and further complicated by the ever shifting sand bars. The resources presently available to the BSF, Police and the Customs are inadequate to meet these challenges in coastal and creek areas. This matter calls for urgent and immediate attention. Provision of resources to equip these forces suitably would have financial implications. The MHA should process the same for approval.
5.20 Since it is quite possible that Pakistan may use the Gujarat route to push Bangladeshi nationals to India, the MHA should take necessary action to prevent any such influx.

[..........................]*

5.21 [..............................................................]

5.22 [..............................................................]

5.23 [..............................................................]

5.24 [..............................................................]

5.25 [..............................................................]

5.26 [..............................................................]

* Government Security Deletion
Indo-Nepal Border

5.27 There is an urgent and important need to entrust the policing of the Indo-Nepal border to the ITBP, which is already deployed on the Western border from Ladakh to Lipu Lekh Pass. A number of steps may also be taken to strengthen policing on this border as follows:-

(a) The existing [...] police stations in the border areas should be suitably upgraded and strengthened with sufficient number of trained personnel for crime investigation and intensive village surveillance.

(b) The [...] border district police headquarters should have sufficient trained personnel for adequate intelligence work and providing police support to assist Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)/Customs in organizing anti-smuggling raids/ambushes.

(c)  

(d) Immigration Check Posts (ICPs) should be increased to cover all transit points. All ICPs should have Land Customs Stations (LCS) integrated with them with adequate facilities for the integrated posts to function from. Computers linked to Kolkata customs should be provided to ensure efficient recording of all movement of material and personnel, including those from third countries. This will also help in cargo profiling.

(e)  

(f) At present all vehicles registered in India require a pass clearance at the Nepal border check post while entering Nepal. A similar system should be introduced for vehicles of Nepal registration entering India as reciprocal measures. The MEA and the MOST may take suitable action.

(g) The preventive activities of the customs on the Indo-Nepal border should be integrated under the DRI. It would be desirable to form a unified/joint command for co-ordination of intelligence, as well as for operational activities. The co-ordination may take place at appropriate levels and at suitable locations.

* Government Security Deletion
The MHA should take further necessary action in consultation with the State Governments, intelligence agencies and Department of Revenue. The MHA should also work out the financial implications and obtain necessary approvals, as funds will have to be provided to the State Governments in respect of some of the measures.

5.28 […………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………].*

5.29 To further improve bilateral relations, expeditious action should be taken on following points:-

(a) Demarcation of the border should be completed and the Joint Working Group should meet more frequently.

(b) Scope for co-operation in border area development should be enlarged.

(c) The agreement on mutual legal assistance should be finalised.

(d) […………………………………………………………………………
…………..].*

(e) […………………………………………………………………………
…………..].*

**Indo-Bangladesh Border**

5.30 One of the major problems afflicting the India-Bangladesh border is the smuggling of a wide range of goods. It is a matter of concern that organised criminal gangs and syndicates with powerful political and communal influence and patronage have cropped up at different places on the border. It is important to remove the factors which promote organised criminal activity in the border areas involving the local population on a large scale and closer co-operation needs to be established between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) to work out strategies to deal with

* Government Security Deletion
organised criminal activities in these areas. It is also necessary to evolve and execute joint operations by the State law and order machinery and the BSF. It may also be worthwhile to pursue diplomatically, the need for more effective concerted action to tackle organized crime by the border guarding forces of the two countries.

5.31 It is necessary to involve all law enforcement agencies including the Customs in formalising day to day working arrangements and for ensuring co-ordinated action amongst them at the ground and the State levels.

5.32 There should be renewed efforts to formalise cross border trade between India and Bangladesh to curb large-scale smuggling. A Joint Expert Group has already been set up, and Foreign, Home and Commerce Secretaries’ level talks are pursuing this objective vigorously.

5.33 Notwithstanding the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh, much of the illegal cross border activities take place at the behest of the Pak ISI which has also spread its tentacles in that country. This is an area where concerted diplomatic action needs to be taken. The MEA may take diplomatic initiatives in this direction.

5.34 There is an urgent need for addressing the problems arising out of inadequate immigration and custom facilities on this border with a view to rectifying the existing shortcomings and inadequacies. The MHA and the MEA to take necessary action.

5.35 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………]*

5.36 The joint Indo-Bangladesh guidelines for border authorities 1975 has laid-down clear and precise rules and procedures, to guide the two forces employed to look after a common border. The guidelines also envisage the establishment of joint check posts to help the nationals of both countries to use main channel of the river wherever the boundary, runs through the mid-stream of a river. The guidelines for setting up of joint check posts between the BSF and the BDR should be implemented. If necessary, the matter should be given definite shape through diplomatic efforts.

5.37 The responsibility for repair and maintenance of boundary pillars on the Indo-Bangladesh border has been placed on the respective border district authorities of the two countries. This has led to poor maintenance and also avoidable delays in the repair of boundary pillars. […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………]* At present the MEA operates the budget grant for repair and maintenance of boundary pillars. It was considered whether the MHA which is in charge of the guarding of the international borders should also

* Government Security Deletion
operate the budget head for repair and maintenance of boundary pillars instead of the MEA. After detailed consideration, it was felt that this should continue to be maintained by the MEA. The matter should, however, be examined further in the MHA in consultation with the State Governments and the Border Guarding Force - in this case the BSF - as also with the MEA and if a change is considered desirable, this may be again placed before the Government for a decision.

**Indo-Myanmar Border**

5.38 .................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................]*

5.39 Free movement across the Indo-Myanmar border has been the practice from times immemorial due to the ethnic and cultural similarity in the areas adjoining the border. .................................................................[..........................]* The issue of free movement regime/border movement was discussed last during the 6th India-Myanmar national level talks held in July 1999. […] .................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................]* Negotiations to obtain MoU on this subject are under way.

5.40 Illegal trade activities in a variety of contraband items flourish at Moreh on the Indo-Myanmar border. In order to check these practices, the following measures may be adopted:-

(a) Trade should be regulated only through one gate.

(b) Border fencing should be undertaken in the area of Moreh.

(c) Free movement regime should be restricted to tribals moving with head loads, comprising authorised local produce.

(d) A composite checkpost should be located at Moreh comprising representatives from Customs, Immigration authority and National Narcotics Control Bureau, with the State police providing protection.

(e) The number of check-posts established on NH-39 from Moreh to Imphal should be reduced. These should be composite check-posts of all concerned agencies.

(f) […].................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................]*

* Government Security Deletion
(g) To arrest the ongoing illegal trade, items of third country origin may be brought under the provisions of the India-Myanmar Trade Agreement or under the clearance of the third country origin goods, vide Luggage Rule 1944. The quantum of free baggage also needs to be determined for the passengers.

5.41 It would be desirable to establish additional trading points in Tirap and Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. Border trade with Myanmar is expected to not only lead to economic upliftment but also wean away the populace from insurgency.

5.42 The Planning Commission is considering the construction of a road running roughly parallel to the Indo-Myanmar border along its entire length. The implementation of this project needs to be expedited.

5.43 The boundary issue with respect to the area of Molcham needs to be resolved bilaterally between the Surveyor Generals of the two countries. Periodic survey and inspection of boundary pillars, by both sides, will help to obviate any encroachment.

5.44 [……………………………………………………………………………………………………]
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
[……………………………………………………………………………………………………]*

5.45 There is a need for raising of additional forces with the Assam Rifles for performing counter insurgency duties and border management related activities. It is noted that the additional force requirements of Assam Rifles as assessed by an Inter Ministerial Group have already been approved by the CCS.

**Indo-Bhutan Border**

5.46 The border areas on both sides of the Indo-Bhutan border do not have basic infrastructure such as communications, roads, health, education, drinking water facilities etc. These areas are often used as sanctuaries by the insurgent groups of the North East particularly the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Police, intelligence machinery and administrative arrangements on both sides of the border need to be strengthened so as to ensure regular and effective monitoring of the activities of insurgent groups along the border. This matter requires a careful re-look as a means to promote better border management. [……………………………………………………………………………………………………]
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
[……………………………………………………………………………………………………]*

5.47 It is imperative that measures including strengthening the arrangements on our international borders in the East, including Bhutan, are set in motion urgently to

* Government Security Deletion
regulate the large scale movement of Bhupalis from Bhutan to India. The MEA should take necessary action in concert with State Governments.

5.48 Settlements of Bangladeshis are coming up along either side of the Indo-Bhutan border. Many of them are reportedly seeking jobs and employment in the Bhutanese territory, in the garb of Indian citizens. This is another reason to closely monitor the Indo-Bhutan border.

5.49 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………

5.50 In the immediate future much more attention must be paid to the problem of anti-India insurgent groups operating from Bhutan. An effective and capable counter insurgency network, to adequately cover all important roads, both land and riverine, connecting India and Bhutan, is necessary. The BSF should be entrusted with this task. […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………

Maritime Borders and Island Territories

5.51 Little has been done over the years to understand or take action to create the infrastructure for the protection of India’s vast coastal areas. The new regime of the oceans enacted under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in 1982 has greatly expanded India’s jurisdiction as a coastal state, through the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf. With an extensive coastline and numerous Island territories, India is endowed with an EEZ of 2.013 million sq kms. After the delimitation of the continental shelf, the sea area of responsibility of maritime agencies will increase to 2.9 million sq kms, which would be almost equal to India’s entire landmass.

5.52 The policy for maritime shipbuilding and acquisition should aim at increasing the share of Indian bottoms ferrying Indian trade from the present low of 27-30 per cent to atleast 50 per cent in the next five years. Efforts are also required to be made to augment the Indian coastal fleet to the projected one million GRT in the next 2-3 years. It is noted that while the MOST concurs in this assessment, it has indicated that efforts to generate policy support on these lines have so far not met with success and that fiscal and policy concessions may be required.

* Government Security Deletion

Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security
5.53 A Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) needs to be installed in approaches to ports and channels to effectively monitor and control movements of ship entering/leaving ports or channels. In principle, VTMS should be installed in all major ports and Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands. In addition, the proposal for VTMS schemes for the Gulf of Kutch and our offshore oil platforms, should be expedited.

5.54 The issue and accounting procedures of the maritime landing certificate should be made more stringent so that the same cannot be misused after persons issued with it have been deported. The Customs/ Immigration facilities at Jamnagar/Bedi Port may also be strengthened. Clear cut instructions should be issued by DG, Shipping on the issue of Seaman’s Cards. The cards should be made tamper-proof, affixed with a photo and laminated.

5.55 The laws and procedures relating to detention and prosecution of poachers and confiscation of boats need to be tightened. The concerned Ministries/Departments of the Government of India should consider setting up Maritime Courts or alternatively, giving powers of prosecution and detention to the Coast Guard and to the proposed Marine Police.

5.56 **Coast Guard.** In view of the very close functional relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard and the requirement for co-ordination between these two maritime forces in both peace and war, the Coast Guard budget may be shifted from the Department of Revenue to the Civil Estimates of the MoD. While Navy-Coast Guard synergy is essential, in order to ensure that the latter continues to function as an independent and distinct force, for administrative purposes, the DG Coast Guard may report to the Defence Secretary, rather than to the Chief of Naval Staff.

5.57 The Coast Guard should take steps to recruit more men to make good its personnel shortages. The issue of improvement of pay and allowances and promotional avenues, ration scales, etc. for the Coast Guard, should be taken up with the next pay commission. In order to enable the Coast Guard to perform its functions efficiently and to grow up as an independent service equipped to fulfill its multifarious responsibilities, particularly in the management of maritime zones, the following measures may be implemented by the MoD:-

(a) The Navy and the Coast Guard may set up Joint Operations Rooms at regional levels.

(b) During joint operations, the command of the tactical situation should at all times remain with the Navy.

(c) Compatibility between the Navy and the Coast Guard in terms of weapons, equipment and training must be ensured.
(d) Coast Guard may induct hovercraft, suitably equipped ships/craft and aircraft in a phased manner.

(e) Coast Guard should set up a coastal station at Jakhau.

5.58 **Marine Police.** Noting that a Marine Police Force has already been raised in the A&N Islands, the GoM felt that it was desirable to set up a Specialised Marine Police in all Coastal States and island territories. This should be in the form of Coastal Police Stations and the police force should be appropriately trained and equipped inclusive of weapons and boats for the nuances of maritime functioning. The State Marine Police should interact with the Coast Guard and pursue legal cases pertaining to their area of responsibility. The MHA, in consultation with the State Governments, should bring a detailed proposal for establishing the proposed Marine Police before the CCS, after working out the financial implications.

5.59 The following measures may be taken to improve effective patrolling of the coastal areas:-

(a) Strengthen the BSF Water Wing in Gujarat and West Bengal.

(b) The placing of orders for Floating BOPs for the BSF may be expedited.

(c) […………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………]. *

(d) The existing police stations, outposts and infrastructure, both in terms of manpower and equipment, should be augmented.

The MHA and the MoD in consultation with the State Governments concerned should take necessary action, after working out the financial implications.

5.60 Sanction of Rs.924.3 crores for the Navy for enhancement of offshore security in the Bombay High region and Rs.1410 crores for the Navy and Coast Guard, as recommended by them in the joint Navy-Coast Guard Paper, for more effective surveillance of the EEZ may be expedited. The MoD in consultation with Ministry of Finance should take necessary action for allocation of funds and speedy implementation of the scheme.

5.61 The Navy’s War Watching Organisation may be integrated into the surveillance and reporting chain of the country. Fishermen watch groups may also be set up in each of the coastal states on similar lines to Gujarat.

* Government Security Deletion
5.62 The following measures may also be taken to strengthen the security of the A&N Islands:-

(a) All the forces deployed in these islands, including the Coast Guard and the Air Force, should be placed under the operational command of the Fortress Commander to adhere to the unified command concept.

(b) Additional Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) with Integral helicopters and Fast Attack Craft (FAC) should be inducted.

(c) ................................................................. .................................................................]*

(d) ................................................................. .................................................................]*

(e) The induction of an India Reserve Battalion, which has been sanctioned for these islands, should be expedited.

(f) Infrastructure for operating long range maritime aircraft from Port Blair should be set-up expeditiously.

(g) ................................................................. ............]*

5.63 There is a need for integrated and clear communication network for effective command and control of the forces of diverse Services. Communications using SATCOM/HF/V/UHF with a suitable security modem should be standardized for the three Services and Coast Guard. In addition, the Union Territory (UT) Police should also introduce suitable secrecy devices for their wireless communications. The MoD should take action as regards the three Services and Coast Guard and the MHA for the UT Police.

5.64 The ingress of illegal Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan migrants, etc. from Kolkata, Chennai and Vishakhapatnam to the A&N Islands should be stopped, by undertaking the following measures:-

(a) Strict verification procedures should be enforced.

(b) Contractual labour on completion of their term of contract should be immediately made to leave the A&N Islands.

(c) Immediate measures should be taken to deport illegal immigrants.

* Government Security Deletion
5.65 It may be ensured that Myanmarese infiltrators, who were held in jail, are repatriated directly to Myanmar on completion of their jail terms. The MHA and the MEA should take necessary action.

5.66 With a view to thwart poaching and other undesirable activity in the A&N Islands, the local fishermen and entrepreneurs may be encouraged to establish a vibrant fishing industry. In order to bring the island territories into the mainstream, special development programmes should be undertaken, to motivate the youth who should also be given better representation in the Armed Forces. Selected youth should be taken on all India tours.

5.67 The Lakshadweep Islands have a tremendous potential for tourism, which should be exploited to boost their economy and to generate employment. The MHA should take necessary action in consultation with Ministry of Tourism. A Marine Police Force should also be expeditiously raised in these islands.

5.68 Specific measures as follows may be taken in the Sir Creek area in Gujarat :-

(a) ........................................................................................................
    ..................................................................................]*

(b) ........................................................................................................
    ..................................................................................]*

(c) ........................................................................................................
    ..................................................................................]*

5.69 The Coast Guard and the BSF should regularly patrol our side of the Sir Creek Mouth area and the Sir Creek area respectively. An action plan is under preparation. Approval of the action plan may be expedited, after working out the financial implications.

5.70 ........................................................................................................
    ..................................................................................]*

5.71 Fishing craft operating on the Gujarat coast should be encouraged to use hand held GPS (Mobile), so as to avoid crossing over the maritime boundary with Pakistan. The MHA should take necessary action and advise the State Government accordingly.

5.72 An apex body for management of maritime affairs should be formed for institutionalized linkages between the Navy, Coast Guard and the concerned Ministries of the Central and the State Governments. The MoD should take necessary action to constitute the apex body.

* Government Security Deletion
5.73 Naval and Coast Guard representation should be made mandatory on major Port Trusts and State Maritime Boards, Maritime State Development Councils and Studies such as the Port Vision 2020 to ensure their effective inter-action with coastal regulatory bodies and port authorities.

5.74 Steps may be taken to ratify the Search and Rescue Convention without any delay. Legislation may also be promulgated making ship position reporting and promulgation of dangerous cargo compulsory when transiting through the country’s EEZ.

5.75 The Flag Officer Offshore Defence Advisory Group (FODAG) may be re-designated as the Advisor Offshore Security and Defence to the Government of India. The MoD and the MOST should take necessary action.

5.76 Carrying of Inmarsat terminal ‘C’/HFSSB, VHF trans-receiver and GPS equipment on all sailing vessels over 100 tons GRT should be made compulsory.

5.77 The following steps should be implemented:

(a) All maps should be converted into vectorized digital maps.

(b) A Port Authority of India may be established to plan, co-ordinate and regulate the activities of all ports.

(c) Naval Hydrographic Department has submitted a draft base line system for the entire coast including Andaman and Lakshadweep islands. These are the base lines from which the limits of territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf are measured. The same needs to be promulgated at the earliest.

5.78 With the Government allowing off shore joint ventures consequent upon liberalisation for exploration of national resources, foreign firms are collecting much sensitive data. A legal mechanism needs to be established to ensure that foreign firms operating in Indian EEZ, as part of such joint ventures or independently, do not collect sensitive marine or other data. The legal and practical implications in this regard should be considered by the Ministry of Law, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and the MoD.

**The Border Guarding Forces**

5.79 The BSF has over the years become a very ‘large force’. Accordingly it is desirable that it should have two wings each under the charge of an Additional DG, one for guarding the Western borders designated as BSF (West) and the other for guarding Eastern borders designated as BSF (East).
5.80 To ensure quick decisions in critical security related matters, it is necessary to evolve procedures and methods to cut down unnecessary delays. It is noted that a High-level Empowered Committee had been earlier set up to approve proposals relating to fencing of the Western and the Eastern borders. The scope of the High-level Empowered Committee may be suitably amended, to include all areas requiring urgent attention of the Government.

5.81 At the time of the BSF’s inception it was envisaged that one battalion should be provided as reserve to cater to the requirement of rest, relief, collective training and annual change over. The Reserve Battalion is a necessary component of the overall strength and therefore should be sanctioned at the rate already approved by the Committee of Secretaries. MHA should work out the financial implications of implementing this recommendation and process the same, for approval.

5.82 A number of proposals have been drawn up with a view to strengthen the BSF Water Wing. These are intimately connected with securing the riverine and creek borders and need to be sanctioned at an early date. The MHA should work out the financial implications and move expeditiously for sanction.

5.83 The water wing of the BSF does not have adequate repair and maintenance facilities for its marine craft. The existing facilities for maintenance and repair in Indian Navy and private yards need to be assessed and wherever possible, such facilities should be fully utilised.

5.84 Keeping in view the enlarged role that the Water Wing is now required to perform for safeguarding the riverine borders and the creeks, the recruitment rules in respect of the personnel belonging to this Wing of BSF, should be finalised expeditiously.

5.85 In order that the Assam Rifles may be able to play its role effectively, it should be placed under the complete control of the MHA. The DG, Assam Rifles should be selected and appointed by the MHA and report to it directly. As stated earlier, since the issues, especially in regard to the officering of the Assam Rifles, seamless interface with the Army, logistics etc., are complex, the MHA in consultation with the MoD should set-up a group to go into the details of the modalities and phasing of transference of Assam Rifles from the Army to the MHA.

5.86 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………]

* Government Security Deletion
5.87 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
[…………………………………………………………………………………………]*

5.88 Effective vigilance machinery should be set up immediately in each of the Border Guarding Forces. The set up should be headed by an IPS officer in the rank of IG to be brought on deputation and he should report directly to the head of the force.

5.89 The special and vital responsibilities devolving on the supervisory levels in the Border Guarding Forces in toning up the overall ethical and integrity standards within the force should be stressed upon.

5.90 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
[…………………………………………………………………………………………]*

5.91 There is a need to recruit more personnel from within the areas of deployment of the various forces, as they would be able to withstand weather and difficult living conditions better than the people from other parts of the country. The percentage of recruitment in the ITBP and the Assam Rifles from the areas of deployment should be higher than the present level. At the same time, increasing the percentage of recruitment beyond a reasonable limit would affect the national character of the Border Guarding Forces. The MHA may take a decision on the quantum of increase in percentage of recruitment of personnel from the areas of deployment, keeping this in view.

5.92 The directly recruited officers of the BSF and the ITBP are put through their basic training in their respective academies. After initial training, it would be advantageous if they are attached to the Army units in the field areas for a period of at least two months for practical training before they are sent on posting. This will enable them to acquire additional skills necessary for their day to day working as well as help in integrating them with the Army whenever circumstances so require.

5.93 The question of reducing the colour service of Army personnel and their absorption in CPMFs/State police, is a complex subject. While the Army desires a younger age profile, so do the CPMFs. There are divergent views on the subject. It is, therefore, felt that the entire matter should be considered by a committee comprising the Cabinet Secretary, Chief of Army Staff, Home Secretary, Defence

* Government Security Deletion

Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security
Secretary and Secretary Expenditure who would submit their considered recommendations in the matter for the government’s consideration.

5.94 Proper training of personnel is very important. Special requirements of each Border Guarding Force based on its role, the terrain in which it is deployed and such other related factors will have to be built into the training facilities in each of them. The following steps may be taken in this direction:-

(a) A larger number of officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) should be seconded for training courses run by the various Army Training Institutions in field tactics and weapons as also leadership at various levels.

(b) The training facilities available to all the three Border Guarding Forces should be broadly on par.

(c) A review may be carried out as to whether the existing training centres in the Border Guarding Forces are adequate for the performance and to ensure quality and whether the trainees’ training quality is optimum in basic training. The review should also lay down the yardstick for instructors for various categories and levels of training.

(d) Generous training allowances should be given to the instructors to attract the best available talent to the training centres.

(e) A scheme of taking Army instructors on deputation, for employment in the training institutions of the Border Guarding Forces should be worked out.

(f) The facilities available in each training institution should be made full use of by all the Border Guarding Forces.

The MHA should take necessary action including working out the financial implications.

5.95 Consequent to the recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission, the post of Naik has been abolished. It is desirable to encourage development of leadership, at the operational and ground level, and also to provide better promotional opportunities at the lower ranks. Therefore, the rank of Naik should be reintroduced in the three Border Guarding Forces. The MHA should work out the financial implications and process the same for approval of the Government.

5.96 Presently, there are many ad-hoc arrangements for deployment of personnel at various levels. Work is being managed by withdrawing personnel from battalions and attaching them to various formations throughout the force. This affects the operational capability of the force. A time bound review of the pending proposals arising out of the attachments be undertaken and formal solutions found so that the attached personnel are restored to their units.
5.97 It is desirable to facilitate the integration of the Border Guarding Forces with the Army whenever the situation so demands. This would necessitate that the Border Guarding Forces should be equipped with weapons at par with the infantry or related units of the Army, when deployed on similar tasks. The MHA should take further action.

5.98 The Reserve Battalion is a necessary component of the overall strength of a Border Guarding Force and therefore, should be sanctioned at the rate already approved by the Committee of Secretaries in the case of the BSF. A number of other measures also need to be taken with a view to improve the capability and morale of the Border Guarding Forces, to deal with their border responsibilities in an effective manner. These are as follows:-

(a) ...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................

(b) Continuation of employment beyond the age of fifty years in the Border Guarding Forces should be dependent upon every individual in the Force fully satisfying the prescribed standards of physical fitness and medical category. The BSF has framed appropriate rules for this purpose and the same are being enforced. It may be desirable for the other Border Guarding Forces also to follow suit.

(c) It is necessary for the Border Guarding Forces to introduce and strictly adhere to pre-determined performance appraisal procedures in respect of their personnel at different levels. The ‘Self Assessment’ criteria evolved by the BSF appears to be adequate for the purpose and may also be adopted by the ITBP and the Assam Rifles.

(d) There should be adequate delegation of both administrative and financial powers to all levels from the head of the Force downwards. While powers should be delegated to the maximum extent, required guidelines for exercise of the delegated powers should also be issued.

(e) There is no justification for differences to exist any longer in the matter of supply of rations in kind and other allowances when Border Guarding Forces personnel are posted to areas, similar to the ones where the Army personnel get such entitlements. The existing differences may be removed.

(f) The ration money allowance for recruits in the Border Guarding Forces should be increased to Rs.853 per month, in order to fulfill new entitlement to at least 3850 calories of food per day.

* Government Security Deletion
(g) In large sections of the border areas, the Border Guarding Force personnel do not get any fresh vegetables or other routine items of rations. As a result, the men in such places have to manage with whatever little they get. Supply of rations in kind, needs to be introduced on a priority basis so that the personnel posted in remote and hard areas do not face undue hardships.

(h) The different ranks in the Border Guarding Forces have been authorized housing at different scales. The present norms described for achieving housing satisfaction are low. Even this is not available in all the forces. This has a telling effect on the health and morale of the forces. The following steps may be taken in this regard:

(i) Housing projects in ITBP, BSF and Assam Rifles may be implemented on priority basis with the help of loans from HUDCO.

(ii) The percentage of married accommodation available to the other ranks and JCOs may be increased from 14% at present to 25%.

(iii) Separated family housing accommodation projects should be implemented and this should cover at least 25% of personnel in each category in all the Border Guarding Forces and should be taken up on a priority basis.

(i) Welfare measures play an important role in keeping the forces at an optimum level of functioning. The personnel posted in border areas face severe problems on account of drinking water shortages, lack of medical and educational facilities, facilities for communication with families etc. A fresh detailed look should be taken at the whole range of welfare measures, which are essential to keep the morale of the Border Guarding Forces high. Some of the immediate steps required to be taken are as follows:

(i) Action should be initiated to remove all existing gaps and inadequacies in the matter of fresh water supply in all places, particularly at places like Vigokot.

(ii) There should be a provision for keeping at least one trained medical assistant in each BOP and one medical officer with each company, at least in inaccessible areas.

(iii) Adequate provisions for rotational and leave reserves should be made and this should not be diverted for any other purpose.

(iv) The INMARSAT mini M telephones must be provided at least in the remote and inaccessible outposts, which will in course of time pay for themselves.
(v) Provision for adequate compensation and ex-gratia payment in cases of death and loss of limbs should be considered. Adequate educational facilities should be developed for the benefit of the children of the Border Guarding Forces.

(vi) Time spent on airlifts for medical emergencies should not be counted against the normal time allotted as per present practice. Evacuation through airlifting should be readily and invariably available without the constraint of the time allotment system. Also, allotment of air transport time should be increased to improve the supervision of remote and inaccessible BOPs.

(j) Considering the importance of the efficient functioning for the overall national security and given the enormous expenditure incurred on maintaining the Border Guarding Forces, it is important that the performance of these forces is assessed annually. This assessment should be based on parameters determined through mutual discussion between the Border Guarding Forces and the MHA.

(k) It is imperative that systems, procedures and methods are built into the Border Guarding Forces so that leadership qualities are ingrained in the various levels of the forces in the normal course at all times and in all situations. This aspect of force management should be looked at in depth and in a dispassionate manner and wherever there are gaps, efforts should be made to find workable solutions.

(l) There should be a very well defined tenure policy for each of the Border Guarding Forces which should be known to every member of the Force. It is desirable that a “Board of Officers” be set up within each Force to ensure that the tenure policies are scrupulously implemented.

The MHA should work out suitable proposals and measures in regard to the above.

Infiltration and Smuggling of Narcotics, Arms and Weapons

5.99 Smuggling of different consumer and intermediate goods has been a bane of Indian economy for over four decades. Narcotic trafficking, mainly in opiates and cannabis products, has however been a much older activity. For clandestine cross-border transit and landing ashore, communities of professional couriers have come up. The land borders, except in certain areas, are looked after by Border Guarding Forces. In the case of coastal areas even though certain measures have recently been initiated in certain stretches on Tamil Nadu and Gujarat coasts, there are serious weaknesses in the remaining coastal borders. Since our vulnerability to infiltration and smuggling
from the coastal areas has increased, a matching security system along the shoreline has become over-due.

5.100 Serious indications of strategic alliances of organisations hostile to India with one or more trans-national criminal syndicates require that the premier intelligence agencies of India should expand their capabilities and coverage to include the local and regional activities of such organisations. Preventive security arrangements are also essential against pre-judicial activities in the territorial water and transgressions of air space. The MoD and the MHA should take necessary action in consultation with the State Governments wherever required.

5.101 All matters relating to border management and security should be brought under the co-ordinated over-seeing and strategy-developing responsibility of a Department of Border Management within the MHA as recommended earlier. There should be a Standing Committee with all the heads of the concerned executive and intelligence organisations as members attached to the Department of Border Management proposed to be created. It should monitor, co-ordinate and over-see border management. Further in each of the States touching the land border and the seacoast, there should be State level Standing Committee and Joint Task Forces. The MHA should take necessary action in consultation with the MoD, the MEA and the State Governments.

5.102 Each of the participating organisation in the Standing Committee mentioned in preceding Para should have a cell in their respective headquarters for strategic studies in their respective areas and circulation of output. Such cells with sufficient resources and inputs are particularly important for the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the DRI who have mandates to co-operate and liaise with international and friendly foreign organisations in the areas of narcotics control and smuggling control the world over. The MHA should take necessary action.

5.103 Organisations like the NCB have a very onerous task in containing narcotics trafficking. The capabilities of NCB, for the development of dissemination of both strategic and operational intelligence, should be upgraded.

5.104 The main task for interception, including that for drugs and contraband, has to be taken up by the forces/agencies present on the borders, such as the BSF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, Customs, Coast Guard and local police. The executive agencies stationed along the border should be appropriately mandated and motivated, with priorities for each stretch of the border laid-down from time to time. This would have major financial implications and MHA may work out the details and come up with specific proposal for improving the effectiveness of these forces in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the MoD.

5.105 Units of different organisations stationed at the same point on the border should be encouraged to form and function as a Joint Task Force. The actual participation of
different organisations in any operation would depend upon the requirement of the situation. The MHA may take necessary action.

**Co-ordination of Border Area Intelligence**

5.106 [……………………………………………………………………………………………]

5.107 [……………………………………………………………………………………………]

5.108 *Border Fencing.* Construction of the border fence in Punjab and Rajasthan has helped in checking illegal infiltration from across the borders in these areas. However, border fencing is not the panacea for all the problems afflicting efficient and effective management of the border. It should not be looked at in isolation but as a means of effective border management. It is one of the physical components forming part of the overall measures to make the border secure to the maximum extent possible. It is essential that a holistic approach involving a wide variety of measures be considered while evolving a strategy for improved border management. To improve effectiveness of the fence, the following measures need to be adopted:-

(a) There should invariably be a jeepable road parallel and close to the fence and care should be taken to see that it is not eroded over a period of time due to rain and weather.

* Government Security Deletion
(b) In certain fenced areas, gaps exist where rivers, even small ones, intervene and where bridges have been constructed over the water channels etc. Such places offer sufficient scope for intrusion and there is a need to introduce additional obstacles in such areas.

(c) Habitation/cultivation should not be allowed, in the area between the fence and the border, and this area should be kept sanitised. This would involve relocation of families/villages.

(d) Flood lighting should be done in all fenced border areas in order to augment the capacity of the border force personnel to thwart attempts at infiltration and smuggling.

(e) In order to satisfy the minimum requirement of ensuring a secure border, it is desirable to convert all single fence into double fence with concertina coils, one over the other, in the space between the two rows of fences, in as many places as possible.

The MHA should examine the issues relating to border fencing including construction of parallel roads, flood lighting, rehabilitation of border population in detail and prepare a comprehensive note for the consideration of CCS within six months. The MHA should also work out the financial implications in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the State Governments.

5.109 **Safeguarding the Sanctity of Indian Air Space.** The incident of arms dropping by a foreign aircraft over Purulia on December 17, 1995 created consternation all over the country. The incident highlighted the shortcomings in the air space management and in particular the Air Traffic Control System in allowing unauthorised aircraft to intrude into Indian air space. The following steps are essential, in order to enable us to overcome these deficiencies :-

(a) The Indian Air Force must enhance its lower level air defence surveillance capability, through procurement of additional Low Level Transportable Radars.

(b) Additional radars, aerostats and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft may be inducted to enhance surveillance of the Indian air space.

(c) The procurement of Integrated Air Command and Control System must be expedited.

(d) The integration of all national radar resources of the Army, Navy and civil radars must be progressed at a faster pace.

(e) Measures must be adopted to counter the threat of intrusion from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
(f) The required communication links would have to be provided, for effective integration of multiple radar sensors into a centralised command and control structure.

(g) The procedures for reporting flights of unidentified aircraft over Indian territory need to be reviewed.

(h) Dedicated training of personnel at all levels in aircraft recognition and identification should be conducted at regular intervals.

(i) Air space management of coastal and island territories needs to be revamped in terms of surveillance and air defence assets. There is a need to integrate civil/Indian Air Force resources for their optimum utilisation in this direction.

(j) All the radars within a Flight Information Centre must be networked and real time information made available to the Joint Field Organisation.

(k) All major civil aerodromes and joint user aerodromes under the control of Indian Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard should be manned by civil as well as military controllers.

(l) Civil and military Air TrafficControllers should be trained during peacetime so that they are conversant with each other’s operating procedures, in order to handle air traffic expeditiously and safely.

(m) The Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network should cover all-important military air traffic centres.

(n) All future Air Route Surveillance Radars to be procured by Airport Authority of India should be Primary Radars.

The MoD should work out the financial implications and take action to process the proposal for approval of the Government. It would be the responsibility of the Defence Secretary to co-ordinate action between the civil and military set-up on utilisation of Indian air space.

**Illegal Immigration**

5.110 Illegal migration has assumed serious proportions. There should be compulsory registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India. This will facilitate preparation of a national register of citizens. All citizens should be given a **Multi-Purpose National Identity Card (MPNIC)** and non-citizens should be issued identity cards of a different colour and design. This should be introduced initially in the border districts or may be in a 20 Kms border belt and extended to the hinterland progressively. The Central Government should meet the full cost of the identity card.
scheme. Many people from the neighbouring countries […………………….] are tempted to cross over to India in search of better job opportunities. In order to prevent illegal migration in future, a `Work Permit for Foreigners` scheme may be introduced, [……………………………………………….* A proposal for introduction of multi-purpose identity cards to all citizens and compulsory registration of nationals and non-nationals in the country is already under the consideration of the Central Government.

5.111 The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act, 1983 (IMDT Act) was enacted for facilitating effective action against illegal migrants. Ironically, it served the opposite purpose of retarding the deportation of illegal migrants. The IMDT Act should, therefore, be repealed and action taken against illegal migrants uniformly under the Foreigner’s Act. It is noted that a proposal to repeal the IMDT Act is already under consideration of the Government.

5.112 For effective action against the illegal migrants, Residence Records of villages in the border districts should be prepared and regularly updated. This will allow easy identification and detection of illegal immigrants, until such time as the scheme of registration of all nationals and non-nationals is introduced.

5.113 Indian Census primary data can easily help in the detection of illegal immigrants. This information can be a useful tool in establishing the status of illegal migrants. However, since census primary data is confidential in nature, this matter needs to be further discussed with the Registrar General of India and the Ministry of Law.

5.114 The Prevention of Infiltration of Pakistani (PIP) Scheme was introduced in 1962 to deal with the immigration of foreigners from the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The name of the scheme was subsequently changed to Prevention of Infiltration of Foreigners (PIF). Under the scheme, watch posts, patrol posts and check posts were set up in Assam. […………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… ]* a revised PIF scheme should be introduced. The following set of changes may be undertaken:-

(a) A post of Additional SP should be created, to be given exclusive responsibility for the scheme at the district level and to work under the guidance of the District Superintendent of Police.

(b) Additional deployment of the staff at the police station level.

* Government Security Deletion
(c) For surprise checking, needed staff should be kept at sub-division and district level.

(d) Quarterly reviews should be undertaken by the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police at the district level and half-yearly monitoring of the progress should be done by the Home Secretary of the State.

(e) Joint annual reviews of the progress made under the scheme at the State level (for West Bengal, Tripura and Assam) between senior officials of the MHA and the concerned State Government.

(f) Annual review reports should be submitted for consideration of the State Cabinet and the CCS at the Centre.

(g) The BSF and other border guarding forces, as applicable, should be involved in these reviews at all levels. This would promote inter-agency co-ordination and accountability.

(h) Attractive financial incentive may be given for information leading to deportation of an illegal immigrant.

(i) […………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………].*

(j) […………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………].*

Citizenship, Passport, Immigration and Refugee Law

5.115 Children born to illegal immigrants living in India are entitled to claim Indian citizenship by virtue of their birth on Indian soil. Therefore, in principle, Indian Citizenship Act should be amended prohibiting acquisition of citizenship rights by the children of illegal migrants born in India before 1 August 1987. This would also meet the stipulations of the Assam Accord. However, as per the advice of the Ministry of Law, the provision can only be introduced with prospective effect. The MHA should take necessary action.

5.116 The applications of a large number of persons, who had crossed over to India during Indo-Pak war in 1965, due to persecution in Pakistan, are pending for confirmation of their Indian citizenship. These applications need to be finalised early after due verification of the antecedents of the applicants. The MHA and the MEA should take necessary action.

* Government Security Deletion
5.117 The offences under the Foreigners Act, 1946, are cognizable and non-bailable. The accused persons arrested for committing offences under this Act manage to obtain bail due to the provision of Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order to remove this lacuna, the MHA had introduced a bill in this regard in the Rajya Sabha on July 24, 1998. The passage of the Bill to amend the Foreigners Act, 1946 should be expedited.

5.118 The procedure for issue of visas to Pakistani nationals proposing to come to India needs to be tightened to put a check on undesirable persons coming into the country. Some specific measures, as follows, need to be taken in this regard:

(a) […………………………………………………………………………………]
(b) […………………………………………………………………………………]
(c) Regular reports are being received regarding Pak ISI trying to cultivate the border population on our side. This is being effected through Pak nationals, who visit border areas on legitimate Indian visas. Hence, there should be a very restrictive issue of visas to Pakistan nationals, for visiting the sensitive border belts. The MHA and the MEA should take necessary action.

5.119 It is desirable to have a single statute dealing with entry into India and exit out of India and providing punishment for those entering and departing from India unauthorisedly. To achieve this, the Passport Act, 1967 and Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, could be substituted by one Act. Although, the Ministry of Law had earlier advised that a single statute could not substitute two Acts, the matter may be taken up once again with the Ministry of Law and further action taken according to the advice of that Ministry.

5.120 The provisions relating to punishment prescribed for violation of the Passport Act, 1967 and the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and those involved for facilitating entry of illegal migrants into India should be made stringent. The touts, abetting illegal immigration, should be brought to book as conspirators and abettors. Strict action should also be taken against the connivance of any official. The following additional measures for amending the Act are suggested:

* Government Security Deletion
(a) A minimum punishment for violation of the law should be provided as one year and maximum punishment should be provided up to five years of imprisonment.

(b) Minimum punishment of three years and maximum up to seven years of imprisonment should be prescribed for repeat offenders.

(c) Making arrangements for securing or facilitating entry of illegal immigrants into India should be made a penal offence under the Foreigners Act, with imprisonment, which may extend to three years.

5.121 Passports are mostly taken by those who are affluent or those who wish to travel abroad for furthering their trade or job prospects. In view of this, there is no reason to subsidise the passport processing costs. The present application fee of Rs.300 for issue of passport may be increased to Rs.1000 to cover processing and other costs and the MHA and the MEA should consider introducing a Pilot Scheme. This may, however, be done in phases. A part of this increase may be reimbursed to the State Government for police verification, which would help in expediting the same. MEA should take necessary action.

5.122 At present, passport seekers face considerable delays and harassment in obtaining a Passport. With the globalisation of the Indian economy, increasing affluence and easy international travel, the number of passport seekers has increased manifold. It is, therefore, necessary to reform the existing system for issue of Passports. Among the important steps must be reduction of the work load of processing all applications at the back office of the main Passport office by involving the private sector in the issue of passport applications and ensuring their completion with the help of the applicants and computerized processing of personal data contained in Passport application. The following specific measures may be taken:

(a) Passport applications may be made available and receivable through Post Offices and authorized private centers on payment of a prescribed fee. It may be insisted that these documents be sent to the Passport Office for further processing through Speed Post or courier.

(b) The work in the Passport Offices should be computerized, with inter-connectivity of all the Regional Passport Offices (RPOs).

(c) The processing of personal data may be done at the back office or through privatization, with the back offices of RPOs, or authorized private sector sending the relevant portion of the application form for police verification direct to the concerned police authorities.

(d) A passport should be routinely issued if police verification report is not received within the stipulated time and the onus of issue of a passport to a non-
deserving person due to non-receipt of a police verification report should rest on the police department.

(e) The State police should be paid Rs.150 for every police verification report received within the prescribed period. This will help in expediting the submission of reports thereby reducing delays in issue of passports. However, increase in police verification charges may be effected by the MEA as and when the application fee gets raised to Rs. 1000.

5.123 […………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………]

5.124 The passport and police authorities need to exercise greater vigilance to prevent corruption in matters relating to police verification and processing of passport applications. The MEA should take necessary action.

5.125 The increased complexity of immigration work necessitates continuity and expertise of the concerned officials. The Bureau of Immigration (BOI) was set up in 1971 for immigration check up and registration of foreigners. However, so far, it has fully taken over immigration work at the Chennai Airport. The BOI should take over immigration at all international airports and other airports handling international traffic by March 2001. For this purpose, the BOI may take police personnel from the concerned State on deputation.

5.126 It is difficult for immigration staff to manually check the immigration and emigration of undesirable persons. Immigration offices should be computerized with the central database at Delhi and inter-connectivity of all immigration offices. This will help in easy verification of information about antecedents of travellers, which is done manually at present. The MHA should take necessary action.

5.127 Most originators of ‘Look Out Alerts’ do not revise them periodically and, unwanted ‘Look Out Alerts’ continue to hinder the work in immigration offices. A system of periodic revision or having a sunset period for ‘Look Out Alerts’ should be introduced. The MHA should take necessary action.

5.128 Advance passenger information system can greatly facilitate immigration clearance. International Airlines may be persuaded to send advance information of their passengers to the immigration office. The MHA should take up the matter with the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

5.129 […………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………]

* Government Security Deletion
5.130 The Government may consider holding a comprehensive discussion with agencies like the Law Commission, National Human Rights Commission, State Governments, the Ministries concerned, security agencies and experts on the subject regarding enactment of a refugee law. In doing so it should balance India’s security considerations with the humanitarian concern for refugees. The MHA should take necessary action in consultation with the concerned Ministries and State Governments.

5.131 As soon as the situation becomes more propitious for enacting a law in this regard, a law, for compulsory registration of all Indian national and non-nationals staying in India, should be enacted. This would help in preparing the National Register of Indian Citizens.

**Border Area Development Programme (BADP)**

5.132 People living on India’s international borders, particularly on land borders, face a myriad problems, like difficult terrain, harsh living conditions and lack of access to public amenities. Frequent shelling from across the border, thinly spread out administration and inadequate social and economic infrastructure, makes life difficult in these areas. Concerted efforts are being made by our hostile neighbour through allures, subversive propaganda and promotion of religious fundamentalism to generate a feeling of alienation among the border population. The remoteness of the local administration, its low visibility, illegal immigration, smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotic substances [………………………………………………………………………………………………………] A number of measures are required to be taken as follows:-

(a) The Border Area Development Programme (BADP) is a step in the direction of addressing the special needs of the border population. To ensure maximum impact of the programme, the present practice of treating community development block on the border as a unit should be continued. The MHA may take this up with the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance.

(b) Like the Tribal Sub-Plan and Scheduled Castes Component Plan, a Component Plan should also be prepared for border areas so that border population can partake of their share of development resources. Since this has major financial implications, the MHA may take this up with the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission for taking necessary action in consultation with the State Governments.

(c) The outlay of the BADP should be enhanced to at least Rs.300 crores for 2001-2002 and to Rs.2000 crores for the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The MHA may take this up with the Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance.

* Government Security Deletion
(d) A perspective plan for integrated infrastructure development of border blocks should be prepared with a 10-year time span. This plan should be implemented by pooling resources available under BADP, various schemes of the Ministry of Rural Development and State Plan Schemes, including the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund. While preparing this plan, the infrastructure requirements of the defence and paramilitary forces deployed in the border areas should also be factored in. The MHA will initiate this exercise in consultation with the Planning Commission and the State Governments.

(e) As against Rs.210 crores available annually under the BADP, funds of about Rs.8000 crores are annually available under various schemes of rural development in the Ministry of Rural Development, such as Employment Assurance Scheme, S.J. Gram Swaraj, Jawahar Gram Swarozgar Yojana, Accelerated Rural Water Supply Scheme, Indira Awas Yojana and the Prime Minister’s Gramodaya Yojana. The Ministry of Rural Development should earmark a portion of their funds available under various schemes of normal development for border blocks.

(f) The Border Guarding Forces like the BSF, ITBP and Assam Rifles have a good presence in almost all the blocks covered under the BADP. The Border Guarding Forces may be involved in execution of community welfare schemes like holding of medical camps, construction of school buildings and water harvesting structures, building sports facilities etc., where local institutions are weak. The MHA should take necessary action.

(g) The existing criteria for determining the quantum of assistance to the States under the BADP may be maintained.

(h) At present, a maximum of 7% of the programme allocation can be spent on meeting the infrastructural needs of the security forces. Since, this is an area development scheme for benefit of the border population; the allocation for the security agencies cannot be increased substantially. Their entitlement limit should, however, be raised from 7% to 15%. The MHA may take this up with the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance.

(i) It is necessary to involve Gram Sabhas and Block Panchayats, in a participatory mode, in prioritizing investment of resources available under the programme. The Planning Commission may take necessary action in consultation with the State Governments.

(j) Due to the special nature of the programme, the responsibility for its coordination and supervision should continue to be with the Deputy Commissioner/Collector.

* Government Security Deletion
(k) The community welfare budget of the BSF should be raised to Rs.50 lakh from 2001-2002. The ITBP and the Assam Rifles should also be provided a budget of Rs.25 lakh each annually for welfare activities to benefit the border population.

Some of the recommendations have major financial implications and would need consultation with the Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance. The MHA should take necessary action in the matter in consultation with different departments and State Governments, wherever required.

5.133 […………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………

5.134 Madrasa education is part of a Muslim child’s religious tradition. Steps should be taken to encourage these institutions to add inputs on modern education also. Efforts should be made for providing increased facilities for modern education, particularly for the border areas where such facilities are lacking. The Ministry of Human Resource Development is presently administering the Central Sector Scheme

* Government Security Deletion
for giving financial assistance for modernization of Madrasa education. The scheme should be strengthened and greater publicity given to it. For bringing Madrasas into mainstream with the benefits of the modern education system, the State Governments should provide support for free supply of text books up to the primary school level, training of Madrasa teachers in teaching of mathematics, science and Urdu and other languages etc. A Central Advisory Board may be set up for Madrasa education instead of leaving this critical matter to different State Level Advisory Boards. The Ministry of HRD should take necessary action in this regard.

5.135 *Disinformation and Subversive Propaganda.* [……………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………………………………… *The forces hostile to India have tended to occupy the vacuum created by inadequate reach of national media. We must wake up to the harsh reality of the fact that low intensity conflict/proxy war has been unleashed against us by way of (dis) information aggression. A generation thus grows up fed by propaganda and the mischief of hostile forces and battle for the mind of our people is lost. It is, therefore, necessary to initiate measures to combat the subversive propaganda and disinformation unleashed against India through a series of measures as identified below :-

(a) An imaginative media policy and information sharing approach need to be evolved to orient the border population towards national development goals, security concerns and national integration.

(b) Special plans of Rs.413 crores for NE region and Rs.150 crores for Punjab and Rajasthan for expanding Doordarshan coverage in border areas should be approved early.

(c) A special plan with an outlay of Rs.94 crore drawn up for augmenting coverage of AIR on the Western border through installation of four High Power Medium Wave transmitters at Kargil, Ambala/Kurukshetra, Gurdaspur/Hoshiarpur and Jaisalmer should be finalized early.

(d) National electronic media have to address the needs and concerns of border population as they see it and not as we see it. The hiatus between these perceptions need to be bridged. Border areas have a very rich cultural mosaic. The local culture and traditions need to be highlighted in programmes of AIR and Doordarshan. This calls for developing decentralized production system at local level with greater participation of local professionals.

(e) There is reluctance on the part of the staff of AIR and Doordarshan to serve in the border areas. Existence of many vacancies at critical levels is

* Government Security Deletion
adversely affecting production and transmission there. These should be filled up expeditiously. High power reviews may be regularly undertaken in this regard. Some incentives should be given to the staff due to the difficult living conditions.

(f) The broadcasting time for the programmes in local dialects needs to be increased. The difficulties in making programmes in local dialects could be overcome by involving local culture groups, NGOs and media professionals.

5.136 For combating terrorism and insurgency, quite often security forces are called upon to take tough measures. These measures may some time cause inconvenience and annoyance to the local people. This sense of discontent is exploited by hostile elements to create feeling of ill will against the security forces and the Government. Timely release of information to the media would help in combating such invidious propaganda of the elements hostile to India. Due to the sensitive nature of their duties, the interaction of the officials of the security agencies and security forces with the media should necessarily have to remain restricted. However, specialized officers, properly equipped and trained should be entrusted with imparting information to the media.

5.137 The officers of the Defence Services and the Border Guarding Force should be imparted skills in communication and media interaction through specially designed training modules. The MHA and the MoD should take action in concert with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

5.138 Expeditious steps should be taken to expand coverage of national electronic media to Pak Occupied Kashmir and to Pakistan. This calls for a change in the mindset of adopting aggressive media posture and giving up existing defensive media posturing. The stakes are too high for any quibbling in this regard. The MHA and the MoD should take action in concert with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

5.139 **Border Area Vigilance.** The concept of Village Volunteer Forces (VVF) helping in border management has a great deal to commend itself and has worked with a good degree of success in areas where it has been tried so far. The following measures should be initiated in order to strengthen the vigilance in our border areas:-

(a) [.................................................................]
   [....................................................................]
   [....................................................................]
   [....................................................................]*

(b) The VVF of a border village should be small in size (10 to 20 persons). All members of the force should be put through induction level training in guarding, anti-smuggling and patrolling duties. Depending on the threat perception, they could also be given small arms for the unit as a whole.

* Government Security Deletion
(c) As leadership and motivation training would play a crucial role in the working of the VVF, greater attention should be given to these aspects in training. Leaders carefully chosen from among the village community, should be given proper training in leadership, motivation techniques, handling of small arms and orientation about the working of border guarding and security forces and security concerns. After the induction training, VVF leaders should be annually called up for active duty/attachment for one month with the Border Guarding Force and paid a suitable honorarium during that period. Like the civilians in the Territorial Army having rank, these persons should also be given an honorary rank in the border guarding organization. After observing their work for some time, they could be given weapons for self-defence and for their work in VVF.

(d) Good induction level training and a month long annual attachment with the border guarding forces would raise their efficiency and leadership qualities.

(e) The VVF should be associated with the community welfare measures undertaken by the border guarding forces. Likewise, they should be involved in organizing sports meets, fairs, relief measures etc. in the border areas.

(f) The border population and the VVF should be co-opted in the border guarding and border vigilance set-up.

The MHA should take necessary action in this regard in concert with State Governments. The MHA should also work out the financial implications, as assistance would have to be given to the State Governments and processed for approval of the Government.
CHAPTER VI

MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE

Demands of the Changing Security Environment

6.1 As detailed in Chapter II, India faces many complex threats and challenges to its security. Moreover, the new and emerging strategic environment will be affected by technological developments in a more fundamental manner than ever before. Currently, these technological developments not only reduce our reaction time but add entirely new dimensions of challenges, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and offensive/defensive information warfare.

6.2 In view of our dynamic and rapidly changing security environment, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to be suitably restructured and strengthened. Far reaching changes in the structures, processes, and procedures in Defence Management would be required to make the system more efficient, resilient, and responsive. This would also ensure the maximisation of our defence capabilities through the optimal utilisation of our resources, potential, and establishment of synergy among the Armed Forces.

6.3 It is in this background that the Group of Ministers (GoM), ably assisted by a multi-disciplinary Task Force of experts under the chairmanship of Shri Arun Singh, has viewed the entire issue of Defence Management. The main focus of the GoM has been on bringing about improvements in the organisations, structures, processes etc. through integration of civil and military components and by ensuring "jointness" among the Armed Forces to the extent desirable.

Problems With the Existing Setup

6.4 There is a marked difference in the perception of civil and military officials regarding their respective roles and functions. There has also been, on occasions, a visible lack of synchronisation among and between the three departments in the MoD, including the relevant elements of Defence Finance. The concept of “attached offices” as applied to Services Headquarters; problems of inter-se relativities; multiple duplicated and complex procedures governing the exercise of administrative and financial powers; and the concept of ‘advice’ to the Minister, have all contributed to problems in the management of Defence. This situation requires to be rectified, to promote improved understanding and efficient functioning of the Ministry.

6.5 The functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-Service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped to
discharge its responsibilities efficiently and effectively, including the facilitation of "jointness" and synergy among the Defence Services.

6.6 The present system governing Defence acquisitions suffers from a lack of integrated planning; weaknesses in linkages between Plans and Budgets; cumbersome administrative, technical and financial evaluation procedures; and an absence of a dedicated, professionally equipped procurement structure within the MoD.

6.7 Ideally, the Government's national security objectives should lead to a formulation of defence objectives, which, in turn, define defence policy and the directives of the Defence Minister. This is not the case at present. The preparation, and subsequent implementation, of defence objectives and missions should result from an interactive process, in which the desired military capability, required technologies and industrial skills and capacities, and fiscal resources, are identified.

6.8 The defence planning process is greatly handicapped by the absence of a national security doctrine, and commitment of funds beyond the financial year. It also suffers from a lack of inter-service prioritisation, as well as the requisite flexibility. It is of prime importance that this process is optimally managed to produce the most effective force posture based on a carefully worked out long term plan, in the most cost-effective manner.

6.9 In equipment development, there is a visible dysfunction between technological planning and development and in the interface between R&D, production agencies and users, particularly in the critical linkages between Services Perspective Plans and the Defence R&D Budget. The potential for rapid movement to re-engineering technologies and production processes have also been undervalued in PAs as has the need to synergise Ordnance Factories Board/Defence Public Sector Undertakings/private sector institutions to impact maximally on both Service users and Defence R&D. The procedures, systems and methods to manage all these complex interactions require substantive re-examination.

6.10 Military capability cannot exist in isolation from broader societal trends and many of the factors that buttress the military ethos are at odds with trends in civilian society. As transparency increases and an active media highlights the business of military life, the ability to maintain a different but acceptable military ethos has come under strain. Finding, identifying, educating, motivating and retaining quality manpower has become difficult and steps need to be taken to optimise the attractiveness of a Service career. Matters relating to promotions, appointments, training, education, ages of retirement, command, tenures, Short Service, Colour Service, manpower classifications, defence-civilian cadres, Armed Forces Headquarters cadre, Territorial Army, ex-servicemen and Defence Security Corps all require examination and attention.
6.11 There is also no synergy between academic research and Government's requirements. Whereas academic research is carried out more or less in a policy vacuum, official agencies undertake their policy making tasks in the absence of the wealth of information available with the academic community. There is a need to ensure that the Government's policy and decision making processes are informed by the findings of rigorous analyses and research.

6.12 A whole gamut of measures relating to cost efficiencies and effectiveness have been examined before by the Committee on Defence Expenditure and require methodical review. A very large portion of costs are manpower related and manning patterns/force levels should be critically reviewed.

**Recommendations**

6.13 Keeping in view the major deficiencies highlighted above, and given the need to enhance the efficiency of the nation's Defence Management structures and processes, the measures as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs are recommended.

**I Higher Defence Management**

**Integration of Service Headquarters Into Government**

6.14 In the organisational setup of the Government, as it exists now, besides ministries and departments, there are either "Attached Offices" or "Subordinate Offices". For merely administrative reasons and not as a management device, the Service Headquarters are referred as "Attached Offices" of the Government. Consequently, there is sometimes the erroneous perception that the Armed Forces Headquarters do not participate in policy formulation and are outside the apex Governmental structure. In order to remove this impression, the Service Headquarters may be designated as "Integrated Headquarters" of the MoD. In order to give effect to this arrangement, the Transaction of Business Rules and Standing Orders should be appropriately amended and issued.

6.15 Though the Service Headquarters have always been associated in the decision making process, the existing procedures involve multiplicity of levels/channels, which often lead to delays in decision-making. Given the size of the country's defence apparatus and its substantial budget, there is a need to progressively decentralise decision-making and delegate powers to the Service Headquarters, wherever feasible. This process is expected to ensure greater speed, higher levels of efficiency and accountability. The delegation of financial and administrative powers to the individual Service Headquarters and lower formations has been attempted by the Government in the recent past and more particularly, during the last 2-3 years. Nonetheless, the process of enhancing the delegated financial and administrative powers of the Services needs to be further strengthened. At the same time, for efficacious exercise of delegated financial and administrative powers, the decision-making apparatus within the Services needs to be upgraded and strengthened.
6.16 In this context and with a view to strike the right balance between the exercise of delegated administrative and financial authority and accountability, it is proposed that the matter be examined in its totality by two committees headed respectively by Defence Secretary, on delegation of administrative powers (refer paragraphs 6.37, 6.44 and 6.70) and the Financial Adviser (Defence Services) (FA DS) on the delegation of financial powers. While finalising their proposals for such delegation of administrative and financial powers, these committees may also carry out an appraisal of the processes/procedures currently in use in the services for exercise of the delegated powers and suggest amendments therein.

6.17 In accordance with the existing delegated powers, acquisition/procurement proposals upto Rs. 20 crores are approved at the level of the Defence Minister and proposals upto Rs. 50 crores are cleared by the Finance Minister. Proposals beyond this limit are required to be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). These powers were delegated almost a decade ago. In the meantime, inflation and the growing sophistication of equipment has considerably enhanced the cost of refurbishing the Armed Forces. For expeditious decision making, higher financial powers need to be delegated to the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister for sanctioning acquisition/procurement related proposals/projects. Accordingly, it is proposed that the existing limits be revised to Rs. 50 crores and Rs. 100 crores for the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister, respectively. Orders in this regard would need to be issued by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

**Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)**

6.18 The COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS). The CDS is required to be established for the following reasons:-

(a) **To Provide Single-Point Military Advice to the Government.** Under the existing system, each of the Service Chiefs renders military advice to the civil political executive independent of one another. This is unsatisfactory. Creation of a CDS would ensure provision of single point military advice to the civil political executive. Before presenting his advice, the CDS will consult the Service Chiefs and will inform Government of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to the subject in hand. Individual Service Chiefs will have the right to present their own view where that is at variance with the CDS’s views.

(b) **To Administer the Strategic Forces.** As India is now a state with nuclear weapons, the highest importance must be attached to the creation of appropriate structures for the management and control of our nuclear weapons and strategic forces. The CDS should exercise administrative control, as distinct from operational military control over these strategic forces.
(c) **To Enhance the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Planning Process Through Intra and Inter-Service Prioritisation.** Under the existing system, each Service tends to advance its own capability without regard for inter-Service and even intra-Service prioritisation. Accordingly, one of the most vital tasks that the CDS would be expected to perform is to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness in the planning/budgeting process to ensure the optimal and efficient use of available resources. This could be carried out through intra-Service and inter-Service prioritisation of acquisitions and projects.

(d) **To Ensure the Required "Jointness" in the Armed Forces.** The capabilities of the Armed Forces can be enhanced significantly, if rather than operating as three individual units, they operate with a high degree of “jointness” and in close tandem with one another in the conduct of various tasks, including training. Modern warfare demands a much higher degree of coordination in operations by all the three Services than ever before. Creation of a CDS would promote greater "jointness" in the Armed Forces.

6.19 The CDS may be a 4-star officer drawn from one of the three Services in rotation. He shall function as a permanent Chairman of the COSC with the VCDS as its Member-Secretary. Accordingly, he should rank *primus inter pares* in the COSC and function as the "Principal Military Adviser" to the Defence Minister. In temporary absence of the CDS, the senior most Chief of Staff in that rank may chair the COSC. It is essential that no CDS ever reverts to his original service after a tenure as CDS, as this stipulation alone will provide him the requisite objectivity and independence so as to enable him to render unbiased advice to the Defence Minister.

6.20 The currently envisaged institution of the CDS is likely to be the first step in a series of structural reforms to be implemented incrementally. As this institution is absorbed and evolves, further refinements and changes in concepts and structures will follow.

6.21 The details relating to the precise role and function of the CDS and his relationships with other key actors in the defence setup, particularly the Service Chiefs, would need to be worked out keeping in view the above broad guidelines. The introduction of major structural changes in the field of Defence have to be carefully planned and executed to ensure that there is no disruption of defence capabilities in the process. In order that the transition from the existing to the proposed structures is smooth, a detailed framework for the introduction and sequencing of the new structures will need to be drawn up, inclusive of the CDS’s precise role, functions and inter-se relationships. It is proposed to entrust this task to the Chiefs of Staff Committee who should make their recommendations to Government within three months. Similarly, Cabinet Secretary should make recommendations in relation to the CDS’s relationships with key civilian personnel in the MoD and elsewhere.

6.22 In order to support the CDS in the optimal exploitation of his role and functions, a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) will be appointed. The VCDS
should be the equivalent of a Service Vice Chief and be drawn from the Army whenever the CDS is from the Air Force or the Navy. This restriction may, however, be waived for a maximum period of three months to provide for an orderly transition of officers appointed to these posts. The VCDS should serve a minimum tenure of two years in the post (not merely in the rank as is currently applicable to Service Vice Chiefs). The VCDS will be responsible for the Defence Staff and report to the CDS. Inter alia, the VCDS may perform the following important functions:-

(a) To render general assistance to the CDS, in his work.

(b) To chair the Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG) made up of officers and intelligence representatives of Services Headquarters and DoD representatives. Other officials may be co-opted as required. The DCMG will be entrusted with the task of preparing contingency plans and assessments for the consideration of CDS and Defence Secretary.

(c) To supervise the Defence Staff which shall be the Secretariat for the CDS. The existing Defence Planning Staff and JS(Military) should be merged and re-organised with suitable additions to become the Defence Staff.

(d) To control a mechanism to be established, whereby no capital scheme is cleared for inclusion in the Service Headquarters budget unless there is reasonable assurance that the necessary formalities in respect of Technical and Commercial evaluations leading to contract and initial payment could be concluded within that year.

(e) To monitor Intra-Service and Inter-Service prioritisation of capital schemes in terms of expenditure during a financial year.

The above list is only indicative and the precise role and functions of VCDS will need to be laid down in detail by the Defence Minister in consultation with CDS and Defence Secretary.

6.23 The Service Chiefs may, meanwhile, continue to advise the Defence Minister on command matters concerning their forces, whenever necessary. They may also be requested to attend the CCS meetings on an “as required” basis.

6.24 Given India's nuclear status, there is a pressing need to establish a Strategic Forces Command, to manage all strategic forces. While the operational control of the strategic forces should unambiguously vest in the highest political authority, the CDS should, as stated earlier, exercise administrative control over these forces and also be the channel of communication between the Government and the Strategic Forces Commander.

6.25 In view of the growing strategic importance of the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands, the replacement of the Fortress Commander Andaman and Nicobar
(FORTAN) by a Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command has now become necessary. This Command may jointly control the assets of the three Services and the Coast Guard and would be the first Joint Command in the country. This proposal may be processed by the MoD and approval of the competent authority obtained expeditiously. The Commander of the Andaman and Nicobar Command may report to the CDS.

The Role and Responsibilities of Defence Secretary

6.26 It is extremely important that there is no dilution in the role of the Defence Secretary as the "Principal Defence Adviser" to the Defence Minister. Accordingly, it is felt that:-

(a) The Defence Secretary should be officially designated in standing orders as the "Principal Defence Adviser" and rank *primus inter pares* among the secretaries in the MoD. This measure is intended to reinforce the view that this individual, irrespective of pay scale or inter-service status, is a vital element in the higher management of Defence and should be so recognised unequivocally in civilian and military hierarchies.

(b) Standing orders need to be promulgated specifying that the Defence Secretary has the primary responsibility for advising the Defence Minister on all policy matters and for the management of the Department, including financial management. As the Chief Accounting Officer for the Ministry, he is accountable to the Parliament for the expenditure of public money as budgeted by Parliament.

(c) The Defence Secretary should be responsible to the Defence Minister for the following:-

(i) Policy Advice.

(ii) Supervising the Department of Defence.

(iii) Co-ordinating the functioning of all departments in the Ministry.

(iv) Co-ordinating the finalisation of the complete MoD Long Term Defence Perspective Plan (LTDPP), 5 year Plan, and the annual budget for approval by the Defence Minister.

(v) Advising the Defence Minister on all matters relating to Parliament, Central Government and State Governments, in addition to advice generated by individual departments, and
Co-ordinating all matters relating to personnel policies, terms and conditions of service, foreign postings and the like, with cadre controlling authorities in the MoD and with the Department of Personnel and Training (DoP&T) when required.

6.27 The Defence Secretary will function as “Principal Defence Adviser” to the Defence Minister in a manner similar to the role to be performed by the CDS as the “Principal Military Adviser” and both will enjoy an equivalent status in terms of their working relationship as distinct from the Warrant of Precedence. Similarly, the Defence Secretary must enjoy an equivalent status vis-à-vis the Chiefs of Staff, in so far as their functional relationship is concerned. Meetings convened by the Defence Secretary on issues concerning him shall be attended by the CDS as necessary and vice versa. The Chiefs of Staff will also attend the meetings convened by the Defence Secretary, if required and vice versa. The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that the aspect of Warrant of Precedence does not vitiate the working environment of the Ministry.

**Defence Intelligence Agency**

6.28 The GoM considers the setting up of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for co-ordinating the functioning of different Service intelligence directorates in Service Headquarters to be an urgent requirement. Detailed recommendations in this regard have been included in Chapter III.

**Enhancement of "Jointness" in the Armed Forces**

6.29 The appointment of the CDS/VCDS with the designated defence staff and the cross-posting of officers in the Operations, Intelligence and Plans Directorates in the Service Headquarters would be the first major step in establishing synergy and "jointness" among the Armed Forces. This would be further fostered by strengthening the existing system of selections for higher appointments in the three Services and by making this process more objective. The COSC, chaired by the CDS, may function as the Review Board for all promotions to the rank of Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and equivalent. The recommendations of the COSC for such promotions should be forwarded to the Defence Secretary for obtaining the Defence Minister’s approval. Where such recommendations are at variance with the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) matrices, the COSC must record reasons that weighed with it in making its recommendations. This procedure is expected to introduce the much needed transparency in the system of higher appointments.

6.30 The three Services also need to optimize the use of training resources and other facilities at their disposal. It would be necessary to avoid replication of similar training facilities in the individual Services and the CDS/COSC should therefore arrange for joint training of the three Services at the earliest possible time. A programme for such training activities at all levels is required to be drawn up and implemented immediately.
**Promotion Boards**

6.31 Furthermore, with a view to ensure the utmost objectivity in the selection process, the Defence Minister’s queries on Promotion Boards for different levels may be analysed by the Defence Secretary and the CDS who may, thereafter, make joint recommendations to the Defence Minister in this regard.

**II  Procurement Organisation and Procedures**

**Defence Procurement Board**

6.32 The existing structure for procurement has led to sub-optimal utilisation of funds, long delays in acquisition and has not been conducive to the modernisation of the Services. The creation of a separate and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the entire gamut of procurement functions is expected to facilitate a higher degree of professionalism and cost-effectiveness in the process. Such a structure would also enable an institutional memory to be built up and taken advantage of to obtain the best value for the money spent by the Government. While on the one hand, the Procurement Board would ensure much closer participation by the Armed Forces in the entire process of decision making, on the other hand, it would also result in higher operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness with better co-ordination and flow of information.

6.33 The Procurement Board may be headed by the Defence Secretary. Its other members should be the Secretary Defence Production & Supplies (DP&S), the Secretary Defence Research & Development (DR&D), FA(DS), the VCDS, the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS)/the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS)/the Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS). The Directorate General Quality Assurance (DGQA)/Directorate General Aeronautical Quality Assurance (DGAQA) could be associated on an “as required” basis. The higher delegated financial powers may be exercised by the Special Secretary (Procurement), who may be assisted by an officer of the Finance Division in the pay scale of an Additional Secretary. He should report to the Special Secretary (Procurement) and also to the FA(DS). In addition, the representatives of the Armed Forces may be associated as technical managers in the procurement undertaken in accordance with the powers delegated to the Special Secretary (Procurement).

6.34 The issue of making the Additional Secretary level officer from Defence Finance the Member Secretary of the Procurement Board was considered by the GoM and it felt that since the matter is internal to MoD and essentially its own concern, the Defence Minister may take a decision on this issue at his own level, after considering all the pros and cons of this proposal.

6.35 The Procurement Board may be tasked to deal only with those major acquisition/procurement cases that require approval at the level of the CCS. Other
procurement, after approval by the concerned Financial Adviser (FA), may be undertaken by the Special Secretary (Procurement), as detailed above. Fresh approval of FA may be obtained in all cases, where, as compared with the cost indicated in the note seeking the FA’s approval, the finally negotiated price is higher by more than 10%. However, fresh approval of FA should not be necessary in cases where the negotiated price is either less than or within 10% of the cost indicated in the note submitted for obtaining the FA’s approval.

6.36 With a view to ensure that the requisite information is available to the decision makers in the shortest possible time-frame, a separate directorate may be set up for the management of information concerning acquisition and purchases under the supervision of the officer of the Finance Division associated with the Procurement Board. The Directorate may maintain the requisite information in electronic format and make the same available to the concerned user on requisition.

6.37 In order to ensure that the transition is smooth, the detailed organisational structure of the Defence Procurement Board, its authority, functions and procedures may be finalised by a committee headed by the Defence Secretary, which may also examine the delegation of administrative powers to the service HQs (refer paragraphs 6.16, 6.44 and 6.70), in a time frame of six months.

Equipment Induction Cells and Contract Management

6.38 In order to ensure that induction of different equipment procured from divergent sources is smooth, specific Equipment Induction Cells (EICs) may be constituted in each Service Headquarters for induction of all major equipment. Similarly, separate Directorates for contract management and monitoring performance of contracts should be established in each Service Headquarters.

Inventory Management and Control

6.39 Further, in order to ensure the most efficient use of the allotted resources, there is a need for improved inventory management and control. Availability of online updated real-time inventory information relating to various equipment needs to be ensured by the concerned Service Headquarters.

DGQA/ DGAQA

6.40 There is considerable room for improvement in the present system of Quality Assurance prevalent in the MoD. The MoD may, therefore, constitute a Group of officers to examine this issue in detail. The Group may submit its recommendations to the Defence Minister, who may take a decision at his level. While doing so, the Defence Minister may also consider the desirability of transferring the indigenisation functions presently handled by DGQA/DGAQA to the Production Agencies (PA) and Service Headquarters.
Standardisation of Contracts and Information Management

6.41 A large quantity of equipment is procured by the MoD from diverse sources every year. However, the terms and conditions of contracts entered into by the MoD vary and there is a need for standardization of the formats for different types of contracts. Such a standardised format may lay down the detailed structure, as well as the basic terms and conditions of the contracts. Although efforts should be made to conclude contracts in the standardised format, the need for flexibility - based on the country of origin, type of supply, length of contract and urgency of requirement - would need to be duly catered for.

6.42 The MoD may, as far as possible, use the system of rate contracts entered into by Central/State agencies. This would ensure speedier decision making and procurement on advantageous terms. Necessary directions to this effect may be issued by the MoD to all concerned.

6.43 In order to ensure continuous improvement in procurement procedures, a system of biennial internal performance reviews of the procurement system should be instituted.

III Restructuring of MoD and Service Headquarters

6.44 Consequent upon the creation of the CDS/VCDS/Defence Staff and the Procurement Board related structures, the organizational structure of the Department of Defence (DoD), Service Headquarters and Inter-Service Organisations (ISO) will need to be reviewed. The Committee headed by the Defence Secretary, looking into the delegation of administrative powers (refer paragraphs 6.16, 6.37, and 6.70), may also finalise the details of such restructuring. To fine-tune the details of restructuring of the Service Headquarters, Defence Secretary may appoint such sub-groups as considered necessary. All new posts to be created as a result of these structural changes may be funded through matching savings.

6.45 Services Headquarters will also require proper restructuring to take account of the changes being introduced. These examinations should be carried out by the respective Chiefs of Staff keeping in view all relevant aspects of the matter. Service Headquarters recommendations may thereafter be placed before the Defence Minister for his approval. All new posts to be created should be funded through matching savings.

IV Planning and Budgeting

Defence Planning

6.46 In the past, the individual Services have prepared their long term perspective plans. However, with the induction of the CDS and other related structures, there
would be a need to prepare a holistic and integrated defence perspective plan for 15-20 years through a rigorous process of Inter-Service and Intra-Service prioritization. The Five Year Defence Plans by the Services should be prepared on the basis of the LTDPP. These are to be followed up by analysis and preparations of the Joint Services Plan by the VCDS, which may be finalised through consultation between the CDS and the Defence Secretary. The defence planning process incorporating the long term defence plan, 5 year plan and annual budget should be revised at the earliest.

6.47 The MoD and the CDS may be directed to ensure timely completion of the LTDPP and five yearly/annual defence plans, apart from introducing all suggested measures to bring about efficiency in defence expenditure. The MoD while deciding on annual budgets must keep in view the requirements of defence plans.

6.48 To ensure the effectiveness of the planning exercise, the Defence Minister's directive should be issued at least 12 months before the commencement of the next Five Year Plan. This will form the conceptual basis for the Defence Plan. The MoF should give a firm indication of the availability of financial resources, for a period of 5 years, at least 6 months before the commencement of the ensuing Five Year Plan.

6.49 To obtain the maximum value for money, the formulation of Services Equipment Policy Statements (SEPS) is required to be co-ordinated with the perspective planning and Services futuristic requirements.

**Defence Budgeting**

6.50 To begin with, the joint time bound scrutiny of the 10th Defence Plan (2002-07) and introduction of zero based budgeting approach for all on-going schemes may be undertaken in a time bound manner.

6.51 Optimal utilization of resources cannot be achieved unless greater emphasis and attention is given to the process of budget formulation and implementation, including forecasting, monitoring and control. In this context, it is felt that capital schemes in Service Headquarters’ budgets should be included only if reasonable assurances of contract conclusion and some payment within the financial year exist. Similarly, only those capital schemes should be included in the Service Headquarters' Priority Procurement Plan and annual budget, where there is adequate evidence that technical and commercial evaluation, leading to contracting and initial payment, can be completed in the relevant financial year. There is also a need for rigorous prioritisation and the order of charge on the budget being established with reference to the plan objectives. The monitoring of inter-Service and intra-Service prioritisation of capital schemes by the VCDS/CDS needs to be institutionalized for ensuring time bound action and the best value for money.

6.52 A need has been felt for a review of the form and content of the Defence Service Estimates and the expansion of budgetary classification to promote programme based budgeting, while ensuring compliance with security requirements.
As such, a Study Group, headed by a senior official from the Finance Division and including representatives from Service Headquarters and the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA), should be constituted to make recommendations on budgetary reforms.

**Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE) Report**

6.53 An Implementation Committee to examine the CDE Report and Services’ in-house studies to achieve cost effectiveness should be set up under FA(DS).

**Office Automation**

6.54 Keeping in view the advantages flowing from the use of Information Technology (IT), office automation of MoD, Service Headquarters and all establishments may be carried out in a time bound manner.

**V Defence Production**

**Defence Minister's Council on Production**

6.55 The country, over a period of time, has made huge investments in the establishment of various Defence PAs and DR&D establishments. Getting the best value for each rupee invested in this sector is considered necessary. To achieve this, a machinery for planning and co-ordinating defence production will need to be established. Indications of long term availability of finances will also be needed well in advance to ensure that the PAs can draw up and implement long term production plans. The Defence Minister's Council on Production comprising the CDS, Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Secretary DP&S, Scientific Adviser (SA) to Raksha Mantri, VCDS, FA (DS), Secretary Department of Space (DoS), Secretary Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Secretary Department of Science and Technology (DST) should be set up to lay down the broad objectives of long term equipment policies and planning on production, simplification of procedures, etc. To the extent feasible, the inclusion of eminent industrialists nominated by the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), and other such industry associations on the Council can also be considered.

6.56 The existing institutional arrangements, viz. the Directorate of Planning and Co-ordination in DDP&S, should undertake the additional functions of the Secretariat for the Defence Minister’s Council, if necessary by augmentation of its staff strength to be managed by internal adjustments. A single composite committee headed by the Secretary DP&S with representatives from the Armed Forces, DR&D, PAs etc. can be set up to provide the agenda for the Defence Minister’s Council.
Private Sector Participation

6.57 The Indian private sector has made significant progress during the last few decades in the industrial and technological field, especially in the field of IT. The country’s vast industrial and technological capabilities and its future potential need to be harnessed to further national security objectives. The DDP&S, in consultation with all concerned, should examine this issue further, to formulate suitable proposals in this regard within a time frame of six months. Vigorous follow-up action on the reports of the six Task Forces for the Defence-Industry relationship, set up by the Defence Minister, needs to be taken up urgently. Measures to provide a level playing field to private industry should also be examined urgently, to encourage private sector participation. The commercial procedures suggested in the Arthur D. Little Report (1964) should also be examined for implementation. Further, Industry Associations need to be requested to furnish approved directories of vendors.

6.58 A large number of items that the Armed Forces procure from the civil sector are reserved for the small scale industry. Since the Armed Forces have to procure such items from a large number of small scale industrial units, they encounter many problems, such as dealing with a number of units spread over different parts of the country, delays in the tendering process, finalisation of lowest bidders and also in ensuring the requisite standards of quality. To overcome this problem, the National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) and Development Commissioner, Small-Scale Industries (DC SSI), can play a pivotal role in the procurement of items reserved for the small-scale industry and the MoD can directly approach the NSIC/DC SSI instead of the individual units. Further, to begin with, the directives requiring purchases to be made only from the small scale industry, need to be relaxed for the Armed Forces.

Export Policy

6.59 The review of the existing Defence Export Policy and ensuring the active involvement of private industry in promoting defence exports, has to be accorded a higher priority. In addition to the expansion of employment opportunities, the economies of scale would help generate both the funds for R&D, and earn valuable foreign exchange. Such exports can also be used selectively for furthering our relationship with target countries. The DP&S is already engaged in an exercise to review the export policy in consultation with other concerned ministries, particularly the Ministries of External Affairs, Finance, and Commerce and private industry. This review must be completed within the next six months.

VI Defence Research and Development

Department of Defence Research and Development

6.60 Despite the fact that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has a number of achievements to its credit in the core areas, collaborative ventures with private sector participation would be required to be institutionalized to
instil a spirit of competitiveness and result orientation in both R&D and production. Specific areas where the participation of the private sector is desirable would need to be identified and urgent time bound action taken.

6.61 To ensure rapid technological development and availability of state of the art weapon systems/platforms, we also need to utilise the existing technological know-how available both within the country and outside, including the tapping of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). It would not be prudent to make huge investments in developing technologies which are available off the shelf or could be developed with the help of NRIs or other experts from abroad, who would be ready to assist in such projects. As such, the DRDO needs to focus more on core technologies, in which expertise is neither available within the country nor can be procured from alternative sources. At the same time, on a case to case basis, short term R&D on parts, components and sub-assemblies can be undertaken by the PAs and in certain cases also by the Services. The DRDO could provide necessary expertise/guidance to facilitate their successful completion by the PAs and Services, on an “as required” basis. In due course of time, some of the PAs can be considered for designation as nodal agencies for development and production of platforms, with the required technical support being provided by the DRDO. There is need to rationalise DRDO laboratories and to create close knit interface between specific laboratories on the one hand and production agencies/service entities on the other. A group to be headed by Secretary DDP&S and comprising Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri and three Service Chiefs should examine this rationalisation and make its recommendations expeditiously to the Defence Minister for his consideration.

6.62 An expeditious review for the simplification/modification of procedures related to “make”, “buy” or “buy” followed by “make” decisions on procurement of major weapon systems/platforms is required to be undertaken urgently. Similarly, the ways and means of linking financial commitments in R&D with performance milestones, also need to be evolved with a view to ensure strict accountability and time responsiveness. The MoD needs to look into these aspects urgently. The DRDO’s formulation of Decision Aid for Technology Evaluation (DATE) for project indigenisation needs to be further honed, before it can be utilized for decision making.

6.63 While exercising the “make” or “buy” option, the Defence Minister's Council on Production would need to approve acquisition and inductions within the specified time frames and financial outlays, after taking into account all relevant factors including the existing and potential defence research and development capabilities in the country. All such decisions would need to be taken after consultation between the DoD, DP&S, DRDO, CDS and the concerned Service Headquarters.

6.64 Keeping in view the extent of expenditure on Defence R&D, a new major budget head for Defence R&D should be created.

6.65 The permanent secondment of Service Officers to the DRDO is an inappropriate concept in as much as the officers so placed belong neither to the
Services nor to the DRDO. This practice should therefore be discontinued forthwith. The concerned officers may be absorbed into the DRDO, if otherwise found suitable.

**Force Multipliers**

6.66 Technology is today a major driving force. Given the fact that India has emerged as a leading player in several high technology areas, particularly IT, there is a need for continuous upgradation of technology in the field of Defence. Major initiatives in this regard have already been taken by the Government, including encouraging the participation of the private sector in this area. Separately, an Inter-Ministerial Task Force has also been constituted by the Government, to carry out a Strategic and Technological Environment Assessment (STEA). The Assessment should be utilised as the basis for further strengthening the capabilities of the Armed Forces.

**VI Personnel Matters**

**Formal Orientation and Training**

6.67 There is a need for providing formal orientation and training to leaders and defence managers engaged in the task of national security at middle and senior levels. Similarly, orientation programmes for senior Defence Service officers on various aspects of governance, to sensitise them to problems on the civil side should also be organised. The MoD, in consultation with all concerned, would draw out a detailed plan for introduction of such training programmes, in a time-frame of six months.

**Optimal Age Profile**

6.68 The GoM has noted that there are problems relating to aspects of retirement age and command profiles in the armed forces. A group of officers chaired by the VCDS with representatives from Service Headquarters, DoD, FA(DS) should be established to examine all aspects of these problems and submit its recommendations before the COSC. Thereafter, the final recommendations of the COSC should be placed before the Defence Minister for his consideration.

**Training Establishments**

6.69 In view of the findings of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) of India in his Report No.8 of 1996, a review of training establishments should be undertaken expeditiously by a group of officers drawn from DoD, Finance Division and Service Headquarters, so as to ensure economy in expenditure.

**Decentralisation of Promotions**

6.70 The decentralisation of promotion and appointments, at and below one star level to the Service Headquarters, may be examined by the Committee headed by the
Defence Secretary, which may review delegation of administrative powers to the Services (refer paragraphs 6.16, 6.37, and 6.44).

**Upgradation of Quality of Personnel in the Armed Forces**

6.71 In view of the increasingly complex requirements of modern-day warfare, the need to attract quality personnel and nurture leadership in the Armed Forces is paramount. Therefore, ways and means of attracting and retaining people with the best talent in the Armed Forces should be evolved. There is also a need to upgrade their skills through technical education of the highest order for regular officers both in the National Defence Academy (NDA) and at other Service training institutions. To ensure such quality upgradation, in addition to all other measures, an Air Force College of Engineering and a Defence Services Software Institute, should be set up at the earliest possible time.

**Reduction in Colour Service of the Armed Forces**

6.72 In order to ensure that the Armed Forces are at their fighting best at all times, there is a need to ensure a younger profile of the Services. However, this is a highly complex matter. While the Army desires a younger age profile, so do the Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs). The GoM recommends that the Cabinet Secretary, COAS, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary, and Secretary Expenditure may look into the terms of engagement of soldiers, lateral entry into other organisations and resettlement policies. The recommendations in the matter could be submitted for the Government's consideration.

**Territorial Army (TA) Review Committee**

6.73 The MoD should examine the recommendations of the TA Review Committee in a time bound manner keeping in mind the suggestions in this regard in Chapter IV.

**Recruitment in Ladakh Scouts and J&K Light Infantry (JAK LI)**

6.74 The enhancement in recruitment to the Ladakh Scouts and JAK LI is eminently desirable particularly in view of their sterling services. While the increased recruitment already undertaken and that proposed to be undertaken in respect of the Ladakh Scouts is satisfactory, the projected increase in recruitment to the JAK LI is much too small and needs to be substantially enhanced. The MoD may, therefore, move Government for raising of an additional JAK LI battalion.

**Manpower Issues**

6.75 In view of the fact that the number of manpower classifications in the Armed Forces is excessive, DoD may review and simplify their classifications in a time bound manner with a view to reduce and rationalise their number.
6.76 In order to examine and identify measures for increasing cost effectiveness in the employing organisations in the DoD, a committee chaired by an Additional Secretary of DoD should be set up immediately. Similarly, a committee may be set up to look into the issue of better utilization of Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civil Service officers within the MoD.

6.77 The studies carried out in Service Headquarters relating to military and civilian manpower should be examined by instituting joint procedures and mechanisms for their speedy implementation after consultations between DoD and Service Headquarters.

6.78 All future Central Pay Commissions should have a senior retired “Defence Adviser” to be nominated by the Defence Minister based on the recommendations by the CDS/Defence Secretary.

Medical Cover

6.79 The provision of post-retirement medical cover for ex-servicemen needs to be examined and implemented expeditiously.

VIII National Defence University

6.80 University research in India in the field of defence is not managed, funded, or structured effectively and it lacks both in a policy orientation and in synergy between the academic community and governmental functionaries. The development of country/region specialization along with associated language skills and studies in strategic areas need to be ensured by putting in place the necessary institutional arrangements. The setting up of a National Defence University, which could undertake long term defence and strategic studies and could also affiliate some of the existing institutions, needs to be considered by a group to be chaired by the Defence Secretary and including representatives from Indian Institute of Management, Indian Institute of Technology, University Grants Commission, Services Headquarters, NSCS and external experts. This group should make its recommendations to the Defence Minister within 6 months.

IX Other Related Matters

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Terrorism

6.81 Today's terrorists, be they religious extremists, Jehadis, international cults like Aum Shinrikiyo or individual nihilists, may gain access to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons or raw materials. NBC terrorism today has moved from the stage of far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen tomorrow. The advances in IT and communications have made terrorism with Weapons/Materials of Mass Destruction easier to carry out. The Government would, therefore, be remiss if timely measures were not taken to reduce the likelihood and severity of this threat. The
National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) has already prepared a detailed paper on this subject, which is scheduled to be considered in the Strategic Policy Group (SPG). Cabinet Secretary may have this important subject considered at the earliest, for formulation of a detailed action plan and designating a nodal ministry/agency for follow-up action in this regard.

Civil-Military Interface

6.82 The establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels from Command Headquarters to operative formations at the ground level, is essential to smoothen the relationship during times of stress and to prevent friction and alienation of the local population. In this respect, the GoM has decided the following:-

(a) In the States of the North East and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) the Unified Headquarters are presently in existence. These mechanisms are geared primarily to deal with insurgency situations in the relevant States. There is need to further streamline them [………………………………………..……………………………………………………………].*

(b) There is need for a mechanism that caters for the entire spectrum from peace passing through precautionary and preparatory stages and finally to war. At the State level, a Core Group of existing civil-military liaison forum may be set up to identify the problem areas and evolve a system of smooth mobilisation and thereafter, to meet the logistic needs of the Army. The group may meet twice a year and the Home Department may function as the convening department on behalf of the State Government concerned. At the district level also, a group may be set up from the mobilisation stage onwards comprising representatives of the district administration and the Army, if available.

(c) The above civil-military liaison mechanism may not be essential for all States, but can be institutionalised in the States of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, J&K, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The districts also need to be identified by the State Governments in consultation with the Army commands where the suggested mechanism may be put in place. This Core Group may meet at least twice a year.

(d) Although in some States formal structures already exist, problems of lack of communication, co-ordination and even misunderstandings between the civilian and the military officials on the one hand and the military and the civilian populace on the other, persist. In this context, inter alia, the following measures may be considered for implementation:-

* Government Security Deletion
(i) The earlier tradition of military and civil officials posted in the field making social calls on the occasion of their joining the station should be strictly enforced.

(ii) Special care should be taken by DoP&T to post officers with appropriate background to Ministries like Defence, Home Affairs, and other security agencies.

(iii) Upon their posting, the civilian officials must be put through a mandatory briefing and orientation of two to four weeks, in which they should visit certain military establishments like Siachen, training establishments etc., to secure a better understanding of the problems of the Armed Forces.

(iv) The military officials posted at the Headquarters should also be sensitised to the role and responsibilities of the civilian officials and the manner in which Government functions. They should be appropriately sensitised to procedures followed in staff organisations, as distinct from command organisations.

(v) A conscious effort must be made by the Services and MoD to promote active social interaction between the civilians and the Armed Forces.

(vi) A civilian in the MoD should be provided certain facilities available to the Armed Forces, like membership of clubs, medical facilities etc., so that they develop a sense of belonging to the Defence establishments and vice versa.

(vii) A composite group of representatives of the Ministries of Home, Defence, and the Defence Forces may be set up to undertake an in-depth examination of the civil-military interaction problems and bring out a manual on civil-military interface, incorporating practical measures for implementation, not only at the formal but also at the informal level. The manual should give the civilian officers an idea about the ethos and problems of work among the Armed Forces, and provide to the military officials information about the obligations and constraints on the civilian side.

**Media Relations**

6.83 The MoD must have an organisation integral to it for interface with the media on Defence related issues. It should therefore evolve the precise details of the structure, composition and modalities of functioning of this entity. For this purpose it may draw appropriate personnel from other organisations, if considered necessary.
Media cells should also be set up by the MoD in States or at places where they are required, such as in the field formations, upto an appropriate level.

6.84 The MoD should have standing instructions or provisions in the relevant manual specifying to what extent and in what situations the Armed Forces should take the initiative to invite media teams to cover activities of Armed Forces in conflict situations and in such cases, what information/material should be made available to them (including what material/information should not be shared with them) and what facilities should be extended to them. The media in the country has been consistently favourably inclined to the Armed Forces and a more forthcoming approach is not only justified but essential, to ensure better informed reporting and positive coverage.

6.85 As and when media teams are invited by the Armed Forces (all three wings) in peace and conflict situations to places where operations are being conducted, the latter should provide local transport and boarding/lodging facilities, as in border or conflict areas where civilian infrastructure or facilities are not available.

**Information Dissemination**

6.86 All concerned ministries should indicate their requirements to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) annually for bringing out special publications. While so doing, they may be required to supply the requisite material and the relevant sources of information. Further, action in this matter may be co-ordinated by the Ministry of I&B, in consultation with the concerned Ministries.

6.87 The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) informed that Prasar Bharati in J&K lacks Balti and other linguistic skills to reach the people across the Line of Control (LoC). It was thereafter brought to the notice of the GoM that the Ministry of I&B would advise Prasar Bharati to ensure daily transmission in each of the local languages comprising at least three bulletins of ten minutes each through individual radio stations. However, the GoM felt that the duration of half an hour every day in three bulletins in each of the minor languages would be rather limited. Hence, the Ministry of I&B may consider extending the programme to at least one hour each day.

**Publication of War Histories**

6.88 The Ministries of Defence and External Affairs may review the issue of publication of the official histories of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars and a history of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations and finalise the decision within a period of three months. While preparing the historical account of the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the events relating to Kutch should be included. It would also be desirable for the MoD to commission an authoritative history of the Kargil conflict for subsequent publication, after the necessary documentation in this regard has been completed. Cabinet Secretary may take an appropriate view regarding the declassification of records for this purpose in consultation with the concerned Ministries like the MoD, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
7.1 It is for the first time, in independent India’s history, that a comprehensive review of the national security system in its entirety has been undertaken. This is most timely, as our security environment has inevitably experienced major changes in the preceding five decades. The apparatus and systems that we had inherited from the British, are no longer suitable in this day and age. The biggest challenge, facing the country today, is the need to step up the pace of economic growth and to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of the fruits of such growth. However, rapid development coupled with distributive justice cannot be achieved, without first ensuring stable peace and security in the country. Hence, the task of effectively safeguarding the country’s security assumes an overriding primacy and demands that the systemic reforms required for achieving this goal must be implemented without delay.

7.2 Despite the difficult and complex mandate given to the GoM, it has made an earnest effort to suggest a range of potential solutions. It must, however, be emphasised that any plan of action for reform is only as good as its implementation. Hence, it is essential to put in place procedures and a mechanism to ensure the speedy implementation of the recommendations, both in letter and spirit.

7.3 This report has covered broadly four major areas of national security i.e. Intelligence, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence. It is suggested that the recommendations approved may be remitted for implementation to the concerned nodal Ministries/Secretariat i.e. the Cabinet Secretariat (NSCS) for Intelligence, Ministry of Home Affairs for Internal Security and Border Management and the Ministry of Defence for Management of Defence. The concerned nodal Ministry/Secretariat, while implementing these recommendations, should take into account the relevant Task Force Report for guidance and background.

7.4 Considering the need for speedy execution of the accepted recommendations, it will be necessary to provide undivided and focussed attention to their implementation. It is, therefore, recommended that each nodal Ministry/Secretariat may set up a separate cell, to undertake the task of monitoring implementation of the recommendations and for resolving any issues which impede the process of implementation. These cells should be headed by officers of the level of Additional/ Joint Secretary or an OSD and report directly to the Secretary-in-charge of the Ministry/Secretariat.

7.5 A quarterly review, of the implementation of the accepted recommendations, may be undertaken in a meeting of the concerned Secretaries, to be presided over by Cabinet Secretary. Such inter-Ministerial review should facilitate co-ordination where needed and removal of difficulties through mutual consultation, whenever required. An Action Taken Report may be prepared by the National Security Council Secretariat, under the guidance of the Cabinet Secretary/National Security Adviser on a quarterly basis and circulated among the concerned Secretaries and the Ministers for their information.
7.6 In addition, it is recommended that a six monthly Action Taken Report be submitted to the National Security Council/Cabinet Committee on Security for its information and for any directions that it may deem necessary. Any major issues emerging in the course of implementation or suggestions for mid-course corrections can be addressed at this level.

7.7 It is further proposed, that following acceptance of the recommendations contained in this report, the nodal ministries may be directed by the Cabinet Secretary to issue necessary executive orders within a period of three months. In certain matters which are complex and need inter-ministerial consultations, consultations with States, or legislative measures, a longer time frame may be required. Proposals of the concerned Ministries in this regard, seeking extension in the time-frame, may be approved at the level of the Cabinet Secretary, on the merits of each case.

7.8 Since this constitutes the first comprehensive review of our security mechanisms in their entirety and since the country is faced with a rapidly changing security environment, it is important that national security management systems are re-examined at periodic intervals. It is accordingly suggested that the next such review be undertaken after a period of five years. This exercise should take stock of the progress achieved in the implementation of the recommendations approved, address areas of difficulty and chart out a plan of action for the future.

7.9 It is hoped, in conclusion, that this Report would be able to make a modest contribution towards upgrading India’s security mechanisms and systems.

(LK Advani)
Chairman

(George Fernandes) (Jaswant Singh) (Yashwant Sinha)
Member Member Member

New Delhi
February 19, 2001
It has been decided with the approval of the Prime Minister to constitute a Group of Ministers to review the national security system in its entirety and, in particular, to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and formulate specific proposals for implementation. For this purpose, the Group may commission such studies as it considers necessary or set up/obtain the opinion of expert groups on specific subjects.

2. The composition of the Group of Ministers will be as under:-

1) Shri L.K. Advani, Minister of Home Affairs.
2) Shri George Fernandes, Minister of Defence.
3) Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs.
4) Shri Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance.

3. Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security Adviser, will be a Special Invitee for the meetings of the Group.

4. The Group will submit its report in six months from the date of its constitution.

5. The Group will be serviced by the National Security Council Secretariat.

Sd/-
(P. Gopalakrishnan)
for Cabinet Secretary
Annexure B

Kargil Review Committee’s Recommendations

1. A thorough review of the national security system in its entirety should be undertaken by an independent body of credible experts whether a national commission or one or more task forces or otherwise as expedient.

2. Having a National Security Adviser who also happens to be Principal Secretary to PM can only be an interim arrangement. There must be a full time NSA and a second line of personnel should be inducted into the system urgently and groomed for higher responsibilities.

3. There must be periodic intelligence briefings of Cabinet Committee on Security with all supporting staff in attendance.

4. Every effort must be made to ensure that a satellite imagery capability of world standard is developed indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible time.

5. Acquisition of high altitude UAVs should be undertaken and institutionalised arrangements made to ensure that imagery generated by them is disseminated to concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible.

6. Communication interception equipment needs to be modernised and direction finding equipment augmented.

7. The establishment of a single organisation like the National Security Agency of the USA, grouping together all communication and electronic intelligence efforts, needs to be examined.

8. Adequate attention has not been paid to develop encryption and decryption skills.

9. The issue of setting up an integrated Defence Intelligence Agency needs to be examined.

10. There is no institutionalised mechanism for coordination or objective oriented interaction between intelligence agencies and consumers at different levels. Similarly, there is no mechanism for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality. Nor is there any oversight of the overall functioning of the agencies. Accordingly, a thorough examination of the working of the intelligence system with a view to removing these deficiencies is called for.
11. Though the efficacy of the JIC has increased since it became part of the National Security Council Secretariat, its role and place in the national intelligence framework should be evaluated in the context of the over-all reform of the system.

12. The development of country/region specialisation along with associate language skills should not be further delayed. It is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialisation and to organise regular exchange of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

13. In order to have a young and fit Army, colour service should be reduced from 17 years to between 7 to 10 years. Released officers and men should then be diverted to paramilitary formations. Subsequently older cadres might be further streamed into regular police forces.

14. Improved border management necessitates a detailed study in order to evolve appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with the inflow of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms.

15. Many experts have suggested the need to enhance India’s Defence outlay as budgetary constraints have affected modernisation and created operational voids. Government must determine the level of Defence spending in consultation with the concerned Departments and Defence Services.

16. Armed Forces headquarters are outside the apex governmental structure. This had led to many negative results and it is felt that the Services headquarters should be located within the Government. The entire gamut of national security management and apex decision making and the structure & interface between the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces’ headquarters, should be comprehensively studied and reorganised.

17. Beginning with Indira Gandhi, successive Indian Prime Ministers have consistently supported an Indian nuclear weapons programme but enveloped it in the utmost secrecy not taking into confidence their own party colleagues, the Armed Forces and senior civil servants. Record establishes that the Indian nuclear weapons programme had a much wider consensus than is generally believed. Accordingly, the publication of a white paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme is highly desirable.

18. On many vital issues, sufficient public information is not available in a single comprehensive official publication. The Government must review its information policy and develop structures and processes to keep the public informed of vital national issues.

19. One of the major factors influencing Pakistan’s aggressive behaviour in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 has been a deliberately cultivated perception of an ineffecutual Indian Army and a weak and vacillating Indian Government. Though Pakistan was discomfited in all the four military adventures it undertook, it has attempted to portray
each as a narrowly missed victory. It is, therefore, necessary to publish authentic accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars to establish the facts. It is also recommended that an authoritative account of the Kargil conflict be published at an early date.

20. A true partnership must be established between the Services and DRDO to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former get the indented equipment they require without delay.

21. Establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels from Command Headquarters to operative formations at the ground level, is essential to smoothen the relationship during times of stress and to prevent friction and alienation of the local population.

22. A rehabilitation programme for Kargil must be put in place.

23. The dedication and valour of Ladakh Scouts and J&K Light Infantry merits recognition through raising of additional units of these regiments locally.

24. The country must not fall into the trap of Siachenisation of the Kargil heights and similar unheld gaps. The proper response would be a declaratory policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LOC and cross-border terrorism will meet with retaliation in a manner, time and place of India’s choosing.

25. Credible measures must be undertaken in J&K to win back alienated sections of the population and attend to genuine discontent.

26. Neither the Northern Army Command nor HQ 15 Corps nor the lower field formations had media cells which could cater to the requirement of the press corps. It must also be recognised that the media has to be serviced at many levels – national, local and international.

27. The US Armed Forces usually operate dedicated radio and TV channels to entertain and inform their armed forces when deployed overseas. The Government should seriously consider similar dedicated facilities for the Indian Armed Forces. If such facilities had been available at the time of Kargil, some of the misleading reports and rumours that gained currency could have been effectively countered.

28. The Committee was informed that Prasar Bharti in J&K lacks Balti and other linguistic skills to reach the people across the LOC. Unless such software and programming aspects are taken care of, mere hardware expansion may not be cost effective.
Subject: Task Force to Examine Issues Concerning Internal Security

It has been decided with the approval of the Group of Ministers (GOM) constituted vide Cabinet Secretariat letter No.141/2/1/2000-TS dated April 17, 2000 to set up a task force to examine issues concerning Internal Security and formulate specific proposals for GOM’s consideration.

2. The terms of reference of the task force shall be as under:-

(a) To assess the national level threats to internal security, such as insurgencies, terrorism, left wing extremism, drug trafficking and religious fundamentalism and to recommend appropriate measures for tackling them.

(b) To examine and recommend the reorganisation of structures and procedures in the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India relating to the management of Internal Security issues including, inter alia, the Central Police Organisations and the Department of Internal Security.

(c) To examine the health of the State Police Forces’ set up and CPMFs and to recommend measures for improving their effectiveness in dealing with internal security threats, inter alia, by way of training, modernisation, restructuring, adoption of appropriate personnel policies and other related measures.

(d) To examine the role and responsibility of MHA and State Governments in Internal security management.

(e) To recommend measures for involvement of local communities in exercising vigilance.

(f) To consider issues relating to cyber crime and cyber warfare and make relevant recommendations in this regard.

(g) To recommend measures to inculcate a spirit of patriotism and for enhancing citizens awareness of their duty towards maintenance of public order, inter alia, rendering national service.
3. The composition of the task force will as under:-

- Shri N.N. Vohra, Chairman
- Shri J.F. Ribeiro, Member
- Shri Rajendra Shekhar, Member
- Lt. General (Retd.) V.K. Nayyar, Member
- Shri R.C. Jha, Member
- Shri M.L. Wadhawan, Member

4. For examination of the foregoing terms of reference the task force may engage such consultants for its assistance, as it may consider essential with the concurrence of the NSCS.

5. The task force should interact with key officials from all concerned Ministries/Organisations/Agencies, the other three task forces set up by the GOM and such experts as it may wish to consult. The task force may also review earlier reports on the subject commissioned by the Government, if considered relevant.

6. The task force will submit its report within 3 months from the date of its constitution. The task force may also submit interim reports for urgent consideration of the GOM, if considered expedient.

7. The task force will be serviced by the Ministry of Home Affairs which will also provide it requisite facilities and secretarial support.

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS
Subject: Task Force to Examine Issues Concerning Internal Security

It has been decided with the approval of the Group of Ministers (GOM) constituted vide Cabinet Secretariat letter No.141/2/1/2000-TS dated April 17, 2000 to set up a task force to examine issues concerning Internal Security and formulate specific proposals for GOM’s consideration.

2. The terms of reference of the task force shall be as under:-

   (a) To assess the national level threats to internal security, such as insurgencies, terrorism, left wing extremism, drug trafficking and religious fundamentalism and to recommend appropriate measures for tackling them.

   (b) To examine and recommend the reorganisation of structures and procedures in the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India relating to the management of Internal Security issues including, inter alia, the Central Police Organisations and the Department of Internal Security.

   (c) To examine the health of the State Police Forces’ set up and CPMFs and to recommend measures for improving their effectiveness in dealing with internal security threats, inter alia, by way of training, modernisation, restructuring, adoption of appropriate personnel policies and other related measures.

   (d) To examine the role and responsibility of MHA and State Governments in Internal security management.

   (e) To recommend measures for involvement of local communities in exercising vigilance.

   (f) To consider issues relating to cyber crime and cyber warfare and make relevant recommendations in this regard.

   (g) To recommend measures to inculcate a spirit of patriotism and for enhancing citizens awareness of their duty towards maintenance of public order, inter alia, rendering national service.
3. The composition of the task force will as under:-

Shri N.N.Vohra - Chairman
Shri J.F.Ribeiro - Member
Shri Rajendra Shekhar - Member
Lt. General (Retd.) V.K.Nayyar - Member
Shri R.C.Jha - Member
Shri M.L.Wadhawan - Member

4. For examination of the foregoing terms of reference the task force may engage such consultants for its assistance, as it may consider essential with the concurrence of the NSCS.

5. The task force should interact with key officials from all concerned Ministries/Organisations/Agencies, the other three task forces set up by the GOM and such experts as it may wish to consult. The task force may also review earlier reports on the subject commissioned by the Government, if considered relevant.

6. The task force will submit its report within 3 months from the date of its constitution. The task force may also submit interim reports for urgent consideration of the GOM, if considered expedient.

7. The task force will be serviced by the Ministry of Home Affairs which will also provide it requisite facilities and secretarial support.

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS
Subject : Task Force to Consider Measures for Improving Border Management

It has been decided with the approval of the Group of Ministers (GOM) constituted vide Cabinet Secretariat letter No.141/2/1/2000-TS dated April 17, 2000 to set up a task force to consider measures for improving border management and, in particular, to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee in this regard and formulate specific proposals for GOM’s consideration.

2. The terms of reference of the task force shall be as under:-

(a) To propose measures to safeguard not only the security of India's land and maritime boundaries but also that of its island territories, territorial waters and exclusive economic zone; in addition, to propose appropriate steps to preserve the sanctity of its air space.

(b) To study in detail steps needed to improve border management and, in particular, to suggest measures for appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with entry of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms; and to recommend measures to address existing deficiencies including suitable steps for vigilance, fencing, illumination and related matters.

(c) To review citizenship, Passport and immigration control laws/systems and suggest needed reforms.

(d) To recommend means for implementation by the States and the Centre to check, reduce and eliminate illegal immigration.

(e) To examine the measures to establish closer linkages with the border population and to protect them from subversive propaganda, to prevent unauthorised settlements and to initiate special developmental programmes. In this context, the role of security agencies in supplementing these efforts and means of harmonising the efforts of security agencies and of local administration may be recommended.
3. The composition of the task force will be as under:-

Dr. Madhav Godbole - Chairman
Shri ML Mehta - Member
Shri T Ananthachari - Member
Vice Admiral (Retd) AR Tandon - Member
Shri D.V.L.N. Ramakrishna Rao - Member
Shri Chinmoy Chakravarty - Member

4. The task force may engage such consultants for its assistance as it may consider essential with the concurrence of the NSCS.

5. The task force should interact with key officials from all concerned Ministries/Organisations/Agencies, the other three task forces set up by the GOM and such experts as it may wish to consult. The task force may also review earlier reports on the subject commissioned by the Government, if considered relevant.

6. The task force will submit its report within 3 months from the date of its constitution. The task force may also submit interim reports for urgent consideration of the GOM, if considered expedient.

7. The task force will be serviced by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which will also provide it requisite facilities and administrative/secretarial support.

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS
New Delhi, May 29, 2000

Subject: Task Force to Consider Measures for Improving Border Management

This is in continuation of Cabinet Secretariat (NSCS) OM No.C-182/1/2000, NSCS(CS) dated May 16,2000.

2. Lt. Gen (Retd) VK Sood, PVSM, AVSM, has been inducted in the task force on Border Management. Accordingly the composition of the above task force will now be as under:

- Dr. Madhav Godbole - Chairman
- Lt.Gen (Retd) V K Sood, PVSM, AVSM - Member
- Shri ML Mehta - Member
- Shri T Ananthachari - Member
- Vice Admiral (Retd) AR Tandon - Member
- Shri DVLN Ramakrishna Rao - Member
- Shri Chinmoy Chakravarty - Member

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS
Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security

Annexure G

No. C-180/1/2000-NSCS(CS)
Cabinet Secretariat
(National Security Council Secretariat)

New Delhi, May 17, 2000

Subject : Task Force for Review of the Management of Defence

It has been decided with the approval of the Group of Ministers (GOM) constituted vide Cabinet Secretariat letter No.141/2/1/2000-TS dated April 17, 2000 to set up a task force to review the management of defence and, in particular, to consider the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee in this regard and formulate specific proposals for GOM's consideration.

2. The terms of reference of the task force shall be as under:-

   (a) To examine existing organisations and structures and recommend such changes, as considered necessary, for improving the management of the country's defence. Since accountability to Parliament constitutes the basic feature of Government of India, the task force, while making its recommendations, will examine the evolution and the changes in this respect that have taken place in other parliamentary democracies. In particular, the UK model should be studied closely.

   (b) While considering (a) above, to also examine the changes required in the management structure in the emerging security scenario having regard to the nuclearised environment, revolution in military affairs, information revolution and other similar developments.

   (c) In the context of (a) and (b) above, to examine the apex decision making structure and the interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces Headquarters and recommend appropriate measures for redressing such deficiencies as may be identified; in this process the task force may also recommend measures for more efficient coordination between the political executive, the various departments of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces as also to examine the desirability, necessity and modalities of setting up an integrated command structure for the Armed Forces.

   (d) To recommend such organisational and other changes as considered appropriate to bring about improvements in the procurement processes. While making its recommendations, the task force will also keep in view the imperative of ensuring accountability for proper expenditure of public funds, as also the need to have time bound decisions.
(e) To recommend measures for improving cost-effectiveness in management of defence.

(f) To examine impediments to modernisation and to recommend appropriate measures for their removal and in this context, to examine how a true partnership can be established between the Services and the DRDO so as to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former get the indented equipment they require without delay.

(g) To examine the issue of developing interface and synergy between the Civil and Defence, Research, Development and Production facilities.

(h) To consider measures for development of country/region specialisation along with language skills and to recommend steps for networking with think-tanks.

3. The composition of the task force will be as under:-

Shri Arun Singh - Chairman
Vice Admiral (Retd) P.S.Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM - Member
Lt. Gen. S.S.Mehta, AVSM*, VSM - Member
Air Marshal T.J.Master, AVSM - Member
Vice Admiral A. Prakash, AVSM, VrC, VSM - Member
Shri Narendra Singh Sisodia - Member
Shri Dhirendra Singh - Member
Shri S.K.Misra - Member
Dr A.S. Bains - Member
Shri G. Prakash - Member
Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, AVSM - Member
Vice Admiral Madanjit Singh, AVSM - Secretary

4. The task force may engage such consultants for its assistance as it may consider essential with the concurrence of the NSCS.

5. The task force should interact with key officials from all concerned Ministries/Organisations/Agencies, the other three task forces set up by the GOM and such experts as it may wish to consult. The task force may also review earlier reports on the subject commissioned by the Government, if considered relevant.

6. The task force will submit its report/reports within 3 months from the date of its constitution. The task force may also submit interim reports for urgent consideration of the GOM, if considered expedient.
7. The task force will be serviced by the National Security Council Secretariat which will also provide it requisite facilities and administrative/secretarial support.

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS
In continuation of the Cabinet Secretariat (NSCS) OM of even number dated May 17, 2000, setting up the task force for review of the Management of Defence and in pursuance of the decision taken in the Group of Ministers' meeting held on August 25, 2000, it is hereby notified that Shri VS Jafa shall be deemed as a member of the task force with effect from the date he had commenced working with the task force i.e. June 01, 2000.

2. The terms and conditions of his appointment shall be the same as those approved for the other non-official members of the task force vide Cabinet Secretariat OM of even number dated May 29, 2000.

Sd/-
(Satish Chandra)
Secretary, NSCS