



Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
Annual Workshop on Internal Security -2013
Seminar Hall, CLAWS, New Delhi
05-06 Sep 2013
Report

Introduction

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), organised a two day workshop on Internal Security from 05 Sep to 06 Sep 2013 at CLAWS Seminar Hall. Noted experts gathered to discuss the various challenges that lie in the domain of Internal Security and define a road map for future conflict resolution. The Welcome Address was delivered by Director CLAWS which spelled out briefly the various challenges that lie ahead for our nation in the paradigm of Internal Security. The Keynote Address was delivered by Lt Gen Anil Bhalla, VSM, DG PP & President, Executive Council CLAWS. The seminar was well attended by serving and retired officers of all three services, serving officers of the MHA, paramilitary forces, CAPF, members of the strategic community, media and the faculty from CLAWS.

Welcome Remarks by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM,VSM (Retd), Director, CLAWS

The diverse group of speakers will promote an understanding of causative factors of security challenges that exist within India and suggest a road map that will lead to conflict resolution. The Internal Security Workshop has gone through a great metamorphosis with the immensely enriching feedback which has been received since its inception. In Arthashastra, Kautilya had written about four kinds of threats, namely, internal threats, external threats, externally aided internal threats and internally aided external threats. In India, the internal security scenario has a mix of all these four threats. There is insurgency in North East India since Independence, Pakistan inspired militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and Red Corridor inspired by the Left Wing ideology.

Keynote Address: Lt Gen Anil Bhalla, VSM, DG PP & President, Executive Council CLAWS

Internal Security is an important contemporary topic and policy makers, particularly in the Army circle, have carefully looked upon the suggestions and feedback that emerge out of the annual workshop organised by CLAWS. Internal environment shows receding insurgency but there has been a steep rise in ethno- religious violence. Terrorism remains a global challenge. Rapid dissent and chaos in Middle Eastern region, disturbance in the Af-Pak region and turmoil in our immediate neighbourhood are some challenges that need immediate attention.

J&K has shown significant improvement in its security environment. Although there have been much talks about removal of AFSPA, the recent sectarian violence in Kishtwar has proved that these regions are yet not ready for withdrawal of AFSPA. Cross border tensions continue to prevail and infiltration remains a serious menace. The Nepalese route being used by the infiltrating terrorists is a

cause of serious concern. If this escalates then the political stability would be hard to come by. A comprehensive J&K security plan needs to be devised to keep the turbulence in check.

Ministry of Home Affairs has brought out a comprehensive two pronged approach to ensure effective security and governance in Left Wing Extremism affected districts. Though Integrated Action Plan and other developmental civilian projects are underway, the State response has been inadequate in providing political and economical stability to the region. Maoists continue to enhance their warfare capabilities and occasionally resort to violence in the region.

North Eastern States have also shown an upward trend in violence with a jump of almost 40 percent in 2012. Insurgency has assumed the role of an industry in the region. ULFA seems to be looking at the NSCN-IM model to call for the ceasefire agreement. It is possible that the insurgent groups in the North East have connection with the Maoist outfits. MHA has launched initiatives for surrender and rehabilitation but its efficacy will manifest into reality only with effective governance and development. The increasing number of insurgents and sectarian violence remains a serious concern. Modernisation and capacity building of the State police forces is being carried out in a proactive manner. Effective border management, administrative support and governance have to be enhanced to ensure stability. Eventually good governance is the final key that will lead to conflict management and eventual resolution.

The key issues raised in each session are given in the following paragraphs in the chronological order of the speakers.

SESSION I : JAMMU & KASHMIR

Opening Remarks by the Chairperson-Lt Gen K T Parnaik, PVSM,UYSM, YSM,(Retd), Former GOC-in-C Northern Command

Geostrategic relevance of J&K

J&K has a geostrategic relevance which has attracted foreign rule over the centuries. Nestled in lofty Himalayas it forms the bastion of our Northern frontier, and its occupation is vital for the national security. Moreover, J&K remains an unfinished agenda of partition for Pakistan, a means to avenge the loss of East Pakistan and an obsession for a state born of a 'Two Nation Theory'.

- (a) Its proximity to the epicentre of global terrorism (Af - Pak region), makes it vulnerable .
- (b) It acts like a bridge between two ambitious adversaries, denying space & collusivity.
- (c) All major river systems of Pakistan, flow out of J&K.
- (d) An ideological bastion for Pakistan

- (e) A symbol of our national integrity & pride.

J&K has witnessed all the wars fought on Indian soil, since Independence and has been subjected to an externally abated proxy war for over two decades. It is vulnerable and yet provides opportunities to actualise our Pro-Active strategy.

Current Situation

J&K is in a transitory stage, what began as a popular uprising in late 80's and turned into an armed insurrection, is now in the throes of a 'Proxy War', which does not seem to go away. Pak/ISI carefully calibrated a strategy of "Political Defiance" due to decrease in terrorist violence post GWOT in AF – Pak region. 2011 saw a turnaround, as the Civil Administration & SF chalked out a proactive strategy by neutralising the terrorist leadership, heightening the vigil on LC to minimise infiltration and defeating and discrediting the separatist at their own game. A renewed focus on perception management supported by a meaningful WHAM campaign, restored peace all through 2011-12

The violence levels are down, infiltration reduced and focus on development and governance issues has taken priority, as is evident from peaceful protests by civilians for "Sadak, Pani & Bijli". The valley has witnessed three relatively calm summers. Nevertheless, some emotive issues like, mass graves, Dogra Certificate and partial revoking of AFSPA have surfaced. Activism in HR, legal and local media circles continues to act as an irritant. In East Ladakh the Chinese belligerence, spiraled in face offs, causing security alarm in the establishment. Presence of large number of Chinese workers in Gilgit – Baltistan (GB) for infrastructure development, is also a cause of worry, being in close vicinity to own LC. The relative peace in J&K is fragile and subject to triggers. It is therefore imperative to observe, analyse and predict the events unfolding in our neighbourhood, and be prepared for the worst.

External events and their impact on security dynamic of J&K- Chair

The state of J&K is surrounded by disputed, porous and unsettled borders with Pakistan and China, while being afflicted by a raging Proxy War, unabated for over two decades. Unfolding events in its neighbourhood, and intent of the adversaries, directly impacts its security and poses great challenges of conflicts in a conventional as well as sub - conventional domains.

The Afghanistan Imbrolio

The US draw down from Afghanistan has commenced and is scheduled to be completed by 2014, leaving minimal staff, to ensure safety of US/ISAF assets, the President and to oversee the development/restoration effort, sponsored by US. However with elections due in Afghanistan and the Taliban all eager to wrest power, the exit time seems inopportune, like in Iraq. Many believe that ANA/ANP are incapable of defending the nation; they lack training, motivation and leadership. Pakistan's strategy in Afghanistan is India centric. It aims to create a subversive space on Afghan soil

by ensuring its influence in the country, through their 'Proxies' (Taliban). Pak would want China to fill in the vacuum left by US, so that its energy corridor is secured. China can exploit the mineral rich Afghanistan for material and also secure its XUAR province from being afflicted by the radical terrorist in FATA/NWFP. Pakistan is weary of conceding its strategic space in Afghanistan, fearing Indian conventional edge along its Eastern Border.

Whichever way Afghanistan goes, all the terrorist organisations will be fiercely involved in gaining ascendancy, failing which, they may well target Pak Army/hinterland. This will prompt Pak Army/ISI to divert them to J&K and up the ante to take pressure off from the terrorist. The resultant outcome could be HOT LC, Ceasefire violations, increased infiltration, religious rhetoric, disruption of elections, and targeting of democratic institutions. The HM faction will gain importance due to its internal support to foreign terrorist. Provocation of the SF and triggers, will be high on Pak agenda.

Unpredictable Pakistan

Pakistan is passing through a turbulent time ever since it joined the US in its GWOT. It had a duplicitous role to play, seemingly supporting the US by sealing the border in FATA/NWFP and targeting the Taliban, which has earned them \$15 bn, so far. The money earned by Pakistan is being used to induct and upgrade conventional weapons, combat insurgency in the west as well as siphon part of it to provide weapons and material to the terrorist groups. Post killing of OBL in May 12, Pak Army's credibility has suffered. Relations with US/ISAF are at an all time low, due to frequent drone strikes in FATA/NWFP, killing hard core terrorist as well as innocent civilians. Pak deployment of troops in FATA/NWFP as part of operation Al-Mizan has depleted Pak reserves on its Eastern borders, causing them enough worriers of likely misadventure by Indian Army. Pakistan's ability to calibrate and support Proxy war in J&K has been visibly reduced. The situation in GB/ Northern Areas (NA) has worsened due to sectarian violence and suppression of the Shia population (Baltis). Huge Chinese presence in GB, inadvertently brings them into focus in any conventional contingency in future. It also raises a spectrum of likely mischief by Pak Army/ISI in carrying out infiltration/violent incidents east of Zojila. Pak intent and manipulation could translate in heightened propaganda, sectarian and religious friction, increased infiltration, Cease Fire Violations and disruption of elections in the state of J&K, as well as spreading the arc of violence to Jammu & Ladakh regions.

Chinese activity in our Periphery

Chinese spectacular economic rise since 1970, has also supported its rapid ascendancy as a military power. It has created infrastructure which promotes trade economy and growth. In doing so, it has virtually encircled India, raising security concerns.

Impact on J&K. Prospects of infiltration across LC in GB, east of Zojila, creates security problems in Ladakh. For China, control of GB areas will be vital, while pursuing any option in E Ladakh. It is imperative that our intelligence, surveillance and infrastructure capability is upgraded to deal with arising situation.

Changing Trends of Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir - Dr Ashok Bhan, former DG Police, J & K

Situation in Jammu and Kashmir today is a vast improvement over what one witnessed in early 1990s. However the relocation of troops during Pakistan's Kargil misadventure had weakened the IS grid and caused a vacuum resulting in increase in violence by terrorists. "Positive peace" still eludes the state which will be achieved, only when at least the major stake holders are satisfied. This can be achieved only when issues like winning "hearts and minds" and addressing aspirations of different regions and groups is done.

Sharif Government will remain engaged for quite some time in dealing with the economy and the Army and the ISI will continue to dominate handling of the security and foreign affairs in Pakistan. Therefore, resumption of composite dialogue is not expected any time soon.

With elections to Indian parliament only a few months away any forward movement on Kashmir will have to wait. After the parliamentary elections, it will be time to prepare for the state assembly polls due towards the end of 2014. Therefore, the focus in next about two years may remain development oriented. The situation in Jammu and Kashmir will have to be managed for quite some time without any serious political prescriptions coming into play. The security apparatus will have to ensure that there is no relapse.

Trends in Terrorist Violence

After two relatively peaceful years 2011 and 2012 in the state, the first half of 2013 was marked by increase in ceasefire violations and infiltration attempts from across, targeting by terrorists of security forces and police personnel, targeted attacks on civilians including Panchayat members and resumption of civil strife and protest hartals in the aftermath of hanging of Parliament attack accused Afzal Guru.

There have been targeted killings of police and security force personnel and two daring attacks in the outskirts of Srinagar on CRPF deployment and Army convoy inflicting heavy casualties are indicative of terrorists raising their heads again. There is also revival of protests and hartals. The terrorists have increased targeting of SFs and police and separatists are once again proactive in exploiting each incident to malign security forces including when terrorists are killed in encounters.

Sectarian violence in Badgam district of the valley and communal violence in Kishtwar district of Jammu province pose fresh challenges for the already stretched security apparatus. The communal situation will have to be closely watched in run up to the elections and the civil administration and security apparatus must prevent recurrence of a Kishtwar like situation.

Issues needing urgent attention

Four important issues that need urgent attention:

- (a) Firstly, the synergy between security forces, local police and the civil administration must not be allowed to get diluted.
- (b) Secondly, return of peace strengthens the democratic institutions which are incapacitated by terrorist to see that the writ of the State does not run. The issue of phased withdrawal of AFSPA as a confidence building measure needs to be revisited.
- (c) Thirdly, phased withdrawal of AFSPA it necessarily entails availability of sufficient trained policemen and infrastructure so that the J&K police and PMFs are well prepared to take over the vacated areas.
- (d) Fourthly, recent successes in arrest of LeT IED expert Abdul Karim Tunda, top Indian Mujahidin terrorist Yaseen Bhatkal and some others in quick succession will send terror cells in rest of the country into hiding for some time. Pakistan may use this period to step up violence in J&K so that pressure on India is built to resume the composite dialogue.

Some issues related to State Assembly Elections

The Panchayat Raj institutions are yet to take off and elections to civic bodies have not been held. The next challenge for the Government and the security apparatus in J&K is going to be holding of a free and fair Assembly elections scheduled towards the end of year 2014.

Role of the security grid has in no way lessened in this election than in the previous elections. This time the regional and communal tensions and their exploitation for political gains will be an additional challenge. The cut throat competition among the two regional parties (National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party) in the valley and the two national parties (Congress and BJP) in Jammu will throw up debates and controversies on relationship between the State and the Union of India. The machinery of the Election Commission will also have to be secured to ensure this.

Options for Conflict Resolution – Lt Gen SA Hasnain, UYSM, PVSM, AVSM, SM*, VSM*(Retd), Former Military Secretary, Indian Army

Solutions to resolve the Kashmir Problem and the resultant conflict situation depend on how the problem is perceived by different stakeholders. For Pakistan, it is virtually an existential problem, justifying its long dead rationale of the Two Nation theory; for the Pakistan Army it's a means to legitimise its own hold over Pakistan; for the ISI it is an extension of Afghanistan where it played the dirtiest intelligence game, most successfully. For India it is the crown of its secular character, a physical outreach to dominate the areas of the New Great Game and legitimate territory ceded to it legally under the Instrument of Accession. Similarly there are interests of varying intensity and nature of many others who claim to be stakeholders – Separatists, Foreign Powers, Ideologists, Non State Actors etc.

It has come to be broadly accepted in today's strategic environment that there are no military solutions to territorial problems. Consultative machineries, functioning in a conducive environment, identify need to pursue the agenda of peace for extensive periods, to come to any solutions.

However, the current status of the Kashmir Problem, which is generally accepted as political in nature, is exacerbated by the Pakistan sponsored 24 year proxy war, the situation in the Af-Pak region, increasing radicalism in the region and the various individual aspirations of the stakeholders.

The moot point is whether an environment at all exists for conflict resolution. Simplistic solutions such as the Musharraf-Manmohan formula of soft/diffused borders, withdrawal of military wherewithal and joint consultation can work with stability and political will as a prerequisite. However, the current environment of strategic uncertainty in Af-Pak, political instability in India and Pakistan and the continuing turbulence resulting from proxy support to terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India limits serious options of conflict resolution. Perhaps, the time is best for examining options for conflict stabilisation through stronger integration of J&K with the Indian mainland (Rest of India). Such integration will have to be in multiple spheres – political, economic, social, emotional and psychological, even as the doors of diplomacy remain open. Let India have the upper hand, if and when we have to engage in parleys for final resolution of the Kashmir Problem. Short term gains through solution of the Siachen Issue have the potential of upsetting India's larger interests.

Issues Discussed

The following key issues were discussed:

- (a) The culture of drugs has been there in Kashmir for a long time and has influenced the behaviour of the local youth especially those who have been involved in protests.
- (b) The extent of the influence of the Wahhabis is less as mainly it is the Tablighis. The Jamaatis are the strongest in terms of influence and they themselves belong to various shades.
- (c) The stand of Al Qaeda on Kashmir is marked by the fact that it has not conducted any strikes on the state. It is not clear why this is the case.
- (d) Women have a marked role in peace building in Kashmir and they should be promoted as stakeholders in the peace process owing to the extent of influence they wield over the family.
- (e) AFSPA is in place and should remain so because of its aim of protection and empowerment of the troops.
- (e) The inflow of illegal money in the Valley is due to the efforts of the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi which has been providing cash to the separatists.
- (f) The conversion of the LC into the IB is not a feasible option and all comparisons with it and the Partition of 1947 should be avoided as they are wrong and ill-placed. The Partition

involved massive displacement of the people on both sides of the border which must not be replicated in Kashmir and is also not relevant to this situation.

SESSION II: LEFT WING EXTREMISM

Threat Analysis and Likely Future Trajectory: Mr. Shubhramshu Choudhary

Left Wing Extremism has stayed with us since politics started in this country, but they have now become a threat because they have succeeded in mustering support from the vast tribal population which lives in these regions. The Maoist war is slowly turning into women's war. 40 to 60 percent of the naxal cadres are now women and 99 percent of the women did not join to uproot the existing system. They joined to fight patriarchy. There is a tiny population of intellectuals who are directing the Naxalite movement. They mostly belong to Andhra Pradesh and a small number are coming from West Bengal. Many Maoists claim that they are fighting to bring "Navjanvadi Kranti". India is already a socialist State however Maoists say that they are fighting for "Samaajvaad" that will follow once Socialism is achieved.

The 12 Gram Sabhas held in Niyamgiri hills voted against granting their land to the giant mining company called Vedanta. Not a single person went with the decision made by the Government yet allotment was done. If this happens in the world's biggest democracy then its a serious cause of concern.

Tribals also have a tiny upper class. We have educated 2 to 5 percent of adivasis and pushed aside the remaining 95 percent. Maoists are strategic people, they do not love tribals, they are there to exploit their cause to attain their political objectives. There has been no education and no development for several years in the region. The real adivasi speaks Gondi and tribal languages. There is a need for Security Forces officers to learn Gondi.

The tribals are now becoming radicalised. One can now see an advent of adivasi Maoists.

Current Action Plan to Counter Environmental Extremism- Mr. MA Ganapathy, JS (Naxal Management)

CPI Maoist remains the biggest group. Stage of Naxalbari in its pre- 1967 and current stage is very different. Their entire world view lies in a pact of documents called "*Strategy and Tactic of Indian Revolution*". They are plotting the plan of action to overthrow the State but their socio-political ideology does not fall in line with the time and place India is in today. In reality much of their force belongs to Chhattisgarh. The Maoist India map shows—occupied areas (area that belongs to the State), guerrilla areas, guerrilla bases, regular or liberated base (which are strictly controlled by Maoists). Their objective is to bring more areas under liberated bases over a period of time.

Maoists have also built their footage in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Central committee is their strategic think tank. Maoists have received some training from PLA Manipur and shares some links with NSCN-IM.

Integration Action Plan has sanctioned more than 30 crores but most areas have still not benefitted. The State has deployed more than 80 battalions in the region, but there still exists a security and a political vacuum in many “liberated areas”.

Violence is plummeting and there has been a slight trickle down from the Government in terms of development but much remains to be done. Their strength is growing by the day and they will be capable of capable of spectacular strikes in the future.

Remarks by the Chairperson: Mr. A K Doval, KC, Director, Vivekananda International Foundation

Security management and a solution is an urgent requirement in the case of LWE affected districts. Maoists and tribals are not ideologically related but they have been able to exploit the cause of tribals. They have been able to collect the critical mass to pursue their political objective. For India’s security discourse, certain things that need to be carefully studied are modus operandi, history, literature, organisation and means of communication of the insurgent groups.

Issues Discussed

The following key issues were discussed:

- (a) It remains to be seen if after the murder of Mahendra Karma and BC Shukla free and fair elections will take place in the region.
- (b) There needs to be a strategy to find out the number of tribals in the affected districts. Maoists have managed to flag the cause of tribals because of their presence in the areas which are inaccessible. It is an opportunist movement.
- (c) Mahatos who are the leaders are not tribals, every tribal is not residing in jungle. They are primarily involved in agriculture.
- (d) The government has not conflated economics and security to fight the Maoists. The secured space in the country is shrinking.
- (e) When Karma was shot, the women cadres stabbed him 70 times. The boy who was carrying the radio set was mere ten years old. Such actions indicate that they have invoked brutalisation in the minds and actions of women and children. India has to take an effective strategy to fight this menace.

- (f) Remote areas in Orissa and Chhattisgarh are underdeveloped. If the Maoists want development, the security forces and government agencies must be allowed to carry out developmental work in the region.
- (g) If the Naxals have to win the war they have to transcend from the rural to the urban space. How they will achieve this remains to be analysed.
- (h) In 1971, Dantewada region had the highest number of post-mortems being carried out in the whole of Asia. It shows that tribals in that area have always been violent.
- (i) 300 boys of the naxal cadres went to Nayagarh which is very far from Chhattisgarh. They walked for 3 months with two guns each undetected. If this is possible we are headed for a very dangerous situation
- (j) Whose development is the key question? That people need to be asked. People did not allow Vedanta. If we listen to people they will with be us.
- (k) Progression and industrialisation will lead to displacement and angst, which has to be managed in an efficient manner.

SESSION III: NORTH EAST INDIA

Introductory Remarks

India's Northeast Region has been an area of great deal of concern. There is a need for introspecting the reasons as to why conflict resolution has not taken place in Northeast India despite sixty years of effort.

Changing Face of Ethnic Militancy – Mr. Jaideep Sakia, Terrorism and Conflict Analyst

India with a fixed boundary is a new concept and India as a nation state is still evolving. Northeast India is the only region in South Asia, which is strategically encircled – Nepal, China, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh encircles this region. The region is connected to the rest of India by only 2 percent of land area through Siliguri (West Bengal) corridor.

Prolonged years of dialogue with the Nagas have not achieved much headway. While some of the demands of the Nagas have been accepted by the Government of India, there are others such as having their own civil services, postage, stamp, standing Naga Army etc. along with demand for greater Nagalim, have been the irritant in the dialogue process. Prolonged ceasefire has created a dilemma among the Naga youths on their decision such as whether to join the Indian Army or the Naga insurgents. The SOO duration has also allowed entry of spoilers of the peace process. Therefore, government agencies should keep in mind that when peace process is adopted with the militant groups, a ceasefire should be unveiled by the government after all the homework has been

done. The common Naga people are fed up of lawlessness due to constant fight between the factions. Also, supra state of Greater Nagalim is not acceptable to Assam, Arunachal Pradesh or Manipur.

The Maoist might not succeed in Northeast India because when compared to Andhra Pradesh or Bihar, the Northeast has no large land holdings.

There is certainly a re-entry of China in Northeast scheme of things. This is however, different in the context of Maoist involvement from Central India in the Northeast.

As far as ULFA is concerned, there is a change in their recruitment strategy, which is now a operation specific recruitment.

Overall, to deal with the problems in the Northeast, there is a need for a comprehensive dialogue, correct diplomacy with Myanmar and other states around the region, and engagement with Bangladesh. There is a need of a Northeast Security Council so that policies directed towards the region are streamlined.

Strategic Encirclement: A Political Threat: Lt Gen AS Lamba, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Former VCOAS

There is a threat for Northeast India from China as absence of evidence should not be interpreted as evidence of absence as China expands its String of Pearls to encircle India at large and NE India in particular.

Economic Growth: A Catalyst to Conflict Resolution: Brig Narendra Kumar, SM, VSM

Land of rising sun waiting for the rise of opportunities but yet to see the light of hope. Perception differences have not allowed the integration of the region in entirety either culturally, economically or socially. Interestingly, available information shows that at the time of Independence per capita income in the undivided State of Assam was higher than the national average by 4 per cent. Thus, even under the British colonial rule the economic performance of the region was better than the rest of the country and this shows its vast developmental potential.

Economic Growth the Only way Ahead for Conflict resolution

Four Pillars a Pre-requisite for Economic Development. Security. Development of Communication & Connectivity, Power/ Energy and Education.

Conflict and instability a problem of mindset. Security has remained a constant worry for the government, people, investors and even the right thinking people. The challenges have been:

- (a) Physical violence.

- (b) Cultural and structural violence a constant threat to resolution of the conflict.
- (c) Conflict of perception within people, within states and main land India.
- (d) The number of underground insurgents have reduced but the number of insurgent groups' have increased.
- (e) The policy of the state and central government to bring the insurgent groups to the negotiation table by offering cease fire, suspension of operation (SOO) and surrender is indeed being misused by the insurgents
- (f) Recycling of insurgents is a grave threat to peace; way forward is an effective rehabilitation policy which unfortunately exists on papers only.
- (g) There is a persistent risk of destabilisation if the insurgent groups are allowed to retain weapons, trained armed cadres and organised camps
- (h) Nexus Between insurgents and drug mafia.
- (j) Linkages of insurgents with regional and trans regional insurgent org.

Development and Trust Deficit. The High-Level Commission appointed by the Prime Minister in its report submitted in 1997 (India, 1997) stated that there are four basic deficits confronting the North East and these are:

- (a) A basic needs deficit;
- (b) An infrastructure deficit;
- (c) A resource deficit; and
- (d) A two-way deficit of understanding with the rest of the country.
- (e) To this should be added the governance deficit.

Opportunities

Regional Integration. Development is the only path to conflict resolution. People must be made stake holders.

Potential for Growth in the North East.

- (a) Power Generation.

- (b) Guwahati as Manchester of North East and Mumbai of North East.
- (c) North east is sitting on Green Gold. Can be fruit, vegetable and flower market of South Asia and ASEAN.
- (d) Infrastructure Devp.
- (e) Agriculture.
- (f) **Education centre for Excellence.** National Institute for forest, horticulture and medicinal plants should be established in North east. Establish advance studies centre of forest and environment.
- (g) **Small Scale Industries.** 20, 00,000 looms out of which 1.5 lacs are idle 60% of total idle looms are in Assam.

Projection and Integration of NE with Regional Countries.

Integration with the South Asia & ASEAN is important for NE India.

Projection of Power. Projection of power should not be only for mil deterrence. Projection of power for collective development is far more potent.

Oil and Natural gas reserves.

- (a) Myanmar NE borders the oil and natural gas rich Myanmar which has estimated hydrocarbon reserves of 2.5 trillion cubic meters (TCM) of natural gas and 3.5 billion barrels of crude oil. China will import 12 million tons of crude oil per year and 12 bcm of natural gas.
- (b) Bangladesh estimate of 20 TCF is gaining acceptance among experts, but some argue that experiences in comparable basins elsewhere in the world suggest that the ultimate recoverable resource could be as high as 50 TCF or even 100 TCF.
- (c) Import oil and gas and export electricity.

Integration with the economies of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. Economic integration through infrastructure development, creation of opportunities for their economic development, exploitation of natural resources for collective growth of the region, enhancing human resource by imparting training for skill development and improvement of services sector..

Models for Development

Hybrid Infrastructure Development. Hybrid infrastructure is the future of inclusive development, creating a whole new platform for job creation, economic growth and empowerment of people. Integration of IT with traditional physical infrastructure to deliver more efficient and effective capabilities. North east is most suitable region for hybrid infrastructure, raw material, demand for development, opportunities for export to the region, and capability to absorb the fruit of the hybrid infrastructure.

Maoist Inroads into Northeast India: Mr. Shambhu Singh, JS (North East)

LWE movement in Northeast India has had a very limited existence for a brief while. The first time ever that Government of India came to know about the movement of the Left Wing Extremist in the Northeast is when one Aditya Bora, a Leftist was arrested in Assam. Eventually it came out that the LWE were carrying various activities of recruitment in the region. The Northeast region became important for the LWE because of the region's encirclement and the existence of the arms market of Southeast Asia as well as that of China. The history of the Northeast shows a very old history of violence and once the main component of ULFA was dissipated, there was a vacuum created in Assam in particular, which LWE tried to fill. The LWE also thought that the remaining extremist element of the NDFB and the ULFA will provide them with a ready support.

COMPOSA is the over ground organisation of the Maoist organisations of South Asia. In its recent meeting in Bihar, the attendance also included members from Manipur's underground groups.

The security forces also discovered major plans for creation of strategic zones in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. However there are no longer any important Left Wing leaders left in Assam who can actually take the LWE movement forward. Also there is no doubt, resistance by the people of Assam not to allow any other groups from outside the region to gain a foothold but there are vulnerable areas where LWE might find its place.

The Maoist might not be able to influence the tea tribes of Assam because they are much better off economically compared to their erstwhile relatives of Jharkhand, Odhisa or Chhattisgarh. The other reason could be that the tea tribes have a permanent kind of employment, which their counterparts do not have. The signal that the Manipuri insurgent groups are sending, which is relevant in the context of LWE making inroads in the region is that they have ordered an operation 'All Clear' in Manipur to throw out Indians from other parts of the country particularly those from Bihar and UP who are residing/working in the state. Government of India has recommended that monitoring and mapping of LWE activities has to be a priority because the Maoist leaders has been known to have visited states like Manipur in the recent past.

The important thing about the Northeast is not investment or the lack of it but about, what money reaches to the grassroots, as there is a huge question mark on the distribution of developmental fund in the region. Unfortunately, it is the vested interest at the top level of politics and bureaucracy who happen to siphon off major portion of investment.

Issues Discussed

The following key issues were discussed:

- (a) Grant of ST status to the Maitai community of Manipur. The response to this query stated that if done so, Muivah will feel that Government of India is promoting prospective clash between them and the Maitai community.
- (b) There were also queries about why PC Halder was still continuing in dealing with the region. At this, the responder stated that he is still doing a great job with his knowledge of the region.
- (c) On the question of alternate route to Manipur, it was stated that there have been improvement on the existing routes to Manipur and also development of new routes. At present, along with Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal road, other routes include Ziliarong-Imphal road and Maram-Pareng-Ghaspani road..
- (d) Assam has been dealing with the various ethnic demands independently rather than coming up with a holistic solution.

Vote of Thanks: Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Director CLAWS

Director CLAWS thanked all the panels and audience and highlighted that it was the interactive session which made the discussion on the Internal Security worthwhile. He also elucidated that it was very difficult to conduct a workshop of this nature and even more to get an appropriate response. He pointed CLAWS further needs to engage government officials to know the government views and what it is doing, so that it can be broadcasted to a larger audience and be well propagated.